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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Consumers of Higher Education in Australia: do the unfair contract term provisions in 
the Australian Consumer Law provide effective protection for students as consumers 
of educational services? 
 
Abstract 
Extensive consumer protection legislation has existed in Australia for nearly four 
decades. The new Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) in schedule 2 of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (‘CCA’)1 is the most significant change to 
consumer rights since the introduction of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA’). 
Over a corresponding period of time, the landscape of the higher education sector 
has been transformed into a culture of consumerism with the student at the centre as 
the consumer. However, students have seldom sought redress in relation to 
infringement of their rights as consumers under consumer protection legislation and 
more rarely successfully. It is recognised that some rights do accrue to students as 
consumers of educational services under the ACL, principally with regard to 
promotional activities of higher education institutions (‘HEI’).2 It is not certain that the 
ACL can provide effective protection for students as consumers of educational 
services beyond this known application to address issues regarding the nature of the 
                                                 
1 Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), formerly the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth) as amended Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No.1) 2010 (Cth); and 
Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No.2) 2010 (Cth). The first tranche of 
reforms received assent on 14 April 2010, operative from I July 2010. The second Bill was passed on 24 
June 2010 and took effect on 1 January 2011.  
2 The nomenclature ‘higher education institution’ (‘HEI’) is adopted as this is seen as a broad definition 
consistent with policy and international literature. University: ‘noun: a high-level educational institution in 
which students study for degrees and academic research is done’ Angus Stevenson (ed) Oxford 
Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press, 2010) Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press, 
Curtin University of Technology 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t140.
e0906710> or tertiary: ‘chiefly (Brit.) relating to or denoting education at a level beyond that provided by 
schools, especially that provided by a college or university’ (at e0854390) clearly encompasses private 
providers of post-secondary qualifications. See Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan (eds), The New 
Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University Press, 2008): at e2272. The use of HEI is also consistent 
with the terminology used in the Bradley Review of Australian Higher Education December 2008: see 
Denise Bradley, Peter Noonan, Helen Nugent, Bill Scales, Review of Australian Higher Education Final 
Report, 2008 Australian Government (28 September 2010) 
<http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Review/Pages/ReviewofAustralianHigherEducationReport.a
spx> chapter 1, nn 1, 2, 1-2. If the word ‘tertiary’ is used, following the OECD adoption of the 
terminology in the ISECD standards, this would have the effect that tertiary only relates to degree 
programmes and above. The phrase ‘higher education’ is broader and encompasses associate degrees 
and diplomas. It is also used by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
(‘DEEWR’) and academic commentators in the UK in the field of higher education law, a less developed 
area of specialty in Australia. On the development of education law in Australia see generally Ralph 
Mawdsley, and J Joy Cumming, ‘The Origins and Development of Education Law as a Separate Field of 
Law in the United States and Australia’ (2008) 13(2) Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & 
Education 7. The legal status of HEI in Australia also bears a resemblance to that of the UK (with the 
exception of Cambridge and Oxford), particularly since the commencement of the Education Reform Act 
1988 (UK) and Higher Education Act 2004 (UK). See generally Oliver Hyams, Law of Education 
(Jordans, 2nd ed, 2004). 
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service provided. This research is specifically concerned with whether the 
introduction of an Unfair Contract Terms (‘UCT’)3 regime in the ACL overcomes 
identifiable barriers faced by students using consumer protection as a means to 
ensure they receive services as promised and advances their rights as consumers. 
 
The ACL saw the introduction of an UCT regime, which previously had only existed in 
limited jurisdictions in Australia, notably Victoria, as a means of protection in 
consumer contracts. Now any term in a consumer contract that is an unfair term as 
defined under the ACL is void. The application of these provisions in the context of 
the student as a consumer of educational services will require first an assessment of 
whether there exists in Australia a contract between the student and HEI. Further, for 
the UCT to apply, the student–HEI contract must be a ‘standard form’ ‘consumer 
contract’4, for ‘services’ occurring in ‘trade or commerce’5. Importantly the analysis 
will identify any connection between the UCT provisions regarding substantive 
unfairness and the protection this affords students in the context of the provision of 
educational services, such as the design and delivery of courses, as distinct from 
promotional activities.  
 
Ordinarily, claims concerned with the nature of the educational service provided are 
considered matters that involve questions of academic judgement. Courts have been 
consistent in their reluctance to examine matters relating to the exercise of academic 
judgement and accordingly such matters are considered non-justiciable. The 
significance of the UCT provisions is that rather than just focusing on procedural 
unfairness, they attempt to deal with substantive unfairness.6 In the context of the 
student–HEI contract and provision of educational services, the UCT provisions have 
the potential to ensure that the student–HEI contract does not contain terms that are 
substantively unfair. Consequently, HEIs may now be obliged to provide educational 
services in a manner students might reasonably expect upon entering the student–
HEI contract. Thus the new UCT regime may deal with claims concerning the 
provision of educational services more effectively than other actionable rights that 
require the court to examine matters of academic judgement in relation to the nature 
of educational services provided. The analysis will evaluate the implications for the 
                                                 
3 ACL Part 2-3.  
4 ACL ss 23, 27.  
5 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘services’, ‘trade or commerce’). 
6 Jeannie Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law: The Rise of Substantive Unfairness as 
a Ground for Review of Standard Form Consumer Contracts’ (2009) 33(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 934. 
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higher education sector and make recommendations for change in the current 
practice. 
 
Objectives 
Research problem 
A review of the literature and case law reveals a number of barriers faced by 
students seeking redress under consumer protection legislation in relation to claims 
made against HEIs regarding the nature of the educational service supplied.7 
Predominantly these are a reluctance to categorise the provision of educational 
services as being a service supplied in ‘trade or commerce’, and that matters of 
academic judgement are non-justiciable. Even if students have been able to 
overcome these barriers, proving loss or damage has been problematic.8 It is 
recognised that some rights do accrue to students as consumers of educational 
services under the ACL, principally with regard to promotional activities of HEIs.9 This 
work seeks to identify whether there is an application of the protections afforded by 
the ACL beyond this known application as a result of the new UCT regulation so as 
to overcome the identified barriers faced by students in legal challenges. The 
principal research question that is addressed in this thesis is whether the introduction 
of an UCT regime in the ACL advances students’ rights as consumers by providing 
effective protection for students regarding the nature of educational services 
supplied. 
 
In order to answer the research question, the objectives of this research are to: 
1. Review the case law, legislation and literature to establish how student 
complaints are currently resolved to situate the research within the legal 
framework of the student–HEI relationship and potential avenues for redress. The 
examination of the various areas of law will identify the significance of the 
research within a broader legal context. 
                                                 
7 See especially Megumi Ogawa, ‘The Courts’ Jurisdiction Over Student/University Disputes In 
Australia’, (2012) 2(1) International Journal of Public Law and Policy 96, an article by a student herself 
involved in protracted and bitter litigation with the University of Melbourne. 
8 Ibid 96–7, where the author and student complainant identifies the reluctance of the courts to consider 
complaints that relate to academic judgement and adequacy of available orders as significant issues 
preventing or influencing students’ decisions to bring their disputes with their HEI to court. 
9 Despite judicial affirmation that the provision will apply to the promotional activities of a HEI, in general 
claimants have been unable to successfully prove their case in the higher courts: Plimer v Roberts 
(1997) 150 ALR 235; Fennell v Australian National University [1999] FCA 989. There has been mixed 
success at the tribunal level. The student was unsuccessful in the matter of Kwan v University of Sydney 
Foundation Program P/L (General) [2002] NSWCTTT 83. Claimants were successful in Jones v 
Academy of Applied Hypnosis P/L (General) [2005] NSWCTTT 841 and Cotton v Blinman Investments 
P/L & Blinman (General) 2004 NSWCTTT 723. See further Jim Jackson, ‘The Marketing of University 
Courses under Section 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)’ (2002) 6 Southern Cross 
University Law Review 106. 
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2. Examine and analyse the case law and literature to determine whether claims 
made by students in relation to academic matters are justiciable. In order to 
assess the effectiveness of the UCT provisions of the ACL in relation to claims 
regarding the educational service provided by a HEI, the research will examine 
whether courts will adjudicate on claims relating to the same.  
3. Examine and analyse the new national uniform consumer protection legislation, 
the ACL, with reference to case law, to determine the threshold issue of whether 
the ACL applies to the provision of higher education services to students in 
Australia. Specifically, the research will assess whether the supply of educational 
services is a ‘service’10 that occurs in ‘trade or commerce’11 as defined by the 
ACL.  
4. Undertake an analysis of the case law, legislation and literature to establish 
whether there exists in Australia a contract between the student and HEI, the 
nature and terms of any such contract and available remedies on a breach. A 
detailed analysis and examination of the specific legislative provisions will ensue 
to determine whether the protections available under the UCT of the ACL are 
enlivened. In addition to the requirement that the contract for the supply of 
educational services must be in ‘trade or commerce’, for the UCT regime to apply 
the contract must also be a ‘standard form’ ‘consumer contract’.12 The research 
will also consider whether any terms in the contract for the supply of educational 
services are potentially unfair terms and consequently void.  
5. Analyse the specific UCT provisions of the ACL to evaluate the efficacy of these 
provisions as a mechanism to ensure students receive services as promised and 
advances their rights as consumers. Consideration will also be given to the 
impact of the findings of this research on the higher education sector and 
recommendations for change in current practice. 
 
Background 
Fundamental reforms to the higher education system in Australia began in the late 
1980s with the Dawkins Report.13 The provision of higher education is now a 
significant industry in Australia and rivals established industries in its contribution to 
the Australian economy. Official figures indicate that international education 
                                                 
10 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘services’, which are ‘provided, granted or conferred in trade or commerce’).  
11 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘trade or commerce’). 
12 ACL s 23. 
13 J. Dawkins, (1988) Higher Education: A Policy Statement, Australian Government Publishing Service 
(AGPS), Canberra. 
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contributes in excess of AUD$10 billion to the Australian economy.14 The higher 
education sector is Australia’s third largest exporter.15 Expenditure by consumers of 
higher education is not insignificant. Students (or their parents or employers) invest 
heavily in post-secondary education. The average cost of a three-year undergraduate 
degree in Australia is substantial.16  
 
Since the Dawkins’ reforms, participation in higher education has also undergone 
dramatic change17. Student cohorts undertaking higher education study are diverse 
                                                 
14 Australian Government, Department of Education, Science and Training, The Higher Education 
Report 2005, (1/2007) [3.6.1]. There has been considerable growth in the sector since this report, see 
DEEWR Higher Education, Statistics publication (8 August 2012). Some press reports put this figure as 
high as AUD $17 billion in 2010. See Luke Slattery, ‘Soul-Searching for a Liberal Curriculum’, The 
Australian (online), 30 June 2010 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/soul-searching-for-
a-liberal-curriculum/story-e6frgcjx-1225885869499>. Although there have been noteworthy falls in that 
number, some commentators suggest that by semester one 2013 the decline may be reversed. See, eg, 
Stephen Connelly, ‘Data Confirms 2020 For Return to Student Peak’ The Australian (online), 9 May 
2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/opinion/data-confirms-2020-for-return-to-
student-peak/story-e6frgcko-1226350097162>; Bernard Lane, ‘Gloom With Glimpses of Light in Latest 
Student Figures’, The Australian (online), 27 April 2012http://www.the australian.com.au/higher-
education/gloom-with-glim>; Bernard Lane, ‘Overseas Student Market Still in Decline’, The Australian 
(online), 2 July 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/decline-continues-in-overseas-
student-market/story-e6frgcjx-1226412198477>; Stephen Matchett, ‘Education Exports Slump’, The 
Australian (online), 18 November 2011 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/education-
exports-slump/story-e6frgcjx-1226197702736>. 
15 The higher education sector is now Australia’s third largest exporter: Bradley, above n 2, 4 and 148, 
detailing higher education revenue by source. See also Australian Government, Transforming 
Australia’s Higher Education System Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
(2009) 6 (29 August 2011) 
<http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Documents/TransformingAusHigherED.pdf>. However in 
relation to recent concerns regarding the downturn in the international student market, see Deloitte 
Access Economics, Broader Implications from a Downturn in International Students (2011) Universities 
Australia, (11 July 2011) <http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/resources/618/1100> . 
16 For a domestic student with a Commonwealth supported place, the fees in 2010 were as follows (per 
year of full time study): BAND 1: $5310 (fields such as humanities, social studies, languages, visual and 
performing arts); BAND 2: $7567 (fields such as agriculture, built environment, computing, health, 
engineering, surveying); BAND 3: $8859 (fields such as law, medicine, dentistry, veterinary science, 
accounting, administration, economics, commerce); National Priority: $4249 (nursing, education, 
mathematics (including statistics and science). Full fee courses are set by the institution and vary across 
the sector. An indication of how much these course can cost is the limits on FEE-HELP for student 
borrowing. There is a limit on how much students can borrow, indexed annually. In 2010 the maximum 
was $85 062 (or $106 328 for medicine, veterinary science and dentistry). Some courses cost more than 
these amounts. The Good Universities Guide, Degree Costs and Loans (28 September 2010) 
<http://www.gooduniguide.com.au/School-Leavers/Paying-Your-Way/Degree-costs-and-loans>  
Detailed costs are available at Australian Government, Study Assist (7 August 2012) 
<http://www.goingtouni.gov.au/main/coursesandproviders/gettingstarted/costsandentrancerequirements/
provider-tuition+costs.htm>. In 2012 a band 3 course (law, medicine, commerce etc.) was advertised on 
the Curtin University website as costing $9425 for the year at Curtin University: FEES@CURTIN (14 
June 2012) <http://fees.curtin.edu.au/scheduledfees2012_cs.cfm>. In 2012 the capped student places 
(quota system) was removed in Australia; however, at this time tuition fees will remain set at statutorily 
prescribed amounts for HECS students, although Universities are able to determine their own student 
contribution fees: Stephen Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services by 
Higher Education Providers’ (2012) 35(1) UNSW Law Journal 1, 6. In the UK, HEIs are now permitted to 
charge top-up fees: Glyn Jones, ‘Managing Student Expectations: The Impact of Top-up Tuition Fees’ 
(2010) 14(2) Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education 44. See generally Anthony Stokes 
and Sarah Wright, ‘Are University Students Paying Too Much for Their Education in Australia?’ (2010) 
65 Journal of Australian Political Economy 5. 
17 For a discussion of policy changes under the Howard and Rudd governments see Simon Marginson, 
‘Universities — Where to now? Conditions for an Education Revolution’ (2008) 27(1) Academy of the 
Social Sciences 3. 
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and no longer consist primarily of school-leavers accepting publically funded places 
via traditional pathways to entry.18 The number of providers of higher education has 
increased19 and can now operate solely in an online environment with no entry 
requirement other than a payment of fees,20 or accept a significant number of 
international students who, while subject to entry requirements, pay handsomely for 
the opportunity to study in Australia.21 As all academics know, these fundamental 
shifts in the sector have had significant impact of the nature of academic work and 
heralded substantial organisational change.22 
 
Equally, the character of the relationship between the student and HEI has been 
subject to change, shifting from the traditional in loco parentis to a more clearly 
                                                 
18 Bradley, above n 2, xi, 70–1. 
19 There are 39 Australian universities, 37 are publically funded and 2 are private. There is one 
Australian branch of an overseas university, 3 other self-accrediting higher education institutions and 
more than 150 non-self-accrediting higher education providers (that is, it offers at least one course of 
study that is accredited as a higher education award) extracted from DEEWR Higher Education, 
Overview (14 June 2012) <http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Pages/Overview.aspx>. For a full 
list of higher education providers see Australian Government, Study Assist, (14 June 2012) 
<http://studyassist.gov.au/sites/studyassist/mytertiarystudyoptions/providers-that-offer-commonwealth-
assistance/pages/universities-and-other-higher-education-providers>. In 2010, 93.2% of students were 
enrolled at public universities. Public university enrolments increased 5% in 2010 (1 111 352 students in 
2010, up from 1 058 399 students in 2009), while private provider enrolments increased 6.3% (81 305 
students at 87 providers in 2010, up from 76 467 students at 77 providers in 2009). Department of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations Higher Education, Statistics publication (20 
September 2012) 
<http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/HEStatistics/Publications/Pages/Students.aspx
>; Bernard Lane, ‘Private Providers Surge Ahead’, The Australian (online), 27 June 2012 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/private-providers-surge-ahead/story-e6frgcjx-
1226409533778>. 
20 See, eg, the Open Universities Australia scheme (20 September 2011) 
<http://www.open.edu.au/public/home?gclid=CNmfgdz1q6QCFQdLbwod2EmCcA>. 
21 In 2008 there were 771 932 domestic students in 2008 — comprising 72.4% of all enrolments — an 
increase of 2% from 2007. Overseas student enrolments increased 7.7% over the same period to 294 
163 in 2008. In 2010 there were 1 192 657 domestic and international students enrolled at higher 
education providers (‘HEPs’), an increase of 5.1% from 2009. There were 857 384 domestic students in 
2010 (71.9% of all students) an increase of 5.3% from 2009. Overseas student enrolments increased 
4.5% from 2009 to 335 273 in 2010. Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
Higher Education, Statistics publication (14 June 2012) 
<http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/HEStatistics/Publications/Pages/Students.aspx
>. The recent and notable downturn in international student enrolments has been well documented in 
the press. See, eg Lane, ‘Overseas Student Market Still in Decline’, above n 14; Matchett, ‘Education 
Exports Slump’, above n 14. In 2011, there were 557 425 enrolments by full-fee paying international 
students in Australia on a student visa. This was a 9.6% decline on the same period in 2010: Australian 
Education International, End of Year Summary of International Student Enrolment Data — Australia — 
2011 (14 June 2012) <https://www.aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-
Data/Documents/Monthly%20summaries%20of%20international%20student%20enrolment%20data%20
2011/12_Dec_2011_MonthlySummary.pdf> 
22 See, eg, Emmaline Bexley, Richard James and Sophie Arkoudis, ‘The Australian Academic 
Profession in Transition: Addressing the Challenge of Reconceptualising Academic Work and 
Regenerating the Academic Workforce’, Centre for the Study of Higher Education, The University of 
Melbourne, September 2011 (Commissioned report prepared for the Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations) (14 June 2012) 
<http://www.cshe.unimelb.edu.au/people/bexley_docs/The_Academic_Profession_in_Transition_Sept20
11.pdf>; Julie Hare, ‘Academe Faces Looming Crisis’ The Australian (online) 21 September 2011 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/academe-faces-looming-crisis/story-e6frgcjx-
1226142093440>.   
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commercial relationship.23 Commentators are divided on the nature of the 
relationship and the literature discloses the competing notions of students as 
members of the university (corporators) and as parties to a contract, consequently a 
consumer.24 The academe oft laments the rise of the student as a consumer25 and 
the popular press postulates a view of students, particularly international students, as 
vulnerable consumers26 exposed to exploitation by HEIs.27 The recommendations of 
                                                 
23 Helen Fleming, ‘Student Legal Rights in Higher Education: Consumerism is Official, but is it 
Sustainable?’ Sustainable Education, Schools, Families and Communities — Education Law and Policy 
Perspectives, Proceedings of the 2011 ANZELA Conference 115, 115.  
24 Fleming, above n 23. See also Francine Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between the Student and The 
University’ (1998) 3(1) Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 28; Francine Rochford, 
‘The Contested Product of a University Education’ (2008) 30(1) Journal of Higher Education Policy and 
Management 41. Much has been written on this and is discussed fully in Chapter 5. As a starting point 
see Mike Molesworth, Richard Scullion and Elizabeth Nixon (eds), The Marketisation of Higher 
Education and the Student as Consumer (Routledge, 2011); R Brown (ed), Higher Education and The 
Market (Routledge, 2011).  
25 Again much has been written on this issue, see, eg, Tim Kaye, Robert D Bickel and Tim Birtwistle, 
‘Criticizing the Image of the Students as Consumer: Examining Legal Trends and Administrative 
Responses in the US and UK’ (2006) 18(2–3) Education and the Law 85; Margaret Thornton, ‘The Law 
School, the Market and the New Knowledge Economy’ (2007) 17(1–2) Legal Education Review 1; paper 
given by Margaret Thornton ‘Universities: The Governance Trap And What To Do About It’ Wednesday 
Night at the New International Bookshop, Australian Fabian Society, Association for the Public 
University/Akademos, Melbourne, 16 March 2005 (26 September 2010) < 
http://www.fabian.org.au/876.asp>; Slattery, ‘Soul-Searching for a Liberal Curriculum’ above n 14; 
Jennifer Oriel, ‘Profit Trumps Plato in the Consumer-Driven University’ The Australian (online) 6 July 
2011 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/opinion/profit-trumps-plato-in-the-consumer-
driven-university/story-e6frgcko-1226088278082>. Many commentators are supportive of the use of 
consumer protection law in the higher education setting. See, eg, Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, 
‘Getting What They Paid For: Consumer Rights of Students in Higher Education’ (2006) 15 Griffith Law 
Review 306; Lynden Griggs, ‘Knowing The Destination Before the Journey Starts — Legal Education 
and Fitness For Purpose’ (2007) Murdoch ELaw Journal 315 
<https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/issues/2007/1/eLaw_knowing_destination.pdf>;David 
Palfreyman, ‘The Trials of Academe: The New Era of Campus Litigation’ (2011) 15(2) Perspectives: 
Policy and Practice in Higher Education 73.  
26 For a discussion about vulnerable consumers see Chris Field, Current Issues in Consumer Law and 
Policy (Pearson Education, 2006), 1–15. See also Australian Government Productivity Commission, 
Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Final Report No 45 2008, Canberra 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/ consumer/docs/finalreport>, 304, the submission made to the 
Productivity Commission by the National Children’s and Youth Law Centre (NCYLC). 
27 See, eg, Australian Broadcasting Commission Television, ‘International Student Market Corrupt, 
Industry Says’, The 7.30 Report, 20 March 2007 (Heather Ewart) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s187721.htm>; Australian Broadcasting Commission 
Television, ‘International Students a Lucrative Market In Australian Tertiary Institutions’, The 7.30 
Report, 3 April 2007 (Heather Ewart) <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s1888001.htm>; Larry 
Anderson, ‘Rethink Needed as International Students Caught in Safety Undertow’ The Australian 
(online), 17 August 2011 < http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/opinion/rethink-needed-
as-international-students-caught-in-safety-undertow/story-e6frgcko-1226115975371>; Amit Banerjee, 
‘Indian Students Exploited in Aus?’, The Times of India (online), 26 April 2007 
<http://www.timesofindia.com/articleshow/msid-1960961,prtpage-1.cms>; Sarah Elks, ‘Ill-feeling for 
Nursing Students’, The Australian (Canberra), 3 January 2008, 4; Dorothy Illing, ‘Deliver Service or We’ll 
Sue’, The Australian (Canberra) 21 July 2004, 33; ‘India Raps Colleges and Greedy Bosses’, The West 
Australian (Perth), 11 January 2010, 6; Debra Jopson, ‘Unis Face Legal Challenge From Students’ 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 6 June 2005; Eric Jensen, ‘Overseas Pupils Losers In Scramble For 
Fees’, The West Australian (Perth), 18 July 2007, 18; Adam Morton, ‘Creating a Degree of Unrest’, The 
Age (online), 17 March 2007 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2007/03/16/1173722744906.html>. For 
an analysis of the portrayal of students as consumers in the UK press see Joanna Williams, 
‘Constructing Consumption: What Media Representations Reveal About Today’s Students’ in 
Molesworth, above n 24, ch 14, 170. See also Hon Senator Chris Evans, Minister for Tertiary Education 
(Cth), ‘Better Consumer Protection for International Students’ (Media Release, 23 September 2011) 
<http://www.aei.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx 2> to provide a system for refunds for international students 
in the event of a higher education providers closing. 
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the recent Bradley Review of Australian Higher Education focus on the assurance of 
high quality education services through accreditation and standards frameworks.28 
The Federal Government’s response, Transforming Australia’s Higher Education 
System, acknowledges the need for a high quality education system, with students at 
the centre of the reforms designed to increase participation, assure quality of the 
learning experience and maintain international rankings.29  
 
The legal relationship between the student and HEI is multifaceted, overlaid by 
principles at common law and under statute. Similarly, complaints made by students 
against HEIs are varied in their diversity of causes of action, reflective of the complex 
nature of the relationship. Frequently claims brought against HEIs by students can be 
categorised as ‘omnibus litigation (there being an unwieldy bundle of claims)’.30 Two 
significant studies have recently been undertaken to determine the nature of student 
litigation with HEIs and the outcomes and trends in this regard. 31 The studies also 
disclose the difficulties students face when bringing their complaints to the courts, 
both procedurally and substantively.32 Despite this, these studies report an increase 
in the number of cases being brought before courts and tribunals by students.33 
However, many of the claims do not involve consumer protection legislation despite 
considerable regulation in the sector and for consumers generally. Extensive 
provisions protecting the rights of consumers have existed in Australia for nearly forty 
years.34 There also exists a plethora of legislative regulation apart from consumer 
                                                 
28 Bradley, above n 2. See in particular recommendations 19, 20, 21, 23 and 24 relating to a national 
accrediting body, quality assurance and a standards framework and 26 with regard to funding for 
teaching and learning in higher education. 
29 Australian Government, Transforming Australia’s Higher Education System, above n 15, 31–3 and the 
establishment of TEQSA; Bradley, above n 2, 78–80. 
30 Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122, [2]. 
31Jim Jackson et al, ‘Student Grievances and Discipline Matters Project’ (Final Report, Australian 
Learning and Teaching Council, May 2009); Hilary, Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court: Causes, 
Costs and Consequences of Increasing Litigation’ (2008) 19(3) Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 
156; Hilary Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’ (2010) 21 Australasian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 20; Patty Kamvounias and Sally, Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University 
Decisions Affecting Students in Australian Courts and Tribunals’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law 
Review 141. For a comparative study see Lelia Helms, ‘Comparing Litigation in Higher Education: The 
Unities States and Australia in 2007’ (2009) 14(2) International Journal of Law & Education 37.  
32 Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 31, 31; Jackson et al, above n 31. The 
authors state that the most common reason why students were unsuccessful in their claims was 
because the allegations made were not supported by the facts or the court/tribunal lacked jurisdiction: at 
13. 
33 Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court’, above n 31. Astor notes that despite the increase in the size 
of the higher education section and therefore a corresponding increase in student numbers, the increase 
in litigation is not a proportionate increase: ‘Roughly speaking, the number of Universities has doubled 
and the number of students tripled but the levels of the litigation have increased about eightfold’: at 166.  
34 Previously the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and state equivalents, now the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) and in particular schedule 2 to the CCA, the Australian Consumer Law.  
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protection law that includes sector specific legislation,35 dispute resolution 
processes36 and various codes of conduct.37 
 
Reasons as to why so few consumer protection matters are brought before the 
courts, when anecdotal evidence would suggest that students are in fact vulnerable 
or disadvantaged consumers, are varied. One explanation for this may be that 
students as ‘consumers’ is a relatively new phenomenon in Australian society.38 A 
proportion of the consumers affected may be simply unaware of their legal rights39, 
as is typical in younger people.40 There is also likely to be an element of practical 
consideration given that a large number of students are impecunious and therefore 
unable to afford access to the legal system. Further, dispute resolution or complaint-
handling processes in place at HEIs may be effective in addressing the majority of 
students concerns.41 Alternatively, it appears that when students do turn to the legal 
system for protection and redress they do so under other legislative regimes, such as 
anti-discrimination legislation based on grounds of gender, race or disability. 
Examination of the case law and literature in these areas suggests that while some 
                                                 
35 Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth), which draws on consumer protection 
language considerably, see Jim Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education: Australia and New 
Zealand’ (2005) 10(2) & (2006) 11(1) Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 67. All 
universities in Australia are enacted under legislation (see, eg, the University of Western Australia Act 
1911 (WA)). Each state regulates providers of higher education under the various state Higher 
Education Acts and the Commonwealth under the Higher Education Act 2001 (Cth). There are of course 
other statutory protections that students have sought redress under, such as the various anti-
discrimination legislative regimes at both state and federal level, and other legislation such as Freedom 
of Information Acts. 
36 Standard 8 Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth); NSW Ombudsman, 
Complaint Handling at Universities: Best Practice Guidelines, December 2006, A-6. Note now also a 
specific ombudsman for international students studying with private providers of higher education, see 
Overseas Student Ombudsman, (21 September 2011) <http://www.oso.gov.au/>. See also Hilary Astor, 
‘Improving Dispute Resolution in Australian Universities: Options for the Future’ (2005) 27(1) Journal of 
Higher Education Policy and Management 49; Jackson et al, above n 31. 
37 See, eg, Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee, Provision of Education to International Students 
Code of Practice and Guidelines for Australian Universities, 2005. The Code specifically refers to the 
provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Most institutions also have their own codes of conduct 
and students charters of rights. See, eg, Curtin University Codes of Conduct for both students (21 
September 2011) <http://students.curtin.edu.au/rights/conduct.cfm> and staff (21 September 2011) 
<http://policies.curtin.edu.au/local/docs/Code%20of%20Conduct%2020Approved%2030%20June%202
009.pdf >.  
38 Although students as ‘consumers’ now appears to be a more commonly held perception by both 
students and staff in Australia. See Jackson et al, above n 31, 38, 54, 60. 
39 The recent Australian Consumers Survey 2011 confirmed that while there is a general awareness 
within the wider Australian community regarding the existence of consumer rights, there is much less 
detailed knowledge of these rights and business obligations: Department of the Treasury, Australian 
Consumer Survey, (2011) Australian Government.  
40 For example, The Shopfront Youth Legal Centre, The Shopfront Story (27 September 2010) 
<http://www.theshopfront.org/9.html> regarding young people’s lack of awareness of their legal rights. 
This lack of knowledge of specific as opposed to general rights under consumer legislation is not limited 
to younger people. Department of the Treasury, Australian Consumer Survey, above n 39. 
41 Discussed further in Chapter 2. 
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applicants were unsuccessful in their claims based on discrimination, there may well 
have been a cause of action arising under consumer protection legislation.42  
 
There may also have been barriers within the regulatory framework. The recent 
introduction of a single national consumer protection law, the ACL, has the potential 
to improve the protection afforded to students as consumers.43 The ACL is the most 
significant change to consumer rights since the introduction of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth). The impetus for a new national consumer law was the review by the 
Productivity Commission into Australia’s consumer policy framework.44 The first 
tranche of reforms resulted in the imposition of an unfair contract terms law from 1 
July 2010. Now any term in a consumer contract that is unfair as defined by the ACL 
is void.45 It is arguable that universities’ arrangements with their students falls within 
the definition of standard form consumer contracts, to which the law attaches.46 The 
significance of the UCT provisions is that rather than just focusing on procedural 
unfairness, they attempt to deal with substantive unfairness.47 In the context of the 
student–HEI relationship and provision of educational services, the UCT provisions 
have the potential to ensure that the student–HEI contract does not contain terms 
that are substantively unfair. 
 
In evaluating the efficacy of the UCT provisions, this research is particularly 
concerned with legal challenges involving matters of academic judgement. Usually 
challenges pertaining to academic judgement are not entertained by the courts on 
the basis that the merits of the decision are not within the purview of the courts.48 
Historically courts have been reluctant to disturb decisions that have been seen as 
within the domain of the learned academic.49 Matters of academic judgement include 
decisions made by the HEI relating to the marking of student work; content of 
                                                 
42 See, eg, Lina Obieta v New South Wales Department of Education and Training [2007] FCA 86. This 
is also consistent with the findings in the studies identified in above n 31 and is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2. 
43 Indeed UK commentator David Palfreyman recently advocated increasing the use of consumer 
protection by students as other mechanisms employed by HEI had failed, such as quality assurance 
measures. Palfreyman, ‘The Trials of Academe’, above n 25, 74. 
44 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, 
above n 26. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 5. 
45 ACL s 23. 
46 ACL pt 2–3. 
47 Paterson, above n 6. 
48 Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 3 All ER 752; Griffith University v Tang 
[2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99, 156 [165] (Kirby J); Mark Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic 
Immunity” — The Beginning of a New Era?’ (2004) 16(2–3) Education and the Law 75. 
49 Clark [2000] 3 All ER 752 and the exclusive purview of the university Visitor. See a more detailed 
discussion in Chapter 2. Note that this may still be an issue for students studying in Western Australia 
where the university Visitors’ jurisdiction is still alive and potentially extensive.  
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courses; styles of teaching;50 methods and modes of course of delivery (format and 
availabilities of online resources, laboratories); and academic progression.51 It may 
also include decisions regarding attribution of credit for previous studies or relevant 
work experience (recognised prior learning).52 Other claims made by students relate 
to disciplinary decisions regarding students’ behaviour in relation to HEI property or, 
most usually, academic misconduct. As will be seen, the student–HEI contract 
contains terms relating to all of these types of decision making, that is, terms 
regulating disciplinary decision making as well as matters of academic judgement. 
Decisions involving disciplinary issues are complex in their interrelation with 
administrative law principles and will only be examined to the extent that terms in 
relation to disciplinary issues form part of the student–HEI contract and are therefore 
subject to the UCT provisions.53 
 
Not all of the examples of academic judgement given above will necessarily be a 
term of the standard form contract for the supply of educational services. It is the 
proposition of this research that to the extent matters of academic judgement are 
terms of the standard form consumer contract for the supply of educational services 
they will be subject to the UCT provisions. Therefore, as the UCT provisions address 
issues of substantive unfairness, it is possible that judicial scrutiny of the actual effect 
of a HEI relying on an unfair term that is concerned with matters of academic 
judgement will be countenanced. A common example is a term that enables a HEI to 
unilaterally vary the delivery and content of individual units if the term relied on alters 
the characteristics of the services supplied.54 This, it is suggested, circumvents the 
principle that academic matters are non-justiciable, thus advancing students’ rights 
as consumers. As the UCT looks to the substantial fairness of terms, the provisions 
rely less on a determination by the courts in relation to the quality and standard of 
educational services with reference to analogous principals from other areas of law, 
such as professional negligence.55 It is arguable that the new UCT regime can deal 
with claims in relation to the provision of the service more effectively than other 
                                                 
50 Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘In-House or in Court? Legal Challenges to University 
Decisions’ (2006) 18(1) Education and the Law 1, 2.  
51 Martin Davis, ‘Students, Academic Institutions and Contracts — A Ticking Time Bomb?’ (2001) 13 
Education and the Law 9, 8. 
52 See, eg, Dudzinski v Kellow [1999] FCA 390. 
53 A similar approach was taken by Davis, above n 51, 18. For more on the interrelation between the two 
see Simon Whittaker, ‘Public and Private Law-making: Subordinate Legislation, Contracts and the 
Status of “Student Rules”’ (2001) 21(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 103. 
54 Discussed in Chapter 5. 
55 See Davies, above n 48; David Palfreyman, ‘£400K for Educational Malpractice by University 
Academics’ (2006) 18(2–3) Education and the Law, 217; David Palfreyman, ‘HE's ‘Get‐Out‐of‐Jail‐Free 
Card’ (2010) 14(4) Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education 114. 
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actionable rights where the courts have declined to examine matters of academic 
judgement in relation to the educational services provided.  
 
Significance 
As the corporatisation of universities and export of education continues to grow, 
protection of consumers of higher education in Australia is an important one.56 
Despite considerable regulation, evidence suggests that consumers of higher 
education services do not seek redress under legislative regimes specifically 
designed to protect the rights of consumers.57  
 
This work will contribute to the field of research by an examination and analysis of 
the case law, legislation and the literature in respect of this area of the law. The UCT 
became operative nationally in 1 July 2010. Such consumer rights have existed in 
other jurisdictions such as the UK for some years and applied to the higher education 
sector, albeit not extensively.58 A search of the literature shows that the impact of the 
new provisions has not been considered in any detail in the context of the Australian 
higher education sector. The work will determine whether the introduction of a UCT 
regime in the ACL overcomes identifiable barriers faced by students using consumer 
protection as a means to ensure they receive services as promised and advances 
their rights as consumers. The research will make a contribution to knowledge in the 
field by the identification of changes required to current practice in the higher 
education sector. 
 
Research Method 
Legal research involves an application of two broad categories of legal source 
materials, that is, examination of both primary and secondary sources.59 Primary 
sources of law are found in legislation and the reported legal cases. Secondary 
                                                 
56 Bradley, above n 2, recommendations 19, 20, 21, 23 and 24 relating to a national accrediting body, 
quality assurance and a standards framework and 26 with regard to funding for teaching and learning in 
higher education. See also Australian Government, Transforming Australia’s Higher Education System, 
above n 15; Bradley, above n 2, 31–3 and the establishment of TEQSA. 
57See Jackson et al, above n 31; Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 31; 
Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 31; 
Helms, above n 31.  
58 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UK). See, eg, Office of Fair Trading, Unfair 
Contract Terms (1999) 6, 8 [1.15], 72; Office of Fair Trading Unfair Contract Terms (1998) 5; Office of 
Fair Trading, Unfair Contract Terms Bulletins 27, 28 (2004) September (5 August 2012) 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-categories/guidance/unfair-terms-consumer/>. 
59 See Catriona Cook, Robin Creyke, Robert Geddes and David Hamer, Laying Down the Law 
(Butterworths, 2008); Bruce Bott, Jill Cowley, Lynette Falconer, Irene Nemes and Graeme Coss 
Effective Legal Research (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007); Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing 
in Law (Lawbook Co, 2010); John Farrar, Legal Reasoning (Lawbook Co, 2010); Margaret McKerchar, 
Designs and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting (Thomson Reuters, 2010). 
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sources of law are found in scholarly works such as textbooks and monographs, 
legal encyclopaedias and journal articles. Further explanation of the research method 
is outlined below. 
 
Primary source material 
The research of primary source material of information on the law will involve a 
detailed explanation of the application and interpretation of the various sections of 
Commonwealth and state legislation regarding consumer protection and how the 
legislation has been interpreted in court proceedings.60  
 
Secondary source material 
This research will include a thorough investigation of all available secondary source 
materials pertaining to tertiary education and consumers. Many legal publications 
have restricted access and lending protocols and are more easily accessed in law 
libraries in Australia. Well established protocols for undertaking this research of legal 
materials will be followed. 
 
Analysis and Compilation 
Due to the interpretative function of the courts with respect to legislation, 
consideration of legislation involves analysis of relevant case decisions. A 
comparison of associated decisions will then be undertaken with reference to 
secondary source content, outlining the views of legal scholars and judges who refer 
to those cases in subsequent decisions. The information obtained from the views of 
authors on secondary sources as well as the reasoning made by judges will then be 
compiled. The compilation will be done in such a way as to interpret whether there is 
evidence that supports or contradicts the view that consumers of education services 
in Australia are effectively protected in the delivery of quality of those services. 
 
Outline and structure 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter describes the research problem, explains the objectives of the thesis, 
the research methodology and identifies the significance of the work within the legal 
framework of the higher education sector. 
                                                 
60 A search of all available court and tribunal databases in Australasian Legal Information Institute 
(AustLII) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/> was undertaken up to 18 July 2011 using the search term student!. 
A Boolean search of all case and journal data bases using student* and consumer* was also undertaken 
up to 21 July 2011. The use of ‘student’ as opposed to ‘university’ was significant as this ensured that 
claims against private providers of higher education services were captured in the results. 
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Chapter 2: The Student–HEI Relationship 
A review of the case law, legislation and literature will be undertaken to establish how 
student complaints are currently resolved to situate the research within the legal 
framework of the student–HEI relationship and potential avenues for redress. The 
examination of the various areas of law will identify the significance of the research 
within a broader legal context. (Objective 1) 
 
An examination of what matters courts consider justiciable in the context of HEI 
decisions in other areas of the law will also be undertaken in an attempt to ascertain 
whether claims made by students in relation to academic matters are justiciable. In 
order to assess the effectiveness of the provisions of the UCT in the ACL in relation 
to claims regarding the nature of the educational service provided by a HEI, the 
research will examine whether courts will adjudicate claims relating to the same. 
(Objectives 2, 4 and 5)  
 
Chapter 3: Application of the ACL to HEI’s in Australia 
This chapter will examine and analyse the new national uniform consumer protection 
legislation, the ACL, with reference to case law, to determine the threshold issue of 
whether the ACL applies to the provision of higher education services to students in 
Australia. Specifically the chapter will identify any barriers preventing students from 
utilising the consumer protection legislation that relates to the contract for educational 
services. In particular the effect of the new extended definition of ‘trade or 
commerce’, which includes activities carried on in a business or professional 
services, will be considered.61 In order to attract the UCT provisions, the contract for 
services must be services provided, granted or conferred in trade or commerce.62 
 
Specifically the research will assess what matters of academic judgement are 
activities that fall within the scope of the legislative requirement that the services 
supplied must occur in ‘trade or commerce’ as defined by the ACL. Previously under 
the Trade Practices Act (1974) (Cth) matters going to issues of academic judgement 
(as opposed to promotional activities) have been considered matters internal to the 
student–HEI relationship. Therefore, academic activities, such as statements made in 
lectures, while conducted in relation to the trade and commerce of a HEI, are not 
                                                 
61 ACL s 2.  
62 ACL s 2.  
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within the scope of the legislation as conduct in trade or commerce.63 Attention will 
also be given to whether HEIs can avail themselves of Crown immunity64 or if there 
are any jurisdictional issues arising for particular categories of students, including 
international students, students studying at Australian HEIs at campuses located 
overseas, and online students who may enrol in Australian courses but be resident 
outside the jurisdiction.65 (Objectives 2, 3 and 4) 
 
Chapter 4: The Student–HEI Contract 
The protections available under the UCT of the ACL require the existence of several 
factors before the provisions are enlivened. First there must be a contract between 
the supplier of the services (the HEI) and the consumer of those services (the 
student). This chapter is firstly concerned with an analysis of the case law and 
literature to establish whether a contract between the student and the HEI exists in 
Australia. Assuming such a contract exists, the chapter will then examine the nature 
of the student–HEI contract and attempt to determine the scope of the terms of the 
contract, with particular reference to the myriad of HEI enrolling, policy and other 
documents. This also assists with the determination of the exact nature of the 
educational service supplied, which is relevant when considering the specific UCT 
provisions in Chapter 4. (Objectives 3 and 4) 
 
Chapter 5: The Student–HEI Contract and the UCT 
The ACL saw the introduction of an unfair contract terms regime that previously had 
only existed in limited jurisdictions in Australia, notably Victoria, as a means of 
protection in consumer contracts. Now any term in a consumer contract that is an 
unfair term as defined under the ACL is void. An analysis of the case law, legislation 
and literature will be undertaken to establish whether the contract for the supply of 
educational services is a standard form consumer contract as defined by Chapter 2 
Part 2–3 of the ACL. Whether students are consumers for the purpose of the relevant 
legislative provisions will be also considered in the light of academic commentary 
from other related disciplines. (Objective 4)  
 
                                                 
63 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548; Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235; Quickenden v 
O’Conner (2001) 184 ALR 260; Francine Rochford, ‘Traders of The Lost Ark — Lecturers and Liability’ 
(2001) 13(2) Education and the Law 127. 
64 CCA ss 2A, 2B. 
65 The CCA extraterritorial reach is extended by simply requiring one party to be in Australia, see, eg, 
ACL s 2, the definition of in ‘trade or commerce’. Many providers use educational agents. Liability for the 
use of educational agents lies with providers and is currently governed by the National Code of Practice 
for Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students 2007 and 
common law principles of agency. 
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Importantly the analysis will identify any connection between the UCT provisions 
regarding substantive unfairness and the protection afforded students by the 
legislation in the supply of educational services. Specifically the chapter will consider 
whether there are any terms in the student-HEI contract that are potentially unfair 
terms as proscribed under the ACL. The consequences and remedies available upon 
a term being declared unfair will be considered. The analysis will evaluate the 
implications for the higher education sector and make recommendations for change 
in current practice. (Objectives 4 and 5) 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter will conclude by determining whether the UCT provisions of the ACL 
provide effective protection for students as consumers of higher education services 
by overcoming the identified barriers faced by students in legal challenges as regards 
the nature of the educational service supplied. The identified barriers are first, that 
claims relating to academic matters are almost without exception, non-justiciable. 
Second, even if students have been able to establish their claim, proving loss or 
damage has been problematic. In relation claims made against HEIs in consumer 
protection litigation specifically, the principal barrier has been difficulties with 
categorising the provision of educational services as being a service supplied in 
‘trade or commerce’. It is arguable that the introduction of a UCT regime in the ACL 
overcomes the identified barriers faced by students using consumer protection 
legislation as a means to ensure they receive services as promised and advance 
their rights as consumers. 
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Chapter 2: The Student–HEI Relationship 
 
Introduction 
The principal research question addressed in this thesis is whether the introduction of 
an Unfair Contract Terms (‘UCT’) regime in the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) 
advances students’ rights as consumers by providing effective protection for students 
in the supply of educational services. Recent studies have considered the nature of 
student litigation with HEIs.1 The reports disclose the difficulties students face when 
bringing their complaints to court, both procedurally and substantively.2 A review of 
the case law, legislation and literature will be undertaken to establish how student 
complaints are currently resolved to situate the research within the legal framework 
of the student–HEI relationship and potential avenues for redress. In evaluating the 
efficacy of the UCT provisions, it is necessary to place rights accruing to students as 
consumers in a broader legal context. 
 
This chapter will consider some of the barriers faced by students bringing legal 
challenges more widely than consumer protection alone. This will assist in the 
evaluation of whether these issues can be overcome by the UCT regime in the ACL. 
The most significant limitation faced by students is the courts’ preparedness to 
consider the substance of their claim if it relates to questions of academic judgement 
or evaluation. Courts have been consistent in their reluctance to examine matters 
relating to the exercise of academic judgement and accordingly such matters are 
considered non-justiciable. The apprehension of courts to engage in review of 
academic decisions resonates with many of the concerns identified in the 
jurisprudence relating to whether the activities of a HEI are in ‘trade or commerce’ as 
required by the ACL, discussed in Chapter 3. The new UCT regime may deal with 
claims concerning the provision of educational services more effectively than other 
actionable rights that require the court to examine matters of academic judgement in 
relation to the nature of educational services provided.   
                                                 
1 Jim Jackson et al, ‘Student Grievances and Discipline Matters Project’ (Final Report, Australian 
Learning and Teaching Council, May 2009); Hilary Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court: Causes, 
Costs and Consequences of Increasing Litigation’ (2008) 19(3) Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 
156; Hilary Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’ (2010) 21 Australasian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 20; Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions 
Affecting Students in Australian Courts and Tribunals’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 140. 
For a comparative study see Lelia Helms, ‘Comparing Litigation in Higher education: The United States 
and Australia in 2007’ (2009) 14(2) International Journal of Law & Education 37. 
2 Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1, 31; Jackson et al,  above n 1. The 
authors state that the most common reason why students were unsuccessful in their claims was 
because the allegations made were not supported by the facts or the court/tribunal lacked jurisdiction: at 
13. 
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The legal framework 
The legal relationship between the student and HEI is multifaceted, overlaid by 
principles at common law and under statute.3 Similarly, complaints made by students 
against HEIs are varied in their diversity of causes of action, reflective of the complex 
nature of the relationship.4 Frequently claims brought against HEI by students can be 
categorised as ‘omnibus litigation (there being an unwieldy bundle of claims)’.5 Two 
significant studies have recently been undertaken to determine the nature of student 
litigation with HEI and the outcomes and trends in this regard.6 These studies also 
report an increase in the number of cases being brought before courts and tribunals 
by students.7  
 
One of the objectives of the research is to review the case law, legislation and 
literature to establish how student complaints are currently resolved to situate the 
research within the legal framework of the student–HEI relationship and potential 
avenues for redress. As indicated, the nature and volume of litigation involving 
students and HEI is increasing and diverse, reflecting the complex nature of the 
student–HEI relationship. Many of the claims brought before the courts do not involve 
                                                 
3 See generally Dennis Farrington and David Palfreyman, The Law of Higher Education (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2012); Oliver Hyams, Law of Education (Jordans, 2nd ed, 2004); Jim Jackson 
and Sally Varnham, Law for Educators: School and University Law in Australia (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2007); Tim Birtwistle and Melissa Askew, ‘The Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 
— Impact on the Student Contract’ (1999) 11(2) Education and the Law 89; Martin Davis, ‘Students, 
Academic Institutions and Contracts — A Ticking Time Bomb?’ (2001) 13(1) Education and The Law 9; 
Lynden Griggs, ‘Tertiary Education, The Market and Liability ‘In Trade or Commerce’ (2004) 12 
Competition & Consumer Law Journal 1; William P Hoye and David Palfreyman, ‘Plato vs Socrates: The 
Devolving Relationship Between Higher Education Institutes and their Students’ (2004) 16(2–3) 
Education and the Law 97; Jim Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education: Australia and New 
Zealand’ (2005) 10(2) & (2006) 11(1) Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 67; J 
Stephen Kós and Russell McVeagh, ‘The View From the Bottom of the Cliff — Enforcement of Legal 
Rights Between Student and University’ (1999) 4(2) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Law & 
Education 18; Bruce Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law: Negotiating the Legal 
Terrain of Student Challenges to University Decisions’ (2007) 12(2) Australian & New Zealand Journal 
of Law & Education 7; Sam Middlemiss, ‘Legal Liability of Universities for Students’ (2009) 12(2) 
Education and the Law 69; David Palfreyman, ‘The HEI–Student Legal Relationship, with Special 
Reference to the USA Experience’ (1999) 11(1) Education and the Law 5; Francine Rochford, ‘The 
Relationship Between The Student and The University’ (1998) 3(1) Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Law & Education 28; Simon Whittaker, ‘Public and Private Law-Making: Subordinate Legislation, 
Contracts and the Status of Student Rules’ (2001) 21(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 103. 
4 See especially Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions’, above n 1; 
Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1; Neville Harris, ‘Resolution of Students 
Complaints in Higher Education Institutions’ (2007) 27(4) Legal Studies 566; Patty Kamvounias, and 
Sally Varnham, ‘In-House or in Court? Legal Challenges to University Decisions’ (2006) 18(1) Education 
and the Law 1. 
5 Hanna V University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122, [2]. 
6 Jackson et al, above n 1; Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1; Astor, 
‘Australian Universities in Court’, above n 1; For a comparative study see Helms, above n 1. 
7 Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court’ above n 1. Astor reports that despite the increase in the size of 
the higher education section and therefore a corresponding increase in student numbers, the increase in 
litigation is not a proportionate increase: ‘Roughly speaking, the number of Universities has doubled and 
the number of students tripled but the levels of the litigation have increased about eightfold’: at 166. 
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consumer protection legislation. Lindsay8 has considered in detail the legal 
framework applying to the student–HEI relationship and the causes of action 
available to students with respect to HEIs. Lindsay categorises the areas of rights 
arising in broadly three circumstances: within the ‘domestic jurisdiction’, under ‘public 
law’ and rights accruing in ‘private law’. Rights available to students under consumer 
protection legislation would fall into the category of private law. The classification of 
Lindsay is adopted below and serves as an overview for a framework for placing this 
research in context. The examination of the various areas of law will identify the 
significance of the research within the broader legal context. It is not intended to deal 
in detail with other causes of action available to students in bringing complaints 
against HEI elsewhere in the thesis, except to the extent it assists with the 
determination of what matters of academic judgement courts consider justiciable. 
 
Domestic jurisdiction  
The university Visitor  
The higher education sector and institutions in the post-secondary sector are highly 
regulated in their formation and operation in Australia.9 All universities within the 
sector are special purpose statutory corporations with their own enabling acts.10 
Originally, all of these acts provided for a university Visitor. The jurisdiction of the 
Visitor to adjudicate matters in dispute within the university arises as staff and 
students are members of the eleemosynary corporation, on which the Australian 
legislative framework for universities is based, having its history in canon law.11 
Rochford notes:  
                                                 
8 Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 3. 
9 Helms, above n 1. She describes the three types of higher education providers: self-accrediting; non-
self-accrediting and universities. Helms notes that the post-secondary sector in Australia is dominated 
by universities and all HEIs are governed by state and commonwealth was legislation in the form of 
various state Higher Education Acts and Commonwealth funding legislation Higher Education Support 
Act 2003 (Cth) and Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Cth). There are special regulatory provisions in 
relation to international students Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth): at 37, 39. 
There are 39 Australian universities, 37 are publically funded and 2 are private. There is one Australian 
branch of an overseas university, 3 other self-accrediting higher education institutions and more than 
150 non-self-accrediting higher education providers (that is it offers at least one course of study that is 
accredited as a higher education award): extracted from 
<http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Pages/Overview.aspx 20 September 2011>.  
10 See Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions’, above n 1, 143 nn 9–11 
citing, eg, Australian National University Act 1991 (Cth); Charles Darwin University Act 2003 (NT); 
Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld); University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA); University of Canberra Act 1989 
(ACT); University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic); University of Sydney Act 1989 (NSW); University of 
Tasmania Act 1992 (Tas); University of Western Australia Act 1911 (WA); and the two private 
universities Bond University Act 1987 (Qld) and University of Notre Dame Australia Act 1989 (WA).  
11 See generally J L Caldwell, ‘Judicial Review of Universities — the Visitor and the Visiting’ (1982) 1 
Canterbury Law Review 307; J W Bridge, ‘Keeping the Peace in the Universities: The Role of the Visitor’ 
(1970) 86 The Law Quarterly Review 531. 
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Where students are members of the corporation, the rules of the University are binding 
upon them in the same manner as municipal laws are binding upon constituents of the 
municipality. 12 
 
The courts have repeatedly affirmed the Visitor’s exclusive jurisdiction over matters 
internal to the membership of the university, including academic decisions made 
pursuant to the internal rules of the university and as such are not reviewable by the 
courts.13 Caldwell notes that the courts have been consistently reluctant to review 
decisions of the Visitor outside of issues relating to the adherence of procedure and 
natural justice (and even then there has been limited success).14 The special needs 
and nature of the university have resulted in universities being afforded significant 
autonomy under the Visitorial system.15 
 
However, the university Visitor has been abolished for all but ceremonial functions in 
every state in Australia with the exception of Western Australia.16 Thus there may still 
be difficulties for students in Western Australia bringing claims against universities, 
as the jurisdiction of the Visitor is exclusive.17 This potentially prevents students in 
Western Australia from bringing claims in relation to matters considered internal to 
the university, including challenges to decisions considered to be purely academic in 
nature and possibly claims arising under the student–HEI contract. However, it is 
argued that the situation for students with a claim under consumer protection 
legislation and more particularly a claim under the UCT provisions is analogous to 
the case of Murdoch University v Bloom [1980] WAR 193. In this case the court 
considered a dispute in relation to a university staff member under the terms of the 
contract of employment. On appeal in respect of the issue of review by the Visitor, 
the Supreme Court: 
… distinguished rights enjoyed under the law of the land (such rights as under contract) 
and matters of an intra-mural nature. Thus the Court held that the defendant’s first claim 
was essentially a claim for a declaration of right concerning the common law question of 
                                                 
12 Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’, above n 3, 29. For a 
discussion of the nature of the corporate status and membership of students in universities see Suzanne 
Corcoran, ‘Living on the Edge: Utopia University Limited.’ (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 265. 
13 Caldwell, above n 11, 316; Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 3, 13. See 
generally Anwar N Khan and Alan G Davison, ‘University Visitor and Judicial Review in the British 
Commonwealth (Old) Countries’ (1995) 24 Journal of Law and Education 457. 
14 Caldwell, above n 11, 319. 
15 Caldwell, above n 11, 318; See generally Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The 
University’, above n 3. 
16 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions’, above n 1, 148–50 nn 58–9. 
17 University of Western Australia Act 1911 (WA) s 7(1); Curtin University of Technology Act 1966 (WA) 
s 27; Murdoch University Act 1973 (WA) s 9; Edith Cowan University Act 1984 (WA) s 42; Lindsay, 
‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 3. Citing Murdoch University v Bloom [1980] 
WAR 193: at 116. 
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contractual construction. Burt CJ said, at 198 ‘[i]t is not a matter which relates to the 
management of the house and it is not a matter indifference which can be resolved by the 
application of the law of the house’18 
 
In considering the impact of this decision on the modern visitatorial jurisdiction 
Caldwell states: 
… it is submitted that when an Act of Parliament is in issue then any duty under it would 
fall within the province of the courts — although domestic characteristics may be influential 
in the courts declining a discretionary remedy. 19 
 
However, Caldwell goes on to note that ‘if an issue of purely domestic administration 
arises it is then that the Visitor would become the appropriate forum for complaint.’20 
The notion that a duty arising under legislation, here the ACL, is within the courts 
purview is consistent with the courts consideration of matters arising under the 
various anti-discrimination acts noted below. In this way it is arguable that a claim 
under the ACL is not an issue of purely domestic administration. 
  
Direction regarding the exercise of the Visitor’s exclusive jurisdiction and the ability of 
the court to review matters raised under statute can also be found in the decision of 
Drummond J in Dudzinski v Kellow [1999] FCA 390. In that matter, a student brought 
a claim against individual members of Faculty and Griffith University in negligence 
and misleading and deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). In 
considering the University’s application to strike out the statement of claim, 
Drummond J stated at paragraph [3] (emphasis added): 
Some of the applicant’s complaints concern harm he alleges he suffered as a result of the 
misapplication to him by University staff of various of the internal rules of the University. At 
common law, the courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain such matters: the power to 
enquire into and rectify such wrongs if necessary by the award of full compensatory 
damages, is vested exclusively in the Visitor of the University, subject only to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the appropriate superior court. See Thorne v University of 
London [1966] 2 QB 237 and to the width and jurisdiction of the powers of the Visitor see 
Bailey-Jones v University of Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWLR 424. However, there is no 
provision under the Griffith University Act 1971 (Qld) for a Visitor of that University ... I 
think that I have jurisdiction to determine this class of matter raised by the applicant: there 
is no ground for holding that this Court’s jurisdiction under the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth), which is invoked by the applicant in respect of some of his causes of action and of 
                                                 
18 As cited in Caldwell, above n 11, 326–7 (emphasis added). 
19 Caldwell, above n 11, 327. 
20 Ibid. 
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which some of his complaints concerning the misapplication of the University’s internal 
rules are associated, is impliedly excluded by the circumstance I have referred to. In any 
event, it would be rare for an implication to be so clear as to exclude the general 
jurisdiction of a court of plenary jurisdiction. 
 
The position for students in Western Australia where the office of the Visitor remains 
operational is less clear. However, following the reasoning in the decisions above it is 
submitted that rights arising under the statutory ‘law of the land’ are not excluded 
from the courts general jurisdiction and are arguably justiciable by the courts 
notwithstanding the operation of the Visitor’s jurisdiction. 
 
Dispute resolution processes 
Most HEIs typically have significant processes in place for internal grievance and 
dispute resolution mechanisms,21 although according to the recent Australian 
Learning and Teaching Council (‘ALTC’) project on student grievances and discipline 
matters they are perhaps not as robust as one may expect.22 While HEIs have made 
progress in the development of internal grievance procedures, more work is required 
in relation to their overall soundness23 as well as students’ perceptions regarding the 
reliability and trustworthiness of outcomes.24 Most commentators in this area are 
champions of dispute resolution processes as a cost effective and efficient way to 
resolve student complaints. The benefits are said to be not just in terms of 
measurable financial savings, but other intangible issues that arise when students 
and HEIs are in conflict, such as reputational issues, emotional stress and 
impairment to careers of faculty members.25 Further, some scholars in the area have 
suggested the adoption of a National Student Ombudsman in much the same way as 
the UK system currently exists.26 Some HEIs have also established their own student 
Ombudsman within their campus.27  
                                                 
21 And have statutory obligations in this regard in relation to the provision of higher education services to 
international students: Standard 8 Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth). See 
generally NSW Ombudsman, Complaint Handling at Universities: Best Practice Guidelines, December 
2006, A-6. 
22 Jackson et al, above n 1, executive summary, XI.  
23 Jackson et al, above n 1, 83 [11.6.3]; See also Hilary Astor, ‘Improving Dispute Resolution in 
Australian Universities: Options for the Future’ (2005) 27(1) Journal of Higher Education Policy and 
Management 49. 
24 Jackson et al, above n 1, 85 [11.8]; Neville Harris, above n 4. Harris discusses the impact of the 
dispute resolution processes of the Office for the Independent Adjudicator in the UK and the resultant 
reduction of students’ request for judicial review: at 583. 
25 Astor, ‘Improving Dispute Resolution in Australian Universities’, above n 23; Astor, ‘Why Do Students 
Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1; Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court’, above n 1; 
Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1.   
26 Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1. Astor observes that ‘complexity’ in 
student litigation supports the idea for national dispute resolution scheme as complexity means resource 
intensive plus unrepresented litigants: at 30; Astor, ‘Improving Dispute Resolution in Australian 
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Reports in the media suggest that HEIs often settle students’ claims privately,28 
presumably after accessing the institutions internal grievance procedures. The 
motivation and push for cost effective and efficient solutions needs to be moderated 
by the view that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can erode rights in the 
long term29 because of the confidential nature of the settlements.30 As commentators 
have noted, if HEIs ‘payout students who complain … this prevents such information 
being available to other students or prospective students.’31 It is also possible that 
mandatory dispute resolution clauses may in fact fall foul of the new UCT provisions 
in the ACL. Such a term could be an unfair term if it attempts to restrict parties’ rights 
to bring the matter before the courts and therefore void. 32 This is discussed more 
fully in Chapter 5. 
 
Public law 
Judicial review 
As noted above, private and public HEIs are incorporated by statute under 
establishing acts33 and regulated by various commonwealth and state legislation 
regarding the provision of educational services in higher education. In these 
                                                                                                                                            
Universities’, above n 23; Bronwyn Olliffe and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘A National University Grievance 
Handler? Transporting The UK Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (OIA) to 
Australia’ (2007) 29(2) Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 203.The OIA for higher 
education in the United Kingdom has been operating since it was established under the Higher 
Education Act 2004 (UK) and in effect replaces the Visitor jurisdiction in UK higher education 
institutions. For further discussion of the effectiveness of this office see Harris, above n 4. Harris 
observes that judicial review of student cases have become more rare since 2005: at 583; A national 
student Ombudsman was not supported nor specifically rejected by Jackson et al, above n 1, 85 
[11.8.3], although there does not appear to be popular support for a national student Ombudsman 
currently. See, eg, Guy Healy, ‘Student Ombudsman Scotched’, The Australian (online), 21 January 
2010 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/student-ombudsman-sctotched/story>. 
27 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1, 
151. 
28 See, eg Debra Jopson, ‘Unis Face Legal Challenge From Students’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
6 June 2005; Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For: Consumer Rights of 
Students in Higher Education’ (2006) 15 Griffith Law Review 306, 320, nn 74–7. See also Joanna 
Williams, ‘Constructing Consumption: What Media Representations Reveal About Today’s Students’ in 
Mike Molesworth, Richard Scullion and Elizabeth Nixon (eds), The Marketisation of Higher Education 
and the Student as Consumer (Routledge, 2011) 170. 
29 See, eg, Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 
2002), 380–6. This argument is most commonly raised in the context of legal disputes involving claims 
of discrimination. The development of consumer rights is analogous to the development and protection 
of rights that prevent discrimination on unlawful grounds. See generally Claire Baylis, and Robyn Carroll, 
‘The Nature and Importance of Mechanisms for Addressing Power Differences in Statutory Mediation’ 
(2002) 14(2) Bond Law Review 285 <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol14/iss2/3>. 
30 Harris, above n 4, 584. 
31 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 28, 320; Astor and Chinkin, above 
n 29, 380–6.  
32 See ACL pt 2-3 s 25(k) discussed in Chapter 5. 
33 Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 3. He notes that even those 
universities that are not incorporated by statute and are incorporated under the Commonwealth 
Corporations Act have statutory support in the form of enabling legislation: at 8. See also Corcoran, 
above n 12. 
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circumstances, administrative law remedies may be enlivened.34 Rochford notes also 
that ’the University as a public organisation is problematic: it is clear that it may be 
subject to administrative remedies in many jurisdictions…’35. 
 
Kamvounias and Varnham discuss in detail the nature of judicial review under statute 
and common law in relation to claims made by students against HEIs.36 Their paper 
includes a detailed analysis of the judicial review cases before the courts, including a 
consideration of the nature of the claims and in particular student challenges in 
decisions involving academic judgement and assessment. Kamvounias and Varnham 
conclude that while courts have demonstrated a reluctance to interfere in academic 
decisions, courts will take care to determine whether the challenge is to a decision 
that involved academic judgement or to the process by which an academic decision 
was made.37 ‘Substance is immune from review but process is not’.38  
 
It is also clear from the High Court decision in Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 
CLR 99 that a narrow interpretation of the court’s jurisdiction in relation to judicial 
review will be taken, at least under the Administrative Decisions(Judicial Review) Act 
1977 (Cth) and the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). In that case, a student brought 
proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking review under the state Act 
(which was based on the Commonwealth Act) regarding a decision to exclude her 
from the PhD programme she was enrolled in at Griffith University. The student was 
excluded on the grounds that she had ‘undertaken research without regard to ethical 
and scientific standards’ and had thereby engaged in ‘academic misconduct’. 39 
 
The student sought orders based on breaches of the requirement of ‘natural justice, 
failures to comply with mandatory procedure requirements, improper exercises of 
power, and errors of law.’40 The appeal turned on the issue of whether the decision 
made by the Assessment Board (a subcommittee of the Research and Post-
Graduate Studies committee of Griffith University) was ‘a decision of an 
                                                 
34 Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 3, 8. 
35 Francine Rochford ‘Claims Against a University: The Role of Administrative Review in Australia and 
the United Kingdom’ (2005) 17(1–2) Education and the Law 23, 37. 
36 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1, 
157–71. 
37 See generally Bruce Lindsay, ‘University Hearings: Student Discipline Rules and Fair Procedures’ 
(2008) 15 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 146. 
38 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1, 
164. 
39 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 99[1]. 
40 Ibid. 
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administrative character … made under enactment’.41 The court determined that the 
decision to exclude the student was not a decision made under enactment and 
therefore the student’s claim failed. Kamvounias and Varnham suggest that this 
decision of the High Court should be narrowly construed as pertaining to one section 
of a Commonwealth Act in relation to judicial review42 and: 
… should not be read as limiting common law rights in anyway and that Australian 
students will continue to have common law rights to seek judicial review wherever there is 
sufficient indication of a failure on the part of a University to adhere to its published 
processes or lack of fairness and will be successful if they can prove unfair operative 
process.43 
 
Similarly, Lindsay is of the view that the application of administrative law to the 
student–HEI relationship remains broad in relation to claims of abuse of process, 
denial of natural justice, or error of law in relation to the process, but not a 
determination of the fairness of the decision itself. 44 
 
Office of the Ombudsman 
Students attending HEIs also have access for redress through the state 
Ombudsmen. It is important to note that an Ombudsman’s remedial powers are 
limited in the sense that they can only make recommendations to a HEI regarding an 
appropriate course of action following review of a student complaint to their office.45 
Astor, Kamvounias and Varnham provide a more detailed discussion of the role of 
the Ombudsman46 in higher education and a summary of their reports.47 All authors 
note the advice from state Ombudsmen offices about the increasing number and 
complexity of student complaints to their offices and the ‘extraordinary step’ the 
Ombudsmen took in writing a joint letter to the editor of The Australian in April 
                                                 
41 Ibid 99 [3]. 
42 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Doctorial Dreams Destroyed: Does Griffith University v Tang Spell the 
End of Judicial Review of Australian University Decisions?’ (2005) 10(1) Australia & New Zealand 
Journal of Law & Education 5. For a full discussion of the case and implications for judicial review see 
Daniel Stewart, ‘Griffith University v Tang, “Under an Enactment” and Limiting Access to Judicial 
Review’ (2005) 33(3) Federal Law Review 525. 
43 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Doctorial Dreams Destroyed’, above n 42, 15. 
44 Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 3, 9. 
45 See, eg, Ombudsman Western Australia (6 August 2012).  
<http://www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au/About_Us/Role.htm>; Victorian Ombudsman Frequently Asked 
Questions (6 August 2012) <http://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/www/html/43-frequently-asked-
questions.asp>. 
46 Astor, ‘Why Do Students Sue Australian Universities’, above n 1, 21. See also Kamvounias and 
Varnham ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1, 150. 
47 Kamvounias and Varnham ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1, 
150, nn 61–72; See also Olliffe and Stuhmcke, above n 26; Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court’, 
above n 1. 
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2005.48 Further, HEIs in receipt of public funding (and whose employees are public 
officers) are also subject to review by governmental agencies charged with the 
oversight of proper and appropriate use of public monies and conduct of public 
officers. Universities are increasingly finding themselves the subject of scrutiny by 
such agencies.49 
 
Particular protections for international students are also available in relation to 
complaints by international studies against their HEI. The provision of education to 
international students by Australian higher education providers is subject to 
significant regulation in the provision of education and training to these students.50 In 
2011 the Commonwealth Government established an Overseas Students 
Ombudsman for complaints relating to private providers of higher education.51 This 
Ombudsman deals specifically with complaints from international students attending 
at a private HEI. This means that complaints from international students from the 37 
public universities in Australia cannot be remitted to this office. It is interesting to note 
that the Ombudsman has no remedy beyond fee recovery52 and nor does the 
Ombudsman have jurisdiction in relation to overseas students studying outside 
Australia.53 The website for the Overseas Student Ombudsman contains a page 
entitled ‘Other Complaint handling review agencies’.54 The page includes information 
and links to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Aged Care Complaints 
Resolution Scheme and Commissioner, the Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity, the Australian Human Rights Commission, the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security, the Migration Review Tribunal and Refugee 
Review Tribunal, the National Anti-Discrimination Gateway, the Office of the 
                                                 
48 Kamvounias and Varnham ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1, 
151. 
49 See, eg, Western Australian Corruption and Crime Commission, Report on the Investigation of 
Alleged Public Sector Misconduct by Dr Nasrul Ameer Ali as a Sessional Academic Employed by Curtin 
University, 2010. 
50 Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth); National Code of Practice for 
Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students 2007 (Cth); 
Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee, Provision of Education to International Students Code of 
Practice and Guidelines for Australian Universities, 2005. 
51 See Overseas Students Ombudsman (6 August 2012) <http://www.oso.gov.au/>; Bernard Lane, 
‘Commonwealth Ombudsman Allan Usher Already Awash with Grievances’, The Australian (online), 6 
July 2011 <http://www.the australian.com.au/higher-education/commonweath-ombudsman-allan-asher>. 
52 See also Hon Senator Chris Evans, Minister for Tertiary Education (Cth), ‘Better Consumer Protection 
for International Students’ (Media Release, 23 September 2011) 
<http://www.aei.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx 2> outlining the Education Services for Overseas Students 
Legislation Amendment (Tuition Protection Service and Other Measures) Bill 2011 to provide a system 
for refunds for international students in the event of a higher education providers closing. 
53 See Overseas Students Ombudsman, above n 51. An overseas student is a student who is or is 
about to study in Australia on a student visa: at <http://www.oso.gov.au/frequently-asked-questions/for-
overseas-students/>. 
54 Ibid <http://www.oso.gov.au/related-sites/other-complaint-handling-review-agencies.php>. 
LG 14040113 M.Phil 27 
 
Australian Information Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, the Social Security 
Appeals Tribunal and the Veterans Review Board. It is curious to note that the site 
does not contain any reference to the Australian Consumer Law or appropriate 
regulating agency, such as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(‘ACCC’). 
 
There have been very few decided cases and even less legal academic commentary 
in relation to the regulatory regimes for international students.55 One commentator 
notes that a distinguishing feature of the federal Ombudsman’s scheme for 
international students and the legislation and codes surrounding the regulation in this 
area is the use of consumer language by the legislator56 and an emphasis on codes 
and audits.57 It is beyond the scope of this research to consider the particular 
protections available for international students under this Commonwealth Scheme. 
Issues in relation to international students and jurisdictional matters will be 
considered in Chapter 3 in relation to the application of the ACL. 
 
Private law  
Contract 
There has been considerable commentary regarding the nature of the contractual 
relationship between students and HEIs.58 Notwithstanding the difficulties in 
jurisprudence surrounding the jurisdiction of courts in relation to the Visitor, or the 
applicability of public law remedies to the student–HEI relationship, it is generally 
accepted that a contract between the student and HEI exists and can in fact coexist 
                                                 
55 See generally Bruce Baird, Australian Government, Review of the Education Services for Overseas 
Students (ESOS) Act 2000, Final Report February 2010 (7 August 2012) <https://aei.gov.au/Regulatory-
Information/Education-Services-for-Overseas-Students-ESOS-Legislative-Framework/ESOS-
Review/Pages/default.aspx>. 
56 Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education’, above n 3, 70, 73. He also notes the lack of 
equivalent remedy provisions: at 74. 
57 Ibid 79. See also John F Burke and Rosemary Lucadou-Wells, ‘Towards Creating Sustainable 
Australian Education’ (2010) 7 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 87.  
58 See generally Birtwistle and Askew, above n 3; Davis, above n 3; Palfreyman, ‘The HEI–Student 
Legal Relationship’, above n 3; Julia Pedley, ‘The Development of a Student Contract and Improvement 
in Student Disciplinary Procedures at Massey University’ (2007) 12(1) Australian & New Zealand 
Journal of Law & Education 73; Bruce Lindsay, ‘Student Subjectivity and the Law’ (2005) 10(2) Deacon 
Law Review 628, 633–4; Kós and McVeagh, above n 3; Hoye and Palfreyman, ‘Plato vs Socrates’, 
above n 3; Middlemiss, above n 3; Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between the Student and the University’, 
above n 3; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decision Affecting Students’, 
above n 1, 142, 146; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘In-House or in Court?’, above n 4, 9–12; Kamvounias 
and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 28, 312–14; Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity 
in University Law’, above n 3, 10–11: Sally Varnham, ‘Liability in Higher Education in New Zealand: 
Cases for Courses?’ (1998) 3(1) Australia and New Zealand of Law and Education 3, 11–13; Ruth 
Gaffney-Rhys and Joanna Jones, ‘Issues Surrounding the Introduction of Formal Student Contracts’ 
(2010) 35(6) Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education 711.   
LG 14040113 M.Phil 28 
 
with students’ legal standing as a corporator of the HEI.59 The construction of the 
terms of the student–HEI contract is not without its difficulties, and its precise terms, 
beyond what is already contained in the relevant statues, are difficult to discern.60 It 
has also been noted by commentators that in practice students’ success in claiming 
damages as a result of a breach of specific contractual promises have been limited.61 
The existence of and the precise nature of the student–HEI contract will be discussed 
more fully in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Tort of negligence 
Students in Australia may also be able to avail themselves of the emerging cause of 
action in ‘educational malpractice’ or ‘failure to teach’.62 The matter of Dudzinski 
Kellow [1999] FCA 309 included a claim in negligence against the university and its 
staff. While the Court did not make any determination in relation to the substance of 
the student’s allegations, at paragraph [34] Drummond J noted: 
I am not prepared, as presently advised, to hold that an action might not lie at the suit of a 
student for damages for economic loss caused by the decision of a lecturer to fail the 
student in a university degree examination where that decision can be shown to have 
been made negligently. It may be no easy matter to prove such a case: whether a lecturer 
has breached any duty of care she may owe to a student in assessing the student’s work 
may be a matter difficult of proof, given that a wide range of opinions about the quality of 
the student’s work may each nevertheless be consistent with the exercise with the 
                                                 
59 Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [200] 3 All ER752; Bayley-Jones v University of 
Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWLR 424; Harding v University of NSW (2001) NSWSC 301; See also 
Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘In-house or in Court?’, above n 4, 10–11; Farrington and Palfreyman, The 
Law of Higher Education, above n 3, chapter 13 and in particular the summary of principles: at [13.04]–
[13.05]; Whittaker, above n 3; Simon Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review in Public Law and in Contract Law: The 
Example of “Student Rules”’ (2001) 21(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 193.  
60 See especially Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between the Student and the University’, above n 3; 
Davis, above n 3; Jim Jackson, ‘The Marketing of University Courses Under Sections 52 and 53 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)’ (2002) 6 Southern Cross University Law Review 106, 109; Jackson, 
‘Regulation of International Education’ above n 3, 74–5; Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review in Public Law and in 
Contract Law’, above n 59.  
61 David Palfreyman, ‘Phelps … Clark … and now Rycotewood? Disappointment Damages for Breach of 
the Contract to Educate’ (2003) 15(4) Education and the Law 237; Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between 
the Student and the University’, above n 3. 
62 Francine Rochford, ‘Suing the Alma Mater: What Loss has been Suffered?’ (2001) 13(4) Education 
and the Law 319; Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between the Student and the University’, above n 3; 
Middlemiss, above n 3; Pheh Hoon Lim and Juliet Hyatt, ‘Educational Accountability — Do Tertiary 
Students Need More Academic Protection in New Zealand?’ (2009) 14(1) International Journal of Law 
and Education 23, 27; Ralph Mawdsley and J Joy Cumming, ‘Educational Malpractice and Setting 
Damages for Ineffective Teaching: A Comparison of Legal Principles in the USA, England and Australia’ 
(2008) 20 Education and the Law 25; Kathy Eivazi, ‘Universities’ Negligent Misstatement and Students’ 
Admission: Opening Doors to a Worthy Claim in Educational Negligence’ (Paper presented at the 
proceedings of the ANZELA Conference ‘Education: A Risky Business’, Victoria, 30 September 2009); 
Andrew Hopkins, ‘Liability for Careless Teaching: Should Australians Follow the Americans or the 
British?’ (1996) 34(4) Journal of Education Administration 39; Mark Davies, ‘Universities, Academics 
and Professional Negligence’ (1996) 12(4) Tolley’s Professional Negligence 102. 
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requisite level of care. But that is no ground for denying the availability of such an action 
on proper proofs.  
 
Claims in negligence by students against HEIs is a developing area and a number of 
commentators are of the view that in the modern higher education sector notions of 
academic immunity is misplaced.63 This emerging area of law is well placed to 
provide assistance in the interpretation of the new statutory consumer guarantees in 
the ACL,64 notably the requirement that services need to be rendered with ‘due care 
and skill’.65 It is less significant in relation to claims regarding UCT, although it does 
signal a willingness by the courts to entertain claims that go to more substantive 
matters, namely the standard of the educational service provided. 
 
Statutory claims 
Statutory duties are also imposed on HEIs under various legislative regimes. 
Obligations arising under the ACL are the subject of this thesis and will be 
considered in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Other legislative regimes also impose 
obligations on HEIs. The statutory frameworks relating specifically to international 
education have been mentioned above in the context of public law (administrative 
review). A significant number of claims made by students relate to applications under 
the various freedom of information acts.66 Possibly the most significant area of law 
where students make claims against their HEI is regarding alleged breaches of the 
various anti-discrimination statutes (state and Commonwealth).67 Again Kamvounias 
and Varnham note that in all instances students have been unsuccessful in these 
types of claims largely because the students have been unable to establish the 
causal link between their complaint in relation to decisions involving academic 
                                                 
63 See generally Middlemiss, above n 3, 77–80; Hoye and Palfreyman, ‘Plato vs Socrates’, above n 3, 
105–107; Eivazi, above n 62; Mark Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity” — The Beginning of a 
New Era?’ (2004) 16(2-3) Education and the Law 75; Varnham, ‘Liability in Higher Education in New 
Zealand’, above n 58, 16-17; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 28, 
310–12. 
64 See Russell Miller, Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (Thomson Reuters, 
33rd ed, 2011). Miller states that ‘due care and skill is a common law negligence standard’ and the ‘effect 
of the section is to negate the opportunity to contract out of a claim for negligence’: at [1.S2.60.10].   
65 ACL s 60. The emerging jurisprudence in this area will assist with an understanding of how the quality 
and standards of educational services could be assessed by the courts with reference to analogous 
principles from other areas of law, such as professional negligence in the law of torts. See especially 
Stephen Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services by Higher Education 
Providers’ (2012) 35(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1.  
66 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1. 
The authors consider in detail applications that have been brought in relation to particular types of 
documents and circumstances at and include a consideration of the types of exemptions that university 
may be able to claim: at 173–9. 
67 Ibid 172–3; Sally Varnham and Patty Kamvounias, ‘Unfair, Unlawful or Just Unhappy? Issues 
Surrounding Complaints of Discrimination Made by Students Against Their Universities in Australia’ 
(2009) 14(1) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 5; Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue 
Australian Universities?’, above n 1, 25–6. 
LG 14040113 M.Phil 30 
 
assessment, progress or other disciplinary proceedings and the ground for the 
alleged discrimination.68 Astor, in her article examining why students sue Australian 
universities comments:  
There appears to be a problem that students are using discrimination law as an avenue for 
challenges to perceived unfair conduct by universities, including decisions relating to 
academic matters.69   
 
This of course is consistent with Astor’s theme in her commentary that students’ lack 
of success in bringing claims before courts is a result of ‘shoehorning’. Thus students 
are unsuccessful because they attempt to ‘shoehorn their complaints into legal 
causes of action where they (do) not fit’.70  
 
Thus it can be seen from the above overview of the legal framework applying to the 
student–HEI relationship and the causes of action available to students with respect 
to a claim against a HEI that students have wide-ranging avenues for redress. 
Students can seek reparation either internally through domestic procedures of the 
HEI, or possibly judicial review of the same. Students can bring their grievance 
before the relevant Ombudsman. Students also have significant private rights, albeit 
complex. It is however often difficult to determine the exact nature of those rights or 
obtain a remedy due to lack of proof of loss suffered. Students’ rights are also 
reinforced by the considerable ancillary and supporting statutory frameworks around 
the regulation of the higher education sector,71 and more general statutory rights, 
such as freedom of information legislation or anti-discrimination legislation. 
International students in particular now have specific protections in place.72 
Consequently a claim under the ACL by a student against their HEI for an alleged 
failure in the provision of educational services is only one option open to the student. 
However, in relation to all areas of law outlined above, the impediment remains that 
claims made by students in relation to academic matters are not justiciable. It is 
suggested that claims made pursuant to the UCT provisions regarding the nature of 
                                                 
68 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University of Decisions Affecting Students’ above n 
1, 173; Varnham and Kamvounias, ‘Unfair, Unlawful or Just Unhappy?’ above n 67; For commentary on 
the equivalent provisions in the UK see Middlemiss, above n 3. Middlemiss notes that the anti-
discrimination legislation is of limited use for students in their claims against HEIs as very few of the 
statutes are specifically structured to protect the rights of students: at 87. 
69 Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1, 26. 
70 Ibid 26, 31. While some applicants were unsuccessful in their claims based on discrimination, there 
may well have been a cause of action arising under consumer protection legislation. See, eg, Lina 
Obieta v New South Wales Department of Education and Training [2007] FCA 86.  
71 See, eg, various state Higher Education Acts and Commonwealth funding legislation Higher 
Education Support Act 2003 (Cth); Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Cth); Tertiary Education Quality 
and Standards Agency Act 2011 (Cth) (‘TEQSA Act’).  
72 Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth). 
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the educational service provided by a HEI may not be so limited, as the legislation 
prevents a HEI from relying on a term in the student–HEI that is unfair. As will be 
seen in Chapter 5, this goes beyond issues of procedural fairness to matters that 
address the substantive fairness of the contractual term relied upon. As the UCT 
provisions address issues of substantive unfairness, it is possible that judicial 
scrutiny of the actual effect of a HEI relying on an unfair term that is concerned with 
matters of academic judgement will be countenanced. 
 
What is justiciable? 
It is clear that courts are prepared to review decisions of a HEI on the basis that 
those decisions have been procedurally unfair or there has been an error of law.73 It 
is also accepted that recourse to the courts should be seen as a last resort.74 
However, recent studies on the nature and outcomes of student-based litigation in 
Australia (not just those based on consumer protection legislation) reveal the 
difficulties students face when bringing their complaints to the courts if those 
complaints relate to questions of academic judgement in the course of the delivery of 
the educational service.75 This includes claims relating to course content, design and 
delivery, the standards of teaching or the merits of an academic decision in the 
assessment of the standard of students’ work or academic progression. Historically 
courts have been reluctant to disturb decisions that have been seen as within the 
domain of the learned academic.76 Subject to few exceptions, academic activities 
involving the exercise of academic evaluation by an academic or the standard of the 
academics’ professional services (as opposed to the process by which an academic 
decision is reached) will not be interfered with by the courts.77 This is and continues 
to be, a significant hurdle for students seeking redress for what they perceive to be 
poor quality educational services.  
 
                                                 
73 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘In-house or in Court?’, above n 4, 2–9; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal 
Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1, 164, 152–169; Astor, ‘Why do 
Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1, 30. 
74 Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122; Chan v Sellwood [2009] NSWSC 1335, 
‘disputes between students and establishments of learning are ordinarily unsuitable for adjudication in 
the courts and ought to be resolved by internal procedure’ [25]–[26] (Davies J). 
75 Astor, ‘Australian Universities in Court’, above n 1; Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian 
Universities?’, above n 1; Helms, above n 1; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University 
Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1; Jackson et al,  above n 1. 
76 Clark [2000] 3 All ER 752. Note that the exclusive purview the university Visitor may still be an issue 
for students studying in Western Australia where the university Visitors’ jurisdiction is still alive and 
potentially extensive. This is discussed further below.  
77 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 156 [165] (Kirby J); Davies, ‘Challenges to ‘Academic 
Immunity’, above n 63; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting 
Students’, above n 1, 159–60. 
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In order to assess the effectiveness of the UCT regime as mechanism that enhances 
student consumer protection, this chapter will examine what academic matters, if 
any, have been considered justiciable both under consumer protection legislation and 
other areas of the law. This is relevant as the research argues that the new UCT 
provisions may deal with claims concerning the nature of the educational services 
more effectively than other actionable rights that require the court to examine matters 
of academic judgement. 
 
What do students complain about? 
There is variance in views regarding what students are in fact complaining about 
when bringing their claims before courts. Kamvounias and Varnham categorise 
student challenges into three broad types.78 The first is complaints against 
disciplinary decisions that are unconnected to academic achievement, such as a 
student’s behaviour in relation to university property. The second is disciplinary 
decisions that relate to findings of academic misconduct, for example, appeals by 
students against decisions involving cheating or plagiarism.79 The third is complaints 
against decisions or conduct that involve academic judgement. In relation to this 
category of ‘purely academic’ matters, Kamvounias and Varnham give examples of 
the marking of student work including evaluations of academic merit and viability of 
research projects, the content of courses and styles of teaching.80 It would also 
include decisions regarding methods and modes of course of delivery (format and 
availabilities of online resources, laboratories) and academic progression (as distinct 
from decisions relating to discipline or misconduct matters).81 It may also include 
decisions regarding attribution of credit for previous studies or relevant work 
experience (recognised prior learning).82 Claims that relate to academic judgement 
have had little success in the courts, as discussed in detail below. It can be said that 
claims in relation to matters of academic judgement involve a review of substantive 
matters, not just procedural. When considering the efficacy of the UCT provisions in 
advancing students’ rights as consumers of educational services, regard should be 
had to what students are allegedly complaining about in relation to those services. 
Therefore, it is important to establish whether students’ themselves are concerned 
with only procedural fairness in relation to the supply of educational services, or 
something more.  
                                                 
78 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘In-house or in Court?’, above n 4, 1–2. 
79 Ibid 2.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Davis, above n 3, 18. 
82 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1, 
160–1. 
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A leading commentator in this area, Astor, has suggested that student claimants are 
unconcerned with the impact that academic judgement has on the quality or standard 
of the educational service provided. In her recent study on why students sue 
universities she asserts that: 
...the data on litigated cases does not bear out the assertion that student litigation is 
predominately, or even significantly, concerned with educational standards. Rather, it is 
concerned with the fairness of university decision-making. 83 
 
If this is so, then the concern to address substantive issues regarding the supply of 
educational services is less critical, as students have adequate protection in regards 
procedural fairness, as was seen in the earlier discussion of the legal framework. In 
support of her thesis that ‘very few litigated cases concern complaints about 
educational standards’, Astor notes there have only been five cases involving the 
Trade Practices Act.84 She asserts that only three were in relation to standards of 
education and all were unsuccessful.85  The point is that three of the five cases 
clearly concerned issues going beyond the fairness of the decision making process. 
It is also clear from the statements of claims filed by the students, albeit often poorly 
pleaded, that students’ have been concerned with the standards and quality of the 
learning and teaching experience or lack thereof.86 As will be demonstrated in 
subsequent chapters there are many reasons for students’ lack of success in 
litigation.  
 
Further, given the dearth of case law in relation to student claims under the 
consumer protection legislation, it can be argued that it is very possible students are 
not aware of their consumer rights in the context of educational services.87 In a 
submission made to the Productivity Commission by the National Children’s and 
Youth Law Centre (‘NCYLC’) and included in the final report, the NCYLC suggested 
the needs of young people should receive greater attention in consumer policy 
making: 
… most young consumers do not know their consumer rights, nor are they aware of or 
equipped to access the complaints mechanisms that are available. Even if they do 
                                                 
83 Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1, 24.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid, 24–5. 
86 Ibid. It is also important to note that Astor’s research is focused solely on the 39 Australian 
universities and does not include cases involving private providers of higher education services. As will 
be seen, the nature of complaints made in the lower courts and those against private providers 
frequently concerns matters going to quality and alleged breaches of consumer protection legislation. 
87 See also Department of the Treasury, Australian Consumer Survey, (2011) Australian Government. 
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understand their rights, they are not likely to seek to enforce those rights or to pursue 
remedial action if those rights are violated, often due to a lack of confidence either in 
themselves or the mechanisms available.88 
 
Alternatively, even if students are aware of their rights they may not pursue remedial 
action because of a lack of confidence when faced with the might of the institution or 
the significant financial resources required to bring an action before the courts.89 
HEIs should perhaps consider directing some of the funds raised by the new services 
levy to the strategies suggested by the NCYLC, particularly in relation to the notion of 
improved advocacy services for students as consumers.90  
 
Other commentators are of the opinion that as a result of the commodification of 
education and the placement of the student as a consumer of educational services, 
students will more readily demand quality services and litigate if unsatisfied.91 
Students are concerned with, and make complaints about, the nature of the 
educational services provided. This was born out by the recent study undertaken in 
the Australian Learning and Teaching Council (‘ALTC’) project on student grievances 
and discipline matters.92 The authors note that student survey results (826 
respondents) revealed that: 
                                                 
88 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, 
Final Report No 45 2008, Canberra < http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/ consumer/docs/finalreport>, 
304. Strategies suggested included improvement of education strategies to inform young people of their 
consumer rights and capacity to assert the same; financial hardship programmes to assist with the 
payment of outstanding payments or fee waivers; trustworthy and user friendly avenues for complaint 
and funding for youth specific advocacy services. 
89 See Justice Ryan’s statement in Ogawa v University of Melbourne: ‘I am mindful of the need to 
ensure that an impecunious student is not shut out by a potential liability for costs from pursuing an 
apparently meritorious claim against a large and wealthy corporation like the University’: at [2005] FCA 
1139 [95] (Ryan J); Megumi Ogawa, ‘The Courts’ Jurisdiction Over Student/University Disputes in 
Australia’, (2012) 2(1) International Journal of Public Law and Policy 96, 100–1; Kamvounias and 
Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’ above n 28, 324–6; Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the 
Supply of Educational Services’, above n 65, 27. 
90 See Stephen Matchett, ‘New Uni Charge Approved’, The Australian (online), 11 October 2011 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/time-tight-for-student-service-fee/story 3 November 
2011>. Marchett discusses how the funds raised from the new levy is to be controlled by HEIs rather 
than student associations and concerns regarding the use to which it will be put. 
91 See generally Glyn Jones, ‘I Wish to Register a Complaint: The Growing Complaints Culture on 
Higher Education’ (2006) 10(3) Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education 69; Kamvounias 
and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 28, 324–6; Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and 
the Supply of Educational Services’, above n 65; Davis, above n 3; Helen Fleming, ‘Student Legal 
Rights in Higher Education: Consumerism Is Official, But Is It Sustainable?’ (Paper presented at 
Sustainable Education, Schools, Families and Communities Education Law and Policy Perspectives, 
Australia and New Zealand Education Law Association Conference, Darwin, 2011) 115; Griggs, ‘Tertiary 
Education, The Market and Liability’, above n 3; Hoye and Palfreyman, ‘Plato vs Socrates’, above n 3; 
Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education’, above n 3; Kós and McVeagh, above n 3; Lindsay, 
‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 3; Middlemiss, above n 3; Palfreyman, ‘The HEI–
Student Legal Relationship’, above n 3. 
92 Jackson et al, above n 1. The Australian Learning and Teaching Council has been replaced by the 
Australian Government Office of Teaching and Learning (19 June 2012) <http://www.olt.gov.au/>. The 
project involved the surveying (575) and interviewing (51) staff in relation to student complaints. They 
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The most common type of complaint was about assessment, followed by inadequate or 
poor quality teaching, followed by inadequate or poor quality services or facilities.93 
 
The authors also interviewed 22 students. ’Complaints about the quality of teaching 
or supervision were the second largest category, particularly from undergraduate 
students’.94 In identifying recurrent themes the authors stated: 
… the vast majority of complaints included some element of assessment, followed by 
quality of teaching and learning issues. Incorrect information also featured as a significant 
source of discontent. Moreover, we found that complaints do not always fit neatly into one 
category — they often have a number of aspects to them;95 
 
Both the ALTC report on student grievances and Astor’s study identify that students 
‘use a range of different, and sometimes inappropriate, legal avenues to challenge 
university decisions on academic matters’.96 Both studies found that students’ 
disputes with universities are multifarious and ‘complex’ due in part to the nature of 
the litigants themselves.97 Astor remarks further of students litigating: 
They appear sometimes to be attempting, without success, to shoehorn their complaints 
into legal categories where they do not belong.98 
 
                                                                                                                                            
note: ‘… the numbers of non-academic complaints (for example, disputes about fees, discrimination, 
harassment or bullying) were exceptionally rare … The results are particularly interesting when 
compared with litigated matters, which indicate, on the face of it, that causes of action are framed 
around non-academic issues (such as unlawful discrimination) rather than academic issues. However … 
closer analysis reveals that disputes about academic judgment are often the trigger for the complaints, 
and are re-framed around a particular cause of action for which there is remedy’: at 54; see especially 
student survey results at 32; Chapter 3 generally. 
93 Jackson et al, above n 1, especially student survey results at 26. 
94 Ibid 32. 
95 Ibid. See especially student survey results at 35. It is curious that the results of the data collected from 
academic staff that were interviewed indicated that the most common complaints concerned academic 
progression or appeals against academic misconduct: at 60. However, indications are that the wider 
interviews (more than just the academic staff) demonstrate that student complaints concerning the 
quality of teaching supervision were equal second to complaints about academic misconduct: at 49. 
96 Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1, 31; Jackson et al,  above n 1, 54.  
97 Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1. Astor notes that the notion of 
‘complexity’ in cases rests in not just the nature of the claims made, but in the number of claims and 
appeals brought, and the characteristics of the litigant themselves. ‘Complexity’ can be characterised by 
the behaviour of unreasonable and vexatious litigants. This is represented on a scale from one to four, 
one being ‘normal complaints’ to four being ‘querulant … described as being aggrieved, having an 
enormous sense of entitlement, seeking vindication, being completely focused on their grievances and 
unable to accept a resolution of it — even if they are offered all they have asked for.’ She concludes that 
all are present in the student cases: at 28. See also the comments in Hanna v University of New 
England: ‘It could be perceived that the history of the dealings between the parties did not fall into the 
category of the usual. There was an avalanche of applications, decisions, appeals and other 
communications. The communication between the parties went well beyond what could be expected to 
be the norm (and included threats of litigation). It might be thought that what took place imposed an 
onerous administrative burden’: [2006] NSWSC 122 at [52]; Cf Ogawa, ‘The Courts’ Jurisdiction Over 
Student/University Disputes’, above n 89. 
98 Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’, above n 1, 31. 
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It is not clear why the practice of ‘shoehorning’ as described by Astor does not apply 
equally to complaints going to substantive matters impacting on the nature of the 
educational service supplied. Nor is the proposition that student litigation is not 
significantly concerned with educational standards but rather the fairness of 
university decision making supported by the case law or the results of the recent 
ALTC project. Students may well be concerned that decision making processes are 
fair, but this is not mutually exclusive of claims in relation substantive matters. What 
the case law bears out, as discussed below, is simply that prima facie academic 
matters are not justiciable. Given that courts have consistently refused to look at 
matters of academic judgement when reviewing student claims, students may have 
been particularly concerned to establish that their claim rests on issues regarding 
procedural fairness and the quality of the decision making process rather than the 
merits of the decision itself.99 It is submitted that students are concerned with more 
than procedural fairness in relation to educational services and therefore the UCT 
provisions, which address substantive as well as procedural fairness of the 
contractual terms, are significant in the advancement of students’ rights as 
consumers. 
 
Are academic decisions justiciable? 
The exclusion of academic judgement from the scrutiny of courts, the extent of the 
concept of academic immunity and its appropriateness has been the subject of much 
debate amongst legal scholars.100 As noted above, academic judgement refers to 
decisions relating to course content, design and delivery, the standards of teaching 
or the merits of an academic decision in the assessment of the standard of students’ 
                                                 
99 See, eg, in Clark [2000] 3 All ER 752 the appellant student was given leave to amend her pleading on 
appeal so that the claim in breach of contract related to procedural irregularities in the application of 
student regulations, rather than the merits of the decision of the university in the construction of the 
meaning of plagiarism. The court found that this was a matter that could then be reviewed by the court, 
whereas the former claim could not as it was a pure academic matter. 
100 See generally Farrington and Palfreyman, The Law of Higher Education, above n 3, 360–6 [12.40]–
[12.45]; Jackson and Varnham, Law for Educators, above n 3, 252–3; Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic 
Immunity”’, above n 63; J Joy Cumming, ‘Where Courts and Academe Converge: Findings of Fact or 
Academic Judgement’ (2007) 12(1) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 97; 
Davis, above n 3; Tim Kaye, ‘Academic Judgement, The University Visitor and the Human Rights Act 
1998’ (1999) 11(3) Education and the Law 165; Tim Kaye, Robert D Bickel and Tim Birtwistle, 
‘Criticizing the Image of the Students as Consumer: Examining Legal Trends and Administrative 
Responses in the US and UK’ (2006) 18(2–3) Education and the Law 85; Hoye and Palfreyman, ‘Plato 
vs Socrates’, above n 3; Kós and McVeagh, above n 3; Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University 
Law’, above n 3; Middlemiss, above n 3; Palfreyman, ‘The HEI–Student Legal Relationship’, above n 3; 
Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’, above n 3; Francine Rochford, 
‘Traders of the Lost Ark — Lecturers and Liability’ (2001) 13(2) Education and the Law 127; Francine 
Rochford, ‘Claims Against a University: The Role of Administrative Review in Australia and the United 
Kingdom’ (2005) 17(1–2) Education and the Law 23; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to 
University Decisions Affecting Students’, above n 1; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘In-House or in Court?’, 
above n 4; Francesca Bartlett, ‘Student Misconduct and Admission to Legal Practice — New Judicial 
Approaches’ (2008) 34(2) Monash University Law Review 309. 
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work or academic progression, and has been termed collectively academic matters. It 
is contended that it is issues relating to academic matters that go to the heart of the 
provision of the educational service with which the student will be concerned.101 The 
research question is concerned with whether the UCT provisions will assist students 
making claims in relation to these types of academic matters more effectively than 
other actionable rights that require the court to examine matters of academic 
judgement. It is suggested that claims made pursuant to the UCT provisions 
regarding the nature of the educational service provided by a HEI may not be limited 
by the issue of justiciability, as the legislation prevents a HEI from relying on a term in 
the student–HEI contract that is substantively unfair rather than examining the quality 
of, or standards pertaining to, the academic activity in question.  
 
It should be stated at the outset that an underlying tenet in much of the commentary 
concerning this issue is a desire to protect ‘academic freedom’.102 The debate about 
whether educational activities should properly be subject to judicial scrutiny is often 
entangled with nostalgia about what a HEI might traditionally be, rather than the 
modern reality of the higher education marketplace. Resistance from the academe is 
often expressed on the grounds that any diminution of academic freedom will be 
deleterious to the broader goals of higher education and the public good.103 It is 
important to be cognisant of the need to protect traditional rights of academic 
freedom, balanced against the assurance of the exercise of academic expertise and 
skill in the provision of educational services to students.104 Lindsay suggests, 
                                                 
101 Jackson et al, above n 1. The authors state ‘complaints about the quality of teaching or supervision 
were the second largest category’: at 32.  
102 See generally Margaret Thornton, ‘The Law School, the Market and the New Knowledge Economy’ 
(2008) 17(1&2) Legal Education Review 1; Margaret Thornton, ‘The Idea of the University and the 
Contemporary Legal Academy’ (2004) 26(4) Sydney Law Review 481; Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost 
Ark’, above n 100. Rochford refers to public policy reasons why s 52 of the TPA should not apply to 
lectures. She is of the view that the protection of the idea of academic freedom should be as critical as 
that for the reasons given for exclusion for newspapers: at 138–9; Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between 
The Student and The University’, above n 3; Francine Rochford, ‘Academic Freedom Insubordination: 
The Legalisation of the Academy’ (2003) 15(4) Education and the Law 249; Francine Rochford, ‘The 
Contested Product of a University Education’ (2008) 30(1) Journal of Higher Education Policy and 
Management 41; Francine Rochford, ‘Academic Freedom and the Ethics of Marketing Education’ in 
Tripathi, Purnendu and Siran Mukerji, (eds) Cases on Innovations in Educational Marketing: 
Transnational and Technological Strategies (IGI Global, 2011) 160; Francine Rorke (now Rochford), 
‘The Application of the Consumer Protection Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to 
Universities’ (1996) 12 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 176; Thomas T A Schweitzer, 
‘Academic Challenge Cases: Should Judicial Review Extend to Academic Evaluations of Students’ 
(1992) 41 American University Law Review 267; Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 100; Mike 
Molesworth, Elizabeth Nixon and Richard Scullion, ‘Having, Being and Higher Education: The 
Marketisation of the University and the Transformation of the Student into Consumer’ (2009) 14(3) 
Teaching in Higher Education 277; Patrick. D Pauken, ‘Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy 
in American and Australian Universities: A Twenty-First Century Dialogue and a Call to Leaders’ (2007) 
12(1) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 7. 
103 See also the discussion of ‘marketisation’ of the higher education sector in Chapter 5. 
104 Lim and Hyatt, above n 62, 28. 
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however, that the changing nature of the higher education sector itself opens the 
prospect for judicial review of academic judgement and evaluation.105 It is suggested 
that it is to the benefit of HEIs to establish exactly the extent of what is to be 
considered matters of academic freedom and ensure that this is not entangled with 
administrative issues106 or incompetent teaching.107 Varnham observes that 
academic freedom is not commensurate with protection from incompetence: 
The court will be required to examine the extent to which academic freedom preserves the 
ability of an institution to vary the terms of the agreement formed on enrolment as it thinks 
fit, in light of circumstances as they arise, and the resources available at any point during a 
student’s term of study. It is difficult to imagine that such an argument would be sustained 
in the current consumerist environment. Once a contract is formed for the supply of any 
service or product the parties must perform those terms save their mutual agreement to 
vary those terms in any way. The better argument must be that academic freedom in this 
context relates to the prior planning and resourcing of courses and to the exercise of 
academic judgement in the manner of delivery and assessment of a course. It would be 
hard to sustain an argument on this basis in defence of poor teaching, supervision or 
assessment.108 
 
Varnham’s comments and her focus on the contractual arrangements between the 
HEI and the student are noteworthy in light of the introduction of the UCT regime. 
The cases discussed below, although not always concerned with action pursuant to 
consumer protection law, are significant in as much as they give an indication of the 
courts’ attitude regarding judicial review of academic matters. An examination of the 
case law reveals few exceptions to judicial reticence in appraising academic matters. 
It is clear that a court is more willing to review academic matters when the HEI is a 
private provider in the higher education sector. This is particularly evident when one 
reviews the claims made by students in small claims tribunals.109 An emerging area 
of law where it would appear the courts are prepared to examine the merits of an 
academic decision is in admissions law. The focus of the discussion for the purpose 
of this chapter will be on the extent to which the court will review academic matters. A 
more detailed discussion of the substance and merits of the claims made in those 
                                                 
105 Lindsay, ‘Student Subjectivity’, above n 58, 637. 
106 See also Forster, Ex Parte; Re University of Sydney [1964] NSWR 723, 728. The court made obiter 
comments in relation to the limited resources and need for efficient administration in universities and the 
possibly that this would be compromised should decisions of academic judgement and evaluation be 
open for scrutiny for the courts. Even in 1963 such matters were problematic in the higher education 
sector.  
107 Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 100, 122. 
108 Varnham, ‘Liability in Higher Education in New Zealand’, above n 58, 12–13. 
109 See below pages 28–9, nn 136-46. 
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cases where it relates to the student–HEI contract will be considered in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
 
The seminal English case relating to the justiciability of academic matters is Clark v 
University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 3 All ER 752 (‘Clark’). This decision 
of the Court of Appeal involved a claim for breach of contract by a student against the 
university. The dispute concerned the marking of an assessment that resulted in 
findings of plagiarism. Initially the student claimed that the university had 
‘misconstrued the meaning of plagiarism and that the paper had been given a mark 
beyond academic convention’.110 On appeal, the student’s claim was limited to 
breach of contract under the university’s regulations.111 Therefore, the examination 
by the Court was limited to the question of procedural fairness undertaken in 
reaching the decision. The decision was also a significant one as it confirmed the 
existence of a contract between a fee-paying student and a university. In an oft 
quoted part of the decision from the leading judgment, Sedley LJ stated: 
The arrangement between a fee-paying student and ULH is such a contract: … Like many 
other contracts, it contains its own binding procedures for dispute resolution, principally in 
the form of the student regulations. Unlike other contracts, however, disputes suitable for 
adjudication under its procedures may be unsuitable for adjudication in the courts. This is 
because there are issues of academic or pastoral judgment which the university is 
equipped to consider in breadth and in depth, but on which any judgment of the courts 
would be jejune and inappropriate. This is not a consideration peculiar to academic 
matters: religious or aesthetic questions, for example, may also fall into this class. It is a 
class which undoubtedly includes, in my view, such questions as what mark or class a 
student ought to be awarded or whether an ægrotat is justified. It has been clear, at least 
since Hines v Birkbeck College [1985] 3 All ER 156, [1986] Ch 524 (approved in Thomas’s 
case), that this distinction has no bearing on the availability of recourse to the courts in an 
institution which has a visitor. But where, as with ULH, there is none, the decision of the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in Norrie v Senate of the University of Auckland [1984] 1 
NZLR 129 and the remarks of Hoffmann J in Hines v Birkbeck College [1985] 3 All ER 156 
at 164–165, [1986] Ch 524 at 542–543 open the way to the distinction as a sensible 
allocation of issues capable and not capable of being decided by the courts. It would 
follow, I think, that the issues which the courts remitted with obvious relief to visitors in 
such cases as Thomson v University of London (1864) 33 LJ Ch 625 (which concerned 
the award of a gold medal), Thorne v University of London [1966] 2 All ER 338, [1966] 2 
QB 237 and Patel’s case (both of which concerned the plaintiff’s academic competence) 
                                                 
110 Clark [2000] 3 All ER 752, 752. 
111 Ibid. 
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would still not be susceptible of adjudication as contractual issues in cases involving 
higher education corporations. 
 
It is on this ground, rather than on the ground of non-justiciability of the entire relationship 
between student and university, that the judge was in my view right to strike out the case 
as then pleaded. The allegations now pleaded by way of amendment are, however, not in 
this class. While capable, like most contractual disputes, of domestic resolution, they are 
allegations of breaches of contractual rules on which, in the absence of a visitor, the courts 
are well able to adjudicate.112 
 
This position has been adopted repeatedly by the courts in Australia. The majority in 
Griffith University v Tang,113 although deciding that judicial review under federal 
legislation was unavailable, noted that no claim in contract had been made by the 
PhD student. In their joint judgment, their Honours Gummow, Callinan and Heydon 
JJ stated: 
Had reliance been placed upon contract, then the occasion may have arisen to consider 
the apparent exclusion from justiciability of issues of academic judgment, including issues 
of competence of students, by the English Court of Appeal in Clark v University of 
Lincolnshire and Humberside114. The basis upon which the lack of justiciability was put in 
Clark appears not to depend upon the absence of contractual relations for want of animus 
contrahendi115; rather, the basis appears to be that any adjudication would be, as 
SedleyLJ put it, ‘jejune and inappropriate’.116 
 
His Honour Kirby J had similar views in relation to this point (although strongly 
dissenting on the issue of availability of judicial review in this matter). Kirby J stated: 
Of academic independence and other concerns 
 
The special position of universities:  I recognise that universities are in many ways peculiar 
public institutions117. They have special responsibilities, as the University Act envisages in 
this case, to uphold high academic standards about which members of the academic staff 
will often be more cognisant than judges. There are issues pertaining to the intimate life of 
every independent academic institution that, sensibly, courts decline to review: the 
                                                 
112 Ibid 756 (emphasis added). 
113 (2005) 221 CLR 99. 
114 [2000] 1 WLR 1988; [2000] 3 All ER 752. 
115 Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95. 
116 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 121 [58].   
117 Citing Daniel Nelson, ‘Judicial Review in the Community of Scholars: A Short History of Kulchyski v 
Trent University’, (2004) 13 Education and Law Journal 367, 375.   
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marking of an examination paper118; the academic merit of a thesis119; the viability of a 
research project120; the award of academic tenure121; and internal budgets122. Others might 
be added: the contents of a course; particular styles of teaching; and the organisation of 
course timetables. As Sedley LJ noted in Clark v University of Lincolnshire and 
Humberside123, such matters are ‘unsuitable for adjudication in the courts ... because there 
are issues of academic or pastoral judgment which the university is equipped to consider 
in breadth and in depth, but on which any judgment of the courts would be jejune and 
inappropriate’. Judges are well aware of such peculiarities. The law, in common law 
countries, has consistently respected them and fashioned its remedies accordingly. 
 
However, as Maurice Kay J explained in R v University of Cambridge; Ex parte Persaud124 
(a recent English case similar to the present appeal), it is entirely ‘correct’ of courts ‘to 
distinguish between the disciplinary type of case and the situation where what is in issue is 
pure academic judgment’. In the present appeal, the respondent's claim fell squarely within 
the former class. Academic judgment is one thing. But where an individual who has the 
requisite interest is affected by disciplinary decisions of an administrative nature made by 
a university body acting according to its powers under a statute, outside the few categories 
peculiar to ‘pure academic judgment’, such decisions are susceptible to judicial review. 
They are so elsewhere125. They should likewise be so in Australia. An appeal to ‘academic 
judgment’ does not smother the duties of a university, like any other statutory body, to 
exhibit, in such cases, the basic requirements of procedural fairness implicit in their 
creation by public statute and receipt of public funds from the pockets of the people.126 
 
The approach taken in Griffith University v Tang and the English and New Zealand 
authorities is consistent with decisions in other Australian superior courts.127 In 
Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122 Malpass AsJ of the 
                                                 
118 Citing Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 1 WLR 1988, 1992; [2000] 3 All ER 
752, 756; Hines v Birkbeck College [1986] ch 524, 542 Hoffmann J. See also, Thorne v University of 
London [1966] 2 QB 237. 
119 Citing Re Polten (1975) 59 DLR (3d) 197, 206. 
120 Citing R v University of Cambridge; Ex parte Persaud [2001] ELR 64,74 [21] (QBD). 
121 Citing Re Paine (1981) 131 DLR (3d) 325, 331–3. 
122 Citing Kulchyski v Trent University (2001) 204 DLR (4th) 364, 375 [26]–[27], 377 [32], 379–80 [40]. 
123 Quoting Sedley LJ in Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 1 WLR 1988, 1992; 
[2000] 3 All ER 752, 756. 
124 Citing [2001] ELR 64, 72-74 [20]–[21] (QBD). 
125 Citing, eg, Ceylon University [1960] 1 WLR 223 (PC); [1960] 1 All ER 631; R v Aston University 
Senate; Ex parte Roffey [1969] 2 QB 538; R v Chelsea College of Art and Design; Ex parte Nash [2000] 
ELR 686; R v University of Saskatchewan; Ex parte King (1968) 1 DLR (3d) 721. See also, for review on 
contractual grounds, Olar v Laurentian University (2002) 165 OAC 1. 
126 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 156–7 [165]–[166] (emphasis added). 
127 Cf the matter of Mathews v University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414. On the issue of judicial review 
of academic assessment the Court referred to Norrie v Auckland University Senate (1984) 1 NZLR 129 
and Clark but left open the issue of justiciability: at  [25]–[27] (Spender J). Justice Spender stated that 
he had not ‘approached these proceedings on an absence of jurisdiction for the Court to review matters 
of academic assessment in respect of which avenues of internal review are available to a student of the 
University’: at [27]. Mathews was unable to establish on the pleadings that the loss he claimed was a 
consequence of the breach of contract or other causes of action. 
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Supreme Court rejected Hanna’s claim for review of the University’s decision 
regarding an application for advanced standing on the basis that it was inconsistent 
with another decision as misconceived. The Court could find no error in the 
decisions.128 The Court noted that the decisions of university staff involved academic 
assessment, that is, the claim was concerned with the merits of the matter. The Court 
was persuaded by the decision in Clark.129  
 
In Walsh v University of Technology Sydney [2007] FCA 880 (‘Walsh’), Walsh was 
enrolled in a Masters of Education. He brought claims pursuant to various sections of 
the TPA, including s 52 (misleading and deceptive conduct) and s 74 (implied 
warranty although no contract was pleaded) based on the receipt of a fail grade in 
three assignments in one unit in the Masters programme.130 He sought orders for the 
award of a pass grade in each of the three assignments and that he be awarded the 
degree. The claim was struck out on the basis that the claimant had no reasonable 
prospects of success and the lack of legal foundation for the Court to provide the 
relief he was seeking.131 Justice Buchanan found that there were fundamental 
problems with the claim for relief. His Honour referred to Griffith University v Tang 
and various authorities in relation to judicial review of matters involving academic 
judgement. Of the student’s claim he said: 
His case, factually and legally, depends upon the suggestion that the Court can both 
directly and effectively substitute an opinion for that of UTS and require a different result to 
be awarded … 
I expressed directly to Mr Walsh during his oral submissions my reservations about the 
power of the Court to grant him any remedy of the kind he seeks. He was not able to draw 
my attention to any statutory provision, authority or legal principle which might provide a 
foundation or starting point for the proposition that the Court could direct UTS as to course 
content or requirements or require UTS to award him passing grades in either individual 
                                                 
128 Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122, [64]. 
129 Ibid [66]. 
130 It is clear from the courts comments regarding the statement of claim that the pleading was deficient 
Walsh v University of Technology Sydney [2007] FCA 880, [50]. 
131 This case also proffers yet another example of the difficulties faced by the courts when considering 
claims by self-represented litigants in cases that are ‘complex’: See above n 96 and accompanying text. 
There is certainly a significant element of complexity in the Walsh case, see, eg, Walsh v University of 
Technology Sydney [2007] FCA 880, [85]–[86]. The statement of claim disclosed substantial difficulties 
between the student and teaching staff regarding the selection of his topic for which he would be 
assessed. He also alleged wrongful use of his intellectual property and that the university was acting on 
behalf of a secret agent. See also the following comments in Hanna v University of New England ‘It 
could be perceived that the history of the dealings between the parties did not fall into the category of 
the usual. There was an avalanche of applications, decisions, appeals and other communications. The 
communication between the parties went well beyond what could be expected to be the norm (and 
included threats of litigation). It might be thought that what took place imposed an onerous 
administrative burden’: at [2006] NSWSC 122 [52]. 
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assignments or a whole subject. Indeed he said he had been unable to find any case of 
this kind and agreed that he was asking the Court to strike out into new legal territory. 
 
… it was open to UTS to establish the course of study in which Mr Walsh enrolled and set 
the requirements to be satisfied, including the academic standard to be achieved as 
demonstrated by assignments or other coursework. Decisions about such matters are 
inherently unsuited to judicial review … The present case does not raise disciplinary 
issues. It raises questions of academic assessment and judgment. 
 
At the heart of Mr Walsh's claims, and underpinning the relief sought, is an attempt to 
involve the Court directly in an adjudication upon a matter of both academic standards and 
of the assignment of specific grades to particular assignments. In addition, his claim is that 
the Court enforce its own view directly. In the circumstances revealed by the present case 
I can discern no legal foundation for doing so.132 
 
It is noted in Walsh that the Court refers to the power of the institution to set 
standards and requirements. As indicated above, some of the difficulties in relation to 
what is justiciable appear to lie with the lack of clarity in relation to what can be 
categorised as matters of ‘pure academic judgement’ and in turn, academic freedom. 
It is argued that the inquiry of the court in relation to the determination of ‘the few 
categories peculiar to “pure academic judgement”’133 should be limited to those 
functions that the HEI exercises in the establishment of the various programmes, for 
study and research.134 This could be said to be the true exercise of academic 
freedom and judgement. It is the proposition of this research that once the ‘pure 
academic judgement’ has been exercised in the determination of course 
requirements, to the extent the activities in the delivery of the educational service 
form part of the student–HEI contract those terms are subject to review. This is also 
consistent with what might be considered the ‘main subject matter’ of the contract for 
the purpose of the UCT provisions,135 discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
 
                                                 
132 Walsh v University of Technology Sydney [2007] FCA 880, [70]–[80]. 
133 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99,157 [166] (Kirby J). 
134 Ibid. Chief Justice Gleeson said of the functions of the University: ‘The functions of the appellant 
include providing education, providing facilities for study and research, and conferring higher education 
awards. Its powers include the power to do anything necessary or convenient in connection with its 
functions. Subject to any other legal constraint, it may establish a PhD research programme, and decide 
who will participate in the programme and on what terms and conditions’: at 109 [15] (Gleeson CJ). It is 
suggested that pure academic judgement is limited to the establishment of the programme, not the 
terms and conditions in the actual supply. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 
135 ACL s26. Terms that are the main subject matter of the contract are exempt from the UCT 
provisions. See Chapter 5. 
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It is clear that the courts are more willing to review the nature of academic activities 
when the HEI is a private provider in the higher education sector and even more so if 
the claim is made in the small claims tribunal. In the matter of Kwan v University of 
Sydney Foundation Program P/L & Ors (General) [2002] NSWCTTT 83 (‘Kwan’) the 
Tribunal was prepared to scrutinise academic matters. The claim by Kwan under the 
state consumer protection legislation concerned the standard of the educational 
services and facilities supplied. The student was unsuccessful in this case as the 
Tribunal found on the facts the student had been supplied with what was agreed in 
the consumer contract. However, in reaching its findings, the Tribunal was prepared 
to review the standard of the educational service provided, including the nature of 
tuition. This is consistent with other cases136 before the small claims tribunals 
involving private providers where courts have reviewed academic matters concerning 
the admission of unsuitable fellow students into the course;137 the learning 
environment, including staff–student ratios and the condition of premises;138 teaching 
methodologies;139 assessment of students’ suitability for study based on age, 
workload140 and pre-existing knowledge;141 qualifications and experience of teaching 
staff;142 the quality and amount of tuition given;143 and an award of fail grade in 
academic assessment.144 
 
                                                 
136 Although not a private provider of higher education, the matter of ACCC v Henry Kaye and National 
Investment Institute Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1363 is an intriguing case. The National Investment Institute 
was a provider of property investment courses or programmes. The primary course was the ‘Investment 
Mastery Programme’ (IM programme) and cost $15 000 to enrol. The ACCC prosecuted both the 
company and Henry Kaye as an individual involved in the promotion of seminars that promised at the 
end of the course participants would be property millionaires. The case was largely concerned with the 
nature of the representations made in the advertising of the seminars. Evidence was led, however, to 
establish whether the investment strategies taught and detailed in the programme course materials 
provided a basis for the representations made in the advertising. What is interesting is that the court was 
prepared to review in great detail the content of the teaching materials supplied by the private provider 
of what might be called a professional qualification. The court considered the content and teaching 
methods in each module in the IM programme and heard expert evidence in relation to the 
appropriateness of the finance strategies taught. Within the judgment there is a mix of language and 
terms. The court refers to student enrolment, the customer, clients, ‘teaching and learning outcomes’ 
and embedded strategies. The court also heard evidence from a past student, although his evidence 
was rejected on the basis that he was an inept graduate. The court considered the Noah’s Ark case in 
relation to whether the advertisement promoting the seminars (and therefore the IM programme, which 
was the Institutes ‘product’) was in ‘trade or commerce’. The court concluded it was and embarked on a 
detailed review of ‘academic matters’. 
137 St Clair v College of Complimentary Medicine Pty Ltd (General) [2008] NSWCTT 1309. 
138 Qayam v Shillington College (General) [2007] NSWCTT 620. 
139 Cui v Australian Tesol Training Centre (General) [2003] NSWCTT 329. 
140 Evans v Australian Institute of Professional Counsellor Laws (General) [2004] NSWCTTT 108 
141 Qayam v Shillington College (General) [2007] NSWCTT 620. 
142 Cotton v Blinman Investments P/L & Blinman (General) [2004] NSWCTTT 723. 
143 Jones v Academy of Applied Hypnosis P/L (General) [2005] NSWCTTT 841. 
144 Ibid. 
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Interestingly the issue of judicial review of academic matters does not often arise in 
cases where claims are made under consumer protection legislation.145 For example, 
this was so in both Fennell v Australian National University [1999] FCA 989 and 
Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists [2008] FCAFC 72.146 In both cases 
the applicant students’ claim rested on the provision of misleading or deceptive 
information in relation to aspects of their course, be that the nature and support 
provided for work placements or representations in course handbooks. The focus in 
those matters was on whether the conduct complained of was in ‘trade or commerce’ 
and a consideration of the factual evidence. The issue of justiciability in relation to 
academic matters, although forming part of the factual basis of the students’ claims, 
was not considered by the court specifically. Similarly, in his recent article on the 
application of the new consumer guarantees in the ACL to the provision of 
educational services, Corones does not consider the intersection of the jurisprudence 
regarding the justiciability of academic matters and the requirement to render 
educational services with ‘due care and skill’.147 He focuses instead on the specific 
legislative requirements of the ACL, such as the requirement that the service be 
supplied in ‘trade or commerce’ and the impact of the regulators new standards148 on 
the courts’ examination as to whether the educational service has in fact been 
supplied with ‘due care and skill’. It is arguable that this may not be so easily over 
looked by the higher courts. 
 
The recognition in the UK and Australia of the developing cause of action in 
‘educational malpractice’ or ‘failure to teach’149 may, because of its very nature, result 
in courts reconsidering the prohibition on the adjudication of academic matters. It 
may also assist with claims made pursuant to the consumer guarantees under the 
ACL, as some commentators are of the view that this is analogous to the common 
law standard in negligence.150 The matter of Dudzinskv Kellow151 discussed above, 
                                                 
145 Cf Chan v Sellwood ‘disputes between students and establishments of learning are ordinarily 
unsuitable for adjudication in the courts and ought to be resolved by internal procedure’: at [2009] 
NSWSC 1335, [25]–[26] (Davies J). 
146 These cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 in relation to whether academic matters can be said 
to be in ‘trade or commerce’.   
147 Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services’, above n 65. 
148 The Australian Qualifications Framework and Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 
2011 (Cth) (‘TEQSA Act’); Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services’, 
above n 65, 11–14; Trounson, Andrew, ‘Failed Students Could Hold Universities Liable Under New 
Consumer Laws’, The Australian (Canberra), 14 March 2012, 35. 
149 Rochford, ‘Suing the Alma Mater’, above n 62; Middlemiss, above n 3; Lim and Hyatt, above n 62, 
27; Mawdsley and  Cumming, ‘Educational Malpractice’, above n 62; Eivazi, above n 62; Hopkins, 
above n 62. 
150 See Miller, above n 64; Cf Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services’, 
above n 65. He is of the view that it was not parliament’s intention to codify the common law because 
the statute refers to ‘due care’ and not ‘reasonable care’: at 10. 
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included a claim in negligence against the University and its staff. While the Court did 
not make any determination in relation to the substance of the student’s allegations, 
Drummond J held that it was possible that a claim in negligence might lie as a result 
of a decision by a university lecturer to fail a student. He added that this might be 
difficult to prove, ‘given that a wide range of opinions about the quality of the 
student’s work may each nevertheless be consistent with the exercise with the 
requisite level of care’,152 but the matter was left open. Any academic judgement, 
evaluation and exercise of skill relevant to such a claim would have to be examined 
in determining whether a breach of duty occurred, once it was established that the 
duty arose in the first instance.153 Educational malpractice as an available cause of 
action is in its embryonic stages and a student would encounter considerable 
difficulties successfully establishing a claim, even outside of the issue of justiciability 
of academic matters.154  
 
English commentator Mark Davies is strongly in favour of the removal of ‘academic 
immunity’, that is, the exclusion of ‘legal challenges to their key professional 
services’.155 In his article on this issue, Davies considered the decision in the case of 
R v Higher Education Funding Council, Exparte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 
1WLR 242 (‘Dental Surgery’) at length. This case concerned the grading of research 
outputs for the purpose of funding for the HEI. The assessment of the decision 
making panels were final and said to be an exercise of academic judgement. The 
application before the Court was for orders that reasons for the decision should be 
provided. The Court held that ‘where that which was challenged was no more than an 
informed exercise of academic judgement, fairness alone did not require reasons to 
be given’.156 Davies also observed of the decision in Dental Surgery157 that it was 
                                                                                                                                            
151 [1999] FCA 309. 
152 Ibid [34]. 
153 Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122, [74] where no basis for damages in 
negligence was established. The student failed to appreciate that an error or mistake of itself is not 
negligent. The requisite duty of care was never specified; Kós and McVeagh, above n 3. The authors 
suggest that the focus should however ‘not be on what is justiciable, but rather on defining the scope of 
the duty, establishing breach and causation of loss’: at 24. It is unlikely that it will extend as far as was 
claimed in Walsh v University of Technology Sydney. Walsh asserted that UTS owed him ‘a strong and 
non-delegable duty of care on the basis of university and student’, which he submitted meant that the 
duty owed ‘extended to ensuring that private fee paying students passed the courses in which they had 
enrolled’ and ‘at any trial the burden would fall on UTS to justify and objectively substantiate any non-
passing grade assessment.’ The Court understood ‘the proposition to be similar to the idea of a 
presumptive right to passing grades given diligent application’: [2007] FCA 880 at [46]. As already 
discussed, the Court found that there was no foundation for the substance of the claims made. 
154 See Rochford, ‘Suing the Alma Mater’, above n 62; Francine Rochford, ‘The Role of Public Policy in 
Determining an Educator’s Duty of Care’ (2001) 6 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Law & 
Education 63; Gary Slapper, ‘Judging the Educators: The Forensic Evaluation of Academic Judgment’ 
(1997) 9(1) Education and the Law 5.   
155 Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity”’, above n 63, 77. See also Slapper, above n 154. 
156 Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity”’, above n 63, 77. 
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unclear, in as much as it left unexplained why a court will not consider academic 
expertise when they are prepared to scrutinise other areas of complex expertise, 
such as engineering or medicine aided by expert witnesses.158 One issue noted by 
Davies is the difficultly of the courts reviewing academic decisions based on a lack of 
formalised professional identity and clearly defined standards, which make the 
assessment of a ‘reasonable standard’ problematic.159 The steps taken by the federal 
government to formalise a framework of standards and registration process under the 
Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (‘TEQSA’), suggest that academic 
standards can be measured.160 However, to the extent that Davies’ arguments rest 
on the analogy of the removal of advocates’ immunity,161 which is no longer extended 
in the UK but remains in Australia,162 this argument may be less persuasive in 
Australia.163 It is arguable that this follows for the new consumer guarantees in the 
ACL also.164 Notwithstanding commentators’ opinions, there remains little precedent 
to support the view that courts will encroach on the academics’ purview and review 
academic matters in this context. 
 
An emerging area of law where it would appear the courts are prepared to examine 
the merits of the academic decision is in ‘admissions law’. The recent cases of 
                                                                                                                                            
157 R v Higher Education Funding Council, Exparte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1WLR 242 
158 Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity”’, above n 63, 75, 78. 
159 See also Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services’, above n 65. He 
identifies that standards have not been available as noted also in the report by the Victorian 
Ombudsman: J R Taylor, Victorian Ombudsman Investigation into how Universities Deal with 
International Students, (October 2011) 
<http://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/resources/documents/Investigation_into_how_universities_deal_wit
h_international_students.pdf> n 1: at 11. 
160 Ibid 11–14, 17–18; Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity”’, above n 63, 75, 92; Greg Craven, 
‘Standards Agency Armed to the Teeth’, The Australian (online), 11 September 2011 < 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/standards-agency-armed-to-the-teeth/story-e6frgcjx-
1226135998646>; Joanna Mather, ‘Shonky Colleges in the Firing Line’, Financial Review (Sydney), 30 
April 2012, 24. 
161 Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity”’, above n 63, 75, 87–9. In the UK the preservation of 
advocates’ immunity was based on issues of inconvenience. He notes in particular the artificial and 
problematic distinction between procedural and administrative decisions, and those relating to the 
decision based on the skill of the professional. Davies argues in light of this ‘The expectation should be 
that minimum standards of competence are rightly to be expected of all professionals, and that the law 
should ensure that innocent victims of professional failure should not be the ones to suffer’: at 89. See 
also Simon Baker, ‘Legal Immunity over Marks May Wane, Expert Cautions’, Times Higher Education 
(online), 13 January 2011< 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode+414832&sectioncode=26>. 
162 See, eg, Goddard Elliot v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87. In this case the Victorian Supreme Court recently 
confirmed that it was bound by the decisions of the High Court in relation to the existence advocates 
immunity, despite the Court’s obvious discomfort with the outcome of the case. 
163 Lim and Hyatt, above n 62. After a review of available ‘academic’ protections in the UK, USA 
Australia and NZ, the authors state that the ‘inability to find any clear definition of … “quality” will affect 
the willingness of courts to adjudicate on the level of quality of education being provided to tertiary 
students’: at 35. 
164 As discussed above, the claim is likely to be founded in tortious principles. See Miller, above n 64. 
He states that ‘due care and skill is a common law negligence standard’ and the ‘effect of the section is 
to negate the opportunity to contract out of a claim for negligence’: at [1.S2.60.10]. 
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Humzy-Hancock, Re [2007] QSC 34, and the Victorian case Re Legal Profession Act 
2004; re OG [2007] VSC 520 (Unreported Warren CJ, Nettle JA and Mandie J, 14 
December 2007) are instructive. Both cases demonstrate that in circumstances 
where a decision involving academic judgement may impact significantly on a 
student’s capacity to engage in the livelihood for which they have been training for 
their tertiary career, the court will review the merits of the decision made by the 
relevant academic or academic decision making body. These cases both concerned 
the disclosure or non-disclosure of student academic misconduct in their application 
to the legal practitioners’ board in their respective states for approval and permission 
to practice as a solicitor. The Courts’ decision in both cases is not limited to a 
decision in relation to the existence or not of procedural fairness and clearly go 
behind the academic judgement of the university decision making bodies and 
consider the nature and merits of the decision made. In each case the Court made a 
determination whether in fact the student was guilty of academic misconduct, in 
particular in relation to whether the conduct amounted to plagiarism. Cumming notes: 
The determination in Humzy-Hancock has two implications for future educational law 
challenges in Australia, and possibly internationally. First, the language used in the 
determination and judicial pronouncements about the quality of academic work, rather 
than an argument about the establishment of findings beyond a reasonable standard of 
doubt or lack of procedural fairness, indicate that there are circumstances where the court 
will intervene and make judgements of an academic nature, that is, educational decisions, 
contrary to previous policy statements and dicta. With an absence of a clear legal 
framework of reference in this decision, either objective or subjective, the determinational 
facts become a judgement of academic quality and behaviour, not of an expected 
standard of behaviour.165 
 
Bartlett draws similar conclusions in her consideration of the Humzy-Hancock and Re 
OG cases.166 It is clear that the courts’ were concerned with the impact of the 
academic decision on the capacity of the students’ to practice law for which they had 
spent considerable time and money preparing for. 
 
There are other circumstances that commentators have identified as being possible 
exceptions to the moratorium on review of academic matters. Regarding the issue of 
justiciability in general, Davies is of the view that courts in England do acknowledge 
the need for public decision making bodies to be accountable and ‘to account 
                                                 
165 Cumming, ‘Where Courts and Academe Converge’, above n 100, 105. 
166 Bartlett, above n 100. See also Mary Wyburn, ‘Disclosure of Prior Student Academic Misconduct in 
Admissions to Legal Practice: Lessons For Universities and the Courts’ (2008) 8(2) Law and Justice 
Journal 314, 338–9. 
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intelligently for their decisions by explaining not simply how, but why they have 
reached them’.167 He maintains that this pressure increases in accordance with 
statutory pressures, for example, where race or sex discrimination is alleged.168 
Davies is of the opinion that in relation to disability cases, the courts will look behind 
the academic decision made and the reasons thereof.169 Lindsay notes that under the 
Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth), the International Student 
Ombudsman can review an academic decision, which is to be contrasted with the 
position of the independent adjudicator in the United Kingdom.170 Kaye also 
considered the impact of the Human Rights Act 1988 (UK) on the courts’ reticence to 
determine decisions made by the university Visitor and possible contraventions of the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) as it applied in the UK.171 It is possible 
to argue that competing obligations under various statutory regimes provide the 
judiciary with opportunities to review academic decisions. 
 
In the context of the ACL, it could also be argued that the legislature has indicated 
that the supply of services which, as will be argued in the next chapter, includes the 
supply of educational services, must comply with consumer protection legislation. 
Decisions of specialist consumer claims tribunals where typically the HEI is a private 
provider have certainly taken this approach. There are also decisions in admissions 
law, which is concerned with the statutory obligations in relation to legal practice that 
indicate courts are increasingly prepared to review matters of academic judgement. 
In contrast, however, superior courts remain reluctant to adjudicate on matters of 
academic judgement, although it should be acknowledged that there has not been a 
recent opportunity in Australia to consider this point directly.172 Outside of the 
consumer tribunals, there is no Australian precedent to support the proposition that 
the courts will look to matters of quality and standards in the supply of educational 
services the same way as it will for other professional services. As the authorities 
stand, judicial review of academic matters attending to the quality of the service 
                                                 
167 Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity”’, above n 63, relying on the decision in R v Higher 
Education Funding Council, Exparte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1WLR 242: at 78. 
168 Ibid.  
169 Ibid 90–1. 
170 Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 3, 17. The author notes ‘there is no 
restriction on review of academic decisions under the Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 
2000 (Cth) (ESOS) framework. Grievances procedures established under the HESA framework must be 
able to deal with academic decisions: s19–45(1)(b), HEP Guidelines, s 4,5.1(b)’: at 24 n 138. 
171 Kaye, ‘Academic Judgment’, above n 100. 
172 This point was remarked upon by the majority in Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 121, 
[58]. 
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supplied is unlikely.173 Therefore, there may be difficulties in removing academic 
immunity in its entirety, so as to allow the review of the quality or standard of the 
teaching service delivered, even pursuant to the statutory guarantees under the 
ACL.174  
 
It is suggested, however, that claims regarding the nature of the educational service 
provided by a HEI under the UCT provisions are not as limited by notions of 
academic immunity as other causes of action. The corresponding obligation under 
the legislation in the context of this research is that to the extent that standard form 
consumer contracts contain unfair terms, the term will be void. As the UCT looks to 
the substantive fairness of terms, the provisions rely less on an adjudication of the 
quality and standard of educational services supplied by reference to analogous 
principals from other areas of law, such as professional negligence175 and focus 
instead on the essence of the term. As the UCT provisions address issues of 
substantive unfairness, it is possible that the actual effect of a HEI relying on an 
unfair term, which is concerned with matters of academic judgement, will be 
justiciable. These statutory obligations arising under the ACL in relation to the 
provision of educational services may be able to be enforced without reference to 
notions of academic immunity in relation to academic matters in the supply of that 
service.  
 
Conclusion 
The legal framework applying to the student–HEI relationship is multifaceted. The 
causes of action available to students with respect to a claim against a HEI are 
extensive, although frequently limited in their effectiveness, both in terms of suitability 
and adequacy of remedies. Students are often seen to ‘shoehorn’ their grievances in 
a way that will achieve reparation. Students can seek remediation of their claims 
either internally through domestic procedures of the HEI, or possibly judicial review of 
the same. Students can bring their grievance before the relevant Ombudsman. 
Students’ rights are also reinforced by the considerable ancillary and supporting 
                                                 
173 See also Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students’, 
above n 1, 179. 
174 Cf Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services’, above n 65. However 
he does not consider the jurisprudence regarding non-justiciability of academic matters in this context. 
175 See Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity”’, above n 63; David Palfreyman, ‘£400K for 
Educational Malpractice by University Academics’ (2006) 18(2–3) Education and the Law 217; David 
Palfreyman, ‘HE's ‘get-out-of-jail-free card’’ (2010) 14(4) Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher 
Education 114. 
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statutory frameworks around the regulation of the higher education sector,176 and 
more general statutory rights, such as freedom of information legislation or anti-
discrimination legislation. International students have specific protections in place.177 
A claim under the ACL by a student against their HEI for an alleged failure in the 
provision of educational services is only one route open to the student. 
 
As seen above, students are concerned about the nature of the educational 
experience they participate in. They do make complaints when the educational 
services they receive are not of the standard a reasonable (or occasionally 
unreasonable) student might expect. Students may well be concerned that decision 
making processes are fair, but this is not mutually exclusive of claims in relation to 
substantive matters. Despite significant internal, public and private rights, including 
rights accruing under consumer protection, students have had limited success in 
enforcement of the same before the courts. One reason for this is it is often difficult to 
determine the exact nature of those rights or obtain a remedy due to lack of proof of 
loss suffered. However, a common barrier in relation to claims regarding the nature 
of the educational service provided is that subject to few exceptions, such as the 
emerging area of admissions law, claims made by students in higher courts in 
relation to academic matters are not justiciable.  
 
Some of the difficulties in relation to what is justiciable appear to lie with the lack of 
clarity in relation to what can be categorised as matters of ‘pure academic judgement’ 
or academic freedom. It is the proposition of this research that once the ‘pure 
academic judgement’ has been exercised in the determination of course 
requirements, to the extent academic matters form part of the student–HEI contract 
those terms are subject to review. It is suggested that claims regarding the nature of 
the educational service provided by a HEI under the UCT provisions may not be as 
limited by notions of academic immunity as other causes of action, as the legislation 
prevents a HEI from relying on a term in the student–HEI contract that is unfair. As 
will be seen in Chapter 5, this goes beyond issues of procedural fairness to matters 
that are substantive in relation to the supply of educational services. This, it is 
suggested, circumvents the principle that academic matters are non-justiciable, thus 
advancing students’ rights as consumers. 
                                                 
176 See, eg, various state Higher Education Acts and Commonwealth funding legislation such as Higher 
Education Support Act 2003 (Cth); Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Cth); Tertiary Education Quality 
and Standards Agency Act 2011 (Cth) (‘TEQSA Act’).  
177 Educational Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth). 
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Chapter 3: Application of the ACL to HEIs in Australia 
 
Introduction 
Prior to the introduction of the ACL, one significant barrier for students bringing 
claims under consumer protection legislation has been the view that the services 
supplied by the HEI may not be supplied in ‘trade or commerce’. Previously under the 
TPA, academic activities, such as statements made in lectures, have been 
considered matters internal to the student–HEI relationship. Therefore, although this 
type of activity was conduct that may relate to the overall trade or commerce of a 
HEI, it was not within the scope of the legislation as conduct in trade or commerce.1 
This is in contrast to promotional activities of the HEI.2 In order to attract the UCT 
provisions, the contract for educational services must be ‘services’ ‘provided, granted 
or conferred in trade or commerce’.3 This chapter will assess whether the supply of 
educational services falls within the scope of the legislative requirement that services 
must be supplied in ‘trade or commerce’ as defined by the ACL. In particular, an 
analysis of the effect of the new extended definition of ‘trade or commerce’ will be 
undertaken. The extended definition of ‘trade or commerce’4 includes activities and 
transactions characteristic of the carrying-on of a business or profession.5  
 
Thus this thesis is concerned only with whether the student–HEI contract is a service 
supplied in ‘trade or commerce’, as opposed to a broad range of conduct engaged in 
by a HEI and its employees that might be subject to other provisions in the ACL, such 
                                                 
1 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548; Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235; ACCC v Black on White 
Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1. See especially Francine Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost Ark — Lecturers and 
Liability’ (2001) 13(2) Education and the Law 127, 133. 
2 See, eg, Francine Rorke, ‘The Application of the Consumer Protection Provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to Universities’ (1996) 12 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 
176, 177. Francine Rorke now writes under the name Francine Rochford; Phillip Clarke, ‘University 
Marketing and the Law Applying the Trade Practices Act to Universities’ Marketing and Promotional 
Activities (2003) 8 Deakin Law Review 304; Jim Jackson, ‘The Marketing of University Courses Under 
Sections 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)’ (2002) 6 Southern Cross University Law 
Review 106, 114; Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For: Consumer 
Rights of Students in Higher Education’ (2006) 15(2) Griffith Law Review 306, 315–21; Lynden Griggs, 
‘Tertiary Education, The Market and Liability “In Trade or Commerce”’ (2004) 12 Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 1, 6, 8; Judith Bessant, ‘Legal Issues in Higher Education and the Trade 
Practices Act’ (2004) 26(2) Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 251, 256–7; Sally 
Varnham, ‘Straight Talking, Straight Teaching: Are New Zealand Tertiary Institutes Potentially Liable to 
Their Students Under Consumer Protection Legislation?’ (2001) 13(4) Education and the Law 303, 308; 
Bruce Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law: Negotiating the Legal Terrain of Student 
Challenges to University Decisions’ (2007) 12(2) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 
7, 12. Similarly the regulator was also clear some 15 years ago, see, eg, Allan Fels, ‘The Impact of 
Competition Policy and Law on Higher Education in Australia’ (Paper presented at the Australasian 
Association for Institutional Research 1998 International Conference, Australia, 24 November 1998) 4–
5. 
3 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘services’). 
4 Ibid (definition of ‘trade or commerce’). 
5Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists 248 ALR 267; Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (2002) 122 FCR 110. 
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as misleading or deceptive conduct. This research is therefore a narrower inquiry 
than a consideration of the extensive range of individual academic activities that 
could arguably be conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ for the purpose of other protections 
available under the ACL.6 It is the proposition of this thesis that the contract for the 
supply of educational services occurs in ‘trade or commerce’ and is therefore a 
contract subject to the UCT provisions. To the extent that academic activity forms 
part of the student–HEI contract it will be subject to the ACL provisions regulating 
unfair contract terms. 
 
If the ACL applies, this chapter also examines whether HEIs can avail themselves of 
Crown immunity7 and the existence of any jurisdictional issues arising for particular 
categories of students including international students,8 students studying at 
Australian HEIs at campuses located overseas and online students who may enrol in 
an Australian course but be resident outside the jurisdiction9. 
 
The Australian Consumer Law  
The object of this Act is to enhance the welfare of Australia through the promotion of 
competition and fair trading and provision for consumer protection.10 
 
The impetus for a new national consumer law was the review by the Productivity 
Commission into Australia’s consumer policy framework.11 The report was concerned 
with improved coordination of policy development; the minimisation of gaps in the 
law; harmonisation of consumer laws; empowering consumers, especially vulnerable 
and disadvantaged consumers; and eliminating inconsistencies within the system.12 
There was also a concern amongst the Commission and the Council of Australian 
Governments (‘COAG’) about administrative and regulatory duplication and 
                                                 
6 Such as the Consumer Guarantees contained in ACL ch 3 pt 3-2 div 1 sub-div A-D ss 51–68. See 
especially Stephen Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services by Higher 
Education Providers’ (2012) 35(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1. 
7 CCA ss 2A, 2B.  
8 Ibid ss 5(1)(c), 6(3)(a), 6(4). Liability for the use of educational agents lies with providers and is 
currently governed by the National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities and Providers of 
Education and Training to Overseas Students 2007 and common law principles of agency. 
9 CCA ss 5(1)(c), 6(3)(a), 6(4). 
10 Ibid s 2 (objects clause). This was based on Productivity Commission’s overarching objectives in 
Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, 
Final Report No 45 2008, Canberra <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport> 
adopted in Joint Communiqué Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 15 August 2008, Minister for 
Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, Australian Government, An Australian Consumer Law Fair 
Markets — Confident Consumer (2009), 101. 
11 Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, 
above n 10. 
12 Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, Australian Government, An Australian 
Consumer Law Fair Markets, above n 10, 5; Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Review 
of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, above n 10. 
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inefficiencies, particularly for business compliance costs in relation to consumer 
protection.13 The introduction of national laws to regulate unfair contract terms14  was 
seen as one of the six key elements in achieving these objectives. 15 The resulting 
ACL is a cooperative reform of the Australian Government and the states and 
territories underpinned an Intergovernmental Agreement signed by COAG.16 
 
By January 2011, Australia had a single national consumer protection law regime in 
place, the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’).17 The first tranche of reforms resulted in 
the imposition of an unfair contract terms law from 1 July 2010. Now any term in a 
consumer contract that is unfair as defined by the ACL is void.18 It is arguable that 
universities’ arrangements with their students falls within the definition of standard 
form consumer contracts, to which the law attaches.19 The second part of the ACL, 
while leaving the umbrella provision prohibiting misleading or deceptive conduct and 
unconscionable conduct largely unchanged, significantly alters the operation of 
statutory implied conditions and warranties in consumer contracts for goods and 
services.20 A discussion of the provisions contained in the second tranche of reforms 
is outside the scope of this research. The new legislation has also provided additional 
remedies for those seeking redress and heightened enforcement powers for the 
regulators.21 
 
                                                 
13 Darren Jackson, ‘Implications of the Recent Trade Practices Amendments: An Overview of the New 
Legislation’ (Paper presented at Law Summer School 2011, University of Western Australia Law School, 
Perth, 25 February 2011) 44, 47, n 21; Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment 
(Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (Cth) (‘EM1’); Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices 
Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No.2) 2010 (Cth) (‘EM2’); Economics Legislation 
Committee, The Senate (Cth), Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 
[Provisions] September 2009. See generally Australian Government, Australian Consumer Law 
<http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=home.htm>. 
14 Council of Australian Governments, Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law, 
July 2009 <http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/the_acl/downloads/acl_iga.pdf> 4. 
15 Ibid. ‘The overarching objectives are supported by six operational objectives for consumer policy: 1) to 
ensure that consumers are sufficiently well‐informed to benefit from and stimulate effective competition; 
2) to ensure that goods and services are safe and fit for the purposes for which they were sold; 3) to 
prevent practices that are unfair; 4) to meet the needs of those consumers who are most vulnerable or 
are at the greatest disadvantage; 5) to provide accessible and timely redress where consumer detriment 
has occurred; and 6) to promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement’: at 3. 
16 Australian Government, Australian Consumer Law, above n 13. 
17 Schedule 2 of the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No.1) 2010 (Cth); 
Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No.2) 2010 (Cth). The first tranche of 
reforms received assent on 14 April 2010 operative from 1 July 2010 the second Bill was passed on 24 
June 2010 and took effect on 1 January 2011. 
18 ACL s 23. 
19 Ibid s 27. 
20 Ibid ch 3 pt 3-2 div 1 sub-div A-D ss 51–68, previously Part V of the TPA ss 71 and 74 in particular. 
Section 60 provides that services must be supplied due care and skill. For a discussion of the 
application of these provisions to HEI see Corones, above n 6. 
21 ACL ch 5, see, eg, the new substantiation notices pt 5-1 div 2 ss 219–22, pecuniary penalties pt 5-2 
div 1 ss 224–30. See generally Sarah Russell, ‘The Australian Consumer Law: The New Enforcement 
Powers and Remedies — The Story So Far’ (2012) 20 Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer 
Law 6. 
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In essence, the TPA as a legislative mechanism remained unchanged in the sense 
that the TPA was not repealed but rather renamed the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (‘CCA’).22 The ACL in effect operates as a self-contained code.23 The states 
in turn have enacted legislation adopting the text of the ACL as the law of their 
respective jurisdictions.24 The effect of this is that the ACL applies as the law of each 
state and territory.25 There are of course potential problems with a uniform legislation 
approach rather than the states referring their powers to the Commonwealth. There 
is a risk that individual jurisdictions will make small but increasing modifications to the 
law as it applies in their state, potentially defeating the objective to have a single 
national consumer law.26 Additionally amendments at the Commonwealth level do 
not automatically flow through to all the states, notably WA.27  
 
The former consumer protection regime was structured in a framework of the 
Commonwealth TPA, supported by legislation in the various states and territories 
which, for the most part mirrored the provisions of the Commonwealth Act. Due to the 
construction of federal powers within the Constitution, if a claim was bought pursuant 
to the TPA, claimants were required to establish that the alleged wrongdoer was a 
                                                 
22 Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No.2) 2010 (Cth). In addition to the 
name change, Parts IV (A Unconscionable conduct), V (Consumer protection), VA (Liability for defective 
goods) and VC (Offences) of the TPA were moved to the second schedule, the ACL, as amended and 
renumbered and applying as a law of the Commonwealth. See especially Darren Jackson, above n 13, 
45. The paper contains a detailed discussion of the overview of the statutory framework for the 
implementation of the new ACL.  
23 Section 131(1) CCA. See also Russell Miller, Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law 
Annotated (Thomson Reuters, 34th ed, 2012) 1537 [1.S2.2.7].   
24 Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 (ACT) as amended by Fair Trading (Australian 
Consumer Law) Amendment Act 2010 (ACT); Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) as amended by Fair Trading 
(Australian Consumer Law) Amendment Act 2010 (NSW); Consumer Affairs and Trading Act 1990 (NT) 
as amended by Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Amendment (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2010 
(NT); Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld) as amended by Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Amendment 
Act 2010 (Qld); Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) as amended by Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Australian 
Consumer Law) Act 2010 (SA); Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010; Fair Trading Act 1999 
(Vic) as amended by Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Amendment Act 2010 (Vic); Fair Trading 
Act 2010 (WA). 
25 See, eg, Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA) (‘FTA (WA)’) ss 18–19. 
26 As has already occurred in at least one instance. See, eg, the FTA (WA) s 36; Darren Jackson, above 
n 13. Jackson notes there is already a divergence between the curfew on door to door sales activities in 
Western Australia (8pm) compared with the Commonwealth law (6pm): 45 n3. It should be noted also 
that the ACL is a different statutory regime to the Corporations Law whereupon all states referred their 
constitutional power in relation to corporations to the Commonwealth Government. This has not been 
done in relation to consumer protection. It remains to be seen whether the mechanisms chosen to 
harmonise the laws in the Commonwealth will be successful, or whether over time there is a divergence 
in the ACL with parochial idiosyncratic provisions. 
27 All jurisdictions bar WA set the process for future amendments to the Commonwealth ACL to flow 
through to their Acts automatically upon proclamation and Royal Assent of the Commonwealth ACL. 
See, eg, Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) s 29. It appears a little more complicated in WA. Section 20 of the 
Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA) states the Governor may amend the Australian Consumer Law (WA) by Bill. 
Section 21 of the Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA) deals with publication of regulations and notices in the 
Gazette in order to have force. It remains to be seen whether the mechanism of providing for the 
Governor to quickly enact legislative amendments under this delegated responsibility will overcome the 
hurdles of the difficulty of harmonising laws in a Commonwealth, including whether over time all 
amendments are captured: Darren Jackson, above n 13, 44–5. 
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‘corporation’.28 The provisions of the TPA would then apply. These procedural 
difficulties were often overcome by plaintiffs pleading both under the TPA and the 
relevant state or territory fair trading act. Given the introduction of the national 
consumer law, the constitutional requirement that the HEI be a foreign, financial or 
trading corporation is less significant, as a constitutional corporation is not a pre-
requisite to enliven the provisions.29 It is still a requirement however that the activity 
or conduct under scrutiny occur in ‘trade or commerce’.30 
 
Does the ACL apply to Higher Education Institutions? 
The Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs has explicitly stated that the ‘national 
consumer provisions should apply to all sectors of the economy’.31 For at least the 
last ten years it has been settled law that the consumer protection legislation, 
formerly the TPA, has applied to the activities of HEIs, at least in regard their 
promotional activities.32 Academic commentators have been considering the 
application and effect of consumer protection regimes in the higher education sector, 
both within Australia and in other common law jurisdictions for some time.33 
                                                 
28 TPA s 4 (definition of ‘corporation’ and ‘trading corporation’); Australian Constitution s 51(xx). 
29 In the sense that it is the ACL (Cth) that is relied on. They would still be subject to the ACL under the 
various state application Acts. See especially Corones, above n 6, 7–8. It may also be significant in 
determining who the appropriate regulator is: see Darren Jackson, above n 13, 46. In terms of other 
Commonwealth legislation and particularly funding arrangements, the status of the university as a 
trading corporation may be important in light of the High Court’s recent ruling in the School Chaplin’s 
case: see John Ross, ‘The Power to Fund’, The Australian (online), 27 June 2012 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/the-power-to-fund/story-e6frgcjx-1226409483875>; 
John Ross, ‘Ruling on Chaplains Threatens Uni Funding’, The Australian (online), 27 June 2012 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/ruling-on-chaplains-threatens-uni-funding/story-
e6frgcjx-1226409544364>; Joanna Mather, ‘Regulator Could Face Legal Challenge’, Financial Review 
(Sydney), 12 March 2012, 27. 
30 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘trade or commerce’). See, eg, ACL s 18 whereby the misleading or deceptive 
conduct must occur in ‘trade or commerce’; ACL ch 2 pt 2-3 s 23(3) where the contract must be a supply 
for services. ACL s 2 (definition of ‘services’) means that the services must be supplied granted or 
conferred in ‘in trade or commerce’. 
31 Noting the constitutional limitations in relation to financial services see Joint Communiqué Ministerial 
Council on Consumer Affairs 15 August 2008, Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, 
Australian Government, An Australian Consumer Law Fair Markets, above n 10, 103. 
32 Pilmer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235; ACCC v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1; See 
especially Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost Ark’, above n 1; Rorke, above n 2; Clarke, above n 2; Jim 
Jackson, ‘The Marking of University Courses’, above n 2 ; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What 
They Paid For’, above n 2; Griggs, ‘Tertiary Education, The Market and Liability’, above n 2, 6, 8; 
Bessant, above n 2; Varnham, ‘Straight Talking, Straight Teaching’, above n 2, 308; Lindsay, 
‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 2.  
33 Corones, above n 6; Damian Considine, ‘The Loose Cannon Syndrome: University as Business and 
Students as Consumers’ (1994) 37(1) Australian Universities’ Review 36; Fels, above n 2 ; Patty 
Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘In-House or In Court? Legal Challenges to Universities’ Decisions’ 
18(1) Education and the Law 1; J Steven Kós and Russell McVeagh, ‘The View From the Bottom of the 
Cliff: Enforcement of Legal Rights Between Student and University’ (1999) 4(2) Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Law and Education 18; Bruce Lindsay, ‘Student Subjectivity and the Law’ (2005) 
10(2) Deakin Law Review 628; Andre Onsman, ‘Tempering Universities’ Marketing Rhetoric: A Strategic 
Protection Against Litigation or an Admission of Failure?’ (2008) 30(1) Journal of Higher Education 
Policy and Management 77; Francine Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between the Student and the 
University’ (1998) 3(1) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 28; Sally Varnham, 
‘Guarantees for Degrees?’ (2001) New Zealand Law Journal 418; Sally Varnham, ‘Liability in Higher 
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Promotional activities have been identified by commentators as clearly being 
activities in ‘trade or commerce’ and include activities such as statements made in 
prospectuses, advertisements in all forms of media including social networking sites, 
and open days. Common statements made in the course of these activities to attract 
students can include claims in relation to facilities, cost, accreditation status, 
graduate employment prospects, recognised prior-learning credit, additional support 
services, size of classes and how long it takes to complete the course.34 Thus the 
provisions of the TPA, now the ACL, will extend to the recruitment activities for 
international or domestic full-fee paying students.35 Some commentators are also of 
the view that the act of accepting a student into a course may be conduct in ‘trade or 
commerce’ such that if a student is subsequently without the skills to complete the 
course, the HEI may be exposed to claims under the ACL.36  Many of these activities 
can be said to form part of the terms of the contract for supply of educational services 
between the student and HEI. Some observers have, however, cast doubt that the 
provision of services under the government regulated fee payment scheme can be 
caught as a trading activity.37 The issue in relation to Commonwealth funded 
students is considered specifically below.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Education in New Zealand: Cases for Courses?’ (1998) 3(1) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Law 
and Education 3. The Australian commentaries don’t always include a consideration of cases in the 
lower courts such as the Kwan v University of Sydney Foundation Program P/L case; cf Lindsay, 
‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 2, 12; Jim Jackson, ‘Regulation of International 
Education: Australia and New Zealand’ (2005) 10(2) & (2006) 11(1) Australia & New Zealand Journal of 
Law & Education 67, 78; Corones, above n 6. For a discussion of similar issues arising in the UK see, 
eg, Tim Birtwistle and Melissa Askew, ‘The Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 — Impact on the 
Student Contract’ (1999) 11 Education and the Law 89; Mark Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic 
Immunity” — The Beginning of a New Era?’ (2004) 16 Education and the Law 75; Martin Davis, 
‘Students, Academic Institutions and Contracts — A Ticking Time Bomb?’ (2001) 13(1) Education and 
the Law 9; Dennis Farrington and David Palfreyman, The Law of Higher Education (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2012); William Hoye and David Palfreyman, ‘Plato vs Socrates: The Devolving 
Relationship Between Higher Education Institutions and Their Students’ (2004) 16(2–3) Education and 
the Law 97.  
34 Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education’, above n 33, 76–7. 
35 See, eg, Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education’, above n 33, 75–8; Griggs, ‘Tertiary 
Education, the Market and Liability’, above n 2, 5; Clarke, above n 2, 17. 
36 See especially Corones, above n 6, 14–17 and his observations following the report by the Victorian 
Ombudsman, J R Taylor, Investigation into How Universities Deal with International Students (2011) 
who is of the view that this type of claim is very possible in regards the new consumer guarantees 
especially; Rorke, ‘The Application of the Consumer Protection Provisions’, above n 2. Rorke also 
considers the acceptance of students into a course as being in trade or commerce and notes in her view 
that irrespective of the category of the student (ie. HECS or full fee paying undergraduate or 
postgraduate) the ‘acceptance of the student into a course is likely to be in trade or commerce’: at 190. 
She notes further that it is possibly a ‘sustainable argument that a student with insufficient skills was 
being enrolled in a course might be able to recover the fees paid’: at 193. 
37 Clarke, above n 2, 17; Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education’ above n 33, 76; cf Bessant, 
above n 2; Corones, above n 6. 
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Is the contract for the supply of educational services in ‘trade or commerce’? 
In order to attract the UCT provisions, the contract for services must be services 
provided, granted or conferred in ‘trade or commerce’.38 Whether the student–HEI 
contract is for ‘services’ as defined by the ACL is considered in Chapter 4.39 
Assuming that the student–HEI contract is such a service, the focus of this chapter is 
whether the supply of that service occurs in ‘trade or commerce’ as required by the 
ACL. Given the requirement that services be supplied in ‘trade or commerce’ was 
also a threshold requirement under the TPA, an examination of the case law dealing 
with the previous provisions under the former TPA remains relevant and useful to an 
examination of the new law under the ACL.   
 
Few reported cases have considered what type of conduct engaged in by providers 
of higher education services amounts to conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ for the 
purpose of the legislation.40 It is clear that some academic activity will not be 
considered to be conduct in ‘trade or commerce’, such as statements made in public 
lectures.41 There is, however, disparity in the approach taken by the courts across 
the jurisdictions in which these cases are heard, notably the lower courts. 
Furthermore, the complex nature of student litigation has precluded a detailed 
consideration of this issue in a number of cases. In addition, it is apparent that the 
attitude is markedly different if the supplier of the educational service is a private 
provider. 
 
The meaning of ‘trade or commerce’ as interpreted by the courts is considered in 
detail in this chapter. While the decided cases involving HEIs are instructive, it is 
important to remember that this thesis is concerned only with whether the student–
HEI contract is a service supplied in ‘trade or commerce’. Most of the cases 
contemplate whether a particular academic activity is conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ 
for the purpose of a claim that the HEI has engaged in misleading or deceptive 
behaviour as prohibited by the ACL. This research is a narrower inquiry. It is the 
proposition of this thesis that the supply of educational services occurs in ‘trade or 
commerce’ and therefore any contract for those services is subject to the UCT 
provisions. Consequently, the issue of whether particular types of academic activity 
                                                 
38 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘trade or commerce’). See, eg, ACL s 18 whereby the misleading or deceptive 
conduct must occur in ‘trade or commerce’; ACL ch 2 pt 2-3 s 23(3) where the contract must be a supply 
for services. ACL s 2 (definition of ‘services’) means that the services must be supplied granted or 
conferred ‘in trade or commerce’. 
39 ACL ch 2 pt 2-3 s 23(3) where the contract must be a supply for services.  
40 See, eg, Pilmer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235; ACCC v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1. 
41 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548; Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235; Quickenden v 
O’Conner (2001) 184 ALR 260. See generally Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost Ark’, above n 1.  
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or judgement are in ‘trade or commerce’ does not directly arise, except to the extent 
that that activity could be said to be incorporated as a term of the contract in 
question. The nature and content of the student–HEI contract are considered in detail 
in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Legislative definition of ‘trade or commerce’ 
The definition of ‘trade or commerce’ as amended in the ACL, provides a potentially 
wider definition than previously under the TPA. Formerly the definition of ‘trade or 
commerce’ was: 
trade or commerce means trade or commerce within Australia or between Australian and 
places outside Australia.42 
 
The power of the Commonwealth Government to make laws in respect of trade or 
commerce emanates from clause 51(i) of the Constitution. As a result of the 
harmonisation of the consumer protection laws described above, the national law in 
relation to consumer protection is not so restricted. The meaning of the phrase ‘trade 
or commerce’ in the ACL is ascribed a broader meaning. The definition of the ACL 
adopts the wording of that found in former state fair trading acts: 43 
trade or commerce means: 
(a) Trade or commerce within Australia. 
(b) Trade or commerce within Australia and places outside Australia. 
It includes any business or professional activity (whether or not carried on for profit).44 
 
As with the previous definition in the TPA, this has the effect of the ACL applying to 
conduct engaged in outside of Australia, provided at least one of the parties to the 
commercial or trading relationship is situated within Australia. This assists students 
who may be studying fully online or at a branch campus of an Australian HEI outside 
Australia.45 The significance for HEIs in the context of the application of the ACL to 
academic activities is in the addition of the words ‘any business or professional 
activity (whether or not carried on for profit)’. The new extended definition is 
significant in determining what activities of HEIs (beyond promotional activities) are in 
‘trade or commerce’ for the purpose of the ACL. The jurisprudence surrounding this 
                                                 
42 TPA s 4 (definition of ‘trade or commerce’).  
43 See, eg, Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) s 42(1), which used to provide ‘a person shall not, in trade or 
commerce, including any business activity or in any professional activity, engage in conduct that is 
misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive’ and s 4 (definition of ‘business’) ‘includes a 
business not carried on for profit and a trade and a profession.’ 
44 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘trade or commerce’). 
45 See also the discussion below pp 92-93 regarding the extraterritorial application of the CCA. 
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phrase will be considered with particular regard to the effect, if any, of the new 
definition.  
 
Judicial consideration of the meaning of ‘in trade or commerce’ 
Interlocutory proceedings 
In relation to matters brought before the courts by students, often the issue of 
whether the conduct complained of is in ‘trade or commerce’ is not dealt with at all by 
the courts. One could speculate that this is influenced by the fact that much of the 
litigation is ‘omnibus litigation’ and many of the decisions relate to interlocutory 
applications, generally strike out applications or applications for summary judgment.46 
Traditionally courts are not inclined to deny a claimant’s right to be heard in 
substance on the basis of threshold issues in a strike out or summary judgment 
application, particularly when the claimant is an in-person litigant as many students 
are.47 In order to succeed on a strike out or summary judgment, applicants (typically 
the HEI) are generally required to demonstrate a higher standard of proof.48 It is also 
arguable that the outcomes in these types of matters are influenced by what Astor 
has identified as ‘complexity’ in the cases, that is, not just the nature of the claim 
made, but in the number of claims and appeals brought, and the characteristics of 
the litigant themselves.49  
 
                                                 
46 See, eg, Hanna v University of New England [2006] NSWSC 122, [36] where the issue of whether the 
conduct is in ‘trade or commerce’ is noted but the court said that for the present purposes did not need 
to be pursued. The court turned its attention to matters of substance.  
47 As occurred in Walsh v University of Technology, Sydney [2007] FCA 880, [87]. Although the matter 
was struck out, it was on the basis of matters of substance. The issue of whether the conduct had 
occurred in ‘trade of commerce’ was not canvassed at all. This notion of protecting in person litigants is 
also relevant to applications for costs orders by defendant universities, which would prevent students 
from pursuing their claims in a practical way. See, eg, Ogawa v University of Melbourne [2005] FCA 
1139, ‘I am mindful of the need to ensure that an impecunious student is not shut out by a potential 
liability for costs from pursuing an apparently meritorious claim against a large and wealthy corporation 
like the University’: at [95] (Ryan J); Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99. Justice Kirby 
remarked it was of concern that the students complaints in that case the substance of which would 
never be reviewed nor the procedural fairness or not of the same see paragraphs: at 138 [114]–[119] 
(Kirby J). 
48 See, eg, Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O16 r 1,O20 r 19(1) where an order for summary 
judgement can be made on the application of the defendant when the Court is ‘satisfied that the action is 
frivolous or vexatious, that the defendant has a good defence on the merits, or that the action should be 
disposed of summarily … the onus is on the defendant to show that there is no serious question to be 
tried on any cause of action raised by the plaintiff … In a combined application of this sort, the court is 
not confined by the manner in which the plaintiff has formulated his case on the pleadings and may 
consider the undisputed facts as well as the facts which are in dispute’: at LexisNexis Civil Procedure 
WA commentary 
<http://www.lexisnexis.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/au/legal/results/pubTreeViewDoc.do?nodeId=TAADA
ACAAVAAF&refPt=TAAF&pubTreeWidth=23%25>. 
49 Hilary Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’ (2010) 21 Australasian Dispute 
Resolution Journal 20. See the discussion in Chapter 2 n 97. 
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An example50 of this can be seen in the extensive, protracted and bitter litigation 
between the University of Melbourne and former PhD candidate Megumi Ogawa. Ms 
Ogawa brought many claims against the University that were not limited to claims 
pursuant to the TPA and included an application to the High Court. Ms Ogawa was 
incarcerated for contempt and ultimately left Australia due to difficulties with her 
visa.51 She eventually completed her doctoral studies with the University of 
Queensland and ultimately settled the dispute with the University of Melbourne.52 In 
the matter of Ogawa v The University of Melbourne (No.3) [2004] FMCA 536, Ms 
Ogawa made various claims against the University, including contravention of section 
52 of the TPA and breach of contract. The University of Melbourne sought orders to 
strike out the applicant’s statement of claim or alternatively summary dismissal on the 
basis the claim was vexatious. The University’s application was not successful. 
However, Ogawa’s claims against the University were dismissed in Ogawa v The 
University of Melbourne [2005] FCA 1139 as Ogawa failed to attend at the hearing. In 
Ogawa v Phipps [2006] FCA 361, Ogawa was successful in her application for writs 
for certiorari and prohibition in respect of the decision dismissing the application and 
orders for costs53 on the basis that the proceedings had been wrongly transferred to 
the inferior court. The Court also ordered that the matter be transferred to the Federal 
Court. 
 
In relation to the claims made pursuant to the TPA, the University of Melbourne did 
not admit that it was a trading corporation for the purposes of the Act or that the 
offering of courses to overseas students was in ‘trade or commerce’.54 In relation to 
the claim under the TPA for misleading and deceptive conduct, Phipps FM noted the 
difficultly in distilling the representations given the manner in which the claim had 
been pleaded.55 The Court was of the view that it was likely that the impugned 
conduct was first that the candidate would be supervised by members of the 
academic staff with appropriate and continuing research experience and second, in 
absence of this, the University would arrange a suitable replacement.56 It is arguable 
                                                 
50 See also Mathews v University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414; Walsh v University of Technology, 
Sydney [2007] FCA 880; Dudzinski v Kellow [1999] FCA 390. 
51 Adam Morton, ‘Learning to Fight’, The Age (online) 29 July 2006 <http://www.theage.com.au/news/in-
depth/learning-to-fight/2006/07/28/1153816381159.html?page=z>. 
52 See Megumi Ogawa, ‘The Courts’ Jurisdiction Over Student/University Disputes in Australia’, (2012) 
2(1) International Journal of Public Law and Policy 96. 
53 Ogawa v University of Melbourne (No.2) [2005] FMCA 1216. 
54 Ogawa v University of Melbourne (2005) 220 ALR 659 [105]. 
55 Ogawa v University of Melbourne (No.3) [2004] FMCA 536, [14], [17]. 
56 Ibid [23]. 
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that these representations were also terms of the student–HEI contract.57 The issue 
of whether this constituted conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ was not determined as the 
proceedings were resolved by way of confidential settlement.58  
 
By way of contrast, in Mathews v University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414 
(‘Mathews’), claims regarding particular academic activities were struck out, largely 
on the basis that they were not conduct in ‘trade or commerce’.59 A former student 
complained in relation to the failure by the University to properly assess his academic 
achievement and deal with complaints by him about the assessment in relation to 
mathematic units undertaken. The first claim related to the decision by the relevant 
appeals committee and their representation that they could deal with all matters 
raised in his appeal.60 The claimant was of the opinion he should have been awarded 
a grade of seven in the particular subject, rather than the six he received.61 Justice 
Spender was of the view that that the statement of claim did not disclose that this 
representation had been made in ‘trade or commerce’.62 The Court also held that the 
University’s alleged representation that it would not ‘countenance plagiarism’ and 
subsequent failure to apply the plagiarism policy to other students was not conduct in 
‘trade or commerce’.63 
 
                                                 
57 See generally Chapter 4; Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 121; Megumi Ogawa, above n 
52, 98. 
58 Megumi Ogawa, above n 52, 96–7. 
59 Mr Mathews failed to show reasonable cause of action against the University and the proceedings 
were struck out as frivolous and vexatious. See also Dudzinski v Kellow [1999] FCA 390 where the court 
struck out the part of the claim relating to claims under s 52 of the TPA. The student sought to allege 
that the determination by three members of the academic staff that he was not entitled to credit for prior 
learning was misleading or deceptive. The Court stated ‘… his bald assertion of a conclusion without 
any explanation of how the communication by any of (the academic staff) constituted conduct in trade or 
commerce … is plainly embarrassing’: at [26]. 
60 The claimant alleged that committee had falsely represented that they had the ability to deal with and 
consider all relevant matters in relation to the appeal and that they had failed to do so. 
61 Mathews v University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414, [11]. 
62 Ibid [10]. 
63 Ibid [21]. The courts have shown reluctance in other matters to find the development or application of 
institutional policy as an activity that can be said to be in ‘trade or commerce’. For example, jurisdiction 
was denied in relation to a claim made in the matter of Crook v Holmesglen Institute of TAFE (Civil 
Claims) [2010] VCAT 1808. The applicant Crook made a claim in relation to disciplinary action brought 
by TAFE against him because of alleged disruptive behaviour in class. The student applied for an 
injunction, declarations and for a refund of fees. Crook sought orders for a substantial change to 
disciplinary procedures at Holmesglen TAFE, the implementation of an anti-bullying campaign and the 
implementation of proper grievance procedures at the TAFE. The student’s claim was unsuccessful. The 
Tribunal thought that in the circumstances the only remaining question to be determined was whether 
the applicant had been afforded procedural fairness in the appeals process. The Tribunal found that he 
had. When considering jurisdiction, the Tribunal said the ‘items pleaded in the Statement of Claim … do 
not reflect a “consumer and trader” dispute as defined in Part 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1999 because, 
unlike [other] items, they do not reflect a dispute over whether the respondent wrongly deprived him of 
“service” which by contrast it was obliged to supply. Rather [they] request VCAT to dictate to the 
respondent how it should regulate and conduct its disciplinary procedures. That is not something which 
the Fair Trading Act has conferred upon VCAT the jurisdiction to do’: at [15].  
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Mathews also alleged that ‘the University represented that the lecturer responsible 
for the subject would provide a written statement of the goals or purposes of the 
subject and the nature of the assessment, that the lecturers would be available to 
discuss assessments with students.’ 64 He claimed that the lecturer had failed to do 
so and he had suffered loss as a result. The Court held that the representations if 
made were not in ‘trade or commerce’.65 The decision should be treated with caution 
however as scant regard was paid to substantive issues, such as whether the 
impugned conduct is in ‘trade or commerce’. His Honour accepted on principle the 
university’s submissions without giving detailed reasons. The findings in relation to 
what might be activities of a HEI in ‘trade or commerce’ are really bald conclusions 
and cannot be said to be decisive of the matter. The Court focused on the difficulties 
of the student being able to prove that the loss was caused by the representations.66 
Further it is clear that once again the matter and relationship the student had with the 
University was a ‘complex’ one.67  
 
Assumption of application 
In other instances it appears that it is assumed that the conduct is ‘in trade or 
commerce’ or is decided without discussion. If the issue is dealt with it is often in the 
course of the judgment, but not necessarily in the context of a threshold requirement 
to be established by the claimant.68 Again this could be more reflective of the nature 
of claims made often being by self-represented litigants. For example, in the matter 
of Fennell v Australian National University [1999] FCA 989, a former MBA student69  
brought a claim under the TPA alleging that he had been induced by false 
representations to enrol in an MBA with the University. He also brought a claim 
against the individual academic who was the director of the programme. The 
applicant alleged that the University had falsely represented it would arrange a work 
placement for him in Asia. The representations were said to have been made 
variously in an advertisement in a newspaper, the interview process, the prospectus 
                                                 
64 Mathews v University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414, [22]–[23]. 
65 Ibid [34]. 
66 Ibid [22]–[23], [12]–[15], [33]–[34]. The Court identified that the significant problem for the applicant 
student was his inability to establish a causative link between the conduct that was alleged to have 
breached the TPA and any damage or loss suffered by him. Mr Mathews claimed damages in excess of 
$400 million, which included diminished prospects of an academic career and the lost opportunity to 
undertake his PhD in Logical Equivalence of Legal Decisions, which would have been commercialised 
as a computer program.  
67 See above n 49. 
68 See ACCC v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1, 21 [87]. 
69 It should be noted that in this matter the applicant student was assisted by his barrister father. 
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and handbook. The applicant’s claim failed because of his inability to establish any 
loss suffered.70 
 
There was no discussion regarding whether the impugned conduct of the University 
(the various representations) was in ‘trade or commerce’. It appeared that it was 
assumed that the conduct fell within the ambit of the consumer protection legislation. 
The Court proceeded to examine the substantive issues in relation to liability and 
damages. Similarly in the matter of Joseph v LA Trobe University [2004] FCA 746, 
the student made a claim pursuant to the provisions in the TPA alleging coercion and 
exclusive dealing. No consideration was given to whether the imposition of a general 
services fee was in ‘trade or commerce’ as required for the exclusive dealing and 
soliciting payments provisions. No submission on this threshold issue was made by 
the University.  
 
Private Providers 
It is also clear from the cases that the issue of whether or not the conduct is in ‘trade 
or commerce’ is less problematic for the courts if the HEI is other than a public 
university.71 In these cases often the issue does not arise for discussion, but rather is 
assumed by the complainant, provider and the court to apply. If it is raised, the 
discussion and application is often a cursory one. In the matter ACCC v Black on 
White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1, the Court had no hesitation in finding that the 
conduct in question was in ‘trade or commerce’. The ACCC commenced proceedings 
against Black on White Pty Ltd, which was a private provider of colleges specialising 
in early childhood studies for domestic and international fee paying students. The 
ACCC alleged misrepresentations were made in respect of accreditation claims, the 
standard, quality and suitability of the services, refund entitlements and deferred 
payment plans of tuition fees by students.72 It also alleged unconscionable conduct in 
                                                 
70 The applicant had in fact graduated with his MBA and was employed in a new position that paid 
substantially more than his employment as engineer prior to completing his MBA. 
71 In addition to the cases at the tribunals below at n 74, see also Beardsley v Commission of Consumer 
Affairs [2009] SASC 304 where the Supreme Court of SA considered whether offences under the FTA 
(SA) had occurred by the defendant making representations in the course of conducting the business of 
a beauty college. The Court held that the defendant appellant had accepted payments from students for 
the supply of a training course that would lead to qualifications under the Australian Qualifications 
Framework when in fact it would not; ACCC v Real Estate Institute of Australia Inc [1999] FCA 18 in 
relation to undertaking and final orders by consent the issue of jurisdiction was limited to a consideration 
of whether the TAFE was a trading corporation within the meaning of the TPA. No consideration was 
given as to whether the conduct was in trade or commerce but this matter did involve orders by consent; 
ACCC v Henry Kaye and National Investment Institute Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1363 in relation to the get rich 
quick seminars that the courts were clear that the representations were made in ‘trade or commerce’. 
This case was discussed in Chapter 2, n 136. 
72 Again, it is interesting to note that it is arguable that these could be said to be terms of the contract. 
See Chapter 4. 
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respect of the same pursuant to section 51AB of the TPA. Justice Spender simply 
stated: 
I am satisfied that the representations … made by the first respondent was conduct in 
contravention of s 52 of the Act. The conduct was clearly conduct in trade or commerce 
…73  
 
Consumer Tribunals 
The acceptance of the jurisdiction is particularly noticeable in the small claims 
courts.74 In the matter of  Kwan v University of Sydney Foundation Program P/L and 
ORS (General) [2002] NSWCTT 83 (‘Kwan’), a student claimed damages in respect 
of breach of contract and misleading or deceptive conduct pursuant to the Fair 
Trading Act 1987(NSW)(FTA(NSW)). The student was enrolled in a pre-university 
course supplied by the respondent. The respondent was a corporation established by 
the University of Sydney. The substance of the claim is discussed more fully in 
                                                 
73 See ACCC v Black on White Pty Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 1, 21 [87]; In the related area of educational 
consulting services, French J found that the conduct of a private provider of educational services 
engaged in conduct in ‘trade or commerce’. ACCC v Kokos International Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 2035 
involved allegations of price fixing and other anti-competitive conduct between companies providing 
education services to overseas students. It was agreed between the parties that ‘Kokos is and was at all 
material times a trading corporation within the meaning of the Act and carrying on business in trade or 
commerce in Western Australia as a supplier of education consultancy services to students and 
prospective students of Korean origin intending to study at secondary and tertiary educational 
institutions (Schools)’: at [10] (French J). 
74  See also Shu Fen Li v Jia Cheng International Pty Ltd (General) [2008] NSWCTT 944. This was a 
claim by 19 international students enrolled in a certificate course in aged care. The Tribunal said there 
was no doubt the applicants were consumers under the Consumer Claims Act 1998. Consideration was 
given in relation to who were the suppliers within the meaning of the Act, notably the students’ agent. 
The Tribunal found that the agent was a supplier within the meaning of the Act; In Lan v The 
International College of Management, Sydney P/L (General) [2007] NSWCTT 299 an order was made 
pursuant to the Consumer Claims Act 1998 (NSW) for a refund of college fees. The Tribunal found that 
the HEI was a tertiary institution and that the applicant relied on the provisions of s 13(2)(g) of the 
Consumer Claims Act 1988. Without discussing the matter the tribunal found it had jurisdiction to hear 
the matter under the provisions of the Act; In Evans v Australian Institute of Professional Counsellor 
Laws (General) [2004] NSWCTTT 108 jurisdiction lay as this was a ‘consumer claim’ under the 
Consumer Claims Act 1998 (NSW) in relation to a claim of misleading and deceptive conduct when the 
applicant enrolled in a counselling course. The alleged misrepresentations related to the student’s 
selection to undertake a ‘major subject’; In the matter of Cotton v Blinman Investments P/L & Blinman 
(General) [2004] NSWCTTT 723 claims were brought in relation to representations regarding the 
qualifications and experience of the teaching staff at the Strand College of Beauty Therapy. The 
Tribunal found that the College conducted a business and this was a consumer claim within the 
meaning of the Consumer Claims Act 1988 (NSW); In Qayam v Shillington College (General) [2007] 
NSWCTT 620 the student had enrolled in a certificate course in graphic design and alleged various 
misrepresentations about the timing of the format of the courses and the advice that novices could 
undertake the course. Without any discussion the Tribunal decided it had jurisdiction to hear the matter 
under the provisions of the Consumer Claims Act 1988 (NSW); So too in Nguyen v Anderson (General) 
[2009] NSWCTT 278; In a claim for misrepresentation pursuant to s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 
(NSW), the Tribunal did not consider the issue of jurisdiction but only the substance of the matter, St 
Clair v College of Complimentary Medicine Pty Ltd (General) [2008] NSWCTT 1309; In Cui v Australian 
Tesol Training Centre (General) [2003] NSWCTT 329 the application concerned a claim under the 
Consumer Claims Act 1998 (NSW) in relation the refund fees for the Cambridge certificate in English 
Language Teaching to Adults course, which was an international qualification accredited by the 
University of Cambridge (UK). The issue of jurisdiction was not raised at all, so too in the matter of 
Navarro v Academies Australasia P/L (General) [2003] NSWCTTT 678 and Jones v Academy of Applied 
Hypnosis P/L (General) [2005] NSWCTTT 841. 
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Chapter 4. In relation to jurisdiction, the Tribunal found it derived its jurisdiction from 
the Consumer Claims Act 1998 (NSW).75 The Member was of the view that there was 
‘no dispute that there was a supply of goods and services’ and therefore he could 
‘determine a claim or breach of contract for the supply of services … under the Fair 
Trading Act 1997.’76 Part of the claim by the student related to the standard of tuition 
provided as well as claims in relation to the provisions of facilities. The contract 
therefore included academic activities of the HEI, all of which were in effect supplied 
‘in trade or commerce’.77  
 
The test in Concrete Constructions 
The meaning of ‘trade or commerce’ receives very little attention in the Explanatory 
Memorandum Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (no.2) 
2010 (Cth) (‘EM2’) and only in the context of section 18.78 In relation to the 
application of section18 the following is noted from the EM2: 
The High Court has found, for the purposes of section 52 of the TP Act, that ‘trade or 
commerce’ includes conduct which is itself an aspect or element of activities or 
transactions which, of their nature, bear a trading or commercial nature.79 
 
The EM2 footnotes the case of Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson 
[1990] HCA 17 (‘Concrete Constructions’).80 It is relevant therefore to review 
Concrete Constructions and consider how that precedent has been followed in 
subsequent cases with particular regard to what activities of a HEI might be 
considered to be in ‘trade or commerce’ so as to attract the application of the ACL. 
 
In Concrete Constructions, the High Court considered whether the provision of an 
internal memo by an employee of a company to another employee regarding 
directions about the placement of a grate in the workplace was in ‘trade or 
commerce’ for the purpose of section 52 of the TPA. The employee was injured and 
sought to make a claim under the TPA on the basis that the directions given in the 
memo were misleading or deceptive, resulting in his injury. The question was 
                                                 
75The NSW Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear claims brought 
under the FTA unless the action is ancillary to one brought in relation to the supply of goods and 
services. Kwan v University of Sydney Foundation Program P/L (General) [2002] NSWCTT 83, [6]. 
76 Ibid [7]. 
77 Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 2, 12. 
78 Formerly s 52 of the TPA, which provides a broad prohibition on misleading or deceptive conduct. 
Explanatory Memorandum Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No.2) 2010 
(Cth) (‘EM2’) 37–38 [3.7]–[3.16]. 
79 Ibid [3.13]. 
80 Ibid [3.13] n 4. 
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therefore whether the internal memo was conduct ‘in trade or commerce’. Of the 
nature of the conduct, the majority (Mason CJ, Deane Dawson and Gaudron JJ) said: 
The phrase ‘in trade or commerce’ in s 52 has a restrictive operation. It qualifies the 
prohibition against engaging in conduct of the specified kind. As a matter of language, a 
prohibition against engaging in conduct ‘in trade or commerce’ can be construed as 
encompassing conduct in the course of the myriad of activities which are not, of their 
nature, of a trading or commercial character but which are undertaken in the course of, or 
as incidental to, the carrying on of an overall trading or commercial business ... 
Alternatively, the reference to conduct ‘in trade or commerce’ in s 52 can be construed as 
referring only to conduct which is itself an aspect or element of activities or transactions 
which, of their nature, bear a trading or commercial character. So construed, to borrow 
and adapt the words used by Dixon J in a different context in Bank of NSW v 
Commonwealth [(1948) 76 CLR 1 at 381], the words ‘in trade or commerce’ refer to ‘the 
central conception’ of trade or commerce and not to the ‘immense field of activities’ in 
which corporations may engage in the course of, or for the purposes of, carrying on some 
overall trading or commercial business. …. In the context of Pt V of the Act with its 
heading ‘Consumer Protection’, it is plain that s 52 was not intended to extend to all 
conduct, regardless of its nature, in which a corporation might engage in the course of, or 
for the purposes of, its overall trading or commercial business. Put differently, the section 
was not intended to impose, by a side-wind, an overlay of Commonwealth law upon every 
field of legislative control into which a corporation might stray for the purposes of, or in 
connection with, carrying on its trading or commercial activities. What the section is 
concerned with is the conduct of a corporation towards persons, be they consumers or 
not, with whom it (or those whose interests it represents or is seeking to promote) has or 
may have dealings in the course of those activities or transactions which, of their nature, 
bear a trading or commercial character. Such conduct includes, of course, promotional 
activities in relation to, or for the purposes of, the supply of goods or services to actual or 
potential consumers, be they identified persons or merely an unidentifiable section of the 
public. In some areas, the dividing line between what is and what is not conduct ‘in trade 
or commerce’ may be less clear and may require the identification of what imports a 
trading or commercial character to an activity which is not, without more, of that 
character… Nor, without more, is a misleading statement by one of a building company’s 
own employees to another employee in the course of the ordinary activities. The position 
might well be different if the misleading statement was made in the course of, or for the 
purpose of, some trading or commercial dealing between the corporation and the 
particular employee.81  
 
                                                 
81 Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594, 602–4 (emphasis added). 
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What then is the ‘central conception’ of the business of a HEI? Surely at the heart of 
this is the delivery of educational services, a notion that incorporates the provision of 
courses for certification or degree.82 This issue is intrinsically linked to the 
complexities in determining the exact nature of the student–HEI contract. As will be 
seen in Chapter 4, there is little precedent in Australia regarding the exact nature and 
terms of the agreement to supply educational services. The relationship between the 
student and the HEI evolves and multiplies over a period of time. There are many 
activities and transactions in which the HEI and the student deal. There is a potential 
myriad of sources for terms of the student–HEI contract, which may be simply just 
the rules and ordinances of the HEI or, as is likely, something more. The something 
more could include pre-admission representations, terms that relate to descriptions of 
‘course content, course delivery (“consumer services” terms)’,83 assurances in 
relation to standards of the professional services of academics and guarantees in 
relation to learning outcomes and graduate attributes. The commercial or trading 
nature of these types of activities that are related to the dealings between a HEI and 
its students is not as self-evident as conduct that is promotional in nature ‘designed 
to attract custom’.84 The High Court in Concrete Construction notes that the dividing 
line may not always be clear and anticipates the need to identify those aspects of 
particular activities that import a commercial or trading character. It is accepted that 
the section is not intended to operate by a side-wind so as to regulate every activity 
of a supplier.85 The test in Concrete Construction is concerned with the conduct of a 
HEI towards its students in the course of its dealings with them, and the activities or 
transactions which ’of their nature, bear a trading or commercial character’. One 
critical aspect of the analysis is to identify what is internal to the relationship between 
the student and HEI so as not to form part of the contract for supply of educational 
services? That is, what academic activity corresponds to the internal memo between 
employees?  
 
One approach regarding university students is that once enrolled, dealings between 
them and the university are likened to the internal memo between employees. This 
proposition rests on the corporate model of the university and communications 
                                                 
82 Fels, above n 2. He notes that the then TPA applied equally to teaching and research functions: at 3–
4; Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99. Chief Justice Gleeson said of the functions of the 
University: ‘The functions of the appellant include providing education, providing facilities for study and 
research, and conferring higher education awards.’ This is discussed further in chapter four in relation to 
the meaning of ‘services’: at 109 [15] (Gleeson CJ). 
83 Davis, above n 33, 18. 
84Rorke, ‘The Application of the Consumer Protection Provisions’, above n 2, 189. 
85 See generally David Meltz, ‘The Persistent Side-Wind — The Notion of “In Trade or Commerce” 
Under s 52 of the Trade Practice Act 1974’ (2001) 9(2) Competition and Consumer Law Journal 128. 
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between the HEI and student are likened ‘to a communication between a corporation 
and its shareholders after they have become shareholders’.86 This approach 
resonates with the views expressed in the cases relating to the application relating to 
the phrase in ‘trade or commerce’ to negotiations by universities with existing staff 
members.87 As discussed in Chapter 1, it is possible that the student is both a 
corporator and a consumer of educational services provided by the university. These 
rights can coexist rather than the status as a member of the university corporation 
excluding other claims at law. For all providers, public or private, a separate question 
arises as to whether activities or transactions between the student and the HEI have 
a different character if discussing matters arising on admission (i.e. acceptance of a 
place at the HEI) or the ongoing nature of the process of enrolment (enrolment into a 
degree annually, by semester or individual units).The issue is whether the latter is an 
internal communication between students and the university in the course of their 
ordinary activities rather than forming part of the student–HEI contract. Again, to the 
extent that academic activities are a term of the contract for the supply of educational 
services,88 the question of whether the academic activity occurring after the student 
has enrolled is capable of being ‘in trade or commerce’ should be answered in the 
affirmative. Once any academic activity forms part of the student–HEI contract it is 
suggested that prima facie this is then an activity or transaction between the student 
and the HEI which of its nature, bears a trading or commercial character. 
 
Guidance regarding the dividing line in relation to what academic activities bear a 
commercial or trading character can be found in the cases involving a series of 
lectures on creationist theory: Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548 and Plimer v 
Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235 (the ‘Noah’s Ark’ case). The matter was heard at first 
instance by Sackville J in Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548. The respondent, Dr 
Roberts, presented a series of public lectures regarding the genesis theory of 
creation and the alleged discovery of remnants of Noah’s Ark in Turkey. The lecture 
series was organised by the Noah’s Ark Research Foundation (‘NARF’), an 
unincorporated association. Importantly, Dr Roberts was not paid for delivering the 
lectures. The application was brought by a Professor Plimer who objected to the 
representations and claims made by Dr Roberts. He claimed that Dr Roberts had ‘in 
the course of his public lectures and in the brochure and newsletter, made or 
                                                 
86 Rorke, ‘The Application of the Consumer Protection Provisions’, above n 2, 188–9; See also 
Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost Ark’ above n 1,135.  
87 See, eg, Roberts v University of New England [2009] FMCA 964, [52]; Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost 
Ark’, above n 1, 134. 
88 There are grounds to argue that academic activities or the promise thereof are incorporated into the 
student–HEI contract over time, on a rolling basis much like a contract of employment. See Chapter 4. 
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authorised the making of a number of misleading or deceptive statements’, including 
representations that Dr Roberts had actually undertaken ‘archaeological or scientific 
work in relation to the site’.89 Professor Plimer’s claim against Dr Roberts was based 
on contraventions of the consumer protection legislation prohibiting misleading and 
deceptive conduct in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, 
Queensland, Tasmania and the ACT.90 A claim was also brought against Ark Search 
Inc. (an incorporated association that had its origins in NARF) pursuant to section 52 
the TPA prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct.91   
 
The initial question before the court was whether the representations allegedly made 
by Dr Roberts occurred in ‘trade or commerce’ as argued by Professor Plimer. The 
argument relied upon by the applicants was, notwithstanding the fact Dr Roberts was 
not paid for his lectures, ‘he was acting in trading or commerce, because he was 
promoting the business’92 of NARF. The Court was required to determine whether, 
applying the wider definition of ‘trade or commerce’ found in the state Acts, Dr 
Robert’s promotion of NARF’s activities meant that the conduct complained of (the 
alleged misleading statements in the lecture) was “in trade or commerce’. As outlined 
above, the definition of ‘trade or commerce’ in state consumer protection legislation 
had a more expansive definition of ‘trade or commerce’, which was inclusive of not-
for-profit business and professional services. This broader definition is adopted in the 
ACL.93  
 
There were two parts to the Court’s consideration of this issue. First could it be said 
that the NARF was carrying on a business? Second, if the NARF was carrying on a 
business within the meaning of the Act, was the impugned conduct in ‘trade or 
commerce’. The Court examined the business records of NARF and found that even 
though the definition in the state Fair Trading Acts expressly contemplated the 
inclusion of businesses carried on not-for-profit, NARF did not carry on a business 
because its activities lacked the necessary degree of system and continuity.94 Further 
the statements of Dr Roberts were not considered conduct ‘in trade or commerce’.95 
On the facts the Court found that Dr Roberts primary objective was not to promote 
the business of the NARF (which was not a commercial or trading organisation), but 
                                                 
89 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548, 549. 
90 The first applicant Mr Fasold brought claims pursuant to infringements of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth), which are not relevant to this research so will not be canvassed.   
91 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548, 549. 
92 Ibid 553. 
93 See above  page 59. 
94 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548, 553. 
95 Ibid 553. 
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rather to ‘disseminate his own views in relation to the theory surrounding the creation 
of life science’.96 He did not ‘seek to maintain or encourage a commercial relationship 
between his audience and a trading entity’.97 The Court found in these circumstances 
it could not be said that the giving of the lecture and the statements made therein 
bore a trading or commercial character. Therefore the conduct was not in ‘trade or 
commerce’ as required under the Fair Trading Acts.98 
 
Of particular interest to this research is consideration by Sackville J of whether the 
inclusion of the words ‘any business’ to the definition of ‘trade or commerce’ altered 
the test under Concrete Constructions. Sackville J considered the authorities in 
relation to the meaning of the word ‘business’.99 After reviewing the authorities 
Sackville J was of the view:  
…generally speaking, the word ‘business’ as used in the Fair Trading Acts bears the 
dictionary meaning of ‘trade, commercial transactions or engagement’. However, that will 
not always carry matters very far. I think that in addition, ordinarily at least, the concept of 
‘business’ imports … a notion of system, repetition and continuity. I appreciate and accept 
that due regard should be paid to the ‘wide and flexible meaning’ attributed to the word 
‘business’ in common usage … Nonetheless, in general, for an undertaking to constitute a 
business it will have to be conducted with some degree of system and regularity … In my 
view, the less commercial the character and objectives of an organisation, the greater the 
degree of system and regularity required for the organisations activities to be 
characterised as a ‘business’.100 
 
The Court looked at the very small number of sales taken in relation to the seminar 
series in question, including the sale of the taped lectures. In the circumstances, the 
Court found that the objectives and activities of NARF were not trading or commercial 
in character sufficient for the Fair Trading Acts. The NARF was staffed by volunteers 
and a significant amount of their revenue was dependant on donations, 
memberships, small amounts of entrance fees and the sale of the taped lectures.101 
In the circumstances, there was not the system of continuity and regularity required. 
                                                 
96 Ibid 595. 
97 Ibid 595. 
98 Ibid. It should be noted that notwithstanding his findings that the conduct was not ‘in trade or 
commerce’, His Honour did go on to consider whether any of the statements were misleading or 
deceptive. He concluded that had the Acts applied, the statements by Dr Roberts regarding his personal 
participation in the investigations at the Noah’s Ark site and the scientific tests conducted by him as a 
result, would have constituted misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of the Acts: at 597–613. 
99 Ibid 587 and authorities referred to therein. Sackville J adopted the notion that the phrase has a 
‘chameleon-like hue but must take its meaning from the particular statutory context’, quoting Mason J in 
FTC v Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 355. 
100 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548, 588. 
101 Ibid 595. 
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His Honour did note however that ’even a voluntarily organization perusing purely 
altruistic or charitable goals can conduct a business’.102  
 
The matter was heard on appeal by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in 
Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235. The ground for appeal was based on 
Professor Plimer’s assertion that the finding by Sackville J that the NARF did not 
carry on a business, and consequently that Dr Roberts’ representations were not 
made in trade or commerce, was erroneous. The appeal was dismissed. Both Davies 
and Branson JJ agreed with the leading judgment of Lindgren J. However, Davies 
and Branson JJ considered separately the activities of the NARF and whether they 
were ‘in trade or commerce’. Davies J was of the view that because section 42(1) of 
the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) so closely resembled the provisions of the TPA, the 
words ‘in trade or commerce’ should be given the same construction as adopted in 
Concrete Constructions.103 Further, although Davies J was of the view that NARF 
carried on a business within the meaning of the Act, it was only significant if ‘the 
business activities of NARF gave the designated character to the relationship 
between Dr Roberts and those who attended the lectures and purchased the tapes’. 
He concluded that the lectures were not given as part of NARF’s business for 
financial gain,104 but for the achievement of other objectives.105 Justice Branson also 
considered separately the definition of ‘trade or commerce’ and ‘business’ in section 
4 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW). Justice Branson adopted the view of Lindgren 
J in relation to the definition of what amounts to conduct ‘in trade or commerce’; he 
added that the meaning of a business activity within the expanded definition of ‘trade 
or commerce’ ‘is an activity in business which of itself bears a business character 
and a professional activity is an activity in the course of the conduct of a profession 
which of itself bares a professional character’.106 
 
Justice Lindgren did not feel it necessary to decide whether the NARF had engaged 
‘in trade or commerce’ within the meaning of section 42(1) of the Fair Trading Act 
1987 (NSW). He did so on the basis that the trial judge had proceeded on the view 
that the NARF was engaged in business even though that was contrary to his finding. 
Justice Lindgren’s judgment therefore turned on whether the conduct of Dr Roberts in 
the making of the statements in the course of giving a public lecture on a non-
                                                 
102 Ibid 558. 
103 Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235, 237. 
104 Ibid 239, as did the trial judge, Sackville J. 
105 Ibid 238. 
106 Ibid 241. Branson J was of the view that the NARF was engaged in trade within the meaning of the 
Act. 
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commercial matter was in ‘trade or commerce’.107 In considering the specific 
construction of the phrase from section 42 (1), His Honour stated: 
Although the present distinction is a fine and difficult one, I think that, consistently with the 
clearly adjectival senses of ‘business’ and ‘professional’ in the definition of ‘trade or 
commerce’, what the notion of ‘business ... activity’ incorporated into the definition of ‘trade 
or commerce’ includes, is activity which is unequivocally and distinctively characteristic of 
the carrying on of a non-profit business, or of the carrying on of a trade, or of the carrying 
on of a profession. The distinction will, perhaps, rarely be of practical importance and the 
most straight forward way of demonstrating that the inclusory definition is brought into play 
in a particular case will be to show that the conduct in question was engaged in the course 
of the actual carrying on of a particular non-profit business or trade or profession.108 
 
His Honour then considered the test formulated in Concrete Constructions. Justice 
Lindgren was of the view that the statements of Dr Roberts in the course of giving his 
lecture did not constitute conduct ‘in trade or commerce’ according to the test 
formulated in Concrete Constructions.109 The ‘delivery of the lectures was not 
inherently a trading or commercial activity’110 and would not ordinarily be in ‘trade or 
commerce’.111 His Honour did note the possibility of special circumstances where a 
misrepresentation may be made in a lecture or address designed to promote goods 
or services, or the lecturer is themselves in the business of providing lectures for 
profit.112 
 
The case of Monroe Topple and Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia [2001] FCA 1056 (‘Monroe Topple’) concerned the supply of 
educational services for professional development and accreditation. This case is 
especially pertinent to this research as Lindgren J had occasion to revisit the issue of 
the provision of educational services as being in ‘trade or commerce’. The applicant, 
                                                 
107 Ibid 243. As with the other members of the Court, Branson J was of the view that the critical issue 
was whether the conduct of Dr Roberts (the giving of the lectures and the making of statements in the 
seminars) was conduct in trade in which the NARF was engaged within the meaning of s 42 of the Act. 
Branson J concluded: ‘In my view, the accuracy of the content of Dr Roberts’ lectures and answers, as 
opposed to the accuracy of the recordings thereof, was not “the central conception” of the trade of 
NARF’: at 245; Davies J stated ‘Although there were monetary incidents to the lectures such as entry 
fees, the lectures were not concerned with commerce but rather with the promotion of a creationist view 
of history and the investigation of a matter of great historical interest ... The lectures were the subject of 
the sales but the sales themselves were not misleading or deceptive. The consumers obtained what 
they sought and what they paid for’: at 238. 
108 Ibid 254. 
109 Ibid 257. In considering the applicability of Concrete Constructions to the wider definition of ‘trade or 
commerce’ in the NSW Act, Lindgren J found that the ‘“narrow” construction of the expression adopted 
in the joint judgment governed the construction of the same expression in s 42 of the FTA (NSW)’. 
110 Ibid 258. 
111 Ibid 258. 
112 Ibid 254. 
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Monroe Topple and Associates (‘MTA’), was a private provider of educational 
materials for accountants studying in their professional year for accreditation by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (‘ICAA’). The ICAA withdrew its 
support for the services of the applicant MTA. The applicant thereupon made claims 
in relation to breaches of the TPA in relation to anti-competitive behaviour under Part 
IV and unconscionable conduct. One of the agreed issues for determination was 
whether the ‘educational and training functions supplied by the ICAA in connection 
with its CA program pursuant to its Charter constitute[d] the provision of “services” in 
trade or commerce’.113 The ICCA argued that ‘its pursuit of its Charter objects of 
education, training, examination, assessment and certification, [fell] outside the 
meaning of the expression “in trade or commerce” as explained by the High Court in 
Concrete Constructions’ 114 and that it did not make a profit from these activities.115  
 
Justice Lindgren defined the meaning of ‘educational and training functions’ supplied 
by the ICCA before considering whether the supply by ICAA was in ‘trade or 
commerce’:  
I take the expression to refer at least to the enrolment in CA Program modules, the 
compilation and selling of the module syllabuses, the writing, production and sale of 
module support materials, the conduct of ‘focus sessions’ and the provision of ‘feedback’ 
to the candidates. The expression clearly does not include the admission of persons into 
membership of ICAA and the certification of persons so admitted as chartered 
accountants: admission and certification are inherently different from ‘education and 
training’, occur as distinct and later events, and require satisfaction of conditions in 
addition to satisfactory completion of the CA Program … I think it appropriate to regard 
examination as part of ICAA's education and training function: the devising of the CA 
Program modules and of the methods of assessment appropriate for them were closely 
interrelated activities.116 
 
His Honour considered the differing ways the phrase ‘trade or commerce’ was used 
within the TPA. In relation to anti-competitive conduct, this meant the provision of 
services was to occur in a market, whereby those services were provided in ‘trade or 
commerce’. In relation to unconscionable conduct, the impugned conduct must be 
directly related to the supply of services in ‘trade or commerce’. Justice Lindgren was 
of the view: 
                                                 
113 Monroe Topple and Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia [2001] FCA 
1056, [130]. 
114 Ibid [131]. 
115 Ibid [131]. 
116 Ibid [132]–[133]. 
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… ICAA supplies the education and training it provides in connection with its CA Program 
pursuant to its Charter ‘in trade or commerce’. It seems to me that this conclusion is 
compelled by the fact that the ICAA sells those services to students for a very substantial 
monetary return on a highly organised, systematic and ongoing basis. While it may not be 
necessary that all of those features be present in order to satisfy the expression ‘in trade 
or commerce’ the present of all of them makes it clear that the expression is satisfied in 
this case.117  
 
This definition of the supply of education and training functions is clearly applicable to 
the activities of both public and private HEIs. His Honour also held that these 
functions could occur in ‘trade or commerce’ notwithstanding the fact that the objects 
of the organisation had other characteristics, or public or professional obligations.118 
 
ICAA had relied on the decision in the Noah’s Ark case as authority for the principle 
that the provision of educational and training services are not inherently commercial 
and therefore not in ‘trade or commerce’. In particular the ICAA relied on the part of 
Lindgren’s J finding that Dr Roberts was not motivated by a desire to promote the 
business of NARF.119 Justice Lindgren distinguished his decision in the Noah’s Ark 
case. He was of the view that on the facts, the dimensions and features of the ICAA 
educational and trading activity demonstrated that there was a much stronger case 
for regarding those services being provided in ‘trade or commerce’.120 His Honour 
also considered the issue of the services being provided without profit and was 
clearly of the view that the ‘rights of consumers and the obligations of a corporation 
under the Act … should not be denied because no profit was made from an activity in 
question at a particular period in time’.121  
 
The ICAA also relied on comments by Branson J in the Noah’s Ark case, where she 
noted that if a broad operation was given to section 52 of the TPA, this could impact 
negatively on intellectual and religious debate in Australia.122 Justice Lindgren 
distinguished this argument as:  
… a notion far removed from the selling of educational and training services designed to 
equip persons to practice a profession for remuneration as members of a particular 
                                                 
117 Ibid [139] Lindgren J applied the construction taken Concrete Constructions.  
118 Ibid [147]. 
119 Ibid [148]. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid [150]. 
122 Branson J was of the view that if the broad construction of ‘trade or commerce’ advocated by Prof 
Plimer was accepted, this had the potential to ‘significantly deter intellectual and religious debate in 
Australia, at least to the extent that it is carried on through commercial avenues’: Plimer v Roberts 
(1997) 150 ALR 235, 245. 
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professional organisation and under a particular designation. Unlike the activity to which 
her Honour referred, the education and training provided by ICAA in connection with its CA 
Program are commercially valuable services.123  
 
Again, this resonates with the contract for supply of educational services between the 
student and modern HEI being an activity in ‘trade or commerce’ when compared to 
a statement made in a public lecture regarding philosophical or religious views.  
 
MTA appealed the decision of the trial judge Lindgren J in relation to his findings that 
the conduct of ICAA in bundling its services and materials and fixing its charges at 
less than cost did not contravene the anti-competitive provisions of the TPA, nor was 
it unconscionable conduct.124 The members of the appeal court gave separate 
judgments. Only Heerey J (with whom Black CJ agreed) specifically addressed the 
issue in relation to the question of whether the ICAA’s supply of education and 
training in connection with its CA Program was a provision of services in ‘trade or 
commerce’.125 Justice Lindgren had found in favour of MTA on this issue, that is that 
the ICAA had provided education and training services in ‘trade or commerce’. 
Justice Heerey agreed that the status of a non-profit organisation was not conclusive 
of the activities not being in ‘trade or commerce’. His Honour considered the test in 
Concrete Constructions and said: 
The provision, for reward, of training and education services, if carried on systematically, is 
a trading and commercial activity. Everyday examples are the provision of education and 
training in relation to foreign languages, or English, or skills such as cooking or 
photography, or sports such as golf or tennis.  
 
As His Honour noted, the Full Court in Plimer v Roberts (1997) 80 FCR 303 drew a 
distinction between, on the one hand, the selling of door tickets, video tapes and audio 
cassettes in relation to lectures about Creationist theory and Noah’s Ark and, on the other 
hand, the content of what was said in the lectures. The former was accepted to be conduct 
in trade or commerce, the latter not.126 
 
                                                 
123 Monroe Topple and Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia [2001] FCA 
1056, [149]. 
124 Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (2002) 122 
FCR 110. 
125 Ibid 130–1, [76]–[79]. 
126 Ibid, see per Davies J at 305G, per Branson J at 310D and per Lindgren J at 327A. 
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Thus the particular facts of the Noah’s Ark case and the obiter statements of 
Lindgren J127 open the possibility for a construction that in some circumstances 
academic activities of the modern HEI are conduct in ‘trade or commerce’.128 Dr 
Roberts in the Noah’s Ark case was delivering a public lecture and was not seeking 
to maintain a commercial relationship between his audience and a trading entity. It is 
arguable that this is entirely different to a scenario whereby a lecture or series of 
lectures was not delivered as promised. The Noah’s Ark case can be distinguished 
when what is under consideration is the provision of educational services to students 
for reward ‘on a highly organised, systematic and ongoing basis’. In her article 
regarding potential liability for New Zealand HEIs to their students under consumer 
protection legislation, Varnham  considers the type of conduct that may be 
considered in ‘trade or commerce’ in the higher education sector.129 Varnham notes 
that while academics may individually take comfort from the fact that their lecture 
content is unlikely to be considered conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ following the 
Noah’s Ark case, she is of a different view in relation to the position of HEI. Varnham 
refers to the Court’s determination that the misrepresentation related to the lecture 
content rather than the provision of the service (that is the sale of the tickets and the 
recordings of the lecture) and states: 
… there is no comfort here for institutes, however it does not preclude but rather enforces 
the argument that an institute is in trade in respect of the marketing and advertising of its 
courses, and its supply of course information to perspective students.130   
 
It is submitted that Varnham’s argument is not just limited to promotional activities of 
HEIs. Activities or transactions between the student and the HEI pursuant to a 
contract for the supply of educational services of their nature, bear a trading or 
                                                 
127 His Honour gives a number of similar fact examples, including that of a professor giving a lecture to 
university students: see above n 112. In those examples, Lindgren J assumes that the speakers are not 
paid for the delivery of the lecture, seminar or address, although the organisation may be. That was the 
scenario in the Noah’s Ark case. It is not however the usual academic scenario, whereupon academics, 
sessional or tenured, are paid for delivering lectures. They are, so to speak, in the business of giving 
lectures. 
128 See Griggs, ‘Tertiary Education, the Market and Liability’, above n 2 for a detailed consideration of 
the application of the requirement of in ‘trade or commerce’ to the higher education sector and individual 
academic activities. Griggs considers specifically whether information provided to current students or in 
a public lecture is in ‘trade or commerce’. Griggs concludes that in general advice given by a faculty 
officer regarding administrative matters is unlikely to be considered in ‘trade or commerce’. This is in line 
with the test formulated in Concrete Constructions as matters internal to the organisation. However, 
Griggs is of the view that this would likely be different if the advice or information is provided in the 
context of attracting or recruiting students to the particular faculty: at 8. It is this type of activity with 
which this research is concerned. See generally Meltz, above n 45, 137 and the distinction between a 
paid professional speaker and one who is not.  
129 Varnham, ‘Straight Talking, Straight Teaching’, above n 2, 309–11. 
130 Ibid 308. 
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commercial character’.131 So, for example, while the provision of a lecture or the 
giving of feedback could be considered part of the relevant trading or commercial 
relationship, the actual substance of that feedback or statements of opinion made in 
the lecture may well be matters internal to the dealing; in much the same way as an 
internal memorandum between employees was in Concrete Constructions.132 It is 
here that the dividing line referred to by the High Court might lie. The Monroe Topple 
case should be viewed as a clear signal to HEIs that the supply of educational 
services by them, which includes an array of attending activities, is very likely to be 
considered conduct ‘in trade or commerce’ even without the extended definition. The 
modern HEI more closely resembles the supply of educational services by ICAA than 
a community of scholars transmitting knowledge in the Oxbridge tradition. To the 
extent academic activity is part of this contract for educational service it will be 
subject to the UCT under the ACL. The comments in Monroe Topple suggest a wide 
application, including devising courses of study and methods of assessment and 
attending activities, including feedback. To the extent that academic activities form 
part of the student–HEI contract will be fully considered in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
The extended definition 
The extended definition introduces the notion that ‘trade or commerce’ includes any 
‘business activity’ or any ‘professional activity’ whether or not for profit. It is 
suggested that the addition of the words ‘any business activity’ will add very little to 
the test as formulated in Concrete Construction. Regard was had to the meaning of 
‘business’ in the  Noah’s Ark case above and the Court held that ‘for an undertaking 
to constitute a business it [would] have to be conducted with some degree of system 
and regularity’.133 In the Monroe Topple case, Lindgren J distinguished his findings in 
relation to the business of the NARF in Noah’s Ark with that of the trading activities of 
the ICAA. The concept of ‘business’ and ‘trade or commerce’ was used 
interchangeably.134 However, the addition of the words ‘any professional activity’ will 
arguably impact on the application of the ACL to providers of educational services. 
 
                                                 
131 As per the test Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594, 603 
132 Although given the introduction of learning and teaching standards by TEQSA, this may not remain 
the case or may not currently be the position in relation to professional degrees that require approval of 
standards, including veracity of content by accrediting bodies. See below n 164. 
133 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548, 558. 
134 Monroe Topple and Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia [2001] FCA 
1056, [148]. 
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This supposition is borne out by Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists135 
(‘Shahid’). This case concerned the matter of a general medical practitioner seeking 
to obtain further qualifications in the speciality of dermatology. As part of the process 
of becoming a Fellow of the Australasian College of Dermatologists (‘the College’), 
the candidate was required to undertake supervised training in an accredited training 
hospital.136 Each year between the years 2000 and 2004, Shahid applied for 
employment as trainee registrar in dermatology at the hospital. The registrar’s 
position was only available upon the recommendation of the College.137 Shahid 
claimed that the College, through its various conduct including application and appeal 
processes, provision of handbooks, texts, curriculum and the selection process for 
trainee registrars,138 had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in 
contravention of the TPA. Alternatively, Shahid pleaded that the College had 
breached the mirror provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA) (‘FTA’). The 
applicant was unsuccessful in the first instance;139 however, the appeal140 was 
allowed.  
 
The leading judgment on appeal was delivered by Jessup J and a joint judgment 
delivered by Branson and Stone JJ. The Court unanimously agreed on the 
application and meaning of the relevant provisions in the FTA.141 The types of 
activities considered by the Court in relation to whether the conduct of the College 
was in ‘trade or commerce’ included statements in the published handbook regarding 
the appeal process and record-keeping procedures. The programme assessments 
                                                 
135 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists 248 ALR 267. 
136 In this case Royal Perth Hospital (WA). 
137 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267.  
138 Ibid. 
139 At first instance the Court found that the College was a trading corporation and this was not 
challenged on appeal, therefore the appeal under the TPA could be heard. 
140 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267, 305. The issues for 
determination on appeal were as follows: 
(1) Were the record-keeping representation and the meaningful appeal representation, or was either of 
them, made in: a) trade or commerce; or b) a professional activity? 
(2) If Yes to (1), in relation to the meaningful appeal representation, did the making of the 
representation amount to a breach of s 52 or of s 53(aa) or (g) of the Trade Practices Act or the 
corresponding provisions of the Fair Trading Act? 
(3) Did s 55A of the Trade Practices Act, or s 18 of the Fair Trading Act require proof beyond 
reasonable doubt? 
(4) If No to (3), should a finding now be made that the conduct of the College did occur as alleged and 
was liable to mislead the public as to the nature, characteristics, suitability or quantity of any 
services? 
(5) Was the lodgement by the appellant, and the acceptance by the College, of an appeal in each of 
the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 accompanied by an intention to create legal relations? 
(6) To the extent that the appellant succeeds, to what, if any, remedy is she entitled? 
Only issues (1), (5) and (6) are directly relevant to this research. 
141 Jessup J dissented in relation to the application of the meaning of the phrase ‘trade or commerce’ 
under the TPA. 
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and processes, including the substantial fees for textbooks, course materials and 
right to sit the examination, were also considered by the court.142 
 
‘Trade or commerce’ under the TPA 
Justices Branson and Stone (Jessup J dissenting) found the College had engaged in 
‘trade or commerce’ within the meaning of the TPA pursuant to the test set out in 
Concrete Constructions.143 In contrast to Jessup J,144 Their Honours considered the 
cumulative significance of the evidence, rather than each activity separately.145 The 
majority were of the view that the evidence supported the ‘conclusion that the college 
had a commercial relationship with practitioners’.146 This was based on the 
considerable revenue generated by the College in relation to the activities under 
consideration. Significantly, they felt that the publication of the handbook (and the 
representations contained therein) was an important part of that commercial 
relationship. They held that the publication was ‘conduct’ ‘in the central conception’ of 
the College’s commercial activities.147 
 
‘Trade or commerce’ as extended by the definition under the FTA 
All members of the Court of Appeal in Shahid were in agreement regarding the 
meaning of the words ‘professional activity’ and its effect on extending the definition 
of ‘in trade or commerce’. Little attention was given to the issue of how far the 
addition of the words ‘any business activity’ extended the definition of ‘trade or 
commerce’ under the FTA. In considering the structure and objects of the FTA 
Jessup J notes: 
The definition of ‘trade or commerce’ is expanded, and it is expanded to include not only 
any professional activity but also any business activity. The word ‘business’ includes a 
trade or profession. Any businesslike activity of a professional firm or person would be a 
‘business activity’. That the expression ‘professional activity’ means something further 
again does seem to be a grammatically appropriate conclusion.148 
 
                                                 
142 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267, 277 (Jessup J), 270 [2] 
(Branson and Stone JJ).  
143 Ibid 275 [29].The representations made in the handbook were conduct in ‘trade or commerce’.  
144 Ibid 268. In his dissenting judgement on this issue, Jessup J broke down the activities of the College 
into separate components and dealt with each separately. In the end he was of the view that ‘training for 
professional qualifications is not an inherently commercial activity’ and what was provided by the 
College in this matter was in contrast to the overtly commercialised model in Monroe Topple: at 314 
[134]. 
145 Ibid 275 [25]. 
146 Ibid [26]. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid 324 [193]. 
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The focus was on the effect, if any, of the addition of the words ‘any professional 
activity’ on the meaning of ‘trade or commerce’. The approach of the Court in Shahid 
supports the observation that the addition of the words ‘any business activity’ will add 
very little to the test as formulated in Concrete Construction. 
 
‘Any professional activity’ 
Justice Jessup considered at length the meaning of the phrase ‘any professional 
activity’ in the context of the extended definition of ‘trade or commerce’ in both the 
NSW and WA Fair Trading Acts. His Honour casts doubts on the reasoning in Prestia 
v Aknar (1996) 40 NSWR 165 and that Court’s consideration of the phrase ‘any 
professional activity’ and the narrow construction given therein.149 In particular he 
rejected the argument that the phrase ‘professional activity’ was a qualification to 
‘trade or commerce’.150 Rather in his opinion it was clearly an addition.151 His Honour 
then considered the only binding authority, the Noah’s Ark case. The meaning and 
impact of the phrase ‘professional activity’ was left open in the Noah’s Ark case.152 
After considering the judgments of the Full Court, Jessup J stated: 
So far as Full Court authority in this court is concerned, therefore, the position seems to 
be, first, that the expression ‘trade or commerce’ should be so read as to include any 
professional activity; second, that a professional activity will only be such as is 
unequivocally and distinctively characteristic of the carrying on of a profession; but third, 
that whether the activity should also be such that, when done in the carrying on of a 
profession, it bears a trading or commercial character is an open question. The present 
case requires that question to be answered. There is no authority binding on this Full 
Court which requires it to be answered in a particular way.153  
 
His Honour saw no reason why the jurisprudence of Concrete Constructions and 
Noah’s Ark could not inform the construction of the expression of ‘professional 
activities’ in the same way it did ‘trade or commerce’.154 In this way a professional 
                                                 
149 Ibid 317 [173]. That case was a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of NSW and 
concerned alleged misrepresentations made by a solicitor in the course negotiations, but after he had 
ceased to act as a solicitor for his clients. The Court also cited Bernard McCabe, ‘Revisiting Concrete 
Constructions’ (1995) 3 Trade Practices Law Journal 161 in which a distinction between ‘the actual 
exercise of the intellectual skill’ of a professional, on the one hand, and ‘representation about the 
product of that intellectual skill or about the practice which generates it’, on the other hand was made. 
Jessup J declined to be persuaded by the decision in Prestia v Aknar (1996) 40 NSWLR 165: at 317–
18. 
150 Ibid 319 [179]. Jessup J also expressed reservations regarding the emphasis and reliance placed on 
the NSW Court’s concerns regarding the erosion of the advocate’s immunity through a ‘side-wind’ of 
consumer protection regulation.  
151 Ibid 316-319 [171]–[178]. 
152 Plimer v Roberts and Another (1997) 150 ALR 235, 254 (Lindgren J), 241 (Branson J). 
153 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267, 320 [181]. 
154 Ibid 323 [188]–[189]. 
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activity would be one that was ‘unequivocally and distinctively characteristic of the 
carrying on of a profession’.155 His Honour was of the view that there were no 
obvious reasons within the Act itself to qualify to the phrase ‘any professional 
activity’156 and that ‘the introduction of a further limitation, that the professional 
activity must bear a trading or commercial character, would bring confusion, where 
presently there is none’.157  
 
His Honour considered the meaning of the expression ‘any professional activity’ and 
stated:  
… the expression ‘any professional activity’ does not extend to purely instrumental or 
mundane activities by which professionals or their staff execute their daily tasks. A 
professional activity is one that is unequivocally and distinctly characteristic of the 
carrying-on of a profession. This requirement prompts the question which is perhaps at the 
heart of the matter in the present case: is the concept of the carrying-on of a profession 
limited to engagement in professional practice, whether as a principle or as an employee 
or does it extend to functions of the kind carried on by the college? Here it is important to 
consider the underlying denotation of the word ‘professional’. At base, a profession is ‘an 
occupation in which a professed knowledge of some subject, field, or science is applied; a 
vocational career, especially one that involves prolonged training and a formal 
qualification’. Thus ‘professional’ is ‘[o]f, belonging to, or proper to a profession … 
[r]elating to, connected with, or befitting a (particular) profession or calling; preliminary or 
necessary to the practice of a profession … [e]ngaged in a profession, esp one requiring 
special skill or training’: Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. These senses of the noun and 
of the adjective are not limited to engagement in professional practice … I would not 
construe the expression ‘any professional activity’ more narrowly then as implicit in the 
requirement that the activity in question be unequivocally and distinctly characteristic of 
the carrying-on of a profession, giving to the latter concept a connotation which is not 
limited to engagement in professional practice.158 
 
His Honour held that the activities of associations of professionals such as the 
College were not excluded from the expression ‘any professional activity’159 and 
applied this conclusion to the facts: 
                                                 
155 Ibid 323 [188].  
156 Ibid 322 [186]. His honour also noted ‘To say that the Act was substantially concerned with trading 
and trading-like transactions would be to do no more than to beg the question presently for 
determination. The definition of ‘trade or commerce’ is expanded, and it is expanded to include not only 
any professional activity but also any business activity’: at 324 [194] (Jessup J). 
157 Ibid 323 [190]. 
158Ibid 324 [192]–[194] (emphasis added). 
159 Ibid 324 [194]. 
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First, the nature of the calling, vocation or pursuit both of the appellant and of the persons 
who constituted the body which she sought to join was ‘professional’ even in the narrower 
sense of the word. This proceeding does not present an occasion for the exploration of the 
limits of that word in its possible application, for instance, to footballs, film stars and others. 
Second, the college was a professional body whose members were concerned to 
advanced knowledge and to maintain standards in dermatology, and to do so selflessly. 
Third, the establishment of standards of learning, and the enforcement of those standards 
through its training program, were significant elements of the college’s overall activities. 
They were not merely incidental … Fourth, in the transactions presently relevant, the 
college acted as such. That is to say, this was not a case in which there was no more than 
an instrumental act or omission by a subordinate functionary. The representations which 
the trial judge found to have been misleading or false were made in a formal publication of 
the college and were addressed to the cohort of persons which whom the college intended 
to have dealings. Fifth, the training programme, and the selection process within it, were 
tightly organised, systematic and ongoing activities of the college. There was nothing ad 
hoc about them, or about the publication of the handbooks in which the representations 
were made … I take the view that the activities of transactions in the course of which the 
record-keeping representation and the meaningful appeal representation were made were 
unequivocally and distinctly characteristic of the carrying-on of the profession of 
dermatologists. I consider that it would be quite artificial to regard them otherwise. Those 
activities were professional activities within the extended meaning of ‘trade or commerce’ 
in the Fair Trading Act, and the trial judge was in error not to have held so.160  
 
Therefore the relevant test under the extended definition in relation to professional 
activities is whether ‘the activities and transactions are unequivocally and distinctly 
characteristic of the carrying-on of the profession’. 161 This concept is not limited to 
the engagement of professional practice. If the activities are characteristic of the 
carrying on of a profession, then those activities will occur in ‘trade or commerce’.  
 
If each of the points identified in the passage from Jessup J are considered, it is clear 
how the extended definition of ‘trade or commerce’ will be applicable to HEIs. First, 
academics and their institutions are likely to regard themselves as a profession, or a 
collection of professionals (especially if the alternative is footballers or film stars).162 
                                                 
160 Ibid 325 [195], [197]. 
161 Ibid 268. 
162 See generally Justice John Mansfield, ‘Professional Men, They Have No Cares: Whatever Happens, 
They Get Theirs’ (Speech delivered at the Nineteenth Annual Workshop of the Competition Law and 
Policy Institute of New Zealand, 2 August 2008); David Warren Piper, ‘Are Professors Professional?’ 
(1992) 46(2) Higher Education Quarterly 145; Kevin Williams, ‘Troubling the Concept of the ‘Academic 
Professional’ in 21st Century Higher Education’ (2008) 56 Higher Education 533; Mark Davies, 
‘Universities, Academics and Professional Negligence’ (1996) 12(4) Tolley’s Professional Negligence 
102; Corones, above n 6. 
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Second, HEI are institutions whose main concern is to advance knowledge and to 
maintain standards of learning for many disciplines and often in accordance with 
accrediting bodies’ approval.163 Third, the establishment of standards of learning, and 
the enforcement of those standards are significant elements of a HEI’s overall 
activities and are not merely incidental.164 Fourth, transactions with students in 
relation to the delivery of educational services occur as an instrumental act or not as 
an omission by a subordinate functionary. The academic activities are directed to and 
involve the cohort of persons with whom the HEI intends to have dealings. Fifth, the 
entrance into and the provision of education services are tightly organised, 
systematic and ongoing activities of a HEI. Many academic activities that make up 
the supply of educational services will thus be unequivocally and distinctly 
characteristic of the carrying on of the profession of an academic and therefore within 
the extended meaning of ‘trade or commerce’ under the ACL.  
 
There still will be occasion to determine what exactly a ‘professional activity’ is. It will 
not be any ‘purely instrumental or mundane activities by which professionals or their 
staff execute their daily tasks’.165 Not everything that is related to the professional 
activity will be considered to be ‘in’ ‘trade or commerce’ even within the extended 
definition.166 In his article relating to the application of sections 52 and 53 of the TPA 
to specifically the marketing of university courses, Jackson167 draws analogies from 
other professions in determining what conduct in relation to HEIs could be 
considered to be in ‘trade or commerce’.168 Jackson is of the view that universities 
should assume they are engaged in ‘trade or commerce’.169 Rorke suggests a 
‘distinction between representations made in the course of promotion of professional 
skills, and representations made as part of the actual provision of advice.’170 The 
operation of the ACL to ‘a thing done’ ‘in the course of the promotional activities of a 
                                                 
163 It is also possible that differing standards may apply to different disciplines, eg, there may be different 
measures for the need for accuracy regarding exactness of information in a degree in pharmacy or 
medicine, than discourse regarding diverse theories and argument in philosophy.  
164 This is strengthened by the development of learning and teaching standards and frameworks of 
learning and delivery in the higher education sector: TEQSA Act; Corones, above n 6, 11–14. 
165 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267, 325 [194]-[195], [197]. 
166 Commentators in general have been concerned to ensure that the very broad provisions of the 
misleading or deceptive conduct prohibition do not detract from commercial and indeed professional life. 
See Meltz, above n 85, 18.  
167 Jackson, ‘The Marketing of University Courses’, above n 2. 
168 Ibid 112–16. 
169 Ibid. Although he feels it is arguable under the authorities of Quickenden and the Noah’s Ark case 
‘that the issue that certain conduct, for example teaching itself may not be in trade or commerce’: at 116. 
170 Rorke, ‘The Application of the Consumer Protection Provisions’, above n 2, 190. 
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professional person’ is specifically extended by section 6(4) of the CCA171. Rorke 
notes the analogy drawn by McCabe: 
Where representations are made about the experience or expertise of the teacher or class 
sizes or some other matter that might induce students to enrol and pay fees, the 
representations will be conduct in trade or commerce because they are directly relevant to 
the terms of the commercial relationship between the student and the institution. The 
relationships bear a trading or commercial character. But where the teacher in the course 
of teaching the class makes a mistake of fact that misleads the students, the error is not, 
without more, actionable under section 52. It does not relate to the terms of the pre-
existing teacher-student relationship, which is the commercial transaction in question.172  
 
This is in keeping with the proposition of this research that to the extent that there is 
a student–HEI contract, this is a transaction that is properly considered to be ‘in trade 
or commerce’ as required by the ACL. Following Monroe Topple and the majority in 
Shahid, it is arguable that the supply of educational services falls within the definition 
of ‘trade and commerce’ as determined by Concrete Constructions. Even more 
probable is that many of the activities of the modern HEI will be a professional activity 
and within the extended definition of ‘trade or commerce’ under the ACL. This 
interpretation of professional activities of the HEI aligns the sector with other 
professions, their activities being subject to the consumer protection provisions of the 
ACL.173 Thus the student–HEI contract will be subject to the UCT regime.  
 
Commonwealth funded students 
As discussed above, the requirement that one party to the activity in question be a 
constitutional corporation is no longer needed to enliven the consumer protection 
provisions. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence regarding whether HEI’s are ‘trading 
corporations’ remains instructive in the determination of whether educational 
activities are conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ when connected to the teaching of 
                                                 
171 The definition in s 6(4) extends the provisions of the CCA to the promotional activities of 
professional persons, such as solicitors, accountants and teachers. This thesis is concerned with 
matters beyond this. It is also of less significance given the harmonisation of a national consumer 
protection regime. The new definition of ‘trade or commerce’ as discussed in this chapter includes ‘any 
professional activity’. This section however specifically extends the operation of the ACL to ‘a thing 
done’ ‘in the course of the promotional activities of a professional person’. This is in respect of ACL pt 2-
2 (unconscionable conduct), pt 3-1 (unfair practices — other than ss 30 (land) and 33 (nature of goods, 
but not services)), pt 4-1 (offences relating to unfair practices — other than ss 152 (land), 155 (nature of 
goods, but not services) and 164 (pyramid schemes)) and pt 5-3 (country of origin representations) of 
the ACL. There are no reported decisions in relation to s 6(4); however, ‘a thing done’ in the course of 
promotional activities is potentially very wide in its application. Orders for both civil penalties and 
damages against individuals involved in a contravention of the ACL are also available under the ACL. 
172 Rorke, ‘The Application of the Consumer Protection Provisions’, above n 2, 190 quoting Bernard 
McCabe, ‘Revisiting Concrete Constructions’ (1995) 3 Trade Practices Law Journal 161. 
173 See especially Guzyal Hill, ‘The New Consumer Legislation and the Legal Profession’ (2012) 20 
Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law 18. 
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Commonwealth-funded undergraduate and postgraduate domestic students. 
Commentators support the view that the market culture in the higher education sector 
has the resulting effect that the consumer protection legislation applies to educational 
services, although some note the potential issues with the Higher Education 
Contributions Scheme (‘HECS’).174 The former chair of the ACCC Professor Allan 
Fels has long been of the view that HECS charges fall within the business activities 
of HEIs.175  
 
The issue of whether a university is a trading corporation was settled in the matter of 
Quickenden v O’Connor, Commissioner of Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (2001) 184 ALR 260. The matter concerned issues relating to the 
employment of Dr Terry Quickenden at the University of Western Australia (‘UWA’) 
and the validity of a certified agreement made under Commonwealth legislation. On 
appeal, the Federal Court was required to determine whether UWA was a 
constitutional corporation in order for the Commonwealth legislation to apply rather 
than the state Act. The question was whether the University was a foreign, financial 
or trading corporation as defined by the Commonwealth workplace legislation. This 
required a finding that the University’s trading activities were substantial ‘in the sense 
of non-trivial’ although not necessarily ‘the predominant element of what the 
University did.’176 The University submitted that it was in fact a trading corporation  in 
support of its argument that the Commonwealth workplace legislation applied.177 In a 
unanimous decision the court found that the University was indeed a trading 
corporation.  
 
The Court noted that the traditional role of the university was not one that conjured 
immediately a notion that a university was a trading or a financial corporation in 
undertaking educational and research activities.178 In determining the issue, the Court 
                                                 
174 Pursuant to the Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Cth) now Higher Education Support Act 2003 
(Cth). See, eg, Clarke, above n 2 17; Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education’, above n 33, 76; cf 
Bessant, above n 2; Corones, above n 6; Lynden Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination Before the Journey 
Starts — Legal Education and Fitness for Purpose’ (2007) Murdoch ELaw Journal 315 
<https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/issues/2007/1/eLaw_knowing_destination.pdf>; Kamvounias and  
Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 2, 315.  
175 Fels, above n 2. He said of the application of the competitive neutrality principles to government 
business enterprises: ‘… it appears that the Commonwealth government, through Treasury, considers 
that all undergraduate services which involve some user charge, including HECS, will be considered a 
commercial activity and therefore subject to the competitive neutrality principles’: at 5–6, cited in 
Bessant, above n 2, 257. 
176 Quickenden v O’Connor [2001] FCA 303, (2001) 109 FCR 243, (2001) 184 ALR 260. 
177 It was to the University’s advantage that the Federal legislation regulating the workplace agreement 
be the governing law rather than the state legislation. 
178 Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 109 FCR 243, 260 [48]. 
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considered the provision of accounts and evidence of various trading activities179 
from UWA, together with investments in relation to property and other forms of 
investment.180 Importantly for this research, it was submitted by the University that 
the fees charged by it were a fee for service, notwithstanding the fact that a large 
portion of those fees were governed by HECS. In their in the joint judgment, Black CJ 
and French J said: 
The University also submitted that the fees charged by it for courses are fees for services 
notwithstanding that they are regulated by legislation and ministerial guidelines. So it was 
said that under the Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Cth) the regulation of fees is a 
condition of receiving Commonwealth grants and not a requirement imposed directly by 
law. The guidelines themselves, it is said, do not limit the University in such a way as to 
deny the fees the character of payment for services and facilities provided in the courses 
offered by the University. No limits are imposed on the number or content of the courses 
nor on their promotion or design, nor on ancillary matters such as accommodation and 
other student benefits which may attract potential students. Specifically, in respect of 
payments made by the Commonwealth to the University under the Higher Education 
Funding Act it is said that they should properly be characterised as revenue from trading 
activities. The argument is put thus. Some students pay HECS contributions directly to the 
University. That is, they pay a fee for services rendered to them. In 1995 fees paid in this 
way amounted to $8.849 million. HECS payments by the Commonwealth to the University 
in that year amounted to $17.318 million. Those payments, it was submitted, should also 
be characterised as revenue derived from trading. 
 
It is questionable whether the provision of educational services within the statutory 
framework of the Higher Education Funding Act amounts to trading. The Act creates a 
liability for each student to the university in respect of each course of study undertaken in 
a semester. The amount is not fixed by the university but rather by the minister under 
published guidelines. The concept of ‘trading’ is a broad one. It is doubtful, however, that it 
extends to the provisions of services under a statutory obligation to fix a fee determined by 
law and the liability for which, on part of the student, appears to be statutory. For the 
present purposes, however, this aspect of the claim trading activities can be disregarded. 
For it is plain that the other activities sighted are trading activities and are a substantial, in 
the sense of non-trivial…albeit not for the predominant element of what the university 
does. The university was not established for the purpose of trading and at another time, 
closer to the time of its creation, it may not have been possible to describe it as a trading 
                                                 
179 Ibid 261 [49]. Evidence of operating revenues including the engagement in the organisation of 
festivals, sales of publications, parking, provision of student accommodation and other services was 
also tendered in support of the proposition that UWA was a trading corporation.  
180 Ibid. 
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corporation. But at the time relevant to this case and at the present, it does fall within that 
class.181 
 
This has been seen as indicating that activities or conduct in relation to HECS 
students do not fall within the TPA as they are potentially not activities in ‘trade or 
commerce’.182 However, as can be seen from the emphasis above, this specific issue 
was not decided by Their Honours as there were sufficient other trading activities to 
characterise the University as a constitutional corporation. The dicta in the separate 
judgment of Carr J in Quickenden should also be considered in relation to the nature 
of the trading activities of a HEI and students in receipt of HECS. His Honour stated: 
Although it is not necessary for me to decide, in my view there were other aspects of the 
University's activities which could be characterised as trading. Judicial notice can, I think, 
be taken of the fact that these days universities compete for students. The competition 
may be more intense within a particular State, but it certainly extends overseas and 
probably extends interstate. The Higher Education Contribution Scheme, in essence, 
works as follows. Relevantly, if the University wishes to participate in the Scheme it is 
obliged to charge fees to the students for the provision of education. If a student elects to 
pay those fees to the University directly and immediately out of his or her own funds the 
student gets a discount of 25%, with the Commonwealth paying the balance to the 
University. Otherwise the student borrows the amount of the fees from the Commonwealth 
(which the Commonwealth pays to the University on the student's behalf) and 
subsequently repays that loan when he or she earns certain levels of income. The 
evidence was that the University derived, in the year ended 31 December 1997, an 
amount of $29.5 million under the Higher Education Contribution Scheme. I would regard 
that as being a trading activity.183 
 
In the context of determining whether the provision of educational services to 
students falling under the HECS scheme are trading in nature, His Honour’s 
comments are instructive and align with the reality of the modern university. In his 
                                                 
181 Ibid 261 [51] (emphasis added). 
182 Hughes v Al-Hidayah Islamic Education Administration Inc. (2009) WAIRC 00967. Again this was 
another issue in relation to jurisdiction under workplace legislation and the need to determine the 
existence of a trading corporation. In this case it was whether a private school was a trading corporation. 
This turned on the nature of the school fees. The Court found that the school’s income was drawn from 
the state and federal governments and from school fees paid by parents with children at the school. The 
court followed the reasoning of Black CJ and French J in Quickenden and said ‘It is not the case that the 
Quickenden matter found that educational services could not be seen as “trading”, it was simply a 
matter of how the charging for the services was derived. In this matter the fees are charged directly by 
the school and have no statutory basis. The fees, as submitted, do have a commercial character to them 
... “trading”, it a broad concept. Hence is can include, in my view, the receipt of fees for the provision of 
educational services. The fact that a profit is not made is not relevant to my determination. The provision 
of educational services is clearly the main activity of the respondent. Those activities can be classified 
as trading. The question is whether the trading of those services are sufficient to categorise the 
respondent as a trading corporation’: at [12]. 
183 Quickenden v O’Connor (2001) 109 FCR 243, 272 [106]. 
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recent article, Corones is of the view that changes to the funding arrangements under 
the Higher Education Support Act (2003) (Cth) has meant that since I January 2005, 
universities have operated in ‘trade or commerce’ in respect of HECS students within 
the meaning of the legislation.184 The change in the funding model has allowed: 
Universities to determine their own student contribution fees, which may be up to 30 per 
cent more than the HECS fees set by the Commonwealth. This is, in effect, a discretionary 
tuition fee rather than a statutory charge.185 
 
There would be significant difficulties and indeed inequities if the provisions of the 
ACL only applied to students who paid full fees. Ergo the ACL would cover 
international students, domestic students paying full fees and, curiously, potentially 
HECS students who had availed themself of the opportunity of a discount under the 
HECS scheme and paid their fees upfront. It is suggested that an outcome whereby 
the provision of educational services came within the ambit of the ACL for all but one 
group of students would not accord with policies based on equity of access to the 
higher education and certainly in light of the governments push for increased 
participation from disadvantaged groups.186  
 
Further, the Productivity Commission Report was concerned with improving 
outcomes for vulnerable consumers.187 Young people are a recognised category of 
vulnerable consumers.188 The Commission defines vulnerability as: 
a broader term relating to the susceptibility of consumers to detriment based on both their 
personal characteristics (including, but not limited to disadvantage) and the specific 
context in which they find themselves (market features, product qualities, the nature of the 
transaction, the regulatory environment). Disadvantage and vulnerability often overlap, but 
they can be distinct. For instance, in markets where the quality of services is hard to 
discern and convey to consumers, many will be vulnerable, despite not being 
disadvantaged.189 
 
                                                 
184 Corones, above n 6, 6. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Denise Bradley, Peter Noonan, Helen Nugent, Bill Scales, Review of Australian Higher Education 
Final Report, 2008  Australian Government (28 September 2010) 
<http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Review/Pages/ReviewofAustralianHigherEducationReport.a
spx>; Australian Government, Transforming Australia’s Higher Education System Department of 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2009) 
<http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Documents/TransformingAusHigherED.pdf> 6. 
187 Productivity Commission, Australian Government, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework, above n 10, chapter 12. 
188 Ibid 295. 
189 Ibid. 
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The report gives examples of the context in which a consumer may purchase goods 
or services that may make them vulnerable, such as the ‘purchasing goods or 
services at times of emotional stress, or for which the quality is difficult to 
ascertain’.190 It can be said that students, especially school leavers, may make 
decisions about which courses they enrol in at a time of emotional stress. As will be 
seen in Chapter 4, students face significant difficulties ascertaining the exact terms of 
the educational services they transact.  
 
Conclusion — the meaning of ‘trade or commerce’ under the ACL and academic 
activities 
The extended definition into the ACL and the decisions of Monroe Topple and 
Shahid,191 decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court, strongly suggest that the 
contract for the supply of educational services of a HEI will be considered to be in 
‘trade or commerce’ as either a business or professional activity. Activities or 
transactions between the student and the HEI pursuant to a contract for the supply of 
educational services ‘of their nature, bear a trading or commercial character.’ The 
provision of educational services by the modern HEIs is for reward ‘on a highly 
organised, systematic and ongoing basis’. Alternatively, the activities and 
transactions are ‘unequivocally and distinctly characteristic of the carrying-on of the 
profession’.192 This concept is not limited to the engagement of professional practice 
and HEIs are therefore not excluded from the ambit of the ACL on this basis. It is 
arguable that this supply in ‘trade or commerce’ includes Commonwealth funded 
students. 
 
However, regard should properly be had to notions of academic freedom and 
intellectual debate. It is possible to say that academic matters that attend to 
expressions of opinion or the divergence in views are not conduct in ‘trade or 
commerce’ under the ACL as this is not the ‘central conception’ of the commercial 
relationship. Furthermore, while the expression of opinion may be related to the 
exercise of the intellectual skill of a professional, it may not be ‘unequivocally and 
distinctly characteristic of the carrying-on of the profession’, the emphasis on the 
‘carrying-on’. However, while notions of academic freedom should protect that to 
which it strictly obtains, such as the discussion and promulgation of ideas, especially 
                                                 
190 Ibid. 
191 The other case referred to in relation to this issue, Mathews above pp 62-63, was before a single 
judge of the Federal Court and decided before Shahid. Mathews was not referred to at all by the Full 
Court in Shahid. 
192 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267, 268. 
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unfashionable ones, this should not be invoked to limit the ambit of consumer 
protection laws in identifiable consumer transactions.193 The definition of what is ‘in 
trade or commerce’ should not be confused with concerns to protect ideas of 
academic freedom and freedom of speech if in fact the conduct is not divorced from 
any relevant actual or potential trading, commercial, professional relationship or 
dealing.  
 
Can HEIs avail themselves of any immunity? 
If it is accepted that the ACL applies to the activities of the HEI that are in ‘trade or 
commerce’, are HEI able to claim any immunity from the operation of the CCA? The 
issue of the availability of Crown immunity is only relevant to HEI public universities 
and not private providers of higher education services. There is no immunity 
specifically available in relation to the ACL under the CCA.194 As public universities 
are established under state legislation, regard is had to each of the state fair trading 
Acts195 that enact the ACL provisions as law in those relevant jurisdictions to 
establish whether immunity is available. All state Acts adopting the ACL have 
removed Crown immunity from the consumer protection provisions.196 Immunity 
remains in place in relation to prosecution for offences and penalties under the ACL, 
provided the Crown is acting in right of the state.197  
 
                                                 
193 Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost Ark’, above n 1. Rochford refers to public policy reasons why s 52 of 
the TPA should not apply to lectures. Rochford identifies the difference between ‘higher principles’ of 
academic freedom, and draws similarities with ‘high value speech’ of US constitutional law when 
contrasted with ‘low value speech’. She poses the question as to whether a similar distinction should be 
made in this situation: at 138–9 
194 The relevant provision under the CCA is s 2B. Under this section the removal of immunity exists only 
in relation to part IV and XIB of the CCA. In so far as the Crown in each state carries on a business, the 
CCA will apply to the Crown and its authorities in relation to Part IV (Restrictive Trade Practices) and 
XIB (Telecommunications). There has been no amendment to this section of the CCA. Section 2A of the 
CCA deals with the issue of Crown immunity in relation to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth; see 
Rorke, ‘The Application of the Consumer Protection Provisions’, above n 2. Rorke considers the 
application of consumer and protection provisions of the TPA to universities and Crown immunity in right 
of the Commonwealth and the possibility of a university acting as an emanation or authority of the 
Commonwealth carrying on a business. She examines the enabling legislation and in particular 
legislation which applies as a de facto control mechanism of universities by the Commonwealth, such as 
the Higher Education Funding Act 1988. Rorke concludes however that, given the high degree of 
autonomy in relation to higher education institutions, it is unlikely, that they would be able to avail 
themselves of the protection of crown immunity: at179–84; cf Ann Monotti, ‘Universities and the Validity 
of their Claims to Student Intellectual  Properties Rights’ (1998) 24(1) Monash University Law Review 
145, 183–5. Upon an analysis and evaluation to the extent of executive control over a university 
provided in its enabling statute, Monotti considers it possible for a court to find that a university is an 
emanation of the Crown. Monotti does note however that there is a judicial reluctance for this 
proposition and expansion of Crown immunity. For further detailed discussion see Colin Lockhart, The 
Law of Misleading or Deceptive Conduct (ed) (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) 8–16 [1.9]–[1.19] for 
discussion of both Commonwealth and state immunity. 
195 See above n 24. 
196 See, eg, s 10, ss 27–30 of the Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA). All state acts adopting the ACL have 
removed of the Crown immunity from the consumer protection provisions in the same terms.   
197 Jackson, ‘The Marketing of University Courses’, above n 2, 116, n 35. 
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The first issue to be addressed in the application of the provisions in relation to 
immunity is to determine whether the respondent HEI is entitled to immunity as part 
of the Crown. If it is not, then the provisions of the ACL will apply to the respondent in 
the same way as to any other parties. If the respondent would have been entitled to 
immunity as part of the Crown, then the relevant section of the state Act198 will apply 
to waive Crown immunity to the extent that that section applies.199 It is important to 
note that while the Crown acting in right of the state has immunity from being 
prosecuted for offence or pecuniary penalty, this does not extend to an authority of 
the state or territory. As noted by Lindsay it is also possible that the university 
enabling legislation will also make it clear that the institution is not an instrumentality 
of the Crown.200 In the absence of any authority on this issue, an examination of the 
relevant legislation suggests that Crown immunity, including in relation to the 
imposition of penalties, will not be available for public universities. In light of the 
changes to the ACL regarding the imposition of pecuniary penalties and more 
significant consumer enforcement orders in relation to breaches of the consumer 
protection provisions, this may be an issue of some concern for HEIs.  
 
HEI and extended jurisdiction of the ACL201 
Of interest to universities providing online or offshore educational services are the 
provisions of the ACL that extend the application of the ACL to conduct outside 
Australia. Section 5 (1)(c) of the CCA provides that the provisions of the ACL extends 
to conduct engaged in outside Australia by corporations carrying on business within 
Australia, Australian citizens or permanent residents.202 The question therefore would 
be whether the provision of educational services to locations outside Australia would 
be considered to be ‘carrying on a business’. Given the conclusions drawn above 
following the examination of the test for whether activities of the HEI are in ‘trade or 
commerce’, it is highly likely that the provision of educational services offshore by a 
HEI would attract the extended operation of the CCA, as the provision of these 
services would be ‘carrying on a business’. This would also include any overseas HEI 
                                                 
198 See, eg, s 10, ss 27–30 of the Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA). 
199 Miller, above n 23, 330 discussing the operation of the equivalent Commonwealth provision CCA s 
2B. 
200 Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 2, n 145 and the example from the 
University of Adelaide Act 1971 (SA). 
201 It is clear that the activities of HEI supplying educational services will be extended to the scenarios 
outlined below. It is worth noting however in the case of international students (and perhaps online 
students through arrangements such as OUA) who are recruited through educational agents other legal 
issues under the principles of agency law and the interaction with the ESOS Act also arise, but are 
beyond the scope of the thesis to examine it further. 
202 See also the discussion above at page 10 n 45 in relation to the meaning of ‘trade or commerce’. 
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that carries on a business in Australia through a branch.203 The CCA also provides 
extension to encompass the promotional activities of professional persons.204 
 
The provision of educational services through the internet outside of Australia’s 
geographical territory is also likely to be caught by the extended definition under 
section 6(3)(a) of the CCA. This section extends the operation of the CCA to postal, 
telegraphic or telephonic services. It will cover the promotional activities of HEI 
through the internet205 and the delivery of course materials through learning 
management systems such as blackboard, which are accessed via the internet. This 
will be the case even if the server is located outside Australia.206 
 
Conclusion 
While the relationship between the student and HEI is multifaceted, there exists a 
commercial relationship for the supply of educational services, underpinned by the 
law of contract, overlayed by statutory obligations and supported by the placement of 
the student at the centre as consumer. To the extent that a student–HEI contract for 
educational services exists, it is argued that this is supplied in ‘trade or commerce’. 
This is perhaps distinct from academic activities such as statements made in 
lectures, but not necessarily the compilation and provision of teaching materials, and 
the skills and qualifications of academic staff, for example, in the exercise of their 
academic judgement in the preparation and delivery of the course materials or the 
evaluation of assessment. Promises in relation to these aspects of the student–HEI 
relationship may form part of the contract for the supply of educational services, as 
discussed in the next chapter. Ipso facto if there is an enforceable contract there is a 
trading or commercial relationship or dealing. Further, the rights of consumers will not 
be denied because the services are provided without profit for the supplier. 
Alternatively, the supply of educational services is a ‘professional activity’ and 
therefore provided in ‘trade or commerce’ within the extended meaning of the ACL. It 
is also arguable that this includes the supply of educational services to 
                                                 
203 See Miller, above n 23, 401 [1.5.10]. See, eg, Andrew Trounson, ‘Global Laureate International 
Universities Targets Adelaide’, The Australian (online) 15 June 2011 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/global-laureate-international-universities-targets-
adelaide/story-e6frgcjx-1226075202086>. 
204 CCA s 6(4). See above n 171. 
205 In the case ACCC v Henry Kaye and National Investment Institute Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1363, when 
examining the provision of educational materials and the promotion thereof the court noted that the 
promotional activities had occurred using the internet and were therefore caught by the extended 
operation of the TPA.   
206 See, eg, ACCC v Hughes [2002] FCA 270; ACCC v Chen [2003] FCA 897 cited in Russell Miller, 
Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (Thomson Reuters, 33rd ed, 2011) 412 
[1.6.15]. 
LG 14040113 M.Phil 94 
 
Commonwealth-funded students, both on the law and on policy grounds. HEIs are 
unable to claim immunity from the operation of the ACL, which has an extended 
jurisdiction that impacts on the delivery of educational services in locations outside 
Australia, including via the internet. 
 
However, it may be said that within the framework of understanding what the student 
is transacting, there remains room for the expression of divergent views, intellectual 
debate and academic freedom, whatever that phrase entails.207 The courts have 
been concerned to ensure that consumer protection legislation does not impact 
negatively on intellectual debate in Australia.208 Therefore, is it possible to say that 
academic matters that attend to expressions of opinion or the divergence in views 
are not conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ under the ACL, as this is not the central 
concept of the commercial relationship. However, other matters relating to the 
transaction in relation to the delivery of educational services are. The definition of 
what is ‘in trade or commerce’ should not be confused with concerns to protect ideas 
of academic freedom and freedom of speech if in fact the conduct is not divorced 
from any relevant actual or potential trading, commercial, professional relationship or 
dealing. The proposition that the contract for the supply of educational services 
occurs in ‘trade or commerce’ and is therefore a contract subject to the UCT 
provisions is supported by the analysis of the legislation and precedent. To the extent 
that academic activity forms part of the student–HEI contract, it will be subject to the 
ACL provisions regulating unfair contract terms. 
 
 
                                                 
207 Cf Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost Ark’, above n 1. Rochford refers to public policy reasons why s 52 
of the TPA should not apply to lectures. Rochford is concerned that claims made under s 52 of the TPA 
(s 18 ACL) threatens the idea of academic freedom. She suggests that it would be appropriate, as it is 
with newspapers, to obtain exclusion from the operation of the Act for statements made that involve 
matters of ‘academic freedom’. She is of the view that the protection of the idea of academic freedom 
should be as critical as that for the reasons given for exclusion for newspapers: at 138–9. As was seen 
in Chapter 2, it is difficult to state definitively what academic freedom comprises. 
208 See above n 122. 
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Chapter 4: The Student–HEI Contract 
 
Introduction 
The protections available under the UCT of the ACL require the existence of several 
factors before the provisions are enlivened. There must be a ‘standard form’1 
‘consumer contract’2 between the supplier of the services (the HEI) and the 
consumer of those services (the student). Further, that contract must be supplied in 
‘trade or commerce’. The analysis in the preceding chapter established that a 
contract for the supply of educational services, if it exists, occurs in ‘trade or 
commerce’ as defined by the ACL. A consideration of whether the contract is a 
‘standard form’ ‘consumer contract’ as required will be undertaken in Chapter 5.  
 
This chapter is concerned with an examination of the case law and literature to 
determine whether a contract between the student and the HEI exists in Australia. As 
has been discussed previously in Chapter 2, students’ rights at law are various and 
co-exist in a manner that is not exclusive. Legal commentators in Australia and other 
common law jurisdictions have acknowledged that this includes the relationship 
between the HEI and student being situated in contract.3 It is settled law in the United 
Kingdom that a student–HEI contract exists.4 There is very little direct Australian 
authority on this particular issue, but some commentators go so far as to say that it is 
now beyond debate that a student–HEI contract exists in Australia.5 This chapter will 
                                                 
1 ACL s 23(1)(b).  
2 Ibid s 23(3). 
3 Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 3 All ER 752 (‘Clark’). Even Francine 
Rochford who was a strong proponent that the university–student relationship should be one of status 
(that is the students stand as corporators in relation to the university) acknowledges now that the 
prevailing view is to describe the university–student relationship as one of contract: Francine Rochford 
‘The Contested Product of a University Education’ (2008) 30(1) Journal of Higher Education Policy and 
Management 41, 42. See also J Stephen Kós and Russell McVeagh, ‘The View From The Bottom of 
The Cliff: Enforcement of Legal Rights Between Student and University’ (1999) 4(2) Australia and New 
Zealand Journal of Law and Education 18, 26 where Kós and McVeagh acknowledge the coexistence of 
statutory powers and contractual rights in other aspects of New Zealand law, notably companies formed 
under the NZ Companies Act; Simon Whittaker, ‘Public and Private Law-Making: Subordinate 
Legislation, Contracts and the Status of “Student Rules”’ (2001) 21(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
103. 
4 Clark [2000] 3 All ER 752, 756 (Sedley LJ); Moran v University College, Salford [1994] ELR 187 
(‘Moran’). See generally Dennis Farrington and David Palfreyman, The Law of Higher Education (2012, 
2nd ed, Oxford University Press) chapter 12; Tim Birtwistle and Melissa Askew, ‘The Teaching and 
Higher Education Act 1998 — Impact on The Student Contract’ (1999) 11(2) Education and the Law 89, 
95; Martin Davis, ‘Students, Academic Institutions and Contracts — A Ticking Time Bomb?’ (2001) 13(1) 
Education and the Law 9; William P Hoye and David Palfreyman, ‘Plato vs Socrates: The Devolving 
Relationship Between Higher Education Institutions and their Students’ (2004) 16(2–3) Education and 
the Law 97; Sam Middlemiss, ‘Legal Liability of Universities for Students’ (2000) 12(2) Education and 
the Law 61; David Palfreyman, ‘Phelps … Clark … and now Rycotewood? Disappointment Damages for 
Breach of the Contract to Educate’ (2003) 15(4) Education and the Law 237.  
5 See Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘In-House or in Court? Legal Challenges to University 
Decisions’ (2006) 18(1) Education and the Law 1, 10; Lynden Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination Before 
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review the authorities to determine the acceptance of a contract between the student 
and HEI in Australia. However, even if it can be said that the contract does exist, 
there is divergence in views as to the particular arrangements entered into. There is 
some debate about whether the contract for the supply of educational services 
consists of one or two contracts. Proponents of the two contract theory suggest that 
the first contract between the student and HEI is a contract ‘to admit’.6 That is, the 
prospective student in receipt of an offer and upon acceptance of that offer has a 
contractual entitlement to take up a place at the HEI and enrol. 7 The second 
contract, the contract ‘to educate’ (alternately a contract for tuition or matriculation),8 
arises upon enrolment. A consideration of the technical aspects of the formation of 
the contract, such as intention to be legally bound, consideration and agreement will 
be undertaken in an attempt to resolve these issues. 
 
The chapter will also examine the nature of the student–HEI contract and attempt to 
determine the scope of the terms of the contract, with particular reference to the 
myriad of HEI enrolling, policy and other documents. The focus of the analysis will be 
on the potential express terms of what might be considered the ‘standard form’ 
contract. The determination of the nature of the contract and its terms is significant 
for this research. The following chapter will examine the application and effect of the 
UCT provisions to identify any connection between the UCT provisions regarding 
substantive unfairness and the protection afforded students by the legislation in the 
context of the provision of educational services. The identification of the nature and 
terms of the student–HEI contract is necessary in order to assess whether any terms 
in the student–HEI contract are potentially unfair terms as proscribed under the ACL. 
This chapter will then canvass the remedies available at common law for breach of 
the contract for the supply of educational services as it is very possible that the 
remedies available under the ACL are more effective mechanisms for redress for 
students. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the Journey Starts — Legal Education and Fitness for Purpose’ (2007) Murdoch ELaw Journal 315 
<https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/issues/2007/1/eLaw_knowing_destination.pdf> 321.  
6 Moran [1994] ELR 187, OxCHEPS Law of Higher Education online casebook (18 November 2011) 
<http://oxcheps.new.ox.ac.uk/new/casebook/part3_13.php>. See generally Farrington and Palfreyman, 
The Law of Higher Education, above n 4, 336–350 [12.08]–[12.240]; Davis, above n 4; but see 
Middlemiss, above n 4, 85; Birtwistle and Askew, above n 4. 
7 Indeed the initial relationship between the prospective student and the HEI can only be based in 
contract as the prospective student is not yet a member of the HEI. Farrington and Palfreyman, The Law 
of Higher Education, above n 4, 336 [12.08].  
8 Moran [1994] ELR 187, OxCHEPS, above n 6. See generally Farrington and Palfreyman, The Law of 
Higher Education, above n 4; Davis, above n 4; but see Middlemiss, above n 4; Birtwistle and Askew, 
above n 4. 
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The existence of the student–HEI contract9 
The seminal English case is that of Clark v University of Lincolnshire and 
Humberside (‘Clark’),10 which was discussed in some detail in Chapter 2 in relation to 
the justiciability of matters pertaining to academic judgement. In this case the student 
had been working on a paper on the play A Streetcar Name d Desire as part of her 
final examination. She failed to make a backup copy and lost all electronic records of 
her work. As a result, all she was able to submit on the due date was a collation of 
notes copied from other sources. She was failed for plagiarism.11 The student availed 
herself of various university appeal processes, which were unsuccessful. She then 
brought a claim for breach of contract. Initially the student claimed that the University 
had ‘misconstrued the meaning of plagiarism and that the paper had been given a 
mark beyond academic convention’.12 At first instance the trial judge decided that 
alleged breaches of contract by universities were not justiciable by courts.13 This 
point was specifically rejected by the Court of Appeal.14 The Court of Appeal 
confirmed the existence of a contractual relationship between a fee-paying student 
and a HEI.15 On appeal, the student’s claim was limited to breach of contract under 
the University’s regulations.16 This case has been followed consistently in the UK and 
considered highly persuasive in other jurisdictions.17 The issue of what constitutes a 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that this discussion is not concerned with ‘learning contracts’ often found in a 
teaching and learning context, which are imbued with the force of contractual terminology but are not 
intended to be binding at law. The following discussion centres on enforceable legal rights arising from 
the agreement between the student and the HEI in the provision of educational services. See, eg, Paul 
Gibbs, ‘Learning Agreements and Work-Based Higher Education’ (2009) 14(1) Research in ‘Post 
Compulsory’ Education 31. The issues of learning contracts was also raised in the matter of Walsh v 
University of Technology, Sydney [2007] FCA 880, [67] where the student applicant and the respondent 
university agreed after the mispleading by the applicant student that the learning contract was not a 
document intended to be legally binding; but see Ruth Gaffney-Rhys and Joanna Jones, ‘Issues 
Surrounding the Introduction of Formal Student Contracts’ (2010) 35(6) Assessment and Evaluation in 
Higher Education 711 where the authors discuss the ramifications of the introduction of ‘formal learning 
agreements’. Their proposition is that the formalisation of the student–HEI contract can improve student 
satisfaction and assist with the management of student expectations. However, with respect the article 
is unhelpful at times as it is not always clear whether the authors are referring to the implementation of 
those agreements that are legally binding and those that are not (eg, they suggest that the word 
‘contract’ should be avoided because of the negative connotations held by the student respondents in 
their sample, but this would have no effect at law. In the next paragraph the authors emphasise that it 
needs to be clear to all parties whether the provisions are legally binding: at 719). This is exacerbated 
by the use of the phrase ‘learning agreement’, which is often used in a purely learning and teaching 
context.  
10 Clark [2000] 3 All ER 752.  
11 Ibid 754 [1]. 
12 Ibid 752. 
13 Ibid, 755. 
14 See Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of the issues attending to the examination of matters of 
academic judgement. 
15 Clark [2000] 3 All ER 752, 756 [12]. 
16 Ibid 756 [12]. This had the effect of allowing the Court to review the decision making process as the 
claim was no longer framed in a manner that sought review of a matter of academic judgement.  
17 See, eg, Moran [1994] ELR 187, OxCHEPS, above n 6; Grant v Victoria University of Wellington 
[2003] NZAR 186 (‘Victoria University’); Lamb v Massey University [2006] NZCA 167; referred to in 
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99. 
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‘fee-paying student’ in an Australian context is considered further below. Clearly the 
phrase would encompass full fee paying students, typically international students, 
postgraduate students and some domestic students, particularly at private HEIs. The 
situation is less certain for Commonwealth-funded students. 
 
It is also accepted in New Zealand that a student–HEI contract exists. In Grant v 
Victoria University of Wellington [2003] NZAR 186 (‘Victoria University’), the student 
plaintiffs had completed and been awarded the Degree of Master of Arts (Applied) in 
Environmental Studies. They were however dissatisfied with the quality of the course 
provided and brought a claim based on breach of the contract with the University.18 
Justice Ellis was of the view that it was beyond argument that the relationship 
between the student and university was partially based in contract. Thus in New 
Zealand students are entitled to seek redress against a university on the basis of 
contract, tort or judicial review.19 The existence of a student–HEI contract in New 
Zealand was confirmed in Lamb v Massey University [2006] NZCA 167.20 
 
The position in Australia 
Australian commentators are largely of the view that a student–HEI contract does 
arise, at least upon enrolment. Griggs has examined the effect of the former implied 
warranty of fitness for purpose21 into the student–HEI contract in the context of legal 
education.22 He has considered the existence of the student–HEI contract and how 
the matter has been addressed in the UK.23 As there is little direct authority on this 
point in Australia, Griggs relies on persuasive precedent from England and the 
United States.24 Lindsay also agrees that the Australian authorities are ‘scant and not 
particularly revealing of the nature and content of the contract’ and has regard to UK 
                                                 
18 Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186. The second cause of action was based on misrepresentation. 
This decision concerns a strike out application by the University. See especially Kós and McVeagh, 
above n 3. 
19 Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186, 191. 
20 In that matter a student who had passed the theory component of her Diploma of Teaching but failed 
her practicum claimed that the University had breached the contract. No breach of contract was 
established. See Pheh Hoon Lim and Juliet Hyatt, ‘Educational Accountability — Do Tertiary Students 
Need More Academic Protection in New Zealand?’ (2009) 14(1) International Journal of Law and 
Education 23, 31. 
21 TPA s 74. 
22 Lynden Griggs, above n 5. 
23 Ibid 318–21.  
24 Ibid 321. Given the differences in the higher education systems in the United States and Australia, the 
American jurisprudence will not be considered in this thesis. There is a significant jurisprudence in 
relation to a higher education law in the US and has longevity not matched in either the UK or Australia. 
For a comparative analysis of the US and UK see David Palfreyman, ‘The HEI–Student Legal 
Relationship, Special Reference to the USA Experience’ (1999) 11(1) Education and the Law 5. 
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authorities, notably Clark and Moran v University College Salford (No2) [1994] ELR 
187 (‘Moran’).25  
 
The accepted authority in the Australian context is Bayley-Jones v University of 
Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWR 424 (‘Bayley-Jones’). Ms Bayley-Jones applied to the 
Court for an order quashing the Visitor’s award to her for compensation and that 
instead the Visitor be compelled to assess damages due to her in accordance with 
the law.26 The plaintiff had been awarded a ‘solatium’ in the amount of $6,000 by the 
Visitor as a result of her PhD candidature being wrongfully terminated by the 
University.27 The Court found that the Visitor, ‘[h]aving determined that a wrong had 
been done by the University to the plaintiff it was not open to him to deny her such 
compensation as would redress the reasonably foreseeable harm to her caused by 
that wrong and to award her a mere “solatium”.’28 The question was then on what 
basis should damages be properly measured. The University argued that the plaintiff 
could not succeed in her claim as she had not alleged any cause of action upon 
which an award of damages could be based.29 The Court considered potential claims 
arising in administrative law30 and negligence31. In relation to the plaintiff’s reliance on 
a breach of contract to support her claim for damages, the Court said: 
In the petition she set out at great length and with fine particularity all the documentation 
relating to her candidacy being accepted and all the arrangements made between her and 
the relevant University officials. The relevant documents and the relevant rules were 
reproduced in full. Any lawyer reading her petition would have been evincing a remarkable 
lack of perspicacity if his mind did not turn immediately to the law of contract. The word 
‘contract’ is not used. The expression ‘breach of contract’ is not used. But the relevant 
facts are alleged. One can have contractual rights which are a reflection of rules of the 
University. Where in such a case what constitutes the breach of the contract is breach of 
the rules of the University the Visitor's jurisdiction, which is exclusive, is attracted. In my 
opinion it is clear that in the present case the plaintiff is entitled to rely upon any breach of 
contract between her and the University which was involved in the ultra vires purported 
termination of her candidacy.32 
 
                                                 
25 Bruce Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law: Negotiating the Legal Terrain of Student 
Challenges to University Decisions’ (2007) 12(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and 
Education 7, 10–11. 
26 Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWR 424, 425. 
27 Ibid, 427–8. ‘A ‘solatium’ is a sum paid to an injured party ‘by way of solace to his wounded feelings’: 
The Dictionary of English Law’: at 432 (Allen J). 
28 Ibid 428.  
29 Ibid 432.  
30 Ibid 433–5.  
31 Ibid 435.  
32 Ibid.  
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Public HEIs and the contract for the supply of educational services in Australia 
The decision in Bayley-Jones was followed in the matter of Harding v University of 
New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 301(‘Harding’) with very little discussion of the 
issue.33 That case involved an application by the student Mrs Kathleen Harding 
regarding a decision that was made in 1988. The University did not allow her to re-
enrol in the medicine course as she had failed her end-of-year examination. The 
basis of the student’s claim was that the appeal committee formed to consider her 
application supporting her re-enrolment, based on expert medical opinion regarding 
the illness that had contributed to the failure of her exams, did not do so according to 
University rules. One cause of action pleaded by the student was breach of 
contract.34 The Court considered whether there was a contract on foot between the 
student and the University and, if so, did that contract contain a term or terms 
requiring the University to apply its rules regarding the relevant appeals process in 
relation to the claim by the plaintiff. Justice Sully was simply of the view that those 
questions should be answered in the affirmative following the reasoning of Allen J in 
Bayley-Jones.35  
 
A number of Australian cases involving public universities have touched on the issue 
of contractual relationship between the HEI and the student, although largely these 
cases have dealt with the issue of the contractual relationship in interlocutory 
proceedings, usually involving strike-out applications or alternatively determinations 
of deficient pleadings and insufficient evidence. The complex and multi-causational 
matter between a disgruntled PhD student Megumi Ogawa and the University of 
Melbourne has been canvassed earlier in Chapter 3.36 In one of the many 
applications made by Ms Ogawa, the Court had reason to consider a claim by her in 
relation to breach of contract.37 Ms Ogawa alleged amongst other things that the 
supervision of her PhD studies was inadequate and in breach of the contract 
between her and the University. 38 The claim for breach of contract was struck out 
due to Ogawa’s failure to identify the terms of the contract. However, it was 
                                                 
33 Harding v University of New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 301, [18]. 
34 The student also made various claims including discrimination in relation to her medical condition and 
age, negligence, breach of statutory duty, misfeasance in public office and equitable estoppel. 
35 Harding v University of New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 301, [44]–[45]. The Court went on to find 
that the University had breached the term of the contract requiring it to deal with the plaintiff on the basis 
of its rules regarding the appeals committee and had not done so by the fact that the appeals committee 
convened with two members not three. This did not advance the student’s claim however. Even though 
there was a breach, it could not be shown that it related to any damage that the plaintiff could establish.  
36 See generally Megumi Ogawa, ‘The Courts’ Jurisdiction Over Student/University Disputes in 
Australia’, (2012) 2(1) International Journal of Public Law and Policy 96.  
37 Ogawa v University of Melbourne (No.3) [2004] FMCA 536. 
38 Ibid [26]–[27]. 
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specifically noted that the allegation of a breach of contract in general was not 
objected to.39 Ogawa was given an opportunity to re-plead her case but failed to do 
so. 40 The issue of whether or not there can be contract between a student and public 
university has not been specifically decided in other matters, although considered.41  
 
Unfortunately the issue of whether or not a contract to educate exists in Australia 
could not be determined by the High Court in Griffith University v Tang as breach of 
contract was not pleaded by the applicant student.42 At the application for special 
leave to appeal to the High Court, Kirby J noted the absence of what seemed an 
obvious point (although bringing a claim for breach of contract may have impeded the 
availability of judicial review in the circumstances43): 
KIRBY J: Can I just ask a question. It was common ground when we were told this at the 
special leave hearing that there is no contractual relationship. I am curious about that. 
Would not the respondent have paid fees? I accept that this has been common ground 
and maybe it ought not and cannot be revived now, but would you just illuminate why that 
was common ground? 
                                                 
39 Ibid. Although the Court had been able to discern the nature of the allegations regards inadequate 
supervision in contravention of s 52 of the TPA despite the poor pleading, the statement of claim did not 
identify how the contract had been breached. The Court considered whether there was scope within the 
rules of the Federal Court that would allow the matter to proceed, even though the applicant had not 
specifically identified the terms of the contract. The Court held that there was not. Phipps FM was of the 
view that the best way to proceed given these difficulties was ‘… to strike out the whole contract 
pleading but make it clear that … [the allegation of breach of contract] is not objected to and that the 
problem is that the terms of the contract relied upon are not set out and the matters which are alleged to 
consist the breaches need to be set out. Counsel for the respondent accepted that if the pleading was 
struck out the applicant should be given the opportunity to re-plead’: at [35]. In Ogawa v Phipps [2006] 
FCA 361, Ogawa was successful in her application for writs for certiorari and prohibition in respect of the 
decision eventually dismissing the application Ogawa v University of Melbourne (No.2) [2005] FMCA 
1216 on the basis that the proceedings had been wrongly transferred to the inferior court. See Chapter 3 
at pages 10–11 nn 50–8. 
40 Ogawa v The University of Melbourne [2005] FCA 1139 (22 August 2005). A further application that 
the proceedings be dismissed or struck out on the basis that the claim by Ogawa was frivolous or 
vexatious and/or an abuse of process of the court was heard by Ryan J in Ogawa v The University of 
Melbourne [2005] FCA 1139 (22 August 2005). The Court accepted the University’s submission that 
Ogawa’s re-filed statement of claim was in fact a mechanical reproduction in identical form to the claim 
that had been struck out Phipps FM and that Ms Ogawa had made no attempt to reformulate the 
pleading. Orders were made by Ryan J to stay the proceedings relating to the claims pursuant to the 
TPA, the breach of contract and the new claims made under the Racial Discrimination Act: see Ogawa v 
Phipps [2006] FCA 361. The matter was transferred back to the Federal Court and eventually settled. 
See also Ogawa, above n 36. 
41 See Dudzinski v Kellow Dudzinski v Kellow [1999] FCA 390 [18]; Mathews v University of Queensland 
[2002] FCA 414. 
42 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 121 [58].  
43 Ibid 107 per Chief Justice Gleeson ‘The effect of the decision presently in question was to exclude the 
respondent from the appellant's PhD research programme. There was no finding in the Supreme Court 
of Queensland as to exactly what was involved, in terms of legal relations, in admission to, or exclusion 
from, the programme. There was no evidence of a contract between the parties. There may well have 
been such a contract, but, if there was one, we were not told about it, and it was not relied upon by 
either party. The silence in the evidence about this matter, which bears upon the legal nature and 
incidents of the relationship between the parties, is curious. If the decision to exclude the respondent 
had been made pursuant to the terms of a contract, then, on the authorities, that would have been a 
consideration adverse to the respondent on the issue with which we are concerned.’: at 107–8 [12] 
(Gleeson CJ). The decision would therefore not have been made under enactment, but perhaps it 
should have been pleaded in the alternative. 
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MR KEANE: Well, your Honour, it is common ground but no evidence of any contractual 
relationship [was led] … your Honour makes an assumption as to the provision of 
consideration which one cannot confirm. 
 
KIRBY J: I just have to put it out of my brain even though it will not seem to go away. All 
right, well I will do so.44 
 
At the hearing His Honour Gleeson CJ remarked: 
In the present case, the exclusion was in accordance, or purported to be in accordance, 
with the terms and conditions as to academic behaviour which had previously been 
established. It appears to be accepted that, by applying to join the program, the 
respondent was bound by those terms and conditions, at least in the sense that the 
appellant could lawfully apply them to its relationship with the respondent. If there were a 
contract, presumably the contract, either expressly or by implication, included those terms 
and conditions. The case was argued on the assumption that the appellant was entitled to 
invoke and apply its policies in relation to academic misconduct, and its procedures for 
deciding whether academic misconduct had occurred and for internal review of such 
decision. The precise legal basis of that common assumption was not examined in 
argument. There is no reason to doubt that the assumption is correct…Undoubtedly, from 
a practical point of view, it is unrealistic to regard the decision to exclude the respondent 
from the PhD program as no different from the decision of any service provider to withdraw 
future supply from a consumer of those services. Yet the legal effect of an otherwise lawful 
decision to terminate the relationship, contractual or voluntary, may be ascribed accurately 
and sufficiently as a termination of the relationship, even if the statutory or other context in 
which the relationship exists confers particular benefits, or potential benefits, upon one of 
the parties.45 
 
Private HEIs and the contract for the supply of educational services in 
Australia 
The matter seems less contentious in relation to private providers of higher 
educational services or postgraduate training.46 Courts are prepared to accept the 
                                                 
44 Transcript of Proceedings, Griffith University v Tang [2004] HCATrans 227 (21 June 2004), [30]–[45]. 
The relevant passage from the Court of Appeal decision is as follows: Tang v Griffith University [2003] 
QCA 571 ‘In the instant appeal the appellant contended and the respondent accepted that there was no 
contractual relationship between these parties, and the appeal record discloses no evidence of any. For 
example, there is no evidence of any payment made by Ms Tang to the respondent University for 
admission to the PhD course, or of any terms or conditions agreed to between the parties when she was 
(presumably) admitted or accepted as a PhD candidate': Transcript of Proceedings, at [29]. 
45 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 110 [17]–[19]. See also Griffith University v Tang (2005) 
221 CLR 99, 121 [58].   
46 See, eg, Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (2002) 
122 FCR 110. 
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existence of a contract between a student and private provider of higher education.47 
The ease of acceptance of a student–HEI contract is even more apparent when one 
considers the cases that have come before the consumer based tribunals.48 Often 
the supply of services under a contract to educate is readily recognised and the 
tribunals focus on determining the contents of the contract and what loss, if any, has 
been suffered by applicants.49 There appear to be very few cases where a court or 
tribunal has explicitly decided a contract does not exist between a student and a 
provider of educational services.50  
                                                 
47 See below n 49. See also Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For: 
Consumer Rights of Students in Higher Education’ (2006) 15 Griffith Law Review 306, 312 and the 
authorities relied upon Commonwealth of Australia v Noel Ling (1993) 44 FCR 397; Noel Ling v 
Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 51 FCR 88; Commonwealth of Australia v Ling (1993) 44 FCR 397; 
Orr v Bond University (Supreme Court of Queensland, unreported, Dowsett J, No 2337, 3 April 1996).  
48 See, eg, Kwan v University of Sydney Foundation Program P/L (‘Kwan’) [2002] NSWCTTT 83. 
49 Other examples of where the consumer tribunals have been prepared to proceed on the basis of the 
existence of a contract for tuition or a contract to educate include Clair v College of Complimentary 
Medicine Pty Ltd (General) [2008] NSWCTTT 1309 where the Tribunal referred to the prospectus as 
containing the terms of the contract. The applicant agreed that she had signed a contract with the 
college, which included her acknowledgment that she had read and understood the conditions in the 
prospectus. In Qayam v Shillington College (General) [2007] NSWCTTT 620 (17 October 2007) the 
Tribunal did not specifically address the issue of whether there was a contract and appeared to proceed 
on the basis that the respondents had agreed to supply, and the applicant participate in, a certificate IV 
course in design upon enrolment. The issue related to the student’s expectations that she receive one-
on-one tutoring. After referring to the materials relating to the handbook and enrolment court found that 
the college provided an appropriate learning environment that met the obligations under the agreement. 
Cotton v Blinman Investments Pty Ltd and Blinman (General) [2004] NSWCTTT 723 (13 December 
2004) concerned a claim for breach of contract and false representations in relation to the qualifications 
and experience of the respondent’s teaching staff at the Strand College of Beauty Therapy. Again it was 
accepted that a contract was in existence and the focus of the Tribunal was whether or not a false 
representation had in fact been made, if there was a breach of contract and what loss, if any, had been 
suffered. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the contract was contained in a document entitled 
‘Course Enrolment Agreement’: at [7]. 
50 These cases are interesting because of the particular circumstances of the case, the extremity of the 
students’ claims and the poorly formulated pleadings (more so than usual). In the matter of Navarro v 
Academies Australasia P/L (General) [2003] NSWCTTT 678 (4 October 2003) (‘Navarro’), the student 
applicant was seeking an order that he did not have to pay an outstanding amount of $5000 allegedly 
due to Excelsior College Pty Ltd. Excelsior College had been acquired by a subsidiary of Academies 
Australia Pty Ltd. The Tribunal found that any rights under the contract between Excelsior College Pty 
Ltd and the student Mr Navarro had been assigned to Academies Australia Pty Ltd. The question before 
the Tribunal was whether Mr Navarro had undertaken a contractual obligation to pay Excelsior College 
an additional $5000, representing what Academies Australia Pty Ltd considered to be the outstanding 
tuition fee.  There was no evidence before the Tribunal that Mr Navarro actually attended at the college 
or completed any part of his studies. Rather the issue turned on the effect of a certificate issued by the 
Department of Education, Science and Training. The Tribunal found that any certificate issued by the 
Department did not operate as a contract between Excelsior College and Mr Navarro (or respectively 
Academies Australia and Mr Navarro) and was ‘no more and no less than a confirmation of enrolment’: 
at 5. The Tribunal found that there was no evidence of a contract between the student and the College. 
In this instance the Tribunal did not accept that a contract was formed upon enrolment. This is contrary 
to the UK authorities. The Tribunal noted that the respondent was unable to produce evidence of any 
terms and conditions of enrolment, including further payments: at 5. In Navarro one wonders if the 
Tribunal may have been influenced by potentially sharp practices by the higher education provider in 
claiming an amount due to them when in fact there was no evidence any service having been provided 
to the Columbian student. The other two matters of note involve TAFE institutions. In David Joseph 
Crook v Holmesglen Institute of TAFE (Civil Claims) [2010] VCAT 1808 one of the orders sought by the 
student was that the policies and procedures in relation to student grievances and discipline at the 
Holmesglen TAFE be amended. This included the implementation of an anti-bullying campaign. The 
Tribunal declined to deal with any of the student’s claims in relation procedures and policies of the TAFE 
as they were not matters that were between a consumer and trader, that is, the claim was not 
concerned with the supply of goods or services: at [15]; The other matter is Chan v Sellwood; Chan v 
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One issue particular to private providers may be the question of who the student 
contracts with. In the matter of Kwan v University of Sydney Foundation Program P/L 
(‘Kwan’),51 the Tribunal had occasion to consider claims in respect of breach of 
contract and misleading or deceptive under section 52 of the TPA.52 The student had 
been enrolled in and completed a foundation program for admittance to a bachelor 
degree at the University of Sydney. The provider of the program was Taylors Institute 
of Advanced Studies Ltd (‘Taylors’). Interestingly there was no discussion by the 
Tribunal regarding the formation of the contract, rather the application was concerned 
largely with what made up the terms of the contract and whether there had been a 
breach. The Tribunal found that the entity with which the student had ‘contracted to 
supply the course was the Foundation. Taylors was the Foundation’s agent in 
supplying the academic component of the programme’.53  
 
This clearly has ramifications for HEIs who create other entities to provide 
programmes to assist students in securing alternative pathways for entry into a HEI. 
The Foundation in Kwan was established by the University of Sydney. The contract 
with the student was with the Foundation, not the private provider. The private 
provider was the agent of the University Foundation. There are a myriad of 
arrangements between HEIs and providers of what might be called ‘further’ education 
or ‘vocational’ education54 in relation to recognised prior learning, direct entry and 
credit allocated for courses studied at other institutions.55 Thus, while there is a 
                                                                                                                                            
Calvert [2009] NSWSC 135. Here the plaintiff Chan brought an action against the Ultimo TAFE in New 
South Wales and two staff members in relation to a fail mark awarded. One claim by the applicant 
rested on an allegation that there was a breach of TAFE policy in the conduct of the assessors in 
relation to assessment and the provision of full and accurate information: at [23]–[24]. Justice Davies 
found that there did not exist any ‘contractual status between TAFE and any student that gives rise to a 
legal entitlement for the student to sue even if it is accepted that a breach of that clause [of the policy] is 
made out.’: at [25]. The Court followed Clark, that had been ‘seemingly approved’ in Griffith University v 
Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99  and Walsh v University of Technology, Sydney [2007] FCA 880 stating that  
‘Disputes between students and establishments of learning are ordinarily unsuitable for adjudication in 
the courts and ought to be resolved by internal procedures’: at [26]. It is worth noting that as a claim in 
contract was not pleaded, the comments are obiter and not decisive of the issue of the existence of a 
contract between students and TAFE institutions. This seems to go against the weight of other common 
law authority at least in relation to the existence of a contract notwithstanding the public status of the 
higher (or further) education institution.  
51 [2002] NSWCTTT 83. 
52 The Tribunals findings in relation to jurisdiction are discussed in Chapter 2. 
53 Kwan (2002) NSWCTTT 83, [57].  
54 Known as ‘further education’ in the UK. See generally Oliver Hyams, Law of Education (Jordans, 2nd 
ed, 2004) 491. 
55 This is in addition to arrangements such as the one in Kwan, which is followed by many HEIs. See, 
eg, Curtin University and its pathway provider Curtin College, (12 August 2012), 
<http://www.curtincollege.edu.au/>. For articulation arrangements and credit for recognised prior 
learning, see, eg, TAFE (NSW) (12 August 2012) 
<https://www.tafensw.edu.au/tafeunicredit/about/articulation.htm>; Southern Cross University, (12 
August 2012) <http://www.scu.edu.au/articulationpathways/index.php/60/>; College for Law and Justice 
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preponderance of cases in the tribunals brought against ‘vocational’ institutions or 
providers of ‘further’ education, these cases remain instructive and relevant. In some 
instances these types of providers will be the agents of a HEI, as in Kwan. Further, 
these types of claims are also significant given the increasing movement towards the 
integration of the university and Vocational and Educational Training (‘VET’) 
systems.56  
 
Technical aspects in relation to the formation of the contract arising in an 
Australian context57 
Intention to be legally bound and capacity to contract 
Generally intention to be legally bound in business or commercial circumstances will 
be inferred unless the contrary is shown.58 Chapter 3 considered the trading or 
commercial character of the transactions in which the HEI and student deal and 
concluded that it is very likely to be such. Interestingly, however, intention was an 
issue in the matter of Shahid59 discussed in detail in Chapter 3. As discussed there, 
the applicant was a medical practitioner seeking to undertake further training with the 
College that would ultimately enable her to be a specialist dermatologist. The 
applicant’s claim included an allegation that the College had breached its contractual 
obligation by not providing certain rights of appeal as promised.60 At first instance the 
trial judge found that in the circumstances there was not the requisite intention on 
behalf of the parties to create a legally binding contract.61  
 
On appeal, Jessup J referred to the relevant authorities in Australia in relation to the 
establishment of an intention to create legal relations.62 His Honour looked at the 
                                                                                                                                            
Administration, Police and Military RPL, (12 August 2012) <http://policerpl.com.au/university-
articulation>.  
56 See Andrew Trounson, ‘Canberra Uni-TAFE Link Less Than a Perfect Match’, The Australian (online), 
1 June 2011 1 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/canberra-uni-tafe-link-less-than-a-
perfect-match/story-e6frgcjx-1226066699206>.  
57 For a detailed analysis of the technical aspects of the contract, see Francine Rochford, ‘The 
Relationship Between The Student and The University’ (1998) 3(1) Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Law & Education 28, 30–6.  
58 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1976] 1All ER 117; Ermogenous v 
Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95. See Nadine Courmadias ‘Intention to Create 
Legal Relations: The End of Presumptions?’ (2006) 34 Australian Business Law Review 175. Note that 
there is criticism that this remains a separate element for the formation of an enforceable contract, 
especially when not a requirement in other jurisdictions such as the EU. See, eg, Bhawna Gulati, 
‘“Intention to Create Legal Relations”: A Contractual Necessity or An Illusory Concept’ (2011) 2 Beijing 
Law Review 127. 
59 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists 248 ALR 267. 
60 Ibid 329 [209].The terms of the contract in question were that each time the applicant lodged an 
appeal she brought a contract into existence that contained a term that the College would proceed with 
the appeal in accordance with the procedures set out in the training handbook for the relevant year.  
61 Ibid 329–30 [207]–[209]. 
62 Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95; Edwards v Skyways Ltd 
[1964] 1 WLR 349. This was the only issue in contention on appeal as the other elements for the 
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circumstances of the training programme as a whole,63 including the maintenance of 
standards for the profession64 and the detailed nature of the information regarding 
the programme, assessment and process for appeal in the course handbook.65 His 
Honour also noted that the subject matter was important to both the profession and 
the student applicants as it went to their future careers.66 The fee paid upon 
lodgement of an appeal was not insubstantial.67 Justice Jessup held that there was a 
mutual intention to create legal relations.68 Given that students enter into 
arrangements with a HEI to undertake courses of study for advancement of their 
future careers for a substantial fee, it seems unlikely that it will be difficult to establish 
an intention to be legally bound. 
 
The increasing overlay of regulation has also been seen as crystallising the formal 
elements required to constitute an enforceable contract, including the issue of 
intention.69 It has also been noted by a number of commentators that the existence of 
standard form contracts and the inability of students to individually negotiate the 
contract supports the view that there is in fact an intention to be legally bound and 
would certainly negate any argument a provider of higher education would make in 
relation to that point.70 The notion of the student–HEI contract being a standard form 
contract is explored more fully in Chapter 5. No issue in relation to capacity of the 
student, if a minor, to contract exists in a contract that is clearly for the minors’ 
benefit, if not necessity.71  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
formation of the contract were accepted by the parties; Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists 
248 ALR 267, 329 [209]. 
63 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists 248 ALR 267, 330 [213]. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid 331 [214]. 
68 Ibid 332 [216]. 
69 When considering the issue of the formation of the contract, interestingly Griggs turns to the 
requirements set out under the Higher Education Support Act 1992 (Cth) (and in particular division 19 of 
the Higher Education Support Act 2003). This approach resonates with the decision in Moran that had 
regard to the statutory processes regulating the offer and acceptance of a place at the university. Griggs 
argues that the extensive prescription governing the student–HEI relationship arguably leads to the 
conclusion that the offer, acceptance and intent necessary to form contractual relationships are 
established: Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination’, above n 5, 320, n 30; Middlemiss, above n 4, 72. 
70 Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination’, above n 5, 320, n 30. Griggs goes onto to say that his proposition 
is supported by the fact that the contractual documents are dictated by the HEI and the existence of 
inequality in the bargaining power between the student and the HEI. Thus the courts use these factors 
to find a jurisdictional basis to assist the weaker party. See also Birtwistle, and Askew, above n 4, 94.  
71 Hamilton v Lethbridge (1912) 14 CLR 236; Scarborough v Sturzaker (1905) 1 Tas LR 117. See also 
various legislation governing agreements with minors, eg, Minors Contracts Act 1988 (Tas). 
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Consideration 
The UK decision of Clark above is seen as authority for the existence of a contract 
between the HEI and the fee-paying student. The meaning of what is a ‘fee-paying’ 
student is not considered in any detail in Clark. In any event this is likely to be 
something different in Australia given the idiosyncratic and changing nature of higher 
education funding arrangements globally.72 As indicated in the discussion in the 
previous chapter regarding the supply of educational services to Commonwealth-
funded students’ being in ‘trade or commerce’, the commerciality of the transactions 
with these students is less clear. In the context of the formation of a legally 
enforceable contract, consideration, the giving of something for something, is 
required.73  
 
This is fairly obvious and presents no difficulties in relation to full fee paying students 
(typically international students, postgraduate students but also domestic fee paying 
students, particularly at private HEIs). The situation regarding a Commonwealth-
funded student is more complex. In these circumstances, students agree to pay back 
to the Federal Government, with interest, a fee for their course. In turn the 
government pays an amount to the HEI for that particular place. The principles in 
relation to privity of contract might prevent a student from enforcing the contractual 
promise as it is the Federal Government who provides the consideration.74 The 
decision in Quickenden does provide some guidance on the issue of enforceable 
obligations, even though the specific matter under consideration was whether the 
University was a constitutional corporation. The University’s own submissions in that 
                                                 
72 See, eg, Glyn Jones, ‘Managing Student Expectations: The Impact of Top-Up Tuition Fees’ (2010) 
14(2) Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education 44; Roger Brown (ed), Higher Education 
and The Market (Routledge, 2011); For an Australian context see especially Gavin Moodie, ‘The 
Developing Student Market in Australian Higher Education’ in Roger Brown (ed), Higher Education and 
The Market (Routledge, 2011) 63. 
73 Currie v Misa (1875) LR10Ex 153; Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851. 
74 Price v Easton (1833) 4 B& Ad 433; See Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The 
University’, above n 57, 36; Davis, above n 4. Davis is also of the opinion that in relation to third party 
obligations and the idea of another third party providing consideration for the execution of a promise 
under a contract is not unusual in other aspects of law: at 14; Tim Kaye, Robert D Bickel and Tim 
Birtwistle, ‘Criticizing the Image of the Students as Consumer: Examining Legal Trends and 
Administrative Responses in the US and UK’ (2006) 18(2–3) Education and the Law 85, 113; Bruce 
Lindsay, ‘Student Subjectivity and the Law’ (2005) 10(2) Deakin Law Review 628. Lindsay makes an 
interesting observation that perhaps the government should be seen as de facto purchases of their 
educational service provided: at 634; This might even include ‘helicopter parents’ who pay the fees; 
Laura Clark, ‘Now “Helicopter” Parents Land at Freshers’ Week, Hover Around the Campus and Even 
Sleep in Their Children’s Dorms’, Daily Mail (online), 6 June 2012 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2155634/Now-helicopter-parents-land-freshers-week-hover-
campus-sleep-childrens-dorms.html>; Afshan Jafar, ‘Consumerism in Higher Education: The Rise of the 
Helicopter Parent’, The Guardian (online), 23 January 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/higher-
education-network/blog/2012/jan/23/consumerism-higher-education-helicopter-parents>. 
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case add weight to the proposition that notwithstanding the HECS scheme, students 
provide sufficient consideration: 
… the University submits that students incur a liability to it for part of the cost of their 
courses which liability is their Higher Education Contribution. Under the statutory scheme 
provision is made for the Commonwealth to lend to the student an amount equal to the 
unpaid part of the contribution and apply the amount so lent in discharge of the student's 
liability to the University…each institution is, in respect of each semester, to require each 
‘contributing student’ undertaking a designated course of study at the institution to pay to 
the institution in respect of that semester ... There are various … provisions relating to the 
mechanics of the scheme and the repayment of loans. Those mentioned illustrate the 
essential characteristics of an obligation imposed on each institution to require payment 
from students, the creation of a liability for the contribution owed by the student to the 
institution and the provision for the Commonwealth to lend the requisite amount to the 
student to discharge that liability.75 
 
It is interesting to note that in 2012 in Australia the quota restrictions for universities 
on Commonwealth funded places has been removed and universities will compete 
for Commonwealth-funded places. Thus the system operates much more like a 
voucher system where the funding goes with the student to whatever particular 
university they attend.76 This change in the structure and nature of the payment 
system for Commonwealth-funded places also adds weight to the idea of sufficient 
consideration on behalf of the student.  
 
Furthermore, a number of commentators and UK authorities note that there is 
sufficient consideration simply in the student declining another place and thereby 
suffering a detriment77 should the HEI not meet its contractual obligations.78 Rochford 
                                                 
75 Quickenden v O’Conner (2001) 184 ALR 260, 266 (emphasis added). The examples of a contribution 
ascertained in accordance with the section were as follows: ‘.... An institution cannot permit a 
contributing student who is not an excepted student to enrol for, or undertake a designated course of 
study in a semester unless the student has paid at least seventy five per cent of the contribution and 
provided a written request to the Commonwealth to pay the remainder of the liability (s 41(1)(a)). 
Alternatively, a student can be enrolled if the student gives the appropriate officer of the institution a 
document requesting a loan from the Commonwealth equal to the unpaid part of the contribution and the 
application of that loan in discharge of the student's liability to pay the unpaid part of the contribution (s 
41(1)(b)’: at 266. See also Bernard McCabe, ‘Concrete Constructions Turns 15’ (2005) 13 Trade 
Practices Law Journal 6. 
76 See generally Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education, Higher 
Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) Guidelines (13 August 2012) 
<http://www.deewr.gov.au/highereducation/resources/hesupportact2003guidelines/Pages/Home.aspx>. 
77 See Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination’, above n 5, 320, nn 30, 31. The determinant is in forgoing other 
opportunities to enrol at other institutions or alternate courses consistent with the decision in Moran 
(No2) [1994] ELR 187, OxCHEPS, above n 6. Griggs also suggests that the consideration may also be 
seen in meeting the burden of agreeing to comply with the burden imposed by university ordinances and 
by-laws. 
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notes that the situation in Australia prior to enrolment may be a little less clear as a 
result of students being able to accept second round offers without consequence in 
terms of a breach of the admissions contract.79 This may be an argument in favour of 
the one contract analysis (discussed below), at least for the Australian situation. In 
all, it would appear that any difficulty with consideration can be overcome.  
 
Agreement — one contract or two?  
The formation of an enforceable contract requires a ‘meeting of minds’ between the 
parties to the agreement. Identification of the mutual assent is achieved through an 
analysis of where the offer and acceptance lays.80 Given the dearth of authority in 
relation to detailed considered of the student–HEI contractual relationship in 
Australia, regard will be had to UK authority and commentators in this regard. Based 
on Moran,81 the accepted view in the UK is that there are two contracts in existence 
between the student and HEI.  
 
In Moran the plaintiff student brought a claim for breach of contract. The student, Mr 
Moran, received an ‘unconditional offer’ of a place in the University’s physiotherapy 
course. The application by the student, the advice of the offer, the acceptance of the 
offer by the student and acknowledgement of the acceptance all occurred through 
the centralised ‘clearing system’ operating at the time in the UK. The student 
resigned from his employment and quit his accommodation in anticipation of 
commencing his studies. Shortly before the start of the semester and at a point when 
the clearing system had virtually closed, the student was informed that the offer was 
the result of a clerical error and there was in fact no place available for him. 
Farrington and Palfreyman summarise the Courts decision thus: 
The unconditional offer of a place on the course was on the face of it intended to create 
legal relations and appeared to be an offer capable of acceptance. When Mr Moran 
accepted it, at the latest when he notified UCS on July 8, there was strong case for saying 
that an agreement was reached under which UCS agreed to offer him a place if he sought 
to enrol on the due date. However, he would not have been bound to enrol or pay fees 
under the terms laid down by PCAS. His Lordship rejected the argument that Mr Moran 
                                                                                                                                            
78 Moran [1994] ELR 187, OxCHEPS, above n 6; Farrington and Palfreyman, The Law of Higher 
Education, above n 4, 337–8 [12.08]–[12.09]; Davis, above n 4. See also Rochford, ‘The Relationship 
Between The Student and The University’, above n 57, 35. 
79 Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’, above n 57, 36.  
80 See, eg, Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153,179 (Heydon JA). One 
of the issues will be what constitutes invitations to treat by the HEI i.e. open days and promotional 
material: Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421. See also Farrington and Palfreyman, The Law of 
Higher Education, above n 4, 337 [12.09]. 
81 Moran [1994] ELR 187, OxCHEPS, above n 6; Farrington and Palfreyman, The Law of Higher 
Education, above n 4, 337–8 [12.08]–[12.09]; Birtwistle and Askew, above n 4. 
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could have sought to rejoin the clearing system after speaking to the course leader on 
August 16. He was not then told the reason why there was no place and only learned the 
correct reason on September 3. By then it was too late, as the clearing was by then almost 
finished. His Lordship concluded that there was a strong and clear case, on which Mr 
Moran has a good chance of success, that in late June/early July 1993 the parties reached 
a binding agreement, for good consideration, that UCS would accept Mr Moran for the 
degree course in physiotherapy commencing in September or October 1993.82 
 
Therefore upon acceptance of the university’s offer of a place, the student and the 
HEI enter into a contractual relationship whereby the HEI agrees to keep open that 
student’s place in the course of their choice and the student agrees to enrol. A 
separate contract to educate is formed once the student completes the enrolment 
process. The first contract is therefore a contract of admission, the second a contract 
of enrolment or matriculation.83 Davis explains how the two contracts interrelate: 
… an analysis is that there are two contracts — an initial contract entitling a student to 
enrol at the institution and a subsequent contract centred on enrolment itself (a sequence 
of events not unlike the acquiring of an option followed by its subsequent take-up). As a 
starting point this seems a sensible approach, but it leaves open the question of the 
relationship between the two contracts. In particular if, as suggested above, the initial 
application is made on the basis of information provided by the institution to what extent 
does this oblige the institution to honour any (apparent) commitments which may not be 
specifically repeated at the enrolment stage? This is a particularly acute question if it is 
assumed that the only ‘core’ obligations attaching to the institution at this initial stage is to 
fulfil its commitment to enrol the student, and that it is only subsequent to enrolment that’s 
its wider obligation as ‘service provider’ may arise. Perhaps the best way of resolving this 
dilemma is to state the pre-enrolment (or ‘admission’) contract obliges the institution to 
enrol the applicant onto the course in question, on the basis of the pre-admission 
information which the applicant has received.84 
 
Some commentators are of the view that the idea of two contracts may be 
‘unnecessarily complex’85 and that the ‘admission stage merely includes the pre-
contractual arrangements and agreement based on offer and acceptance that applies 
to most contracts’.86 Birtwistle and Askew propose a model of one contract as a new 
analysis for the student–HEI contractual relationship.87 The authors are of the view 
                                                 
82 Moran [1994] ELR 187, OxCHEPS, above n 6. 
83 Farrington and Palfreyman, The Law of Higher Education, above n 4, 336–50 [12.08]–[12.240]; Davis, 
above n 4. 
84 Davis, above n 4, 11. 
85 Middlemiss, above n 4, 85. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Birtwistle and Askew, above n 4, 97. 
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that the then new admissions process in the UK (a centralised ‘clearing system’ 
similar to the process operating in all Australian states)88 and the impact of consumer 
protection law on the student–HEI relationship lends weight to ‘the contention of a 
single contract, be that rolling or merely single’.89 In this way the student indicating to 
the HEI that it intends to accept the ‘offer’ of a place on enrolment is a declaration of 
intention only and the acceptance does not occur until the student completes the 
enrolment process.90  
  
So where does the offer capable of acceptance and effective acceptance occur? 
Students are provided with many sources of information (and attending puffery) in 
determining their choice of HEI. For example, there are open days, advertisements in 
print media, social media platforms advertising and informing students in relation to 
their courses through media such as Facebook and Twitter.91 There are numerous 
course finder web pages for future students detailing the courses available, facilities 
that students can expect to have access to by attending particular institutions and the 
quality of the courses provided.92 There are of course the institutional prospectuses 
that students avail themselves in the selection process. The prospectus is of interest 
because while part of the invitation to treat, it is referred to frequently in the existing 
case law on this issue as forming part of the terms of the contract.93 It is apparent 
from the authorities that courts will readily hold that a contract exists in relation to full 
fee paying students and the requisite offer and acceptance of those students 
contracting direct for educational services is manifest.94 Where the ‘offer’ and 
‘acceptance’ occurs in relation to Commonwealth-funded students is more 
                                                 
88 For example, in NSW and the ACT, see Universities Admission Centre (‘UAC’), (13 August 2012) 
<http://www.uac.edu.au/general/>. In WA see Tertiary Institutions Service Centre (‘TISC’), (13 August 
2012) <http://www.tisc.edu.au/static/home.tisc>.  
89 Birtwistle and Askew, above n 4, 97. 
90 Birtwistle and Askew, above n 4, 100 table 3. This appears to have some resonance with the actual 
practicalities of how the clearing system works in Australia, whereon at least in relation to the 
‘acceptance’ of offers, students have the option of doing nothing more than enrolling at the HEI in 
accordance with their process and by a particular date. See TISC, (17 December 2011) 
<http://www.tisc.edu.au/static/guide/admission-offers.tisc#main_what_now>. 
91 Tim Winkler, ‘Exposing the Lie About Gen Y’ The Australian (online), 21 September 2011 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/opinion/exposing-the-lie-about-gen-y/story-e6frgcko-
1226141829157>. 
92 The HEI will have such a page for their individual institution, see, eg University of Sydney, Future 
Students, (13 August 2012) <http://sydney.edu.au/future-students/>; Government sites, Australian 
Government, MyUniversity (13 August 2012) <http://myuniversity.gov.au/>; The Good Universities 
Guide, Degree Costs and Loans (28 September 2010) <http://www.gooduniguide.com.au/School-
Leavers/Paying-Your-Way/Degree-costs-and-loans>; Jill Rowbotham, ‘Students Go Online to Find 
Couse Advice’, The Australian (online), 10 August 2011 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-
education/students-go-online-to-find-course-advice/story-e6frgcjx-1226111949713>. 
93 See eg, Moran [1994] ELR 187, OxCHEPS, above n 6; Shahid v Australasian College of 
Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267; Kwan [2002] NSWCTTT 83; below n 136. 
94 Below n 136, as would be the case for many postgraduate students, or domestic full fee paying 
students as well as international students enrolled at HEIs. 
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complicated than that of full fee paying students. In relation to the four public 
universities in Western Australia, the process in relation to application, admission and 
enrolment at universities for school leavers is described below.95 The process is 
similar across all Australian jurisdictions.96 
 
Early in the year preceding the students’ enrolment (approximately March), the four 
public universities will submit to the Tertiary Institutions Service Centre (‘TISC’) 
information in relation to the courses they will be offering for the coming academic 
year, including indicative Australian Tertiary Admission Rank (‘ATAR’) scores.97 TISC 
then publish their guides to schools and students based on this information. Students 
are then required to complete an application process wherein they indicate their 
preferences for institutional courses through the TISC online registration process. 
This information is stored on the TISC database. In this sense TISC operates like a 
clearing house for the four public universities. In late November/early December, 
TISC then receives data from the School Curriculum and Standards Authority 
(previously the Western Australia Curriculum Council98) in relation to students’ 
results. TISC holds all the information from the universities about which students are 
eligible for courses or not (in terms of quotas). Universities then access the TISC 
database and download from the TISC website the first preferences of eligible 
students. From this list of eligible students, the ‘offer’ is made to the student. The 
‘offer’ typically congratulates the student and says something along the lines of ‘We 
are very pleased to offer you a place in the … course at XY University’.99 Typically 
this ‘offer’ will provide the students with information on how to accept the ‘offer’ of a 
place or deferment and more information on the enrolment process. Once a student 
has ‘accepted’ the ‘offer’, the student is then required to enrol into the particular 
course.100 So the ‘acceptance’ is to a course or a major, and after completing any 
relevant government information the students then enrol into the accepted course. In 
some universities this means that students initially enrol into an expanded study 
                                                 
95 Interview with Deb Greenwood, Manager Student Central — Admissions, Curtin University, (Perth, 28 
September 2011). See generally TISC, above n 88.  
96 See, eg, Victorian Tertiary Admissions Centre (‘VTAC’) (13 July 2012), 
<http://www.vtac.edu.au/about-vtac.html>; NSW and the ACT, UAC, (13 July 2012) 
<http://www.uac.edu.au/general/>. In some states the participating institutions is wider than in WA. 
97 ATAR is a number between 0 and 99.95 with increments of 0.05. It provides a measure of overall 
academic achievement in relation to that of other students, and helps universities rank applicants for 
selection: UAC (10 July 2012) <http://www.uac.edu.au/undergraduate/faq/atar.shtml>. 
98 On Thursday, 1 March 2012 the Curriculum Council became the School Curriculum and Standards 
Authority. The new Authority will continue the work of the Curriculum Council with some new 
responsibilities and functions: Western Australian Government, Schools Curriculum and Standards 
Authority, (13 July 2012) <http://www.curriculum.wa.edu.au/>. 
99 See Annexure 1 for an example of a letter of offer from Curtin University to prospective students, both 
school leavers and non-school leavers, postgraduate and undergraduate. 
100 Subject to completion of any relevant documentation for Commonwealth-funded students. 
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plan.101 Each year students are then required to enrol into individual units or modules 
(this can be either each study period or over the course of a full academic year). It 
could be said therefore that the second contract, the contract to educate, is either 
varied or renewed each year, still informed by the pre-admission information and the 
initial enrolment document. This is discussed more fully below.  
 
The process outlined above in relation to application for Commonwealth-funded 
places (largely by school leavers) supports the idea in practice of the formation of two 
separate contracts, one of admission and one for a contract to educate, with the 
terms of the first contract of admission rolling into or as part of the second as 
described by Davis.102 The prospectus, open days etc. is the invitation by the 
universities to students to make an application to them (although also potentially 
terms of the contract). Through the centralised system, students’ results are 
uploaded to the TISC site and collated against information already provided to that 
site by the universities. This is potentially an invitation by the student for a university 
to make an offer to them. The offer then comes from the university, to be accepted or 
not by the student according to the processes outlined by the relevant HEI. This is 
then the contract of admission. Difficulties do arise in the Australian context with 
particular regard to the issue of second round offers.103 It is suggested that the 
second round offer is a condition subsequent to the initial contract to admit.104 The 
second contract is then formed upon the student completing the enrolment process in 
relation to the preferred offer. 
 
There are problems with either classification of the contract as a single contract or 
two separate contracts for full fee paying students and Commonwealth-funded 
students alike. If, as proposed by Birtwistle and Askew, there is one contract only, 
formed upon enrolment, from a consumer protection point of view this leaves 
students potentially exposed. If the status of the initial ‘offer’ letter from the HEI to the 
student is simply an invitation to treat and the students’ ‘initial acceptance’ of that 
‘offer’ is merely a declaration of their intent, students’ are left then without any 
                                                 
101 As is the case at Curtin University: Interview with Deb Greenwood, Manager Student Central — 
Admissions, Curtin University, (Perth, 28 September 2011). 
102 Davis, above n 4, 11.  
103 Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’, above n 57, 36.  
104 This may be a Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 situation, although it is more likely a condition 
subsequent. Therefore the initial contract to admit would be said to have a term stipulating that if a 
second offer occurs, and is accepted by the student then either the student or HEI can bring the contract 
to an end Head v Tattersall (1871) LR 7 Ex 7. This is preferable to a classification of a condition 
precedent, because if the second round offer did not eventuate it is possible that the first contract to 
admit is unenforceable: Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 537; Stephen Graw, 
An Introduction to the Law of Contract (Thompson Law Book Co, 5th ed, 2005) 388. 
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protection in contract law and perhaps even under consumer protection law.105 As 
students are not members of the HEI at that point in time, they would have no 
protection under public law, such as judicial review. This is indeed the point that was 
made in the Moran case.  
 
However, concerns about the ‘workability’ of the binding nature of the contract of 
admission have weighed on commentators. There are obvious practical 
considerations for a HEI in the offering of courses that are undersubscribed, which 
the HEI may not have accurate information until the enrolment process is completed. 
If there is a contract of admission, a HEI may find itself compelled to offer the course 
regardless. Varnham comments: 
The English Court of Appeal in Moran v University College of Salford (no.2) took the view 
that a contract was formed when the student accepted an unconditional offer of a place. 
This view may cause problems in a number of areas, for example when the student 
receives the full course information and rules and regulations of the institute of a late date 
and they wish to reconsider. It would also leave the institution at risk of breach of contract 
should they find it necessary to cancel the course due to lack of numbers. A more realistic 
view may be that the contract is formed on the student’s enrolment.106 
 
Other potential problems for a HEI also arise in the form of administrative errors in 
the process leading to the formation of a contract of admission where agreement is 
reached upon the student ‘accepting’ the place ‘offered’ in the initial letter. If, as 
happened with Curtin University at the beginning of the academic year in 2011, there 
is an error in the offer, then the existence of an admission contract may prove 
unworkable.107 This would require the HEI to revoke any offer before there had been 
acceptance by the students of the erroneous offer (as was the case with Curtin).108  
 
                                                 
105Although one could perhaps argue that conduct withdrawing an offer not made in good faith may well 
contravene other areas of law such as misleading or deceptive conduct or unconscionable conduct 
under the ACL. See Jim Jackson, ‘The Marketing of University Courses Under Section 52 and 53 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)’ (2002) 6 Southern Cross University Law Review 106, 110; Jim Jackson, 
‘Regulation of International Education: Australia and New Zealand’, (2005) 10(2) & (2006) 11(1) 
Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 67, 75–7. 
106 Sally Varnham, ‘Liability in Higher Education in New Zealand: Cases for Courses?’ (1998) 3(1) 
Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 3, 12. 
107 Bethany Hiatt, ‘Curtin Makes Bizarre Offers to Applicants’, The West Australian (Perth), 22 January 
2011, <http://global.factiba.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/hp/printsavews.aspx?ppstype=Article>.  
108 Interview with Deb Greenwood, Manager Student Central — Admissions, Curtin University, (Perth, 
28 September 2011); This involves some risk as even though a HEI is entitled to revoke any offer, 
Routledge v Grant (1828) 130 ER 920, the revocation must be communicated to the student before 
acceptance for that revocation to be effective: Byrne v van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344; Henthorne v 
Fraser [1892] 2 Ch 27. 
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It is suggested however that the risks identified should properly lie with the HEI as 
these are not matters that students can influence or contribute to (except perhaps for 
the student who changes their mind upon more closely reading course advice. Of 
course this may be as a result of having been provided insufficient relevant 
information in the first place). They are issues that are related to the proper and 
efficient management of a HEI, not with the conduct of the student. To this end the 
proposition of Davis that ‘the pre-enrolment (or ‘admission’) contract obliges the 
institution to enrol the applicant onto the course in question, on the basis of the pre-
admission information which the applicant has received’,109 is the preferred approach. 
 
Summary — the formation of the student–HEI contract 
While higher courts in Australia have not had an abundance of occasions to consider 
the question of whether a student–HEI contract does exist in Australia, on balance it 
would seem justified that there exists in Australia a student–HEI contractual 
relationship, as in other common law countries. It also seems clear that there are two 
contracts. First, there is a contract of admission, which obliges the HEI to enrol the 
student into the course on the bases of the pre-admission information received by the 
student. The second contract, the contract to educate, arises on the student 
completing the enrolment process. While acknowledging the body of authority and 
commentary suggesting the existence of the contract, there is recognition by 
commentators that the relationship is complex.110 There remain difficulties with the 
contractual classification, particularly in relation to determining the terms of the 
contract and remedies upon any breach.111  
 
The question is then, what is the nature and terms of the contract in the context of 
the application of the UCT provisions under the ACL?  
 
What is the nature of the contract? 
Whether there are two separate contracts between the student and the HEI or one, it 
seems fairly well accepted by commentators and the courts that the contract to 
                                                 
109 Davis, above n 4,11. 
110 See, eg, Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 25. Lindsay concludes that 
the relationship cannot be easily reduced to a contractual basis alone and that the students’ relationship 
to the university remains one of status: at 18. Rochford is stridently critical of the classification of the 
student–HEI relationship as a contractual one, see Rochford, ‘The Contested Product of a University 
Education’, above n 3, 43, although seeming resigned to the contractual analysis of the relationship 
being the predominate one in Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between the Student and the University’, 
above n 57.  
111 Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 74, 100.  
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educate (alternately a contract for tuition or matriculation)112 is a contract for service 
for the supply of educational services.113 Hoye and Palfreyman suggest that the 
student–HEI contract is a ‘contract to supply a business-to-consumer service 
(teaching in preparation for, and access to, the examination/assessment process for 
the award of a degree).’114 Interestingly a leading UK commentator in this area has 
suggested that the student–HEI contract is a hybrid contract ‘consisting of a 
combination of elements of a consumer contract and a training contract.’115 It is not 
entirely clear what this would necessarily add, although the training contract would 
encompass the idea that the student must contribute to their own learning. 
 
As this research is concerned with the UCT regime in the ACL, the contract for the 
supply of educational services must be a ‘service’ within the meaning of the 
legislation. Services are defined in the ACL as follows: 
services includes: 
(a) any rights (including rights in relation to, and interests in, real or personal property), 
benefits, privileges or facilities that are, or are to be, provided, granted or conferred in 
trade or commerce; and 
(b) without limiting paragraph (a), the rights, benefits, privileges or facilities that are, or are 
to be, provided, granted or conferred under: 
(i) a contract for or in relation to the performance of work (including work of a 
professional nature), whether with or without the supply of goods; or 
(ii) a contract for or in relation to the provision of, or the use or enjoyment of facilities 
for, amusement, entertainment, recreation or instruction; or 
(iii) a contract for or in relation to the conferring of rights, benefits or privileges for which 
remuneration is payable in the form of a royalty, tribute, levy or similar exaction; or 
(iv) a contract of insurance; or 
(v) a contract between a banker and a customer of the banker entered into in the 
course of the carrying on by the banker of the business of banking; or 
(vi) any contract for or in relation to the lending of money; 
                                                 
112 See generally Farrington and Palfreyman, The Law of Higher Education, above n 4, chapter 12; 
Birtwistle and Askew, above n 4, 95; Davis, above n 4; Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University 
Law’, above n 25; below n 136. 
113 Davis, above n 4. In considering the UK position, Davis is of the view that: ‘At its simplest the 
student’s college/university contract, founded on enrolment, can be analysed as a contract for the 
provision of educational services by the college. From this perspective the student is the ‘consumer’ of 
the services and the college the supplier’: at 15; See generally Stephen Corones, ‘Consumer 
Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services by Higher Education Providers’ (2012) 35(1) UNSW 
Law Journal 1; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 47; Kamvounias and 
Varnham, ‘In-house or in Court?’, above n 5, 10; Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination’, above n 5; Jackson, 
‘Regulation of International Education’, above n 105; cf Gleeson CJ above n 45 Griffith University v 
Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, where he states obiter that it may be unrealistic in practice to regard the 
contract between the student and HEI in the same way you would an ordinary contract for the supply of 
services: at 110 [17]–[19]. 
114 Hoye and Palfreyman, above n 4, 108. The authors also go on to say ‘As with any such service (say, 
architectural design, dentistry, surgery, litigation) there is no guarantee of success, although the service 
must be rendered with ‘reasonable care and skill’ according to both the common law and also in accord 
with consumer law’: at 108. This is relevant to the statutory guarantees available under the ACL, but 
beyond the scope of this research.  
115 Middlemiss, above n 4, 73. ‘The consumer aspect would relate to well-defined standards of 
educational provision which student can, or at least have a right to, expect. The training contract could 
be utilised here to define the nature of the relationship and express the rights and obligations of both 
parties arising from it’: at 73. 
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but does not include rights or benefits being the supply of goods or the performance of 
work under a contract of service.116 
 
Thus the provision of educational services even if not conferring a ‘right’ can be said 
to be one in which ‘benefits, privileges or facilities’ are, or will be, ‘provided, granted 
or conferred in trade or commerce’. That these services are supplied in ‘trade or 
commerce’ has been addressed in Chapter 2. The definition of ‘services’ above 
provides an inclusive definition of various contractual arrangements under which 
these benefits117 or privileges of facilities are conferred. The only specific exclusion is 
in relation to a contract of employment. In terms of the specific contractual 
arrangements listed, two are applicable to the supply of educational services.  
 
The first is a ‘contract for or in relation to the performance of work (including work of 
a professional nature), whether with or without the supply of goods’.118 It can be said 
that the HEI agrees to contract with the student to supply work of a professional 
nature. Consideration of the professional nature of academic work was discussed in 
Chapter 3 in relation to the meaning of the phrase in ‘trade or commerce’. It was 
established that it is very probable that for the purpose of that requirement, academic 
activities are likely to be considered activities undertaken as a ‘professional activity’. 
In the matter of Monroe Topple,119 the Court had occasion to consider the nature of 
the educational and training functions of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia. Justice Lindgren considered that these functions included the ‘enrolment in 
… modules, the compilation and selling of the module syllabuses, the writing, 
production and sale of module support materials, the conduct of “focus sessions” and 
the provision of “feedback” to the candidates.’ 120 It also included examination as ‘the 
devising of the … modules and of the methods of assessment appropriate for them 
were closely interrelated activities’.121 This is clearly a contract in relation to the 
performance of work. The second example relates to a contract regarding the 
provision, use or enjoyment of facilities for instruction. This would be relevant for any 
terms of the contract for educational services in which the HEI promised the provision 
or use of facilities such as libraries, computing or internet facilities and possibly even 
the standard of teaching venues. 
                                                 
116 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘services’). 
117 Ibid. See also Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, above n 45, 110 [17]–[19] where 
Gleeson CJ refers to the conferment of a benefit under the relationship. 
118 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘services’ (b)(i)). 
119 See Chapter 3. 
120 Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia [2001] 
FCA 1056, [132]–[133]. 
121 Ibid [32]–[133]. 
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Some academic commentators have likened the contract for educational services to 
be rather a contract for the supply of a positional good.122 In one instance in the New 
South Wales Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal, a respondent HEI in fact 
pleaded that the college concerned had ‘sold’ to the student and the student had 
‘purchased’ a Diploma of Business Administration123 in the same terms as a good 
might be sold and purchased.124 While the idea of the ‘product’ in higher education 
being a positional good has been noted by a few commentators,125 it is unlikely that 
the attainment of further education, typically a degree or associate degree, will be 
seen as the supply of a good at law.126 Moreover, the ACL defines ‘goods’ as follows: 
goods includes: 
(a) ships, aircraft and other vehicles; and 
(b) animals, including fish; and 
(c) minerals, trees and crops, whether on, under or attached to land or not; and 
(d) gas and electricity; and 
(e) computer software; and 
(f) second-hand goods; and 
(g) any component part of, or accessory to, goods.127 
 
Educational services are not likely to be considered a ‘good’ in the same way a 
computer program might be goods,128 and is certainly more analogous to the supply 
of a service such as the supply of blood administered by a hospital during an 
operation.129 Given the case law in relation to other service sectors, for the purpose 
of the ACL the product in the ‘higher education market’, (discussed more fully in the 
                                                 
122 Simon Marginson, ‘Competition in Higher Education in the Post-Hilmer Era’ (1996) 68(4) Australian 
Quarterly 23. He states ‘Education produces positional goods in that it assigns people to social 
positions: it determines selection into the professions and increasingly, the upper echelons of 
management. Positional goods in education are those places in education which provide students with 
relative advantage in the competition for jobs, income, social standing and prestige (Marginson 1996; 
Hirsch 1976: 20–22). Places in the elite schools and the sought-after university faculties are the most 
desired form of positional good because these places are associated with a high probability of career 
success, though many other places in education confer a more modest competitive advantage’: at 25; 
See also Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination’, above n 5. He adopts this definition, although he goes on to 
deal with the provision of this good as the supply of educational services for the purpose of the TPA: at 
315. This is significant in the context of the provisions of the ACL as some provisions, such as consumer 
guarantees, apply differently whether goods or services are being transacted. A consideration of those 
provisions is not within the scope of this research; Roger Brown, ‘Markets and Non-Markets’ in Roger 
Brown (ed), Higher Education and the Market (Routledge, 2011) 7 referring to the work by Marginson, 
Brown summarises what might be being produced and traded in the ‘higher education market’: at 7. The 
nature of the ‘higher education market’ is discussed in Chapter 5.  
123 Navarro v Academies Australasia P/L (General) [2003] NSWCTTT 678 (4 October 2003), 3. 
124 Ibid. The Member observed ‘It might appear novel to describe the award of a Diploma in terms of 
sale and purchase, but this was how the Respondent chose to present material to the Tribunal.’ 
125 Above n 122.  
126 See generally Rochford, ‘The Contested Product of a University Education’, above n 3.  
127 ACL s 2. 
128 ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (no.1) (1990) 27 FCR 460; 97 ALR 513.  
129 E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 31 FCR 299; 105 ALR 53. On the facts of this case the 
supply of blood was held to be a supply of service rather than of goods. 
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next chapter) is likely to be considered the provision of educational services rather 
than a good. 
 
Therefore, for the purpose of the ACL the contract for the supply of educational 
services is a ‘service’ as required by the legislation. The contract relates to the 
performance of work, including work of a professional nature and is not limited to 
being attached to the supply of goods. This contract is analogous to the supply of 
services by other professionals such as architects, engineers, and lawyers.130 It will 
also include a contract that relates to the provision and use of facilities for instruction.  
 
Determining the terms of the contract for educational services 
The general consensus amongst commentators is that while it may be comparatively 
straight forward to establish the existence of a contract between the student and the 
HEI, the determination of what the terms of that contract are is less certain (be that a 
single contract or a contract of admission and a contract of enrolment) and a far more 
complex process. As a number of authors have observed:  
The collection of regulations, ordinances, rules, codes of practice and representations 
made on university websites or in hard-copy prospectuses serve rather to obscure the 
parties’ relative positions than to make them clear.131 
 
Counsel involved in the landmark New Zealand case of Victoria University132 
remarked: 
It is difficult to imagine any other major service provider taking so relaxed and chaotic an 
approach to defining the duties and responsibilities of a contractual relationship. This is 
especially so when the reality is that universities have the ability to dictate terms (the 
student-university relationship is not negotiated) and to reinforce or supplement 
contractual terms with subordinate statutes. Yet if you ask a simple question – What is the 
student-university contract? – the answer is not found in a single sensible instrument but in 
a multitude of ephemera.133 
 
                                                 
130 Guzyal Hill, ‘The New Consumer Legislation and the Legal Profession’ (2012) 20 Australian Journal 
of Competition and Consumer Law 18. See also Mark Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity” — 
The Beginning of a New Era?’ (2004) 16(2-3) Education and the Law 75, 77 where he uses this analogy 
as an argument to remove ‘academic immunity, as discussed in Chapter 3. The delivery of other 
professional services, as with educational services, also encompasses more than the simple delivery of 
a good or service, often requiring participation, input and cooperation from the client and frequently over 
a lengthy period of time or on a repeating basis. 
131 Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 74, 114.  
132 Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186.  
133 Kós and McVeagh, above n 3, 28. See also WU, Mr Ying Ching [2003] MRTA 8095 (28 November 
2003) [77]–[78] where Member Hurly stated ‘Strangely, the Tribunal is yet to see a sound written 
contract (leaving aside enrolment forms and what can be inferred out of them) between a student and 
an education provider’ as cited in Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education’, above n 105, 80. 
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It is worth noting that a significant number of universities in the UK and New Zealand 
now have formal written student contracts, the most notable being the Oxford 
University student contract.134  
 
The first issue is to determine when it might be said that the terms of the contract to 
educate are complete. It is suggested that the second contract is informed by any 
pre-admission promises made by the HEI to the student.135 As a result, information 
contained in the HEI prospectus and promotional material may be classified as terms 
of the contract to educate.136 More difficult is the issue of whether the contract arising 
on enrolment is either varied over the course of study or discharged at the end of 
each academic year or study period and a new contract formed upon re-enrolment. 
Some commentators suggest that it is commonly accepted that a new contract is 
                                                 
134 See especially the Oxford Student Contract (13 August 2012) <http://www.st-
annes.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/STA/Documents/University_Contract.pdf> Annexure 2; Formal student 
contracts are used extensively in the UK, see, eg, University of Bristol 
<http://www.bris.ac.uk/secretary/studentrulesregs/agreement.html/>; University of Leeds, Taught 
Student Contract, (13 August 2012) <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ssc/studentcontract.htm>. There are even 
professional development courses that can be taken in this area, see, eg, JISC Legal Information (UK) 
<http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/ManageContent/ViewDetail/ID/1866/ARMED--Student-contract-and-
charters.aspx>. Some examples of formal student contracts in New Zealand are Massey University, 
Student Contract (13 August 2012) < http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/calendar/statutes-
and-regulations/student-contract.cfm>; University of Victoria, Wellington, Student Contract, (13 August 
2012) <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/home/admisenrol/enrol/studentcontract>; Canterbury Christ Church 
University, Student Agreement (13 August 2012) <http://www.canterbury.ac.uk/courses/about/student-
agreement.pdf>. The only formalised agreement that could be found for an Australian HEI was in 
relation to HDR degrees at the University of New England in NSW (13 August 2012) 
http://www.une.edu.au/research-services/forms/studentsupervisoragreement.pdf. See also Julia Pedley, 
‘The Development of a Student Contract and Improvement in Student Disciplinary Procedures at 
Massey University’ (2007) 12(1) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 73; Kamvounias 
and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 47, 313. 
135 Davis, above n 4, 11. 
136 As has been argued in a number of cases see, eg, Fennell v Australian National University [1999] 
FCA 989; Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186 and especially in matters before the consumer tribunals 
see, eg, Kwan above n 93. In determining the contents of the contract the applicant relied on oral 
representations made during a visit to the ‘services centre’ and the ‘programme document’; St Clair v 
College of Complimentary Medicine Pty Ltd (General) [2008] NSWCTTT 1309 where the tribunal 
referred to the prospectus as containing the terms of the contract which the applicant agreed that she 
had signed a contract with the college which included her acknowledge that she had read and 
understood the conditions in the prospectus; In the matter of Jones v Academy of Applied Hypnosis Pty 
Ltd (General) [2005] NSWCTTT 841 (30 December 2005), the applicant sought a refund of course fees 
in the amount of $12 750 and an additional $12 250 for further economic and non-economic loss in 
relation to a two-year course of student for a Certificate IV in clinical hypnotherapy and a 
diploma/graduate diploma in applied hypnosis. The claims made by the applicant included claims in 
relation to the fact that the course and tuition had not been provided within a reasonable time, and 
importantly that the quality and amount of tuition given were less than promised. The Tribunal had 
regard to oral representations made to the applicant by academic staff at the open day, the prospectus 
outlining the quality of the course and the amount of tuition to be given and the decision to fail the 
applicant in the final assessment for the award of the certificate in clinical hypnotherapy. The Member 
found that this constituted a breach of the agreement for tuition. The Tribunal found that ‘…the applicant 
could have reasonably expected to receive competent, considered tuition and support throughout her 
period at the respondent’s academy. I am satisfied that she did not receive the level of tuition, 
supervision, support and service she could have reasonably excepted having regard to the various 
statements and representations made to her in writing and orally prior to her entering into the contract 
for tuition: at 6. 
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formed with each enrolment period.137 One factor that would support the idea that the 
contract is a new contract each time the student enrols in a module or study period is 
the manner in which students are charged for their degree.138 The charges are by 
module or unit and the obligations regarding those units of study are discharged 
upon delivery by the HEI and participation and payment by the student.139 However, 
the presence of additional or new charges also supports the need for consideration 
for any variation of a contract.140 Additionally, subject to meeting HEI’s course and 
institutional requirements, enrolled students are entitled to re-enrol in order to 
progress their academic studies. If the position was that the original or proceeding 
contract of enrolment was discharged by performance at the end of each study 
period or academic year, then students may be left without any contractual right on 
which to assert the right to re-enrol on completion of satisfactory academic 
progression. Thus the preferred view is that the contract to educate is a rolling one, 
whereby it is understood that the terms of the contract will vary from time to time, in 
much the same way as a contract of employment would.141 Therefore, terms agreed 
to in the initial enrolment process whereupon the contract to educate is formed are 
relevant, subject to any subsequent variation. 
 
In the context of this research, this issue may be less critical. It is the terms of any 
‘standard form’ contract with which this thesis is concerned142 as the UCT provisions 
                                                 
137 Or even possibly that the contract to educate is a series of interrelated agreements. Davis, above n 
4, 21 states ‘It is a widely held view that a student makes a new contract every year when they re-enrol 
and that, in effect, the university can begin with a blank page as regards course, modules and the like. 
This is surely questionable’. 
138 Thereby providing sufficient consideration for the new agreement as it is not ‘past consideration. Stilk 
v Myrick (1809) 170 All ER 1168: See Rycotewood (re damages: 28/2/2003, Warwick Crown Court, His 
Honour Judge Charles Harris QC, OX004341/42, Buckingham v Rycotewood College (26/3/2002, 
Oxford County Court, OX004741/0X004343) (‘Rycotewood’) dealing with a breach of contract in relation 
to one unit of study, below nn 199–200; cf Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186 where the claim was in 
relation to the entire degree. 
139 Australian Government, Study Assist, (7 August 2012) 
<http://www.goingtouni.gov.au/main/coursesandproviders/gettingstarted/costsandentrancerequirements/
provider-tuition+costs.htm>. 
140 See generally Graw, above n 104, 411–12 [11.17] regarding partial bilateral discharge and 
modification of the contract requiring additional consideration and the extent of the variation. Citing 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Ltd (2000) 172 ALR 
346. 
141 Davis, above n 4, 21. See also Tim Kaye, ‘Academic Judgement, The University Visitor and the 
Human Rights Act 1998’ (1999) 11(3) Education and the Law 165, 178–9 regarding the analogy to the 
contract of employment. He refers to the views of Simon Arrowsmith and Nicola Hart for support in this 
regard, where they are of the view that the relationship takes ‘the form of a rolling contract which 
matures and changes shape in the course of its life, with both parties apprehending from the start the 
prospect of the introduction of new terms as the contractual relationship develops’ quoting Simon 
Arrowsmith and Nicola Hart, ‘The Higher Education Institution–Student Contract’ in David Palfreyman 
and David Warner (eds) Higher Education and the Law: A Guide for Managers (Open University Press, 
1998) 80. 
142 As regards other provisions, such as consumer guarantees the terms of the contract for the supply of 
educational services is possibly broader, including terms implied regarding quality; See Corones, above 
n 113. 
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only apply to ‘standard form’143 ‘consumer contracts’.144 Whether the contract for 
educational services is a ‘standard form’ ‘consumer contract’ is considered in detail 
the next chapter. It is suggested that the only contract capable of being a ‘standard 
form’ contract arises during the enrolment process. The UCT provisions invoke a 
rebuttable presumption to the effect that once it is alleged that a contract is a 
‘standard form’ contract, it is presumed to be so unless the other party, typically the 
supplier (the HEI), is able to prove otherwise.145 Therefore, the remainder of this 
chapter will proceed on the basis that the contract for the supply of educational 
services contract is at least in part a ‘standard form’ contract.  
 
Guidance from the case law on the content of the contract is limited. This is partly 
due to the courts reluctance to intervene in matters of academic judgement, so often 
the consideration of terms has been restricted to those terms relating to the process 
of the decision making.146 Another difficulty is that as students are largely self-
represented, pleadings are often poorly framed or the claims are the subject of strike 
out applications or summary judgment.147 Another trait identified previously is that the 
courts are often concerned in interlocutory matters to make a determination as to 
whether the claimant has reasonable prospects of success and deal with substantive 
issues, such as whether any loss can be shown.148 In contrast to the higher federal 
and state courts, the consumer tribunals demonstrate a willingness to consider the 
particular terms of the contract to educate. The success of applicants in these 
matters is not necessarily important when determining the existence of terms.149 
What is instructive is what alleged terms tribunals are prepared to review in the 
context of whether in fact there has been a breach. This includes terms relating to 
tuition patterns150 and methodology;151 the quality152and competency of staff;153 and 
                                                 
143 ACL s 27. 
144 Ibid s 23(3). 
145 Ibid s 27(1). 
146 Clark [2000] 3 All ER 752. 
147 See, eg, Mathews v University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414; Dudzinski v Kellow [1999] FCA 390; 
Ogawa v The University of Melbourne [2005] FCA 1139. 
148 See, eg, Fennell v Australian National University [1999] FCA 989. 
149 As often even if the term is found to exist insufficient evidence can be lead to establish the breach. 
See, eg, Kwan (2002) NSWCTTT 83, [68]–[69]. The Tribunal held ‘the applicant successfully completed 
his course. That was the bargain with the Foundation. He got what he paid for’: at 83, [69]. 
150 See, eg, Qayam v Shillington College (General) [2007] NSWCTTT 620 (17 October 2007) where the 
tribunal did not specifically address the issue of whether there was a contract and appeared to proceed 
on the basis that the respondents had agreed to supply and the applicant participate in a certificate IV 
course in design upon enrolment. The issue related to the students expectations that she receive one on 
one tutoring. After referring to the materials relating to the handbook and enrolment court found that the 
college provided an appropriate learning environment that met the obligations under the agreement.  
151 In the matter of Cui v Australian Tesol Training Centre (General) [2003] NSWCTT 329 the application 
concerned a claim under the Consumer Claims Act 1998 (NSW) in relation the refund fees for the 
Cambridge certificate in English Language Teaching to Adults course, which is an international 
qualification accredited by the University of Cambridge (UK). The applicant student complained that ‘he 
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facilities.154 These terms have been found to be incorporated into the contract either 
expressly through a ‘contract of enrolment’,155 which included the published 
handbook, or implied variously through other documents including oral 
representations made or other promotional material.156  
 
If the terms of the contract comprise just the statutes and regulations of a HEI, the 
question arises whether this takes the students’ position any further than if the 
relationship was analysed on a corporate model.157 As Rochford notes: 
So although the statutory rules of a university may be enforceable contractually, they will 
not provide assistance to the student for any purposes other than the enforcement of the 
                                                                                                                                            
was not made aware that teaching in “lecture mode” was not an acceptable methodology for this 
course.’ The applicant, who had obtained a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Western 
Sydney, received a ‘borderline pass’ for the first assessment in week three of the course. He felt 
therefore that he would be unable to pass the course, advised the centre that he wished to withdraw 
from the course and sought a refund of his fees. Although the basis for the applicant’s claim is not clear, 
the Tribunal found that the student had not been misled as to the nature of the teaching experience, and 
the teaching methodology, which involved interaction with the teacher and students, was to be 
reasonably expected and appropriate. The Tribunal found that the respondent had ‘complied with its 
contractual obligations…and was ready, willing and able to continue to supply the contracted services’. 
The student was therefore not entitled to a refund of fees: Cui v Australian Tesol Training Centre 
(General) [2003] NSWCTT 329, [3]. 
152 Kwan (2002) NSWCTTT 83, [18], [22] Mr Kwan claimed that the standard of teaching was in fact 
poor. The complaints in relation to academic standards and poor facilities, while capable of being terms 
of the contract, were in the end not supported by any evidence. 
153Above n 49; Cotton v Blinman Investments Pty Ltd and Blinman (General) [2004] NSWCTTT 723 (13 
December 2004) this matter concerned a claim for her breach of contract and false representations in 
relation to the qualifications and experience of the respondents teaching staff at the Strand College of 
Beauty Therapy. Again it was accepted that a contract was an existence and the focus of the tribunal’s 
time was on whether or not a false representation had in fact been made and what loss if any had been 
suffered if there was a breach of contract. The applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence that there 
was a breach of contract in relation to the standard of teaching or alternatively that the supply of 
services had not been rendered with due care and skill pursuant to the Trade Practices Act. The court 
proceeded on the basis that the contract was contained in a document entitled ‘Course Enrolment; In 
the matter of Jones v Academy of Applied Hypnosis Pty Ltd (General) [2005] NSWCTTT 841 (30 
December 2005), the claims made by the applicant included claims in relation to the fact that the course 
and tuition had not been provided within a reasonable time, and importantly that the quality and amount 
of tuition given were less than promised. The Tribunal had regard to oral representations made to the 
applicant by academic staff at the open day, the prospectus outlining the quality of the course and the 
amount of tuition to be given and the decision to fail the applicant in the final assessment for the award 
of the certificate in clinical hypnotherapy. The Tribunal found that the applicant did not receive 
competent, considered tuition and support throughout her period at the respondent’s academy, as could 
have been reasonably expected. 
154 Kwan (2002) NSWCTTT 83, [5]. The student applicant claimed that the Foundation misrepresented 
the facilities and services which would be available to him during the course, that he would have access 
to all University’s facilities. 
155 Ibid [54]. The Tribunal noted that the program document contained a ‘Contract of Enrolment’. This 
included ‘a covenant on the part of the student to his or her best endeavours to meet the Foundation’s 
requirement and to abide by the rules and regulation of Taylors in the administration of the program and 
the conduct of students’: at [54].  
156 Above nn 49, 152. 
157 In particular, problems remain for Western Australian students as the domestic jurisdiction of the 
Visitor would likely to be considered exclusive if the terms of the contract were simply the internal rules 
of the HEI. For the student to be assisted in relation to contractual protection and remedies there must 
be incorporated into the contract more than simply the internal rules of the HEI. See Bayley-Jones v 
University of Newcastle (1990) 22 NSWR 424; Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186. See especially 
Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’, above n 57, 43–5; Lindsay, 
‘Student Subjectivity and the Law’, above n 74, 663–4; Davis, above n 4, 17. 
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statute … the statute and statutory rules are rarely specific on the obligation of the 
university to teach students. Where does that lead the students alleging a failure to comply 
with a contractual duty to teach effectively, or to provide sufficient facilities, or to hire 
competent staff? This must be the subject of some other contract, aside from the 
statute.158 
 
In the Ogawa matter discussed earlier, in one of the strike out applications by the 
University, Phipps FM made the following comments: 
The documents alleged to be part of the contract are extensive. Included in the matters 
alleged to give rise to implied terms is a Commonwealth Statute, the Education Services 
for Overseas Student Act 2000 (Cth) and the statutes and regulations of the Respondent. 
This may include the University of Melbourne Act 1958 (Vic). Even if it does not, the act of 
Parliament which constitutes the respondent may well be relevant to the terms of any 
contract which exists between the respondent and the applicant.159  
 
A number of commentators have suggested that the contract for educational services 
is potentially broader than merely the ordinances and statues of a HEI. The express 
terms of the contract arising on enrolment ‘would appear to comprise not only the 
various charters,160 codes161 and other HEI ‘regulations’162 usually referred explicitly 
(and in writing) at the time a student enrols’,163 but also published course 
handbooks.164 Implied terms of the contract could include pre-contractual information 
such as the promotional information contained in prospectus and the like.165 In 
relation to implied terms, the Victoria University case is instructive. In their claim for a 
breach of contract regarding the quality of the course provided, the students relied on 
‘statements made in a prospectus and in a practicum guide published by the 
                                                 
158 Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’, above n 57, 33. 
159 Ogawa v The University of Melbourne (no.3) [2004] FMCA 536, [31]. 
160 Davis, above n 4, 15. The inclusion by Davis of student charters is interesting and imbues the 
student with corresponding contractual obligations. Student charters which developed from the customer 
charter movement are couched very much in the language of the client and their rights and expectations 
in relation to the provision of quality services. See generally Simon Smith, ‘Customer Charters the Next 
Dimension in Consumer Protection?’ (1997) 22(3) Alternative Law Journal 138. The legal status of 
Student charters is not always clear; see Gaffney-Rhys and Jones, above n 9, 714. See especially the 
example of Southampton Solent University and discussion of possible content of formalised learning 
agreements: at 719. 
161 See, eg, Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee, Provision of Education to International Students 
Code of Practice and Guidelines for Australian Universities, 2005; Curtin University Codes of Conduct 
for both students (21 September 2011) <http://students.curtin.edu.au/rights/conduct.cfm> and staff (21 
September 2011) <http://policies.curtin.edu.au/local/docs/Code%20of%20Conduct%20-
%20Approved%2030%20June%202009.pdf >.  
162 Including policies of a HEI, see, eg, Curtin University, Legislation, Policies and Procedures (12 July 
2012) <http://policies.curtin.edu.au/home/>. 
163 Davis, above n 4, 15. 
164 Ibid 18; above n 49, 152; Gaffney-Rhys and Jones, above n 9, 714, 719. 
165 Above nn 91–3.  
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University.’166 The alleged implied terms of the contract went to matters concerning 
the actual course content (the particular subject-matter to be incorporated into the 
syllabus), the requisite standard of knowledge, the range of appropriate assessment, 
and adequate planning and supervision of research and practicum work.167 The 
students claimed that despite being diligent students the University failed to deliver 
the course as promised.168 The University failed in its application to strike out the 
statement of claim. Therefore, it is probable that statements contained in teaching 
material, such as unit outlines or course materials, that go beyond the information in 
the published handbook regarding matters such as learning outcomes, graduate 
attributes, and the quality of the student learning experience are implied terms. It has 
been suggested that increasing quality assurance in the higher education sector169 
and the development of academic standards by regulatory authorities’170 also impacts 
on what terms may be implied into the contract for the supply of educational 
services.171 Thus there is potential for a wide range of terms to be implied into the 
student–HEI contract. 172 
 
As noted earlier, the UCT provisions apply only to a ‘standard form’ contract. Thus 
the relevant terms under consideration in this research will necessarily only be the 
express terms of the contract arising on enrolment. This thesis argues that the 
express terms of any standard form contract for the supply of educational services 
are contained in the documentation created on enrolment. The determination of the 
express terms in the absence of a clearly expressed formal document remains 
                                                 
166 Kós and McVeagh, above n 3, 28. 
167 Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186,186–7. 
168 Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186 and the particulars of the breach, 187–8. 
169 See generally Gabrielle Baldwin, ‘The Student as Customer: The Discourse of ‘Quality’ in Higher 
Education’ (1994) 16(1) Journal of Tertiary Education Administration 125; Jill Blackmore, ‘Academic 
Pedagogies, Quality Logics and Performative Universities: Evaluating Teaching and what Students 
want’ (2009) 34(8) Studies in Higher Education 857; Mahsood Shah and Chenicheri sid Nair, ‘Renewing 
Quality Assurance at a Time of Turbulence: An Attempt to Reenergise Quality in Australian Higher 
Education’ (2001) 15 (3) Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education 92. 
170 The Australian Qualifications Framework and Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 
2011 (Cth) (‘TEQSA Act’); Corones, above n 113, 11–14. This in turn promotes an understanding as to 
what a court may consider to be the provision of educational services with ‘due care and skill’ (and 
indeed the parties expectations) as required by the ACL pt 3-2 ACL s 60 and provides an objective form 
of measurement of the requisite standard. The exact content or terms of the contract do not derogate 
from other obligations are overlaid by the ACL. 
171 Birtwistle and Askew, above n 4. After considering the nature of the student–HEI contract, conclude 
in relation to the consumer protection regulation in the United Kingdom: ‘The contract itself does have 
many expressed terms but are there also implied terms? What is the effect of the volume of quality 
assessment that abounds today? If there are objective standards of delivery and supervision and these 
are not delivered then surely those standards are implied as terms in the student contract. Failure to 
deliver is therefore breach and consequences flow – these could be far reaching if the consequences of 
breach reasonably include lack of achieving in later life regarding a career etcetera. The financial flood 
gates could open’: at 95.  
172 Middlemiss, above n 4, 85 suggests that an implied term of requiring the HEI to act reasonably with 
their students may be helpful to give certainty in regards the contents of the contract.  
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challenging, not least because this contract can include variations on re-enrolment.173 
It is therefore the enrolment process and the documents signed thereon that are 
particularly important in the context of this research question. Enrolment processes 
and documents across Australian HEIs are strikingly similar.174 Typically the 
enrolment process occurs online and not necessarily in person on campus.175 Below 
is the student declaration used in the online enrolment process at Curtin 
University.176 The words and phrases underlined are indicative of a hyperlink: 
Student Declaration 
  I understand it is my responsibility to ensure that my enrolment is correct. 
  I have sought appropriate academic counselling in relation to my enrolment. 
  I agree to be bound by the Statutes, Rules and Policies of the University as amended 
from time to time and agreed to pay all fees, levies and charges directly arising from my 
enrolment. 
  I consent to receiving information electronically from the University. 
  I agree to access OASIS (student portal) at least once a week to receive official 
communications from the University (unless approval for exemption is granted). 
  I am aware of the conditions under which I am permitted to use University (computer) 
facilities (refer to the ICT Policy). 
  I acknowledge that I have read and understood the information regarding Guild 
Membership. 
  I acknowledge that I have read and understood the University’s Privacy Statement. 
  I acknowledge that any expense, costs or disbursements incurred by the University in 
recovering any monies owing by me shall be the responsibility of the debtor, including debt 
collection agency fees and solicitor’s costs on the amount outstanding and all other 
reasonable costs incurred in the recovery of outstanding monies.177 
 
In the example given above, a student expressly certifies that their enrolment is 
correct. This can only be based on what is contained in the relevant Course 
Handbook. The express terms of the ‘standard form contract’ are also likely to 
include any published course handbook as students need to have regard to in order 
                                                 
173 Kós and McVeagh, above n 3, 28 where they suggest that the contract needs to be more formalised; 
Davis, above n 4, 21. 
174 For example, the process is similar to the University of Adelaide and their checklist includes the 
following information: ‘Declaration Read this information carefully before you select “I Agree”’ as this 
indicates that you agree to be bound by the statutes, regulations, rules and policies of the University and 
the release of information to statutory authorities, as required by law’: University of Adelaide, University 
Enrolment (12 July 2012) <http://www.adelaide.edu.au/enrol/steps/step4.html>. 
175 Interview with Deb Greenwood, Manager Student Central — Admissions, Curtin University, (Perth, 
28 September 2011); Curtin University, How to enrol, (13 August 2012) 
<http://students.curtin.edu.au/administration/enrolment/howto.cfm> where the webpage speaks to the 
University moving to ‘self-management’ in re-enrolment and ‘large numbers’ of students use the online 
enrolment process. 
176 As at January 2012. Annexure 3. 
177 Ibid.  
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to complete their enrolment. Course handbooks typically set out the requirements for 
the course, including limited detail in relation to content, assessment and tuition 
patterns. While the minutiae of this document may not contain terms relevant to the 
UCT (in the sense that a term in relation to the assessment criteria or tuition pattern, 
for example, is not of itself unfair),178 broader terms in these documents that operate 
as disclaimers may be, as discussed further in Chapter 5.179  
 
Importantly, in the Curtin example, the student agrees to be bound by the ‘Statutes 
Rules and Policies’ of the University.180 This has the effect of incorporating those 
Statutes, Rules and Policies as express terms of the contact.181 There are a myriad 
of Statutes, Rules and Policies available on the Curtin website accessed through the 
hyperlink182as is the case with all Australian HEIs.183 The numerous policies184 are 
grouped in the following categories: ‘Campus Life’, ‘Community Relations’, ‘Facilities’, 
‘Finance’, ‘Human Resources’, ‘Information Management’, ‘Legal’, ‘Library Services’, 
‘Research’, ‘Strategic Management’, ‘Students’, and ‘Teaching and Learning’. Within 
the categories of ‘Students’, there are 30 individual policies ranging in matters from 
admission, enrolment, assessment and plagiarism to lost property. In the ‘Teaching 
and Learning’ category, there are 36 individual policies, which include, in addition to 
policies concerning admission and assessment, maximum numbers for classrooms, 
discontinuing courses, flexible learning, graduate attributes, fieldwork and unit 
                                                 
178 This is to be contrasted with a claim for breach of contract in relation to standards of knowledge or 
promised course content as in Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186. These terms will also operate 
differently in relation to other provisions of the ACL, such as statutory guarantees. 
179 Or sometime the exact terms regarding course requirements may be more difficult to locate, 
including any provisions allowing for changes to course structures. See for example the Handbook for 
the University of Sydney; University of Sydney, Handbooks Online (12 July 2012), 
<http://sydney.edu.au/handbooks/ > where the web page states: 
Handbooks Online is the University of Sydney's central source of official information for students 
undertaking study. The handbook and its updates, along with the Policy Register form the official 
source of information relating to study at the University of Sydney.  
All handbook information should be read together with the University of Sydney (Coursework) 
Rule 2000 (as amended), the University of Sydney (Higher Degree by Research) Rule 2011 and 
University of Sydney (Student Appeals against Academic Decisions) Rule 2006. 
180 See also the language of the Curtin University brochure outlining the appropriate use of ICT by 
students, which is linked through the contract of enrolment by hyperlink, specifically states that ‘students 
are bound by the policy on enrolment’ Curtin University, ICT Appropriate Use Guidelines, (23 July 2012) 
<https://cits.curtin.edu.au/local/docs/ICT-AppropriateUse.pdf>. 
181 Contractual terms can be incorporated by reference, rather than setting them out in full, especially 
when the contract is in writing and signed. L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1943] 2 KB 394 and the 
‘ticketing cases’, see, eg, Thompson v London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co [1930] 1KB 41; 
Sydney City Council v West (1965) 114 CLR 481.  
182 Curtin University, Legislation, Policies and Procedures, above n 162. 
183 See, eg, La Trobe University (12 July 2012) <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/policy/all-policies>; Bond 
University (12 July 2012) <http://www.bond.edu.au/student-resources/student-administration/policies-
procedures-guidelines-and-forms/index.htm>. 
184 It is understood that at Curtin University since the beginning of 2012, 14 policies have been 
amended, 10 procedures have been amended, and 56 policies and procedures have been rescinded. 
Email from Naomi Yellowlees, Director of Legal and Compliance Services, Curtin University, to all Curtin 
Staff, 27 June 2012. 
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outlines. In relation to the statues and rules governing the University, there are listed 
some 35 statues and rules on the University’s website. These cover matters as 
varied as academic misconduct to the payment of fees imposed by the University, 
including penalties.  
 
This potential variety and width of terms expressly incorporated into the contract 
should be of some concern to HEIs. The UCT provisions are concerned especially 
with any terms that are unilateral terms allowing variation of the contract or terms that 
seek to avoid or limit performance.185 Potentially the terms as incorporated through 
the hundreds of documents are wide ranging and include terms that allow the HEI to 
unilaterally vary the characteristics of the services to be supplied.186 The breadth of 
the express terms incorporated through the policies could encompass such matters 
as the delivery of the course content or promised instruction, assessment and appeal 
process or the provision of services and facilities. Furthermore, the policies, statutes 
and rules also include terms that deal with termination of courses, impose penalties 
for breach (by the student, such as non-payment of fines) and mandatory procedures 
for how grievances are resolved. What is considered here is the type and array of 
terms that may be considered to be part of the standard form contract. Whether 
particular terms are potentially unfair will be considered in Chapter 5. 
 
Summary — nature and terms of the student–HEI contract 
It is likely that the contract to educate is a contract for service for the supply of 
educational services, informed by pre-contractual information and as varied over the 
course of study. There is significant uncertainty and potential difficulties in 
determining the terms of the student–HEI contract. This research is however only 
concerned with those terms that can be said to be express terms of any ‘standard 
form’ ‘consumer contract’. It is probable that this will contain those terms referred to 
expressly on enrolment and by incorporation of at least the published course 
handbook and statues, rules and policies of the HEI.  
 
Redress under the student–HEI contract 
It is the proposition of this research that redress pursuant to a claim under the ACL, 
specifically the UCT is more effective than remedies available students in other 
causes of action, including contract law. Leaving aside the issue of whether matters 
                                                 
185 ACL s 25. 
186 Ibid s 25(1)(g). 
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of academic judgement can be reviewed by the courts,187 the case law and 
commentary is clear that the capacity of students to recover damages for breach of 
contract is extremely difficult.188 If the accepted position is that there are in fact two 
contracts, a claim for damages for an admission contract is more obvious and is on a 
loss of bargain basis.189 The more difficult claim arises under the second enrolment 
contract. This is particularly so if the claim is in relation to issues surrounding quality 
of the provision of the educational services. It is apparent from the case law that even 
if a student is able to establish a breach of contract, it is very difficult to establish a 
causal link to the losses claimed190 or alternatively to be able to prove loss at all.191 
To a lesser extent this is so even in the consumer tribunal matters.192 
 
                                                 
187 It is worth noting here that even the Visitor in the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction is required to 
determine an award for damages in accordance with the ordinary principles of law (be that in contract or 
negligence or otherwise) once he or she has made a determination that an award for compensation is 
appropriate, unless the Visitor is able to make an order not within the ‘competence of the ordinary 
courts’ ‘to make good’ the harm done to the plaintiff. See Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle (1990) 
22 NSWR 424, 436–7. 
188 See, eg, Fennell v Australian National University [1999] FCA 989; Mathews v University of 
Queensland [2002] FCA 414. In both matters the students failed to demonstrate any cause or link 
between the alleged misrepresentations and/or breach of contract and any loss suffered: See also 
Victoria University [2003] NZAR 186, 191–2 where the Court noted that the damages claimed may 
appear excessive or remote, but this was a matter for resolution at trial, not in interlocutory proceedings; 
Ogawa, above n 36, 97. 
189 Davis, above n 4, 22; Moran [1994] ELR 187. 
190 Mathews v University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414.The matter of Mathews has been discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3 in relation to Mathews’ claims against the University regarding its conduct in respect 
of various mathematics subjects being in ‘trade or commerce’. One cause of action was founded in 
breach of contract. The difficulty for Mathews was in fact demonstrating that he had suffered any loss or 
damage. The Court identified that the significant problem for the applicant student was his inability to 
establish a causative link between the conduct that was alleged to have breached the TPA or contract 
and any damage or loss suffered by him. Mr Mathews claimed damages in excess of $400 million which 
included diminished prospects of an academic career and the lost opportunity to undertake his PhD in 
Logical Equivalence of Legal Decisions, which would have been commercialised as a computer 
program. Mr Mathews failed to show reasonable cause of action against the University and the 
proceedings were struck out as frivolous and vexatious.  
191 Davis, above n 4, 22. See, eg, Harding v University of New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 301 where 
the breach of contract was made out, but no remedy could be awarded because she was unable to 
establish loss caused by the University’s actions; In Fennell v Australian National University [1999] FCA 
989 while the applicant’s claim was heard, he was unsuccessful. Here a former MBA student brought a 
claim under the TPA alleging that he had been induced by false representations to enrol in an MBA with 
the University. At trial, it became apparent that the applicant would face difficulties regarding his claim 
under the TPA. Consequently the applicant sought to resuscitate his claim in contract. The difficulty of 
this approach was discussed in detail by the Court. In relation to his loss, he failed because he had in 
fact graduated with his MBA and was employed in a new position that paid substantially more than his 
employment as engineer prior to completing his MBA.  
192 See Cotton v Blinman Investments Pty Ltd and Blinman (General) [2004] NSWCTTT 723 (13 
December 2004). This matter concerned a claim for breach of contract and false representations in 
relation to the qualifications and experience of the respondent’s teaching staff at the Strand College of 
Beauty Therapy. The applicant claimed that the respondent had misrepresented the qualifications and 
experience of the teaching staff and particularly that the teachers named in the ‘prospectus’ were no 
longer teaching at the respondent. The applicant was unable to demonstrate on the balance of 
probabilities that the level of teaching provided was at a level that amounted to a breach of contract or 
that there was a breach of the implied warranty that the services would be rendered with due care and 
skill. The Tribunal did find however that the respondent had falsely represented that availability of a 
particular teacher and awarded $400 as fair and equitable compensation for the unavailability of the 
particular teacher.  
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It is the intangible nature193 of the loss sought to be recovered that is problematic.194 
The success of claims for damages by students for more than direct losses, such as 
a refund of fees,195 appears to be reliant on courts likening their claims to cases 
where the subject matter of the contract is the experience itself, the so called ‘holiday 
cases’.196 Damages for breach of contract are not normally available for injured 
feelings, inconvenience, disappointment, anxiety, discomfort or distress.197 However, 
‘where the disappointment or distress is not merely a reaction to the breach and its 
resulting consequences but is itself the resulting damage — damages for annoyance, 
vexation, frustration, anxiety, distress and disappointment can be recovered.’198 
 
Palfreyman considers the decision in Rycotewood (re damages: 28/2/2003, Warwick 
Crown Court, His Honour Judge Charles Harris QC, OX004341/42, Buckingham v 
Rycotewood College (26/3/2002, Oxford County Court, OX004741/0X004343)199 
whereupon students were successful in their claim for damages for breach of the 
contract to educate when the HEI failed to provide the course as advertised, that 
being historical vehicle restoration with significant practical content. The provision of 
the course was ‘low and often poorly taught’.200 The Court awarded damages in the 
amount of £10,000 per student. Of that amount, £2,500 was for mental distress in 
relation to the annoyance, anger, frustration, anxiety and disappointment suffered by 
the students as a result of the educational service not being provided as it should 
have been.201 In his analysis of the case, Palfreyman comments ‘The judgement … 
brings “a course for the provision of education” firmly within the exceptions “as 
something which contains, or should contain, important elements of satisfaction, 
pleasure and tranquillity of mind”.’ 202 
                                                 
193 Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between the Student and the University’, above n 57, 34; Francine 
Rochford, ‘Suing the Alma Mater: What Loss Has Been Suffered?’ (2001) 13(4) Education and the Law 
319. 
194 Of course related to these difficulties is the courts’ reluctance to review matters of academic 
judgment and in fact sit in the shoes of an assessor. Middlemiss, above n 4, proposes an example 
where students might claim that inadequacies in the teaching or assessment in breach of the contract 
contributed to their poor results: at 72. 
195 Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 25, 11, nn 50–3 regarding the 
quantification of damages; See also Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘In-House or in Court?’, above n 5. 
196 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344; Jarvis v Swan Tours Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 71. 
197 Graw, above n 104, 431 [16.4.7].  
198 Ibid 432 [16.4.7], 433 where he observes that the calculation of the amount of these types of 
damages is more restrained in the UK than Australia. 
199 Palfreyman, ‘Phelps … Clark … and now Rycotewood?’, above n 4. 
200 Rycotewood (re damages: 28/2/2003, Warwick Crown Court, His Honour Judge Charles Harris QC, 
OX004341/42, as quoted in Palfreyman, ‘Phelps … Clark … and now Rycotewood?’, above n 4, 238. 
201 The remaining £7500 was for ‘loss of value of the course’ as quoted in Palfreyman, ‘Phelps … Clark 
… and now Rycotewood?’, above n 4, 239. 
202 Ibid 238–9. He comments ‘… the Judge commented that “three years of high-quality teaching and all 
ancillary stimulus and opportunity which might be available at a leading university will or should be of 
inestimable life-long utility and value, and could not sensibly be said to be limited to the sum the college 
or university received from the Government and/or the student as a fee” (4B–D) … In respect of what 
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This issue of a claim for damages, and in particular damages for anxiety and 
distress, in the context of the breach of a contract for educational services was 
considered in Australia in the Shahid203 case. In that matter the appellant claimed 
damages on three grounds.204 First, for the loss of opportunity to establish herself as 
the best candidate for the position of trainee registrar in dermatology. Second, that 
the conduct of the College had caused her anxiety and distress under both breach of 
contract and pursuant to section 79 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA). Third was a 
claim for ‘out of pocket expenditure’.205 The Court noted that a claim for damages for 
loss of opportunity was the most relevant in relation to the claim for damages for 
breach of contract.206 The appellant was not successful in relation to the loss of 
opportunity claim as she was unable to establish by evidence that she would have 
been the best candidate for any of the single positions of trainee registrar in each of 
the relevant years.207 
 
In relation to the College’s failure to adhere to the promised appeals process, Shahid 
claimed damages for anxiety and distress. 208 The Court found that the situation did 
not fall within the exceptional category referred to Baltic Shipping,209 so the claim in 
contract for anxiety damages failed.210 However, the appellant was successful in her 
claim for anxiety damages pursuant to section 79 of Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA)211 as 
the anxiety and distress experienced by the appellant amounted to an ‘injury’ under 
the statute.212 Justice Jessup was of the view213 that the High Court has indicated 
                                                                                                                                            
the Judge accepted was the students’ “acute annoyance, unhappiness and frustration” (6A&B, citing 
one student’s description of the course as “fraught, not pleasant and productive; it was stressful and not 
enjoyable”), there was recognition by the Court of “mental distress” damages as “an interesting, and 
probably developing, area of the law” (6B). The judgement … brings “a course for the provision of 
education” firmly within the exceptions “as something which contains, or should contain, important 
elements of satisfaction, pleasure and tranquillity of mind”; the Judge indeed waxes lyrical: “It can 
pellucidly be appreciated that, for example, the assimilation of literature, history, art or philosophy 
should, and generally will, provide pleasure and relaxation as well as employment opportunity. So, too, 
no doubt, will mathematics and science, where an appreciation of the harmonies of numbers and the 
secrets of creation ought to provide limitless intellectual pleasure and satisfaction. The enjoyment of 
these pleasures is part of the purpose of university and many other educational courses”’ (7A–D)’: at 
239. 
203 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists 248 ALR 267. 
204 Ibid. The appellant also sought orders for a declaration that the College had been in contravention of 
the TPA/FTA. The Court declined to make the orders requested as nothing would be gained by such an 
order: at 341 [252] (Jessup J). Similarly there were no legitimate grounds for the granting of an 
injunction to restrain the college as the events had ceased to exist: at 342 [253] (Jessup J). 
205 Ibid 332 [218] (Jessup J). 
206 Ibid  332 [219] (Jessup J). 
207 Ibid.  
208 Ibid 336 [221] (Jessup J). 
209 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344. 
210 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267,337 [233] (Jessup J). 
211 Which corresponds with the TPA s 82, and for this research ACL s 236. 
212 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267, 336 [230] (Jessup J). 
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that the meaning of ‘injury’ in the FTA/TPA ‘is not confined to personal injury, but may 
extend to any detriment’214 and should not be limited to actions for recovery of 
economic loss.215 His Honour found that the conduct of the College had caused the 
loss as claimed.216 The appellant was awarded damages for the ‘injury’ suffered 
within the meaning of the Fair Trading Act in the sum of $2,500.217 
 
This case is particularly significant as this thesis is concerned with the application of 
the UCT and the situation where a term in the contract is declared unfair and thus 
rendered void. The ACL makes provision for compensatory orders for loss or 
damage suffered, or likely to be suffered, by an injured person, when another person 
seeks to rely on a term that has been declared to be void.218 Moreover, the recent 
amendment to the ACL and the ability of the regulator to seek orders to redress any 
loss or damage suffered by non-party consumers strengthens students’ potential 
ability to secure reparation.219 Additionally, the range of orders available at common 
law or in equity is limited as the courts are unlikely to order specific performance or a 
mandatory injunction to that effect.220 The orders available under the ACL provide for 
significant judicial discretion221 and include the ability of the court to order injunctions 
and specific performance in relation to unfair contract terms.222 These provisions will 
be considered further in Chapter 5. It is clear from the reasoning in Shahid that the 
potential for students to successfully claim damages in relation to claims made 
against a HEI has better prospects under consumer protection legislation when 
compared to a claim in damages for breach of contract. 
 
Conclusion  
On balance it would seem justified that there exists in Australia a student–HEI 
contractual relationship, which co-exists with other legal rights accruing to students 
as in other common law countries. The preferred view is that there are two contracts. 
First, there is a contract of admission, which obliges the HEI to enrol the student into 
                                                                                                                                            
213 Ibid. The Court reviewed the authorities in relation to the meaning of the word ‘injury’ and took an 
expansive view: at 335–6 (Jessup J). 
214 Ibid 335 [225], 336 [227] (Jessup J).  
215 Ibid 335 [226] (Jessup J). 
216 Ibid 336 [230] (Jessup J). 
217 Ibid 336 [231] (Jessup J). The applicant was also successful in relation to a claim for out of pocket 
expenses in relation to costs associated with the expense in the lodgement of the appeals, ($10,684.92) 
and legal costs incurred in connection with the internal appeals ($2200): at 337–41 (Jessup J). Her 
claim for airfares for her husband to fly interstate to Perth for ‘emotional support’ was disallowed: at 341 
(Jessup J). 
218 See, eg, ACL pt 5-2 div 4 ss 237–9 compensation orders for injured persons. 
219 Ibid div 4 ss 237, 239–40. 
220 As described by Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 25, 11, nn 50–3. 
221 ACL s 243.  
222 Ibid s 232.  
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the course on the bases of the pre-admission information received by the student. 
Second, the contract to educate arises on the student completing the enrolment 
process.223 The terms of this contract may be varied over the course of the study 
period, in much the same way a contract of employment might be varied. The 
contract for the supply of educational services is a ‘service’ as required under the 
ACL. There are nevertheless difficulties with the contractual classification, particularly 
in relation to determining the terms of the contract and remedies upon any breach.224 
This research is however only concerned with those terms that can be said to be 
express terms of any ‘standard form’ ‘consumer contract’. In the absence of a formal 
agreement, it is probable that this will contain those terms referred to expressly on 
enrolment and by incorporation of at least the published course handbook and 
statues, rules and policies of the HEI. Further, it is suggested that the remedies 
available under the ACL are more effective mechanisms for redress for students than 
at common law. 
 
The following chapter will examine the application and effect of the specific UCT 
provisions to identify any connection between the UCT provisions regarding 
substantive unfairness and the protection afforded students by the legislation in the 
context of the provision of educational services. The chapter will include an 
investigation of whether particular express terms typically contained in the enrolling 
documents are potentially unfair under the legislation. It will also include an analysis 
as to whether the UCT regime provides effective protection for students as 
consumers of educational services in the context of the student–HEI contract and 
provision of educational services. 
 
 
 
                                                 
223 This relationship will also coexist with others, notably in administrative law and obligations arising 
under legislation as discussed in Chapter 2. 
224 Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 74, 100.  
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Chapter 5: The Student–HEI Contract and the UCT 
 
Introduction 
As indicated in preceding chapters, the protections available under the ACL 
regarding unfair contract terms require the existence of several factors before the 
provisions are enlivened. The thesis so far has examined the nature of the contract 
between the student and the HEI and argued that the contract for educational 
services that exists in Australia is a ‘service’ supplied in ‘trade or commerce’ as 
defined by the ACL. Additionally there must be a ‘standard form’1 ‘consumer 
contract’2 between the supplier of the services (the HEI) and the consumer of those 
services (the student).  
 
The examination and analysis of whether the contract for the supply of educational 
services is a ‘standard form’ contract will be continued from the previous chapter. 
The chapter will then analyse the case law, legislation and literature to establish 
whether there is a ‘consumer contract’ as defined for the purpose of the UCT 
provisions.. Whether students are consumers for the purpose of the UCT provisions 
will be considered in the light of academic commentary from other related disciplines 
as well as a detailed examination of the statutory definitions contained in the ACL. 
The last two decades have seen increasing debate in higher education commentary 
regarding the ‘marketisation’ or ‘commodification’ of higher education.3 Legal 
commentators have been less concerned with the conceptualisation of the student as 
consumers in general and have focused largely on whether the student is a 
consumer for the purpose of the relevant legislative provisions under consumer 
protection law. There has been a general acceptance of the student as consumer for 
the purpose of consumer protection law.4  
 
                                                 
1 ACL s 23(1)(b).  
2 Ibid s 23(3). 
3 See, eg, Roger Brown (ed) Higher Education and the Market (Routledge, 2011); Mike Molesworth, 
Elizabeth Nixon and Richard Scullion, The Marketisation of Higher Education and the Student as 
Consumer (Routledge, 2001). 
4 See, eg, Damien Considine, ‘The Loose Cannon Syndrome: University as Business & Students as 
Consumers’ (1994) 37(1) Australian Universities’ Review 36; Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, 
‘Getting What They Paid For: Consumer Rights of Students in Higher Education’ (2006) 15 Griffith Law 
Review 306, although the authors have not placed as much significance on the wider debate for the 
purpose of the legislative provisions: at 322. In some instances the student as a consumer is assumed 
while other matters under the statutory provisions are considered, see, eg, Lynden Griggs, ‘Knowing the 
Destination Before the Journey Starts — Legal Education and Fitness for Purpose’ (2007) Murdoch 
ELaw Journal 315 
<https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/issues/2007/1/eLaw_knowing_destination.pdf>. 
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However, reference to wider, cross-disciplinary discussions is significant for a deeper 
understanding of the issues arising under the ACL. A broader understanding of what 
is meant by the student as consumer and its impact on the sector, while strictly 
cannot assist with the interpretation of the statutory provisions arising at law, can 
inform the notion of what is meant by a consumer in the context of the higher 
education sector and place the operation of the provisions in context.5 The decline of 
the jurisdiction of the Visitor and the commodification of higher education impacts on 
the development of the acceptance of the student–HEI contract and the positioning of 
the student as a consumer within that market.  
 
This chapter will then consider the operation and application of the specific provisions 
and whether there are any terms in the contract for the supply of educational services 
that are potentially unfair terms as proscribed under the ACL. Particular regard will be 
had to the case law emanating from the Australian state of Victoria,6 which is the only 
Australian jurisdiction to have previously enjoyed a UCT regime in its consumer 
protection legislation, and the experience in the United Kingdom.7 While the UK 
experience informs the discussion, this thesis is not a comparative study. Importantly 
the analysis will identify any connection between the UCT provisions regarding 
substantive unfairness and the effectiveness of the protection afforded students by 
the legislation for students as consumers of educational services. The analysis will 
evaluate the implications for the sector and make recommendations for any 
necessary change in current practice. 
 
Unfair Contract Terms in Australia 
In July 2010, the new national consumer legislation introduced provisions rendering 
unfair terms in consumer contracts void.8 
                                                 
5 Lynden Griggs, Aviva Freilich and Eileen Webb, ‘Challenging the Notion of a Consumer: Time for 
Change’ (2011) 19 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 52, 59. The idea of the student as a 
consumer impacts on traditional views of both the academe and the approach taken by the judiciary in 
reviewing academic judgement; Geoffrey Alderman and David Palfreyman, ‘The Birth of the Market 
Place in English Higher Education’ (2011) 15(3) Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education 
79; Gabrielle Baldwin, ‘The Student as Customer: The Discourse of “Quality” in Higher Education’ 
(1994) 16(1) Journal of Tertiary Education Administration 125; Francine Rochford, ‘The Contested 
Product of a University Education’ (2008) 30(1) Journal of Higher Education, Policy and Management 
41; Tim Kaye, Robert D Bickel and Tim Birtwistle, ‘Criticizing the Image of the Student as Consumer: 
Examining Legal Trends and Administrative Responses in the US and UK’ (2006) 18(2–3) Education 
and the Law 85, 222. See also Tim Kaye, ‘Academic Judgment, the University Visitor and the Human 
Rights Act 1998’ (1999) 11(3) Education and the Law 165, 182. 
6 Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) pt 2B. See generally Consumer Affairs, Victoria Preventing Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts (2007). 
7 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (‘UTCCR’) (UK). 
8 Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No.1) 2010 (Cth); This Act received 
assent on 14 April 2010 operative from I July 2010. Unfair contract terms provisions are contained in 
Schedule 2 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) ch 2 pt 2-3. See generally Jeannie Marie Paterson, 
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This was the first time there had been national regulation in relation to UCTs. 
Previously the only jurisdiction to regulate specifically for UCTs in consumer 
transactions was Victoria. Consequently there is very little case law in relation to the 
interpretation and application of these provisions, save a small body of jurisprudence 
from Victorian state courts and tribunals.9 An unfair contracts regime also exists in 
the UK, although there are notable differences in the UK legislation, including the 
need for a consideration as to whether the impugned term is contrary to the 
requirements of good faith, and important differences in the examples of unfair 
terms.10 Further, the role of the regulator in the UK is proactive rather than reactive, 
which has resulted in a minimisation of litigation in this area.11 The Office of Fair 
Trading (‘OFT’) in the UK is empowered to enter into discussions with traders and if 
necessary seek undertakings in relation to potentially unfair terms, which has been 
observed to deliver real benefits to consumers.12 While regard will be had to the UK 
experience, this thesis is not a comparative study.  
 
It is suggested that the UCT provisions attempt to deal with not just the procedural 
unfairness of terms but indeed the substantive unfairness of terms.13 Prior to the 
introduction of a UCT regime nationally, Australian jurisdictions outside of Victoria 
were limited in the examination of ‘fairness’ in contractual terms due to the 
                                                                                                                                            
‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts’ (2009) 37 Australian Business 
Law Review 184; Tracey Atkins, ‘The Regulation of Unfair Contract Terms and the New Australian 
Consumer Law’ (2010) 38 Australian Business Law Review 318. The ACL applies only to contracts 
entered into after the commencement date. Existing contracts are only affected to the extent that the 
renewal or variation is made after 1 July 2010. See Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer 
Law) Act (No. 2) 2010, (No. 103, 2010) s 3 and sch 7 item 8 quoted in Russell Miller, Miller’s Australian 
Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (Thomson Reuters, 34th ed, 2012) editor’s note, 1697; 
Patrick Dwyer, ‘Fair Terms: New consumer Contract Rights Now in Play’ Law Society Journal (NSW) 
July 2010 53, 55. 
9 See generally Frank Zumbo, ‘Dealing with Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: The Search for a New 
Regulatory model’ (2005) 13 Trade Practices Law Journal 194; Dan Jerker B Svantesson and Loren 
Holly, ‘An Overview and Analysis of the National Unfair Contract Terms Provisions’ (2010) 24(3) 
Commercial Law Quarterly 3; Paul O’Shea, ‘All’s Fair in Love and War — But Not Contract’ (2004) 23 
The University of Queensland Law Journal 227. 
10 See generally Anthony Gray, ‘Unfair Contracts and the Consumer Law Bill’ (2009) 9(2) Queensland 
University Law and Justice Journal 155; Chris Willett, ‘The Functions of Transparency in Regulating 
Contract Terms: UK and Australian Approaches’ (2011) 60 International Law Quarterly 355 at 363–7, 
374–5; John W Carter, ‘The Commercial Side of Australian Consumer Protection Law’ (2010) 26 Journal 
of Contract Law 221, 238–9. 
11 James Davidson, ‘Unfair Contract Terms and the Consumer: A Case for Proactive Regulation?’ 
(2007) 15 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 74, 78–80 where he examines the UK OFT statistics 
from 1999–2004 and concludes that the UK regulations have achieved results without the need for 
recourse to the courts. See also Simone Watson, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: The Issues and 
the UK Solution’ (2005) September Proctor 35, 36. 
12 Davidson, above n 11. See also Watson, above n 11. 
13 See Jeannie Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law: The Rise of Substantive 
Unfairness as a Ground for Review of Standard Form Consumer Contracts’ (2009) 33(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 934, 937–9 particularly in the distinction between procedural and substantive 
unfairness; Peter Doherty, ‘Unequal Bargaining Position’ (Paper presented at Law Summer School 
2011, University of Western Australia Law School, Perth, 25 February 2011) 65; Australian Attorney-
General, The Australian Consumer Law: A Guide to Provisions, 2010. 
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development and complexity surrounding common law or statutory causes of action 
founded in unconscionablity.14 The courts’ reluctance to interfere with contractual 
terms on the basis of unfairness has a long tradition founded on the guiding principle 
of ‘freedom to contract’ and concepts of voluntariness in entering into contractual 
relations.15 It is the accepted view that courts have hitherto confined their 
examination to matters concerning procedural fairness in the formation of the 
contract.16 It can be said: 
Substantive unfairness in contractual dealings refers to an objective assessment of the 
fairness of individual contract terms agreed to between parties. This is in contrast to 
procedural unfairness which is concerned with factors which may erode the ability of one 
of the contracting parties to give a fully informed consent to the terms.17 
 
The UCT regime in the ACL is concerned with both. Notions of transparency, 
accessibility and legibility are matters to be taken into account in the determination of 
whether a term is substantively unfair.18 A leading Australian scholar in this area 
proposes that: 
Fairness in standard form consumer contracts requires terms that are balanced and 
transparent in their effect. Terms need not neglect the legitimate business interests of 
suppliers of goods and services but must be a proportionate response to the risks to which 
those terms are responding.19 
 
In the higher education context this poses some challenges, not least because of the 
difficulty in ascertaining the terms of the contract. Further as discussed below, what 
comprises the higher education sector market and thus the legitimate interests of the 
suppliers of those services is a complex question. There are also parallels in student 
                                                 
14 A claim in equity can arise on a number of grounds where a court may consider vitiating factors that 
have impacted on the validity of the terms of the agreement, such as unconscionablity or duress. Under 
legislation, the former TPA ss 51AB–51AC (now ACL ss 21–22) dealt with unconscionable actions by a 
party who sought to take advantage of a vulnerable party, or the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) in 
relation to ‘unjust contracts’. So the focus has been on the conduct of parties in the negotiation and 
formation of contracts and procedural fairness. See Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms 
Law’, above n 13, 937–9; Svantesson and Holly, above n 9, 4; Griggs, ‘The [Ir]rational Consumer’, 
above n 14, 11; Davidson, above n 11, 84; Willett, above n 10, 369–70. 
15 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 937–8. See generally, Andrew 
Robertson, ‘The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 179. 
16 Above n 14. The focus has been on the conduct of parties in the negotiation and formation of 
contracts and procedural fairness. See Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 
13, 937–9; Svantesson and Holly, above n 9, 4; Griggs, ‘The [Ir]rational Consumer’, above n 14, 11; 
Willett, above n 10, 369–70; Davidson, above n 11, 84. Cf generally Gray, above n 10. He comments 
that the distinction between procedural and substantive unfairness in the existing doctrines is artificial 
because substantive unfairness may be evidence of procedural unfairness, therefore intertwined and 
somewhat circular: at 166. 
17 Davidson, above n 11. 
18 ACL ss 24(2) and 24(3); Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 188. 
See generally Willett, above n 10. 
19 Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 184. 
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litigation regarding the division of substantive and procedural fairness. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the notion that claims going to procedural fairness are justiciable20 but 
those relating to the substance of academic judgement are not reviewable is a 
common theme in student claims. It is possible that the examination of the 
substantive fairness of contractual terms under the UCT provides some measure of 
advancement in the rights of students as consumers of educational services.  
  
Section 23 defines unfair terms in a consumer contract as follows:  
23 Unfair terms of consumer contracts 
(1) A term of a consumer contract is void if: 
(a) the term is unfair; and 
(b) the contract is a standard form contract. 
(2) The contract continues to bind the parties if it is capable of operating without 
the unfair term. 
(3) A consumer contract is a contract for: 
(a) a supply of goods or services; or 
(b)a sale or grant of an interest in land; 
to an individual whose acquisition of the goods, services or interest is wholly or 
predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. 
 
The test for unfairness is set out in section 24 and illustrative examples of what may 
be unfair terms are listed in section 25. A term will be unfair ‘if it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and responsibilities’ and if it is not ‘reasonably 
necessary’ to protect the ‘legitimate interests of the supplier’,21 so as to cause 
detriment to the consumer. Terms and contracts unaffected by the UCT are set out in 
sections 26 and 28 respectively. Pursuant to section 23, if a term is found to be unfair 
it will be void, but the rest of the contract remains in effect to the extent that it is 
capable of operation.22 A number of consequences arise on a declaration of 
unfairness, including the ability for the court to compensate parties who have 
suffered injury as a result of the application of any unfair term.23 Applications for a 
declaration and compensatory orders can be made by either an individual or by the 
regulator, who is now empowered to seek redress on behalf of those who have or are 
                                                 
20 See generally Bruce Lindsay, ‘University Hearings: Student Discipline Rules and Fair Procedures’ 
(2008) 15 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 146. 
21 Economics Legislation Committee, The Senate (Cth), Trade Practices Amendment (Australian 
Consumer Law) Bill 2009 [Provisions] September 2009, 1. 
22 A declaration is made pursuant to ACL s 250 on the application of either the regulator or individual. 
23 ACL pt 5-2. The court has a very wide discretion to make ‘any order it thinks appropriate’: s 237(1). 
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likely to suffer loss or damage, including non-party consumers. 24 A declaration that a 
term is void is not a contravention of the ACL; however, if a party continued to rely on 
such a term it would then be a breach of the Act.25 The elements of the UCT 
provisions and avenues for redress will be considered in turn below. 
 
Standard form contract 
As argued in Chapter 4, a contract for the provision of educational services between 
the student and the HEI exists in Australia. The sections regulating unfair contract 
terms will apply to the student–HEI contract if the contract can be said to be a 
‘standard form’ ‘consumer contract’ within the terms of the legislation. Standard form 
contracts are a ubiquitous part of consumers’ lives. How they are to be treated at law 
under classical contract law principles is the subject of much academic commentary, 
as the fundamental principle of parties’ freedom to enter into a contract that 
represents their bargain is undercut.26 Paterson helpfully summarises the 
commentary and sentiment as follows: 27 
Standard form contracts may benefit contracting parties by reducing the transaction costs 
associated with negotiating and drafting individualised contracts.
28
 However, there is likely 
to be an inequality of bargaining power between the parties to standard form consumer 
contracts due to the disparities in resources, information and experience that typically exist 
between traders and consumers.
29 In this context, standard form contracts appear to offer 
little potential for genuine consent on the part of the consumers to whom such contracts 
are presented. The whole point of standard form contracts is that there will be no 
negotiation over, or variation of, the terms of the contract. They are presented on a ‘[t]ake 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Australian Attorney-General, above n 13, 24. 
26 John J A Burke, ‘Reinventing Contract’ (2003) 10 (2) Murdoch ELaw Journal 18 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n2/burke102.html. See generally Andrew Robinson, ‘The 
Limits of Voluntariness in Contract’ (2005) Melbourne University Law Review 5 for a discussion on the 
notion of voluntariness in contract law and assumption of contractual obligations.  
27 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’ above n 13, 940, n 36–9, below n 28–31. See 
further discussion on the contractual realities and the effect of standards of objectivities on contracts of 
adhesion in Katherine Hall, ‘Power and Privilege: Objectivity, Commercial Interest and Standard Form 
Contracts’ (1997) 6 Griffith Law Review 30. 
28 Michael J Trebilcock, ‘Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy’ in Charles E F Rickett and Thomas G 
W Telfer (eds), International Perspectives on Consumers’ Access to Justice (2003) 68, 93 cited in 
Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 940, n 36. 
29A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616, 624 (Lord Diplock) (‘Schroeder 
Music Publishing’); George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] QB 284, 302 (Lord 
Denning MR) (‘George Mitchell’). See also Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) 47 cited in 
Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 940, n 37. 
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it or leave it’ basis.
30
 The opportunities for consumers to read, comprehend or take advice 
on the terms of the contracts are typically limited.
31
  
 
The rationale for statutory intervention in relation to standard form contracts are 
many and encompass the reasons given by Paterson above. A number of 
commentators32 have also referred to the accepted reality of consumer experience in 
relation to standard form contracts, which include a recognition that consumers rarely 
read standard form contracts;33 that if read, comprehension of those terms is 
limited;34 that consumers often underestimate the risks associated with the terms;35 
and that they perceive themselves to be powerless.36 These factors are heightened 
in the case of young people,37 and in any event, consumers’ ability to counter any of 
these effects is limited because generally similar terms are employed across a 
marketplace38. Therefore intervention by the legislature is on the basis that ‘the 
rational consumer does not and cannot be expected to fully appreciate the 
embedded contractual complexity … the rational behaviour of consumers focusing on 
price, rather than contractual terms.’39 
 
There is no definition of ‘standard form contract’ in the ACL.40 The accepted view of 
the government regulator is that it will ordinarily be: 
… one that has been prepared by one party to the contract and is not subject to 
negotiation between the parties — that is, it is offered on a ‘take it or leave it basis’.41 
                                                 
30 George Mitchell [1983] QB 284, 297 (Lord Denning MR); Schroeder Music Publishing [1974] 3 All ER 
616, 624 (Lord Diplock) cited in Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 940, 
n 38. 
31 Robertson, above n 15, 188; Robert A Hillman and Jeffrey J Rachlinski, ‘Standard-Form Contracting 
in the Electronic Age’ (2002) 77 New York University Law Review 429, 432–3; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
‘The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 211, 242 cited in 
Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 940, n 39. 
32 See generally Griggs, ‘The [Ir]rational Consumer’, above n 14; Watson, above n 11; Aviva Freilich and 
Eileen Webb, ‘The Incorporation of Contractual Terms in Unsigned Documents — Is It Time for a 
Realistic, Consumer-Friendly Approach?’ (2009) 34 University of Western Australian Law Review 261; 
Chris Field, ‘The Death of Unfair Contracts’ Alternative Law Journal (2004) 35; Zumbo, above n 9; 
Willett, above n 10; Economics Legislation Committee, above n 21, ch 4, 22–5. 
33 Freilich and Webb, above n 32, 263. 
34 Watson, above n 11. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Freilich and Webb, above n 32, 264. 
37 Ibid 266. 
38 Watson, above n 11; Field, above n 32. 
39 Griggs, ‘The [Ir]rational Consumer’, above n 14, 2. See also Willett, above n 10, 357–8; Paterson, The 
Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’ above n 13, 952–6. 
40 Economics Legislation Committee, above n 21, 1, 18–20. See the submission made by the Consumer 
Action Law Centre, The Consumer Protection Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Keeping 
Australia Up To Date, May 2008, which the Committee found most persuasive: at 9, 19. The submission 
suggested that ‘a more proscriptive definition would provide opportunities for avoidance’. Cf Sirko 
Harder, ‘Problems in Interpreting the Unfair Contract Terms Provisions of the Australian Consumer Law’ 
(2011) 34 Australian Bar Review 306, 311 where he is of the view that it is difficult to see a real danger 
of this, also noting that this was the view also of the Commonwealth Treasury in their submissions on 
the draft provisions.  
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A rebuttable presumption is invoked by section 27. Once it is alleged that a contract 
is a ‘standard form’ contract, it is presumed to be so unless the other party, typically 
the supplier (the HEI), is able to prove otherwise.42 The rationale for the use of the 
rebuttable presumption is based on the fact that it is likely that the respondent 
(supplier) is best placed to bring evidence in relation to the nature of the contract 
used.43 Even though there is no definition of what is a standard form contract, section 
27(2) provides a list of matters a court must take into account when considering 
whether the contract is standard form (and other matters it thinks relevant): 
(2) In determining whether a contract is a standard form contract, a court may take 
into account such matters as it thinks relevant, but must take into account the 
following: 
(a) whether one of the parties has all or most of the bargaining power relating 
to the transaction; 
(b) whether the contract was prepared by one party before any discussion 
relating to the transaction occurred between the parties; 
(c) whether another party was, in effect, required either to accept or reject the 
terms of the contract (other than the terms referred to in section 26(1)) in the 
form in which they were presented; 
(d) whether another party was given an effective opportunity to negotiate the 
terms of the contract that were not the terms referred to in section 26(1); 
(e) whether the terms of the contract (other than the terms referred to in section 
26(1)) take into account the specific characteristics of another party or the 
particular transaction; 
(f) any other matter prescribed by the regulations. 
 
The legislation in the UK applies to contractual terms ‘not individually negotiated’. 
The Victorian legislation applied to terms in consumer contracts in general (although 
the use of a standard form contract was a consideration in the assessment of 
                                                                                                                                            
41 Australian Attorney-General, above n 13, 8; Svantesson and Holly, above n 9, where they add that it 
contains ‘a generic set of terms’: at 5. But this is absent from the list although present in the Victorian 
legislation; Harder, above n 40, 31, n 21. 
42 ACL s 27(1).  
43 Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (Cth) 
(‘EM1’) 29 [2.88]. Note the submission received by the Senate from Mr Tonking SC highlighting the 
potential problem that while particular terms may be beyond dispute as unfair, whether or not the 
contract is a ‘standard form’ contract may remain in dispute: Economics Legislation Committee, above n 
21, 19. 
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unfairness).44 As Harder has observed, the application of the provisions to the whole 
contract rather than the impugned terms creates some difficulties in interpretation 
and application.45 The focus of the list in section 27 is on the level of negotiation 
regarding the terms and regard is to be had to all of the terms or the whole contract.46 
One problem arises as to whether a contract can still be said to be a standard form 
contract if some of the terms are in fact individually negotiated.47 It is suggested that 
there would have been greater certainty if the UK approach had been adopted and 
there was reference only to contractual terms not individually negotiated.48 The 
practical effect of the difference may be seen when examining the UK scholarship on 
the application of the UK unfair contract terms legislation to the student–HEI contract. 
UK commentators have been able to consider simply the nature of the contractual 
terms without having reference to whether they form part of a standard form 
contract.49 The need to establish a ‘standard form’ contract may prove to be an 
additional complexity for Australian students bringing their claims.50  
 
In Chapter 4 it was proposed that the only contract capable of being a ‘standard form’ 
contract arises during the enrolment process and the terms of that ‘standard form’ 
contract are contained in the documentation created on enrolment. It is possible that 
the terms of the admission contract, particularly those contained in the prospectus, 
may also form part of the standard form contract.51 In the absence of a clear 
definition of the meaning of ‘standard form contract’, regard is had to the matters the 
court is directed to take into account when determining whether a contract is a 
                                                 
44 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UK) rr 4 and 5; Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) pt 
2B; Gray, above n 10, 169–70; Zumbo, above n 9; Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair 
Terms’, above n 8,185–7; O’Shea, above n 9, 229. 
45 Harder, above n 40, 311–13. 
46 Ibid 311–12. 
47 Ibid 312. 
48 Ibid 313. Harder’s suggested approach to overcome this difficulty is to ‘classify the contract as a 
“standard form contract” whenever a significant part of the terms [are] imposed and not individually 
negotiated’: at 213. See also Gray, above n 10, 166–9 who is of a similar view. 
49 Simon Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review in Public Law and in Contract Law: The Example of “Student 
Rules”’ (2001) 21(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 193, 193–217, 207–14; Dennis Farrington and 
David Palfreyman, The Law of Higher Education (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 339 [12.100]–
[12.104]. In regards the application of UTCCR regulations to the contract ‘they control the use of std 
terms’: at 412 [12.100]; Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 5, 118–19; Tim Birtwistle and Melissa 
Askew, ‘The Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 – Impact on the Student Contract’ (1999) 11(2) 
Education and the Law 89, 96; Martin Davis ‘Students, Academic Institutions and Contracts — A Ticking 
Time Bomb?’ (2001) 13(1) Education and the Law 9, 20–2.  
50 Economics Legislation Committee, above n 21. Submission received from Mr Tonking SC above n 43. 
Although this is practically less problematic in terms of formulating complex pleadings and arguments if 
the application for the declaration is sought by the regulator as permitted under the Act, discussed in 
detail below. 
51 Australian Attorney-General, above n 13, 7 explicitly points out that contracts can be made orally or in 
writing and includes contracts made over the phone or a ‘click-wrap agreement’. This seems in contrast 
to the matters to be considered in the determination of whether the term is transparent point to the 
examination of written terms ACL s 24(3) i.e. legibility, presented clearly. 
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‘standard form contract’ in sections 27(2). The HEI has all or most of the bargaining 
power,52 at least for the second contract of enrolment, hence the hesitation in 
definitively including the terms of the prospectus as part of the ‘standard form 
contract’. It is arguable that in relation to the contract of admission (whether to accept 
the place or not) the power between the parties is at least equal in this context. This 
may become particularly acute given that the Commonwealth funding now travels 
with the individual student. The enrolment documentation is prepared by one party, 
the HEI, prior to any discussion53 with the enrolling student, which that student has to 
accept on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.54 There is no real opportunity for an enrolling 
student to negotiate individual terms of the contract55 that take into account their 
specific characteristics.56 Any impression of negotiation is illusory.57  
 
The ACL consultation paper released by the Federal Government specifically states 
that a contract for ‘publically and privately provided vocational training and 
professional development services’ is a type of contract covered by the UCT 
regulation.58 It is suggested that the qualification of the type of educational services 
affected reflects the uncertainty surrounding whether the provision of educational 
services by a HEI is in ‘trade or commerce’. As maintained in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
provision of educational services by HEI is in ‘trade or commerce’. It seems that it 
has been accepted in the UK that the student–HEI contract does have the 
                                                 
52 ACL s 27(2)(a). As discussed in Chapter 4, there are many factors supporting this, including, as 
observed by Griggs, significant regulation in the sector and the prescription of contractual documents 
and terms by the stronger party, resulting in the court using these factors to assist the weaker party, the 
student: Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination’, above n 4, 320, n 30. See also Birtwistle, and Askew, above 
n 49, 94. 
53 Ibid s 27(2)(b). 
54 Ibid s 27(2)(c). 
55 Ibid s 27(2)(d). 
56 Ibid s 27(2)(e). Even equity students are governed by ‘standard form’ policy in that regard. Any 
negotiation is limited to other potential terms of the contract noted in Chapter 4, including the course 
materials, marketing statements and any advice provided by employees of the HEI: Francine Rochford, 
‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’ (1998) 3(1) Australian & New Zealand 
Journal of Law & Education 28, 35.  
57 Bruce Lindsay, ‘Student Subjectivity and the Law’ (2005) 10(2) Deakin Law Review 628, 364; 
Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’, above n 56. In considering the 
source for the content of the agreement, Rochford notes that not only is there very little individual 
student input into the process of negotiating the contract of enrolment, the statutes and rules of the HEI, 
which form part of the terms of the contract, are not capable of renegotiation by an individual as they are 
enabling acts and exist in the form of by-laws (no negotiation is the point of the standard form contract). 
This seems to contradict her proposition later in the article (below at n 62) that the student–university 
relationship is not that of a standard form contract but rather more like an employment contract under an 
award structure, so that there is in fact a form of negotiation. It is submitted that the hybrid model 
proposed by Rochford creates difficulty. The better view is to see the rights as coexisting. On this see 
Simon Whittaker, ‘Public and Private Law-making: Subordinate Legislation, Contracts and the Status of 
“Student Rules”’ (2001) 21(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 103; Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 
49, 193–217. 
58 Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, Australian Government, An Australian 
Consumer Law Fair Markets — Confident Consumer (2009) 33. 
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appearance of the standard form contract.59 As early as 1970, despite the division in 
views regarding the appropriateness of classifying the student–university relationship 
as a contractual one, it was accepted that if it were to be so, it was ‘much closer to a 
contrat d’ adhesion than to the classic type of contract on a consensual basis’.60 
Similarly in Australia, when the matters listed in section 27 (2) of the ACL are 
examined, the contract for the supply of educational services (at least the contract of 
enrolment) bears the traits of a standard form contract. 
 
An interesting proposition is made by Rochford as to why the student–HEI agreement 
is not comparable to a standard form consumer contract. 61 Rochford is of the view 
that there is substantially more negotiation in the student–HEI agreement than 
acknowledged. This negotiation process determines the rules governing entry into 
the institution (and therefore the contract of admission): 
Although the negotiation is not in the hands of the individual student working on his or her 
own entry into the institution, it is in the hands of the student union members, of governing 
bodies, committees and boards making representations on behalf of the entire existing and 
prospective student body. The resulting ‘contract’, if that is what it is called, looks more like 
an employment contract under an award structure rather an a one-off consumer 
transaction governed by a standard form. This is not to say that the mechanism is a 
particularly effective one from the point of view of protecting individual rights of members, 
but it is an interesting comparison with the process of creation of a standard form contract 
in a straight forward commercial context.62 
 
She opines further: 
In addition, student representation occurs at most levels of decision-making in the modern 
university, and the likelihood of senior administrators ‘having it all their own way’ in debate 
is not great.63 
 
Therefore, her view of the student–HEI contract as being an award-based contractual 
arrangement seems to be predicated on the view that student input into this process 
and indeed that of the academy is equal to that of administrators and managers 
within the HEI, thereby taking into account the legitimate interests of the student and 
                                                 
59 Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 49, 338 [12.10]; J W Bridge, ‘Keeping the Peace in the 
Universities: The Role of the Visitor’ (1970) 86 The Law Quarterly Review 531; Kaye, Bickel and 
Birtwistle, above n 5, 118–19; Birtwistle and Askew, above n 49, 96. 
60 Bridge, above n 59, 548. 
61 As discussed, Rochford is reluctant to reduce the student–HEI relationship to simply a contractual 
one. Her preferred view is of the students as corporators of the institution or at least a hybrid approach: 
Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between The Student and The University’, above n 56, 43. 
62 Ibid 40. 
63 Ibid 45. 
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society. It is submitted that while perhaps this collegial approach to university 
matters, including formulation of rules and regulations, was once de rigueur, it is, with 
respect, now dated and somewhat idealistic. As will be seen below, the marketisation 
of the higher education sector has transformed the way HEIs operate in all aspects of 
their ‘business’. The analysis or promotion of the student–HEI contract as being one 
that is negotiated in the same way a union might negotiate an award on behalf of its 
members is not a plausible analogy in the current higher education sector.  
 
‘Consumer contract’ — the student as consumer 
Consumerism and the higher education market 
An analysis wider than the legal definition of the consumer in the ACL is important to 
place this research in context. Certainly the idea of the student as consumer is 
promulgated in the popular press both in Australia and internationally.64 The precise 
legal definition of consumer under the ACL is discussed below. A broader definition 
of student consumerism is set out by Kaye et al and adopted here: 
Consumerism ... is used to denote the belief that individuals obtain gratification and social 
standing primarily through their purchase of commodities and consumption of tangible 
products. So far as higher education is concerned, consumerism implies that students will 
want to see obvious, tangible benefits from their studies, whether in terms of an inherently-
valuable qualification or as a route to a particular form of employment. Students of a 
consumerist bent are unlikely to be interested in studying or working at anything which has 
no clear connection with their grades or future employment prospects, but are increasingly 
ready to challenge as inaccurate any grades that are not as high as they feel they require 
for their chosen career path ... there can be no doubt that the very notion of bringing 
claims to court for alleged educational negligence or breach of contract appears more 
legitimate than it did in the past, and seems based on the image of education as a service 
to be consumed, or as a commodity to be bought and sold, rather than as an activity in 
which to participate.65  
                                                 
64 Heather Ewart, Australian Broadcasting Commission Television, ‘International Student Market 
Corrupt, Industry Says’, The 7.30 Report, 20 March 2007 
<http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s187721.htm>; Heather Ewart, Australian Broadcasting 
Commission Television, ‘International Students a Lucrative Market In Australian Tertiary Institutions’, 
The 7.30 Report, 3 April 2007 <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s1888001.htm>; Dorothy Illing, 
‘Deliver Service or We’ll Sue’, The Australian (Canberra) 21 July 2004, 33; Debra Jopson, ‘Unis Face 
Legal Challenge From Students’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 6 June 2005; Eric Jensen, 
‘Overseas Pupils Losers In Scramble For Fees’, The West Australian (Perth), 18 July 2007, 18. For an 
analysis of the portrayal of students as consumers in the UK press see Joanna Williams, ‘Constructing 
Consumption: What Media Representations Reveal About Today’s Students’ in Molesworth, Scullion 
and Nixon, above n 3, 170. See also Hon Senator Chris Evans, Minister for Tertiary Education (Cth), 
‘Better Consumer Protection for International Students’ (Media Release, 23 September 2011) 
<http://www.aei.gov.au/Pages/default.aspx 2> to provide a system for refunds for international students 
in the event of a higher education providers closing. 
65 Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 5, 86–7. It is interesting to note that in the authors’ view, 
education has always been a commodity in a sense that it has always been available for purchase and 
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What is being ‘produced’ and ‘traded’ has been discussed earlier.66 The idea of the 
marketisation of higher education and placement of the student at the centre of that 
market as a consumer67 is not without strongly expressed concerns from the 
academe. The concerns are wide ranging, from the impact on the status of staff and 
students as members of a community of scholars,68 to the pedagogical effects in 
relation to students’ learning and participation in teacher–student relations. There are 
difficulties accepting the student as a passive consumer.69 Commentators are 
apprehensive about the move from the traditional role of higher education within 
society as a producer of knowledge and primarily facilitating an informed and 
knowledgeable citizenry, to something else that resembles commerce.70 There is 
                                                                                                                                            
that it is the impact of the notion of education as a right that has been influential in changing 
perceptions: at 93–9. 
66 That is a service rather than a positional good. See the earlier discussion in Chapter 4. 
67 Not all commentators agree on the classification of the student as customer, client or consumer. 
Ronald Barnett, ‘The Marketised University: Defending the Indefensible’ in Molesworth, Scullion and 
Nixon, above n 3, 39 considers that it is more appropriate to view the student as a customer rather than 
a consumer; Cf Griggs, Freilich and Webb, above n 5, where they are of the view that the notion of 
customer is very transactional in a sense that it is short lived and tends to deny the notion of a long term 
relationship. See also Felix Maringe, ‘The Student as Consumer: Affordances and Constraints in 
Transforming Higher Education Environment’ in Molesworth, Scullion and Nixon, above n 3, 142, 146–7; 
Andrys Onsman, ‘Tempting Universities’ Marketing Rhetoric: A Strategic Protection Against Litigation or 
an Admission of Failure?’ (2008) 30(1) Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 77; Michael 
Potts, ‘The Consumerist Subversion of Education’ (2005) 18(3) Academic Questions 54. 
68 One particular concern is the shift of the student from that of the student as a corporator, member or 
citizen of the university to the individual consumer with rights based in a contractual relationship. Johan 
Nordensvärd, ‘The Consumer Metaphor Versus the Citizen Metaphor: Different Sets of Roles for 
Students’ in Molesworth, Scullion and Nixon, above n 3, 158. See also the extensive commentary by 
Francine Rochford on this issue in the Australian context. Note in her more recent article, Francine 
Rochford, ‘The Contested Product of a University Education’, above n 5, 43–4, Rochford seems to be 
now resigned to the emergence of the individual contractual relationship as opposed to the idea of the 
student as corporator, which she has championed in other works.  
69 Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 49, 341–3, n 6 in relation to the nature of the participatory 
product of obtaining a degree and the possibility that students for the most part (unfortunately) are 
complicit passive consumers as the (alleged) disengagement in the learning is in fact something they 
are happy with. See also Margaret Thornton, ‘The Law School, the Market and the New Knowledge 
Economy’ (2007) 17(1–2) Legal Education Review 1, where she states that students are interested in 
the obtaining of credentials only, not the actual learning process: at 25; Frank Ferudi, ‘Introduction to the 
Marketisation of Higher Education and the Student as Consumer’ in Molesworth, Scullion and Nixon, 
above n 3, 1. He states ‘often it is [academic disquiet] the cultural, intellectual and pedagogic 
consequences or marketisation that represent a cause for concern. From a cultural perspective the 
project of marketisation represents the attempt to co-modify academic education. Specifically it is 
oriented towards the transformation of what is an abstract, intangible, non-material and relational 
experience into a visible, quantifiable and instrumentally driven process. The various rituals of 
commodification, such as quality control, auditing and ranking performance, quantifying the experience 
of students and constructing league tables, are essentially performance accomplishments’: at 2.  
70 Alderman and Palfreyman, above n 5; Baldwin, above n 5; Tim Birtwistle, ‘What is a “University”? 
(The English Patient)’ (2003) 15(4) Education and the Law 227; Vivienne Brand, ‘Decline in the Reform 
of Law Teaching? The Impact of Policy Reforms in Tertiary Education (1999) 10(2) Legal Education 
Review 109; David Dill, ‘Allowing the Market to Rule: The Case of the United States’ (2003) Higher 
Education Quarterly 1; Lynda Crowley-Cyr, ‘Reflexive Professionals or Disempowered Technicians? A 
Case Study of the Risks of “McLearning”’ in a Regional Law School’ (2008) 1 Journal of the Australasian 
Law Teachers Association 299; Michael S Harris, ‘Out Out, Damned Spot: General Education in a 
Market-Driving Institution’ (2006) 55(3–4) The Journal of General Education 186; Glyn Jones, ‘Managing 
Student Expectations: The Impact of Top-Up Intuition Fees’ (2010) 14(2) Perspectives: Policy and 
Practice in Higher Education 44; Mike Molesworth, Elizabeth Nixon and Richard Scullion, ‘Having, Being 
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disquiet that such consumerism may lead to academics adopting ‘defensive 
educative strategies’.71 A number of commentators have also noted the effect of the 
position of the student as consumer on changed HEI marketing strategies and 
mission statements.72 Some commentators have been able to find a balanced middle 
ground acknowledging the benefits as well as the negatives of the student as 
consumer and the marketisation of higher education.73 However, generally 
commentary on this issue is polarised.  
 
A consumer only exists in a marketplace. Defining what constitutes the higher 
education market is not without its difficulties; however, determination of the market 
informs what might be the legitimate interests of the HEI supplier in the test for 
unfairness. Economic and market analysis has been applied in some detail to the 
higher education sector.74 Applying economic theory, Brown identifies four 
fundamental characteristics: 
… the key ones in determining how far one can truly speak of a higher education market 
are market entry (determining the number of competing suppliers); consumer choice (how 
far purchasers have a choice of supplier); pricing (not only how free providers are to set a 
price for their product that at least covers the cost, but also how far students and other 
purchases have to contribute to the cost from their own resources); and information (for 
both purchases and suppliers).75 
 
The key characteristics are different in diverse systems across the world, although it 
seems clear that no one system operates as a pure market on these indicators, even 
in the US.76 What is accepted by commentators is that the limitations in the higher 
                                                                                                                                            
and Higher Education: The Marketisation of the University and the Transformation of the Student into 
Consumer’ (2009) 14(3) Teaching in Higher Education 277; Onsman, above n 67; Potts, above n 67; 
Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 5; Rochford, ‘The Contested Product of a University Education’, 
above n 5; Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 49; Dennis Hayes and Robin Wynyard (eds), The 
McDonaldization of Higher Education (Bergin and Garvey, 2002); Barnett, above n 67, 39. 
71 Ferudi, above n 69, 3; Birtwistle, above n 70. 
72 Onsman, above n 67; Colin Symes and Susan Hopkins, ‘Universities Inc.: Caveat Emptor’ (1994) 2 
Australian Universities’ Review 47; Helen Sauntson and Liz Morrish, ‘Vision Values and International 
Excellence: The “Products” that University Mission Statements Sell to Students’ in Molesworth, Scullion 
and Nixon, above n 3, 73. 
73 Barnett, above n 67, 39; Roger Brown, ‘The Impact of Markets’ in Brown (ed), Higher Education and 
the Market, above n 3, 20; Maringe, above n 67, 142. 
74 See, eg, Brown (ed), Higher Education and the Market, above n 3; Molesworth, Scullion and Nixon, 
above n 3; Kathryn McMahon, ‘Universities and Market Discourse’ (2001) 27(1) Monash University Law 
Review 105; Hayes and Wynyard (eds), above n 69. 
75 Roger Brown, ‘Markets and Non-Markets’ in Brown (ed), Higher Education and the Market, above n 3, 
9.  
76 See, eg, Christopher C Morphew and Barrett J Taylor, ‘Markets in the US Higher Education System: 
Imperfect Competition for Undergraduates’ in Brown (ed), Higher Education and the Market, above n 3, 
53; Gavin Moodie, ‘The Developing Student Market in Australian Higher Education’ in Brown (ed), 
Higher Education and the Market, above n 3, 63; William Locke, ‘False Economy? Multiple Markets, 
Reputational Hierarchy and Incremental Policy Making in UK Higher Education’ in Brown (ed), Higher 
Education and the Market, above n 3, 74; Lydia Hartwig, ‘Diversification and Competition in the German 
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education market means that it in truth operates as a ‘quasi-market’.77 In an 
Australian context, Moodie observes that the domestic student market is ‘severely 
limited’ by gaps and flaws in information, a lack of substitutability of product due to 
geographical and discipline limitations, further compromised by inadequate price 
signals.78 The imperfections and limitations of the quasi-market add weight to the 
proposition that if students are consumers of educational services, they should be 
afforded adequate protection under legislative regimes such as ACL. In the context of 
protecting students’ rights under consumer protection law, are there any reasons why 
we would encourage the student to be seen as a consumer? 79 There is strong 
evidence to suggest that students see themselves as consumers of educational 
services,80 although to date seemingly reticent to seek protection under the various 
consumer protection regimes.81 As will be seen below, the definition of consumer in 
the ACL is piecemeal, varied and inconsistent. As Griggs and colleagues note, the 
question regarding who exactly ought to be protected as a consumer under the ACL 
has not been clearly answered by the parliament or the courts.82  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Higher Education System’ in Brown (ed), Higher Education and the Market, above n 3, 110; Futao 
Huang, ‘The Marketisation of Higher Education: A Perspective from Japan’ in Brown (ed), Higher 
Education and the Market, above n 3, 146. 
77 See generally Benedict Sheehy, ‘Regulation by Markets and the Bradley Review of Australian Higher 
Education’ (2010) 52(1) Australian Universities’ Review 60; Stephen Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees 
and the Supply of Educational Services by Higher Education Providers’ (2012) 35(1) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 1, 7 where he states that there is sufficient evidence to say conclusively that 
universities ‘compete for students on the basis of price (tuition fees and other costs of attendance) and 
service (courses offered, teaching quality, the standard of facilities and research opportunities)’. 
78 Moodie, above n 76, 72 identifies that the price in the Australian context is that of the tertiary entrance 
rank.   
79 See generally Griggs, ‘The [Ir]rational Consumer’, above n 14. 
80 Jim Jackson et al, ‘Student Grievances and Discipline Matters Project’ (Final Report, Australian 
Learning and Teaching Council, May 2009). See also Ruth Gaffney-Rhys and Joanna Jones, ‘Issues 
Surrounding the Introduction of Formal Student Contracts’ (2010) 35(6) Assessment & Evaluation in 
Higher Education 711. In that study regarding the impact of formal student contracts on student 
satisfaction, 73% of respondents ‘agreed that a university student is a customer of knowledge/skills’. 
There was a stronger correlation to this statement for those students who were full fee paying. The 
authors suggest that there may be a ‘link between consumerist tendencies and propinquity of fee 
paying’: at 717. 
81 See generally Chapter 2; Hilary Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’ (2010) 21 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 20; Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to 
University Decisions Affecting Students in Australian Courts and Tribunals’ (2010) 34 Melbourne 
University Law Review 141. 
82 Griggs, Freilich and Webb, above n 5, 53. The authors note Howells’ and colleagues view: ‘To the 
extent that consumers need special rules, this raises the complex and sensitive issue of how the 
‘consumer’ should be defined. Individuals purchasing for private purposes are normally 
unproblematically treated as consumers … The answer should probably depend on why one is 
protecting the consumer — lack of knowledge, lack of bargaining power — but legislators often agonise 
over these distinctions, which are not infrequently the subject of litigation in the courts’ quoting G 
Howells, I Ramsay and T Wilhelmsson, ‘Consumer law in its international dimension’ in G Howells, I 
Ramsay and T Wilhelmsson with D Craft (eds), Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law, 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2010) 3: at n 4. 
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Is the contract for educational services a ‘consumer contract’ under the ACL? 
In order to avail themselves of the protections available under the UCT provisions in 
ACL, the contract for educational services must be a consumer contract as defined in 
section 23(3): 
(3) A consumer contract is a contract for: 
(a) a supply of goods or services; or 
(b) a sale or grant of an interest in land; 
to an individual whose acquisition of the goods, services or interest is wholly or 
predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. 
 
Thus the supply of the educational service must be to an individual (the student) 
whose acquisition of those services is wholly or predominately for personal, domestic 
or household use or consumption.83 The meaning of ‘acquisition’ is defined in section 
2 and in relation to services means ‘accept’. 84 This is expanded in section 11 of the 
ACL so as not to limit ‘acquisition’ to ‘purchase’.85 As this can include a reference to 
an agreement to supply services, this is of assistance to Commonwealth-funded 
students in the event of any debate as to whether they ‘acquire’ services. 
 
There are a number of definitions of ‘consumer’ that apply to different parts of the 
ACL respectively. Legal commentators in Australia and New Zealand agree that 
students are consumers under the former TPA86 and state fair trading Acts.87 Apart 
from the definition of ‘consumer contract’ for the purpose of the UCT contained in 
                                                 
83 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘acquire’). Harder, above n 40. Harder is of the view that the consumer contract 
definition will also be applied to consumer-to-consumer contracts because the acquisition or supply 
does not need to take place in the course of a business: at 308. With respect, this may be the situation 
with the acquisition of goods, but cannot be the case in relation to the supply of services, as is relevant 
to this thesis, as the definition of services includes the requirement that they be provided, granted or 
conferred in trade or commerce, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. This then leads to a curious anomaly 
where the UCT provisions will apply to consumer-to-consumer contracts for the acquisition of goods, but 
not in the case of services. 
84 It should be noted that while there is an expanded definition of the meaning ‘acquiring goods as a 
consumer’ in ACL s 3, this is not relevant to the UCT provisions. This definition is important for a number 
of Parts of the ACL, including s 18 (misleading or deceptive conduct) and consumer guarantees pt 3-2 
div1. 
85 ACL s 11; Miller, above n 8, 1537 [1.S2.2.10]. 
86 Previously the definition of consumer was contained in s 4B of the TPA (now CCA). This definition has 
not been repealed and remains relevant for any use of consumer outside of schedule 2 of the CCA, the 
ACL, or in Pt XI of the CCA. See CCH, Competition and Consumer Law Commentary 2-000 (6 
December 2011) 
<http://intelliconnect.wkasiapacific.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/scion/secure/index.jsp?node1=business_l
aw&crc1=3EDEC6058158498D&1323144201876=&da=WKAP_TAL_104279029&link_type=7&cfu=defa
ult#page[32]>. 
87 Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 4, 323. For a consideration of the 
consumer definition in New Zealand see Sally Varnham, ‘Guarantees for Degrees?’ (2001) New 
Zealand Law Journal 418; Sally Varnham, ‘Straight Talking, Straight Teaching: Are New Zealand 
Tertiary Institutes Potentially Liable to Their Students Under Consumer Protection Legislation?’ (2001) 
13(4) Education and the law 303, 313; Griggs, ‘Knowing the Destination’, above n 4. 
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section 23(3), there are separate definitions in the ACL relating to consumer 
guarantees,88 unsolicited goods,89 lay-bys,90 and unconscionable conduct.91 This 
approach has attracted criticism,92 especially the resultant lack of clarity due to the 
piecemeal approach to separate definitions within the ACL.93 The idea of a single 
consumer for the purpose of the ACL has yet to be realised by the legislature.94 For 
the purpose of this research, only the definition relevant to UCT will be considered. 
Thus, the more widely known definition of ‘consumer’ replete with two threshold steps 
going to the amount payable and failing that, whether the goods or services were of 
‘kind ordinarily’ used in a personal way, will not be considered in this research. 95 
 
The other definitions of ‘consumer’ within the ACL are based on objective tests 
determined on the facts.96 However, the definition of a ‘consumer contract’ pursuant 
to section 23(3) is subjective.97 This is clearly set out in the Explanatory 
Memorandum: 
This definition does not limit the operation of the unfair contract terms provision to things of 
a personal, domestic or household nature, and would include the supply for any good, 
                                                 
88 ACL ss 51–68. A student will need to be a consumer within the meaning of ACL s 3. In this context 
that will mean ‘acquiring services as a consumer’: see above n 83. The definition of ‘consumer’ for 
consumer guarantees in the ACL is similar to the original definition under s 4B of the TPA and the 
existing jurisprudence relating to s 4B remains relevant: Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices 
Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No.2) 2010 (Cth) (‘EM2’) 24 [2.20]. 
89 ACL s 3.  
90 Which relates to consumer goods ACL s 2 (definition of ‘consumer goods’).  
91 ACL ss 21(5)–(6) has its own definition of ‘consumer’ for this part. The definition of consumer in ACL s 
3 is also relevant to unsolicited consumer agreements, the provision of itemised bills, continuing credit 
contracts and linked credit contracts: Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment 
(Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No.2) 2010 (Cth) (‘EM2’) 22 [2.11]. ACL s 22 (formerly s 51 AC of the 
TPA) deals with unconscionable conduct in relation to business consumers and ACL s 20 deals with the 
codification of the unwritten law. 
92 Aviva Freilich, ‘A Radical Solution to Problems with the Statutory Definition of Consumer: All 
Transactions are Consumer Transactions’ (2006) 33 University of Western Australia Law Review 108; 
Griggs, Freilich and Webb, above n 5; Carter, above n 10. 
93 A change to the definition of consumer was considered by the Treasury and the Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee but this was ultimately rejected and the old definition of consumer was retained. 
For a detailed analysis and summary of the different options of definition of consumer see Griggs,  
Freilich and Webb, above n 5, 65–70; Carter, above n 10, 225–8. Carter is of the view that the definition 
contained in s 23(3) in relation to UCT is the more logical approach and should be adopted for the 
entirety of the ACL. See also Economics Legislation Committee, above n 21, 31–2. 
94 Griggs, Freilich and Webb, above n 5, 70. The authors note that the idea of a unified concept of 
consumer is also preferred by Freehills (a major national law firm) and in particular Professor Baxt, a 
specialist in the area. 
95 Section 4B TPA now ACL s 3.  
96 For a consideration of previous or other legislative definitions of ‘consumer’ see Griggs, Freilich and 
Webb, above n 5; Bruce Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law: Negotiating the Legal 
Terrain of Student Challenges to University Decisions’ (2007) 12(2) Australian & New Zealand Journal 
of Law & Education 7, 12; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 4, 322–3. 
For a consideration of the consumer definition in New Zealand see Varnham, ‘Guarantees for Degrees?’ 
above n 87; Varnham, ‘Straight Talking, Straight Teaching’, above n 87, 313.   
97 The unfair contract terms were based on the experience in the Victorian jurisdiction and the Fair 
Trading Act 1999 (Vic). The definition in the Victorian Act was slightly different and required an objective 
finding a fact also. See Director of Consumer of Affairs Victoria v AAPT Ltd [2006] VCAT 1493 cited in  
Miller, above n 8, 1699 [1.s2.23.30].  
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service or interest in land to a consumer provided the acquisition of what is supplied under 
the contract is wholly or predominately for personal, domestic or household use or 
consumption.98 
 
Therefore, the definition of a consumer contract for the purposes of the UCT 
provisions refers to the use that the goods or services are put to, not, as in the other 
definitions of consumer ‘of a kind ordinarily used or put to’.99 This means that the test 
of whether the services are within the definition of consumer contract for the purpose 
of the UCT sections is in fact far more subjective than the other consumer definitions 
elsewhere in the legislation, focusing on the actual intention of the acquirer of the 
services.100 An educational service for the attainment of an undergraduate or higher 
degree is clearly predominately a service that is put to personal use by the student.101 
While there is an absence of case law directly on point, it is difficult to imagine any 
scenario where educational services would not be viewed as for personal use, even if 
an employer had contributed to the payment of the fees.102 It would seem clear that a 
contract for the provision of educational services would indeed be a consumer 
contract under the legislative definition.  
 
Exemptions 
Before considering the test required to ascertain whether a term is unfair and 
potential examples in contracts for educational services, it is important to have regard 
to any exemptions afforded as part of the UCT regime.103 Section 26 excludes from 
the operation of section 23 terms that define the ‘main subject matter of the contract’ 
or ‘sets the upfront price payable’.104 The definition of ‘upfront price’ includes future 
payments and it seems clear that this provision is aimed at ensuring that consumers 
cannot challenge the adequacy of the consideration provided in accordance with 
accepted common law principles.105 This is unlikely to be an issue in the context of 
                                                 
98 Miller, above n 8, 1699 [1.s2.23.30] (emphasis added).  
99 ACL s 3.  
100 Harder, above n 40, 310; Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 940. 
See also Freilich, above n 92; Carter, above n 10. 
101 Corones is of this view even under the object test of consumer in ACL s3: Corones, above n 77, 5.   
102 There is general consensus on this issue. See Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid 
For’, above n 4, 322; Corones, above n 77, 5. See the commentary by Freilich in relation to the current 
difficulty in relation to judicial guidance on this issue in the context of the objective test in other sections, 
as to what is meant by personal, domestic or household use and irreconcilable cases: Freilich, above n 
92, 115–16. 
103 ACL s 28 exempts particular types of contracts such as marine contracts. ACL s 23 also does not 
apply to contracts for financial services as this is provided for in the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth): CCA s 131A. See Miller, above n 8, 1705 [1.S2.28.10]. This will not be 
considered further as it is not relevant to this research. 
104 ACL s 26(1)(2).  
105 See ‘EM1’ 26 [2.70]; Harder, above n 40, 313–16; Australian Attorney-General, above n 13, 10. 
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the student–HEI contract, although the definition does require that there is disclosure 
at or before the time the contract is entered into. It is possible that there may be 
dispute over the veracity of the disclosure provided in relation to price, particularly 
when the complexity of the Commonwealth funding documents is taken into 
consideration. Commonwealth-funded students must complete this documentation at 
or before the time of enrolment. 106 It is arguable that inadequate disclosure may 
render the term subject to the UCT provisions.107 It is clear however that students will 
be unable to use the UCT provisions to mount a challenge on the basis that they 
didn’t receive ‘value for money’.108 
 
A potentially significant issue for the student consumer is that the ‘main subject’ of 
the contract is the entirety of the contract for educational services, that is the delivery 
of a specified course of study, and therefore outside the ambit of the UCT provisions. 
Thus any terms relating to the provision of that course of study may be specifically 
excluded from the operation of the UCT regime. Some commentators have indicated 
that with respect to the legislative provisions in the UK, the ‘main subject matter’ 
relates to the overall focus of the course or composition of courses offered within the 
degree programme.109 This would not assist students with claims such as the one 
made in the Victoria University case discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the overall 
quality of the Masters course offered.110 Other UK scholars are of the view that the 
potential impact of the UCT regulation is not so limited and its application is 
potentially very wide.111 The Explanatory Memorandum sets out the rationale for the 
carve out of the main subject matter from the operation of the UCT provisions:  
                                                 
106 As per the enrolment process described in Chapter 4. 
107 Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 198, upfront price may be 
unfair if there is not transparent disclosure; Australian Attorney-General, above n 13, 10. 
108 Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 49, 209; Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 49, 413 [12.102] 
where the authors state there can be no review of the basis of price-quality ration as per Reg 3(2) of the 
UCTCCR. 
109 Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 49, 413 [12.102]. ‘Nor that overall the focus of the course should 
have been differently placed or that different courses should also have been offered for students 
chosen’ as per Reg 3(2) of the UCTCCR. This is not as narrow as their earlier view expressed in The 
Law of Higher Education OxCheps Law Update <http://oxcheps.new.ox.ac.uk/lawupdate/ilaw.php>, 
where ‘OFT v Abbey National & others [2009] UKSC 6 by analogy “the main subject matter” of the 
student–HEI contract is the provision of a teaching-assessment service, and hence probably the 
UTCCR test for fairness (Reg 5) does not apply’: at 14.12. The authors did however focus on the main 
subject matter being ‘those aspects the typical consumer (student) will have regard to … when deciding 
whether to enter into the contract (accept the offer of a place)’: Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 49, 
413 [12.102]. See also Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 49, 209. 
110 Grant v Victoria University of Wellington [2003] NZAR 186. 
111 English commentators have indicated that the application of UCT legislation has a potentially very 
wide effect on the on the student–HEI contract notwithstanding the issue of the price and subject matter 
exemption and are of the view that ‘The wide-ranging nature of this definition is sufficiently extensive to 
capture anything from the failure to provide a specific course or instruction of the type promised to the 
decision of the university to withhold the conferment of a degree until it has received payment for the 
library fine’: Kaye, Bickel and Birtwistle, above n 5, 119; Davis, above n 49, 20. 
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Where a party has decided to purchase the goods, service, … that is the subject of the 
contract, that party cannot then challenge the fairness of a term relating to the main 
subject matter of the contract at a later stage, given that the party had a choice of whether 
or not to make the purchase on the basis of what was offered.112  
 
As with other exemptions, it is arguable that the section should be interpreted 
narrowly to protect the student acquirer.113 It may be possible for the student to argue 
that any choice relates to the choice for the contract of admission only, rather than 
the contract of enrolment. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is likely that there are two 
contracts in existence. First, there is a contract of admission, which obliges the HEI 
to enrol the student into the course on the bases of the pre-admission information 
received by the student. The second contract, the contract to educate, arises on the 
student completing the enrolment process. It is suggested that the second contract is 
informed by any pre-admission promises made by the HEI to the student and that the 
contract to educate is a rolling one, whereby it is understood that the terms of the 
contract will vary from time to time. Both of these contracts are a contract for the 
supply of educational services as required by the legislation. However, the only 
contract capable of being a ‘standard form’ contract arises during the enrolment 
process for the reasons discussed above. 
 
Thus the ‘main subject matter’ of the standard form contract for the supply of 
educational services is the acceptance of the ‘place’. What is chosen as the 
‘purchase’ is an acceptance of the overall focus of the course or composition of 
courses offered within the programme. So, for example, a student who chooses to 
undertake studies in physiotherapy at a particular HEI could not challenge a term 
preventing a change of enrolment to engineering on the grounds it was unfair as the 
term regarding the acceptance of a place in the physiotherapy course is the ‘main 
subject’ of the contract. It is submitted that it cannot realistically be said that a student 
chooses freely (in the sense of a voluntary bargain) in relation to the service provided 
beyond this initial choice. There is no genuine negotiation.114 The rationale of this 
carve out is to prevent a consumer challenging a term as unfair simply because they 
changed their mind.115 This is less clear when having regard to the other terms of the 
contract of enrolment. The contract of enrolment is informed by the first contract, so it 
can be said that a term of the contract to educate will relate to acceptance of the 
                                                 
112 EM1, 25 [2.65]. 
113 See Harder, above n 40, 315–16 in relation to the interpretation of ‘upfront price’. 
114 Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Craig Langley Pty Ltd & Matrix Pilates and Yoga Pty Ltd (Civil 
Claims) [2008] VCAT 482.  
115 Attorney-General, The Australian Consumer Law: A Guide to Provisions, 2010, 9. 
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course and its overall composition. It is only this term that could be said to be the 
‘main subject matter’ of the standard form contract. At most the exemption should not 
extend beyond what seems to be the position in the UK, that is, terms relating to the 
overall focus of the course or composition of courses offered within the degree 
programme. Consistent with the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, this can be said to 
be the true exercise of academic judgement and freedom, so it is perhaps proper that 
the exclusion applies in this limited way. Terms going beyond this are considered 
below in relation to the examples provided in section 25. 
 
The final exclusion in section 26(1)(c) is also especially relevant in a higher education 
context. A term is unaffected by the UCT provisions if it is a ‘term required, or 
expressly permitted by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory’.116 Regard 
is had to the specific wording of the legislation and the reference to ‘required’ and 
‘expressly permitted’. It has been suggested that ‘a legislative permission is required 
rather than a mere lack of prohibition.’117 This is very relevant to the terms of the 
contract for educational services. As outlined above and in Chapter 4, it is the 
proposition of this research that the standard form consumer contract for the supply 
of educational services is the contract arising on enrolment and the terms contained 
therein. It is generally an express term of the contract of enrolment that any statutes 
and rules of a HEI are incorporated as terms of the contract. The statute and rules of 
public universities in particular are at the very least permitted, if not required by law. 
This matter has been considered at length by English commentator Simon Whittaker 
in the context of ‘student rules’ or by-laws.118 He considers both the express 
contractual term that the student is bound by the by-laws and the contents of the 
rules themselves.119 In his opinion the exclusion120 is: 
… likely to be held to apply only to terms whose content is determined by law and not 
merely to those made by a body which has been authorized by law to make the term or 
require that a certain term be used. While a university may enjoy statutory or common law 
powers to require the use of a particular contract term in its dealings with students, as 
                                                 
116 ACL s26(1)(c). 
117 Fiona Wallwork and Georgia White, ‘Consumer Law: Bolstering Consumer Protection Nationally 
Against Unfair Terms in Standard Form Contracts’ 63 (5) Keeping Good Companies 295 (15 August 
2012) <http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=109762129105942;res=IELBUS>, 297. 
118 Whittaker, ‘Public and Private Law-Making’, above n 57; Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 49. 
119 Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 49, 209 where he notes that where the rules are made under 
charter or statutory powers, they do not possess the status of inferior legislation. It may be that the rules 
only take effect by way of contract.  
120 A very similar exclusion exists in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UK) 
Reg 4(2)(a). Terms are excluded if they ‘reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’. It is 
suggested that the use of the words ‘mandatory’ and ‘expressly’ is of the same effect. 
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regards the student such a term would not be required by the law itself. The Regulations 
would require contract terms within their ambit to be fair and plain and intelligible.121 
 
Therefore, while it is possible to say that the ordinances of a HEI may be excluded by 
operation of this provision as required for the establishment of the HEI, it is submitted 
that the exemption should be interpreted such that the rules of the HEI are not 
required or expressly permitted by law122 and will not be excluded.123 
 
Unfair Terms 
Pursuant to section 24, a term will be unfair in a consumer contract if:  
24 Meaning of unfair 
(1) A term of a consumer contract is unfair if: 
(a) it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arising under the contract; and 
(b) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of 
the party who would be advantaged by the term; and 
(c) it would cause detriment (whether financial or otherwise) to a party if it were 
to be applied or relied on. 
(2) In determining whether a term of a consumer contract is unfair under 
subsection (1), a court may take into account such matters as it thinks relevant, 
but must take into account the following: 
(a) the extent to which the term is transparent; 
(b) the contract as a whole. 
(3) A term is transparent if the term is: 
(a) expressed in reasonably plain language; and 
(b) legible; and 
(c) presented clearly; and 
(d) readily available to any party affected by the term. 
                                                 
121 Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 49, 210. 
122 They operate in the terms described by Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 49, 210; See generally 
the incorporation of student rules into the contract and coexistence and relationship with public law: 
Whittaker, ‘Public and Private Law-Making’, above n 57. 
123 Note that in the matter of the matter of Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Trainstation Health 
Clubs Pty Ltd [2008] VCAT 2092 there is reference to the ‘rules and regulations’ of the health club. 
These are however entirely based in contract and do not have any basis of power in statute. The 
situation may be less clear for Western Australian university students where the office of the Visitor 
remains operational and the jurisdiction exclusive. An argument may arise where the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Visitor is said to be required or expressly permitted by the law and any term relating to 
that office, including rules, may be exempt from the UCT. However, as was seen in Chapter 1, there 
remains an argument that even in these circumstances the office remains subject to obligations arising 
in other areas of the law. 
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(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), a term of a consumer contract is 
presumed not to be reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate 
interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term, unless that party 
proves otherwise. 
 
Therefore the term of the contract is only unfair if all three parts of subsection one are 
satisfied.  
 
Significant imbalance 
The accepted view is that the ‘significant imbalance’ in the obligations and rights 
accruing under the contract is concerned with the substantive fairness of the term.124 
This is a factual enquiry125 and it has been suggested that the assessment will 
include a consideration of whether the term detracts from rights held at common law 
or departs from the reasonable expectations of the consumer.126 Willett helpfully 
summarises the test regarding ‘significant imbalance’ in the UK 127as follows: 
… terms may violate this element of the test by allocating substantive rights and 
obligations in ways that are unduly detrimental to the consumer(e.g. by adding to the 
responsibilities of the consumer by comparison with the legal default position or 
subtracting the responsibilities of the trader relative to the default position); where there 
cannot be said to be a counterbalancing substantive benefit for the consumer (whether in 
the term itself or in another provision of the contract or another contract on which this one 
is dependent).128 
 
The precise meaning of the term ‘significant imbalance’ is unclear. The matter of 
Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539 dealt with similar provisions in the 
Victorian UCT legislation and considered the meaning of this phrase at length. The 
respondent, Ms Free, had purchased two discounted airfares with Jetstar.129 There 
were restrictions contained in the terms and conditions pertaining to refunds and the 
transfer of the tickets into another passenger’s name. Ms Free was unable to use the 
tickets and sought to transfer them. This was only allowed by Jetstar on the payment 
                                                 
124 Willett, above n 10, 363; Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13. 
125 EM1, 19 [2.3]; Miller, above n 8, 1701 [1.S2.24.15]; Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on 
Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 190.  
126 Miller, above n 8; Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 191 n 19–20 
citing Chris Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms (Ashgate, 2005) 47–8; 
Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 944; Freilich and Webb, above n 32, 
267. 
127 Note that even though there is also the test of good faith in the UK, it is accepted that ‘significant 
imbalance’ and ‘good faith’ are distinct element of the test of unfairness so this remains useful in the 
Australian context. See Cavanough J in Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539, [106]. 
128 Willett, above n 10, 363. 
129 Through an online booking system and by clicking ‘I agree’ to the terms and conditions. 
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of an additional (substantial) charge. Ms Free sought orders that Jetstar had relied on 
an unfair term to impose the additional charge and for a refund of these monies on 
the basis. At the Tribunal it was held that the terms were unfair. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court the decision was reversed. The Court looked to the counterbalancing 
effect of the substantial price discount and the availability of airline tickets on other 
terms and conditions allowing for such changes, albeit at a more expensive price, at 
the time of entering into the contract. They also found that the Tribunal should have 
assessed the effect of the imposition of the charges on the rights and obligations of 
the parties in the context of the whole contract, not independently.130 Justice 
Cavanough was of the view that ‘significant’ means ‘‘significant in magnitude’, or 
‘sufficiently large to be important’, being a meaning not too distant from 
‘substantial’.’131  
 
Doherty is of the view that all that can be said with certainty is that ‘a term that 
produces a trivial or inconsequential imbalance is unlikely to be caught; when making 
the assessment, consideration must be given to the contract as a whole and the 
court may be disinclined to intervene unless the imbalance is substantial’.132 In the 
context of students and HEIs, it is possible that terms may be drafted in a manner 
that will cause a significant imbalance in the rights of the parties in favour of the HEI. 
This is particularly so if one considers the nature of the bureaucracy and size of the 
institutional organisation vis-à-vis individual students and the fact that the terms of 
the contract are drafted by the HEI prior to the making of any ‘offer’ to students.  
 
Reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests 
What will be considered here is the response by the supplier to the ‘risks inherent in 
the transaction’.133 The inclusion of the word ‘reasonably’ indicates that the term must 
be a ‘proportionate response to the risks it seeks to address’.134 It is also the ‘actual 
effect of the term’ that is relevant to the inquiry. 135 Section 24(4) of the ACL shifts the 
onus of proof to the party advantaged by the term, here the HEI supplier, to show 
                                                 
130 Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539, [127]–[135]; Contra the outcome of the 
counterbalancing effect in Kucharski v Air Pacific Ltd (General) [2011] NSWCTTT 55, [36] where the 
Tribunal found the airlines cancelation policy to be unfair notwithstanding the lower cost fares. The 
Tribunal was particularly concerned with the lack of notice of onerous terms and a deficiency of 
transparency. 
131 Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539, [105]. 
132 Doherty, above n 13, 75 [5.12]–[5.13]. 
133 Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 193; Paterson, ‘The Australian 
Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 945. 
134 Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 193; Paterson, ‘The Australian 
Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 945. 
135 Harder, above n 40, 318. 
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that the term is reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of 
the HEI. It is expected that the party seeking to rely on the term would lead evidence 
of the same.136 The HEI of course may well be able to show that any particular term 
is reasonably necessary to protect its legitimate interests. The most obvious example 
here is the potential unfairness of a term that allows a unilateral variation to a course 
or even an entire degree programme by the HEI without consultation or notice to the 
student. The HEI would clearly want to argue that it needs to retain the flexibility to 
alter its offerings so as to respond to change in student demand and/or public funding 
arrangements.137 As noted in the Explanatory Memorandum: 
While it is ultimately a matter for the court to determine whether a term is reasonably 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the respondent, the provision would require 
the respondent to establish, at the very least, that it’s legitimate is interest is sufficiently 
compelling on the balance of probabilities to overcome any detriment caused to the 
consumer, or class of consumers, and that therefore the term was ‘reasonably 
necessary’.138 
 
What will be important is how proportionate the term is to the risk. The courts may 
well consider if there were in fact other ways of protecting the HEIs’ interests that 
were not so burdensome to the student.139  
 
Detriment 
In relation to the third limb of the test for unfairness, the meaning of detriment is not 
limited to simply financial detriment, or actual detriment, just the substantial likelihood 
of detriment relating to the application of, or reliance on the term.140 It is any form of 
detriment suffered, or likely to be suffered by the party disadvantaged by the 
‘practical effect of the term’. 141 As was noted in Chapter 4, one of the problems for 
students in relation to claims for breach of contract has been the difficulties in 
demonstrating quantifiable loss. The UCT provisions clearly allow the court to take 
                                                 
136 EM1, 19 [2.32] and is on the balance of probabilities; Wallwork and White, above n 117. Their 
recommendations for business include checking terms to ensure they are not disproportionate to the 
need to protect the legitimate interest of the business; keeping detailed reasons why terms were 
included to provide the necessary justification; incorporate outlines and acknowledgements as to why 
certain terms are included in the contract; See also Attorney-General, The Australian Consumer Law: A 
Guide to Provisions, 2010, 11. 
137 Sally Varnham, ‘Liability in Higher Education in New Zealand: Cases for Courses?’ (1998) 3(1) 
Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 3, 12. 
138 EM1, 19. 
139 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law: The Rise of Substantive Unfairness’, above n 
13, 945; Doherty, above n 13, 76. 
140 EM1, 20 [2.39], [2.41]. 
141 EM1, 20 [2.39], [2.41]. 
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into account other forms of detriment, including delay or distress suffered as a 
consequence of the unfair term.142  
 
Other matters: the contract as a whole and transparency 
In determining whether a term is unfair, the court must also have regard to the 
contract as a whole and the extent to which a term in question is transparent.143 The 
reference to the court having regard to the contract a whole is to take into 
consideration any counterbalancing measures within the contract. This presumably is 
to prevent a term that taken on its own and perhaps out of context could be classified 
as being unfair when on balance it is in fact not so.144 The impact of this is seen 
above in the Jetstar case and the Court was very clear in regards the need to 
consider the ‘unfairness’ of the term in the context of the whole contract. It is possible 
that when considering the contract for educational services, a court will take account 
of the ‘special nature of the educational and ‘degree-endowing services’145 of the HEI 
when making a determination of fairness, as a consumer contract of ‘a somewhat 
unusual character’. 146 It is possible that the degree of notice, explanation and 
transparency of the terms will in fact be of greater consequence in these 
circumstances. 147 
 
The issue of transparency does not stand alone and is linked to the threshold 
requirements in section 24(1). The role of ‘transparency’ has been considered in 
detail by noted commentators in this field.148 Paterson observes that the requirement 
of transparency is a result of ‘information asymmetry between parties to standard 
form consumer contracts’,149 where consumers commonly do not read the detail of 
the terms, nor may the terms be available to the consumers at the time the contract 
is made.150 Pursuant to section 24(3), a term is transparent if it is expressed in 
reasonably plain language, is legible, presented clearly and is readily available to any 
party affected by the term. A lack of transparency of the terms of consumer contract 
                                                 
142 Attorney-General, The Australian Consumer Law: A Guide to Provisions, 2010, 3. See also the 
reference to the December 2007 research paper ‘Unfair Contract Terms in Victoria’ as quoted in 
Doherty, above n 13, 77, n 20 where the Department of Consumer Affairs, Victoria states that emotional 
and social detriment flowing from the unfair contract term is evidence of detriment for the purposes of 
the Victorian legislation.  
143 ACL s 24(2). 
144 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 949. 
145 Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 49, 211. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 955; Willett, above n 10; Harder, 
above n 40. 
149 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 949. 
150 Ibid. 
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‘may be a strong indication of the existence of the significant imbalance in the rights 
and obligations of the party under the contract’.151 The lack of transparency in the 
enrolment contract may be an indication of significant imbalance of the parties’ rights 
and obligations. A lack of transparency in the actual express term incorporating the 
rules and policies (by reference or accessible by hyperlinks) could of itself be unfair, 
with the result that the rules and policies would not be binding as contractual 
terms.152 This is especially so if the scale, complexity and nature of the rules and 
policies is considered.153 There would be some doubt that terms presented in this 
manner could be said to be ‘readily available’, as it is common for hyperlinks not to 
work satisfactorily,154 or they continue to take students on a never-ending series of 
layers of information.  
 
Additionally when the demographic of the student is considered,155 a court is unlikely 
to find that terms expressed in the rules and policies are in ‘plain language’, ‘legible’ 
or ‘presented clearly’.156 Reference is had to the example of the Curtin University 
enrolment document described above.157 As is common in many HEIs across 
Australia, enrolment occurs largely in an online context. In the student declaration 
described, a box is ticked by the student acknowledging they have had regard to the 
HEI statutes, rules and policies. The magnitude of policies and the level of detail at 
the modern HEI are significant. There is also a noteworthy use of legal jargon in the 
incorporated documents, notably the statutes and rules.158 Presumably this would be 
quite overwhelming for a first time student attempting to read and comprehend their 
meaning. In the context of the online enrolment document, the ability of the individual 
student to process large amounts of information is likely exacerbated if there are 
distractions in the decision making process.159 Furthermore, in the event that any 
                                                 
151 EM1, 21 [2.45].  
152 Because they would be void, but still operative as ordinances and public law. Whittaker, ‘Judicial 
Review’, above n 49, 213.  
153 Jackson et al, above n 80,, above n 80, 76 [11.2] regarding conclusions from a review of universities’ 
websites and processes where the authors conclude the information is not accessible, is not in plain 
language, and inconsistent. 
154 At the time of attempting to access these policies by hyperlink (28 September 2011) the Curtin ICT 
policy page came up as unavailable. 
155 See discussion of vulnerable consumer in Chapter 1 and Freilich and Webb, above n 32, 266 where 
the authors consider the decision of eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd 
(2006) 170 FCR 450. In this matter the Court specifically considered ticket sales for the ‘Big Day Out’ 
and notice of onerous terms in context of young people not experienced in the commercial world. 
156 Jackson et al,  above n 80, 77 [11.2.3]. 
157 Annexure 3. 
158 Jackson et al,  above n 80, 77 [11.2.3]. 
159 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law: The Rise of Substantive Unfairness’, above n 
13. Paterson suggests the need to look more closely at behavioural economics in relation to the factors 
that impact on decision making by individuals. She specifically refers to advertising: at 954; See also 
Dale Clapperton and Stephen Corones, ‘Unfair Terms in “Clickwrap” and Other Electronic Contracts’ 
(2007) 35 Australian Business Law Review 152 where they consider unfair terms, but in the context of 
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term or clause within the rules and policies is especially onerous or unusual, this 
process is unlikely to provide sufficient notice of those terms.160 Issues of notice, 
especially unusual or onerous terms and transparency overlap and are part of the 
overall consideration of whether a term may be considered unfair.161  
 
Another issue is whether transparency can cure an otherwise ‘unfair term’. The 
Explanatory Memorandum would suggest not.162 This would have the effect of 
procedural fairness being able to rectify any substantive unfairness.163 After 
examining the UK legislation and case law and the position in Australia, Willett 
suggests: 
… transparency cannot legitimize a term that is sufficiently unfair in substance; but…a lack 
of transparency can render a term unfair where the term would not otherwise be 
sufficiently detrimental to be found to be unfair.164 
 
Paterson observes that another relevant matter the court may consider in 
determining whether a term is unfair or not is whether the consumer has had a 
reasonable opportunity to consider the information and has sought professional 
advice.165 This is interesting given the term in the Curtin University enrolment 
document where students ‘tick’ a box acknowledging that they have sought academic 
counselling in relation to their choices prior to enrolment.166 In practice it is unclear 
how in fact the professional advice sought is actually given especially when students 
are increasingly enrolling online167 without even having to have come to campus.  
                                                                                                                                            
other common law and statutory rights mentioned above. Interestingly they consider the former Victorian 
UCT legislation in relation to these contracts and conclude that contracts of these types are not 
contracts to which the legislation would apply as they are not ‘standard form contracts for general use in 
a particular industry’, rather they are drafted by individual vendors: at 164–5. It is unlikely that this 
argument for exclusion would be successful under the ACL for the reasons described above regarding 
the definition of standard form contract under the ACL. 
160 For example, fines or penalties for not following HEI processes — withdrawal, late fees library fines. 
In relation to the relationship between substantive unfairness, transparency and notice see Paterson, 
‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 951–6, including an analysis of behavioural 
economic theory that suggests complex information presented in these circumstances is difficult for 
consumers to assimilate.  
161 See Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 951–6; Freilich and Webb, 
above n 32, 270–2 and suggestions regarding notice in retail leases. 
162 EM1, 21 [2.46] transparency, on its own account, cannot overcome underlying unfairness in a 
contract term.  
163 See Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 188–9. 
164 Willett, above n 10, 373, but that this is uncertain as currently drafted. He suggests that the addition 
of amendments to explicitly state the role of transparency i.e. ‘transparency does not necessarily 
prevent a term from being unfair’: at 384. Willett proposes other roles for transparency including it being 
a basic social right, as furthering market discipline and assisting consumers protect their interests post 
contractually, in the sense they know what their rights are and can make informed decisions regarding 
access to justice in the event of a dispute: at 375–8.  
165 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13, 950. 
166 This surely cannot be limited to counselling via schools or other forums such as open days.   
167 Interview with Deb Greenwood, Manager Student Central — Admissions, Curtin University, (Perth, 
28 September 2011); Curtin University, How to enrol, (13 August 2012) 
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Some examples of potentially unfair contract terms168 
Section 25 of the ACL sets out examples of potentially unfair contract terms: 
25 Examples of unfair terms 
(1) Without limiting section 24, the following are examples of the kinds of terms of 
a consumer contract that may be unfair: 
(a) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not 
another party) to avoid or limit performance of the contract; 
(b) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not 
another party) to terminate the contract; 
(c) a term that penalises, or has the effect of penalising, one party (but not 
another party) for a breach or termination of the contract; 
(d) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not 
another party) to vary the terms of the contract; 
(e) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not 
another party) to renew or not renew the contract; 
(f) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party to vary the 
upfront price payable under the contract without the right of another party to 
terminate the contract; 
(g) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party unilaterally to 
vary the characteristics of the goods or services to be supplied, or the 
interest in land to be sold or granted, under the contract; 
(h) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party unilaterally to 
determine whether the contract has been breached or to interpret its 
meaning; 
(i) a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, one party’s vicarious liability for 
its agents; 
(j) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party to assign the 
contract to the detriment of another party without that other party’s consent; 
(k) a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, one party’s right to sue 
another party; 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://students.curtin.edu.au/administration/enrolment/howto.cfm> where the webpage speaks to the 
University moving to ‘self-management’ in re-enrolment and ‘large numbers’ of students use the online 
enrolment process. 
168 For examples from the UK ‘grey list’ in higher education setting see Farrington and Palfreyman, 
above n 49, 413 [12.101]; Birtwistle and Askew, above n 49, 95. There are notable differences in the UK 
list and Australia, notably that there seems to be more clarity in the UK list due to the amount of detail, 
see Gray, above n 10, 171–3; Carter, above n 10, 238–9. 
LG 14040113 M.Phil 163
(l) a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, the evidence one party can 
adduce in proceedings relating to the contract; 
(m) a term that imposes, or has the effect of imposing, the evidential burden on 
one party in proceedings relating to the contract; 
(n) a term of a kind, or a term that has an effect of a kind, prescribed by the 
regulations. 
 
As indicated in the Explanatory Memorandum, these ‘examples provide statutory 
guidance on the types of terms which may be regarded as being of concern’.169 A 
significant number of the examples include terms that allow one party to make 
changes on a unilateral basis. There is however no presumption that a term 
corresponding to one in the indicative list is unfair,170 although concerns have been 
expressed that this will be the effect in practice.171 It is also not clear whether in the 
event of ambiguity in the impugned term it is to be read contra proferentum.172 
 
Three main areas of concern arise in relation to the contract of enrolment. The first is 
any terms that may limit or avoid performance of the contract, such as disclaimers or 
exclusions. The second is those terms that allow for unilateral variations. The third 
area involves the imposition of penalties for breach of the contract. This will be 
demonstrated by reference to the enrolment contract from Curtin University 
discussed in Chapter 4. Space does not permit a detailed consideration of every term 
thus the analysis will be confined to illustrations that are indicative of terms likely to 
be common at other HEIs. 
 
Terms that limit or avoid performance: sections 25 (1)(a) 
The first example comes from those terms incorporated into the contract by reference 
to the Course Handbook. This is on the basis that the student certifies that their 
enrolment is correct, which can only be done with reference to the terms set out in 
the Course Handbook. As discussed in Chapter 4, Course Handbooks typically set 
out the requirements for the course, including detail in relation to content, 
assessment and tuition patterns. These terms in and of themselves are unlikely to be 
‘unfair’. Furthermore, to the extent that they relate to the focus of the overall course 
or overall make-up of the course programme, they may be excluded on the basis that 
                                                 
169 EM1, 23 [2.52]. 
170 EM1, 23 [2.55]. 
171 Carter, above n 10, 238. 
172 Harder, above n 40, 322, n 66, whereas the position in relation to this is clear in the UK under 
UTCCR Reg 7(2). 
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they are concerned with the main subject matter of the contract, unless they can be 
said to fall within the example in 25(1)(g) discussed above.173 However, broader 
terms in these documents that operate as disclaimers may be open to scrutiny as 
unfair.174 For example, the following statement appears in the Curtin Course 
Handbook 2012 for the Bachelor of Commerce: 
Course Structure Disclaimer 
Curtin University reserves the right to alter the internal composition of any course to 
ensure learning outcomes retain maximum relevance. Any changes to the internal 
composition of a course will protect the right of students to complete the course within the 
normal timeframe and will not result in additional cost to students through a requirement to 
undertake additional units.175 
 
Some parts of this term counterbalance what might appear to be the ‘significant 
imbalance’ between the parties. The term could be said to be reasonably necessary 
to protect the legitimate interests of the HEI. It allows the HEI to operate effectively in 
the higher education market and change offerings over the course of time or as 
necessary due to other factors such as funding shifts, government policy changes, 
course demand and staffing patterns, so as not be unfair. Students rights to complete 
the course in the ‘normal time frame’ are maintained, as is the concern that any 
change should not add to the cost (or debt) incurred. However, notably, this doesn’t 
speak to the impact or effect to substantive changes to course content and 
knowledge acquisition. The clause simply refers to ‘the course’. It is suggested that 
clauses such as these may still be drafted too broadly. 
 
In the enrolment contract a student agrees ‘to be bound by the Statutes, Rules and 
Policies of the University as amended from time to time.’176 Interestingly the Curtin 
legislation website (which includes the rules as well as the statutes and is 
hyperlinked in the enrolment contract) contains the following disclaimer: 
1. Disclaimer 
Although the University aims to ensure that the Legislation Information on the 
Legislation Website is accurate and up to date, the Legislation Information may be 
subject to change from time to time. Accordingly, the University: 
                                                 
173 See also Sam Middlemiss, ‘Legal Liability of Universities for Students’ (2009) 12(2) Education and 
the Law 69, 79–80 in relation to exclusion clauses. 
174 They are also likely to be in breach of other parts of the ACL dealing with consumer guarantees (ACL 
s64(1)) as noted by Corones, above n 77, 28. The disclaimer itself could be a breach of ACL s 29(1)(m), 
giving rise to civil pecuniary penalties up to $1.1 million for a body corporate: at s 151. 
175 Curtin University, Courses Online Handbook 2012, (12 July 2012) 
<http://handbook.curtin.edu.au/courses/13/130099.html>. 
176 The Curtin document also includes a specific reference that the student is ‘aware of the conditions 
under which [they are] permitted to use University (computer) facilities (refer to the ICT Policy).’ 
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a. reserves the right to change the contents of the Legislation Website; 
b. makes no warranty, representation or undertaking, whether express or 
implied, and assumes no responsibility or liability for, whether direct or 
indirect, the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any Legislation 
Information; and 
c. assumes no responsibility or liability for, whether direct or indirect, any loss 
(including loss of profits), damage or injury (including death) a person may 
suffer: 
i. arising from any person's use of, or reliance on, any Legislation 
Information (including any such information which may be incomplete, out 
of date, wrong, inaccurate or misleading) expressed or implied in, or 
coming from, the Legislation Website; 
ii. whether caused by any negligent or other unlawful act or omission of, by 
or on behalf of the University; and 
iii. even if the University has been advised of the possibility of any such loss, 
damage or injury. 177 
 
This disclaimer clause is very wide and purports to exclude non-contractual causes 
of action such as negligence. It is difficult to ascertain the corresponding offset for the 
student in similar terms to the Jetstar case. The limitation of liability clause is similar 
in width to those found to be unfair in the matter of the Director of Consumer Affairs 
Victoria v Trainstaion Health Clubs Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2008] VCAT 2092. It is 
suggested that clauses of this type are vulnerable to challenge on the grounds of 
unfairness. Exclusion clauses clearly detract from the common law rights of the 
consumer. The need for counterbalancing terms and transparency are problematic 
for exclusion clauses. 178 
 
One example of a term in a policy that avoids or limits performance by the HEI is 
contained in the Curtin University ‘Classrooms — Maximum Student Numbers Policy 
and Procedures’. This policy is concerned with ensuring that classrooms are safe 
and not overcrowded. Under this policy, if an academic staff member becomes aware 
of overcrowding they must first ask students not registered for the class to leave and 
attend an alternative class. However, ‘if the situation recurs at the next scheduled 
                                                 
177 Curtin University, Legislation, Polices and Procedures, (12 July 2012) 
<http://policies.curtin.edu.au/legislation/>. 
178 See Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 198.   
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class time the class may be suspended.179 The HEI in this instance may claim an 
exemption applies to this term of the contract, as it being ‘required’ under the relevant 
state Occupational Safety and Health legislation.180 As discussed above the 
exemption provisions are likely to be read down.181 The objection is not to the term 
itself, but to the breadth. The term does not appear counterbalanced and allows for 
indefinite suspension of classes by the HEI in the event of overcrowding, with no 
corresponding obligation for the HEI to address the issue or make permanent 
alternate arrangements. 
 
Unilateral variations: sections 25(1)(d) and (g) 
Particularly relevant in relation to the provision of educational services by the HEI to 
the student are unilateral terms that allow the HEI to alter the delivery of the course 
or content, or even to terminate the course in its entirety. It is submitted these types 
of terms, common in contracts of enrolment, are potentially void as unfair terms. In 
particular, reference is had to the example in section 25(1)(g), which is a term that 
‘permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party unilaterally to vary the 
characteristics of the … services to be supplied … under the contract’. This section 
also assists in the interpretation of what is meant by the ‘main subject matter’ of the 
student–HEI contract. The inclusion of this example provides support for the 
proposition mentioned earlier that terms subject to exclusion on the basis that the 
term is the ‘main subject matter should be confined to the terms relating to the 
acceptance of the ‘place’. This would then allow for the interpretation that terms in 
regard the provision of a course, or the content of individual modules, are subject to 
the UCT law. 
 
There are a number of examples in the Curtin University policies where terms 
unilaterally varying the service supplied seek to ensure that there is a counterbalance 
of the corresponding rights and obligations of students and the University. The 
‘Discontinuing Courses Policy and Procedures’ 182 and the ‘Unit Outline Policy’183 are 
two such examples. In circumstances where the University determines that it will 
                                                 
179 Curtin University, Legislation, Polices and Procedures, above n 177, Classrooms — Maximum 
Student Numbers Policy and Procedures. 
180 See Paterson, ‘The Elements of a Prohibition on Unfair Terms’, above n 8, 197 and her discussion of 
Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Trainstation Health Clubs Pty Ltd [2008] VCAT 2092 where the 
termination clause in question was found not to be unfair because the rules and regulations (contractual) 
provided for the ‘safe running’ of the club: at 197. 
181 See above n 116. 
182 Curtin University, Legislation, Polices and Procedures, above n 177, Discontinuing Courses Policy 
and Procedures. 
183 Curtin University, Legislation, Polices and Procedures, above n 177, Unit Outline Policy and 
Procedures. 
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discontinue a course or major because it is no longer viable or of strategic 
importance, there are clear provisions dealing with how this will be communicated to 
students currently enrolled. This includes written notice as soon as possible after the 
decision has been made. Students are given the option of transferring to another 
suitable course or major ‘without significant disadvantage’. If students choose not to 
transfer they ‘shall be given reasonable opportunity to complete’ the original course 
or major, within a set time frame.184 Individual units are also governed by the Unit 
Outline Policy.185 This policy prescribes everything that must be included in the Unit 
Outline for the delivery of the unit. Any variation to the published Unit Outline ‘may be 
altered only with the consent of the majority of the students enrolled in the unit.’186 
This is to be contrasted with the ‘Units Policy and Procedures’ 187 and ‘Graduate 
Attributes Policy.’188 The Units Policy and Procedures is the ‘framework for the 
development, nomenclature, use and deactivation of units.’189 The policy does not 
provide any terms equivalent to the notice provisions regarding discontinuance of the 
whole course. The variations to the individual units under this policy can include the 
‘text’, which includes course content and learning outcomes. The policy applies to all 
units, including foundation units and units offered online in partnership with other 
providers such as Open Universities Australia. The Graduate Attributes Policy 
outlines the attributes ‘that all Curtin graduates will have developed during their 
course in order to equip them for the future’.190 The policy states that Curtin 
graduates will be able to ‘show evidence’ that they have a range of qualities including 
the ability to apply discipline knowledge, think critically, communicate effectively, use 
technology appropriately and have international and intercultural perspectives and 
awareness. These attributes can be unilaterally varied by the Curtin Academic Board, 
without consultation or notice to the student that the characteristics of the services 
have changed. 
 
It is suggested that the policies which allow variation or discontinuance of individual 
units or stated graduate attributes without notice or consultation with the student 
consumer, may be unfair terms as they permit the University to unilaterally vary the 
characteristics of the services supplied. This is especially so for students whose 
                                                 
184 Curtin University, Discontinuing Courses Policy and Procedures, above n 182, cl 7. 
185 Curtin University, Unit Outline Policy, above n 183. 
186 Ibid cl 5.5. 
187 Curtin University, Legislation, Polices and Procedures, above n 177, Units Policy and Procedures. 
188 Curtin University, Legislation, Polices and Procedures, above n 177, Graduate Attributes Policy. 
189 Curtin University, Units Policy and Procedures, above n 187. 
190 Curtin University, Graduate Attributes Policy, above n 188. Additionally, students are ‘presented with 
appropriate learning, teaching, and assessment experiences to enable them to develop and 
demonstrate the Curtin Graduate Attributes’.   
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course of study can be comprised of a selection of units from various providers, as in 
the case of Open Universities Australia.191 The effect of the policies is not expressed 
clearly nor in a manner that is readily accessible. Further, all of the policies may be 
vulnerable to an interpretation of unfairness because of the lack of transparency. It is 
hard to determine exactly how the terms of each policy interrelate,192 even the ones 
that are ‘fair’. As the operation of numerous interlinking is unfair, it advances 
students’ rights as consumers as this deals with substantive unfairness in relation to 
the provision of educational services. That is, the HEI supplier cannot, through 
reliance on a complex maze of policies and rules, unilaterally vary the terms of the 
contract so to alter the essential characteristics of the service it has agreed to supply.  
 
Imposition of a penalty: section 25(h) 
The use of penalty clauses is also constrained at common law and must be a 
genuine pre-estimate of the loss likely to be suffered in the event of a breach.193 The 
Federal Government guidelines indicate that ‘a term may be considered unfair if it 
threatens sanctions over and above those that can be imposed at law’ and that any 
penalty imposed ‘should bear a reasonable relationship to the loss likely to be 
suffered by the business as a result.’194 Willett refers to these as terms that allow for 
‘onerous and disproportionate enforcement by a trader’.195 There are two common 
terms in contracts of enrolment that are likely to be unfair on this basis. 
 
One is a term ‘requiring consumers to pay trader enforcement costs irrespective of 
the reasonableness of the amounts.’196 An example in the contract of enrolment is a 
term whereby the student agrees that ‘any expense, costs or disbursements incurred 
by the University in recovering any monies owing by me shall be the responsibility of 
the debtor, including debt collection agency fees and solicitor’s costs on the amount 
outstanding and all other reasonable costs incurred in the recovery of outstanding 
monies.’197The Victorian Tribunal considered a clause of similar import to be unfair 
because of its breadth.198 
 
                                                 
191 Open Universities Australia scheme (20 September 2011) 
<http://www.open.edu.au/public/home?gclid=CNmfgdz1q6QCFQdLbwod2EmCcA>.  
192 Jackson et al, above n 80, 77 [11.2.5]. 
193 EM1, 24 [2.60]. 
194 Attorney-General, The Australian Consumer Law: A Guide to Provisions, 2010, 16. 
195 Willett, above n 10, 374 discussing the types of terms that might or should be subject to outright 
bans. 
196 Ibid 375. 
197 Annexure 3, final clause or ‘tick box’ (emphasis added). 
198 Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Backloads.com Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2009] VCAT 754, 
[330]–[334]. 
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The other is the very common rule regarding the imposition of academic sanctions for 
the failure by the student to pay any charge imposed in breach of the contract. That 
can include the non-payment of library or parking fines, and recently the new student 
amenities and services levy. Below is an extract from the relevant rule at Curtin 
University:199 
1.0 Purpose of Rule 
This Rule explains how the University will set, approve, collect, and consider 
refunds for, University charges. For the purpose of this Rule, the term ‘charges’ 
includes: 
1.1 The Amenities and Services Fee (ASF) 
1.2 Charges, levies and penalties for materials or services provided which are 
incidental to the student’s studies 
1.3 Penalties which may be charged where documents or payments are 
accepted, or services provided, after published deadlines 
1.4 Penalties under Statute No. 10: Student Disciplinary Statute. 
 
3.2 Failure to pay the appropriate charge by the due date may incur a late fee. 
Regardless of whether a late fee is charged, the following academic penalties 
shall be applied, until such time as the charge is paid: 
3.2.1 The student’s results (for the relevant study period) will be withheld; 
3.2.2 Where applicable, the student shall be excluded from the activity or 
service; 
3.2.3 Where applicable, the item relating to the charge shall be withheld; 
3.2.4 Where applicable, the student shall not be permitted to re-enrol; or 
3.2.5 Where applicable, the student shall not be allowed to graduate.200 
 
                                                 
 
200 Curtin University of Technology Act 1966 (WA), Statute No. 26 — Fees and Charges r 5. Curtin 
University, Legislation, Polices and Procedures, Statutes and Rules, (23 July 2012) 
<http://policies.curtin.edu.au/legislation/statutes_rules.cfm> (emphasis added). The Rule was repealed 
in June 2012 as part of the University’s review and consolidation of policies as per email from Naomi 
Yellowlees, Director of Legal and Compliance Services, Curtin University, to all Curtin Staff, 27 June 
2012. The new consolidated rule for the imposition of all fees and charges can be found at (14 August 
2012) <http://policies.curtin.edu.au/local/docs/Fees%20and%20Charges%20Rules%20-
%20June%202012.pdf>. Nothing in the new consolidated rule changes the impact of cl 3 above, as the 
new equivalent provision remains substantially the same. Further the rule is relied upon as an example 
of a type of rule that is found at HEIs in Australia, rather than an examination of the specific rule for the 
purpose of advice to the particular HEI. In the new rule the reasons for the imposition of charges are 
even less specific to be determined by the Vice-Chancellor and published by the Chief Financial Officer. 
Interestingly the amended rule specifically includes the following section allowing for changes under the 
new cl 1.2: section 4 of Statute No. 3 — Rules relevantly states ‘A Rule is promulgated by posting a 
copy of it on the notice board located outside the main entrance to the Administration block at the 
University at Bentley …’. When accessed on 23 July 2012, the new consolidated rule was not available 
on the University website, only the old rules. The unavailability of the actual current terms and difficulty 
in accessing the same impacts on notions of notice and transparency of terms. 
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This is clearly not proportionate to the risk of the transaction and is very likely unfair 
under the ACL. The imposition of the extreme academic sanctions (withholding 
conferment of the degree) unlimited in time for a late payment of any charge 
incidental to the students’ studies seems entirely too wide.201 
 
Other potential unfair terms 
Examples in section 25(1) (h) and (k) may have relevance in relation to assessment 
and disciplinary procedures common at HEIs. Under (h), one party is not permitted to 
unilaterally determine whether the contract has been breached or determine its 
meaning. This is interesting in two respects. As will be seen below, there are a 
number of policies and rules common to HEIs that state that the relevant academic 
committee is the sole adjudicator for disputes, although most HEIs provide for 
numerous procedures for students to be heard in accordance with administrative law 
principles. Secondly, it is perhaps possible that this provision could augment the idea 
that the substantive fairness of the arrangements between the student and HEI 
should be reviewable by the courts, so as to erode further the notion of academic 
immunity. It is suggested that any contractual provision that supports the HEI’s 
unilateral power to determine a breach, or interpret the meaning of the contract, in 
effect the concept of academic matters being non-justiciable, is substantively unfair. 
 
The example in (k) refers to a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting one party’s 
right to sue another.202 This can include the presentation of the term in a manner that 
might deter, even though there is no intention to exclude.203 It is suggested that 
statements to the effect that ‘the decision of the Student Discipline Appeals Board is 
final’204 following the description of a lengthy appeals process in relation to a finding 
of academic misconduct,205 or that the right to external appeal is with a particular 
                                                 
201 See Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v AAPT Pty Ltd [2006] VCAT 1493 where the imposition of 
a variation clause was too wide as it permitted the telecommunications company a right to vary for any 
cause. 
202 Note the examples of these types of clauses in the student contract examples from New Zealand 
HEIs in Chapter 4 n 133 can exist as currently there is no equivalent UCT regime operating in New 
Zealand. See below n 205. 
203 Attorney-General, The Australian Consumer Law: A Guide to Provisions, 2010, 21. 
204 Curtin University of Technology Act 1966 (WA), Statute No. 10 — Student Discipline, Curtin 
University, Statute and Rules (23 May 2012) 
<http://policies.curtin.edu.au/local/docs/statute_no_10_2010.pdf>. 
205 This is potentially significant when one considers the potential for the internal rules of the HEI to 
provide that students must resolve their grievances by way of internal dispute and decisions made in 
this regard are final. In New Zealand, where there is no UCT regime, the student contract from Massey 
University at cl 12 states: ‘Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Contract, or otherwise 
relating to the performance by the University or its staff of their responsibilities to the Student shall be 
resolved through the Grievance Procedures prescribed by the university calendar, which shall be the 
exclusive procedures for the resolution of such a dispute.’ Massey University, Student Contract (13 
August 2012) <http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/calendar/statutes-and-
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designated external provider, may have the effect of hindering the student 
consumers’ right to take legal action.206 For example, in the Curtin University 
Assessment and Student Progression Manual the following appears:  
External Right of Complaint or Appeal 
Any student that is not satisfied with the result or conduct of the formal appeal process 
described above may request that their appeal be considered by an external person or 
body independent of and external to the University. Students will be notified of the process 
for lodging an appeal to the external person or body in the advice provided to the student 
of the outcome of their appeal to the Student Progress Appeals Committee (only required 
where the outcome is not favourable to the student). 
The University has reached agreement with the Western Australian Ombudsman for that 
office to take on the role of external appeals body. 207 
 
This type of clause may suggest to the student consumer that they are required to 
take their dispute exclusively to the Ombudsman. The only way in which a clause in 
this regard might not be considered unfair is if it falls within the exemption under 
section 26(1)(c) where this is expressly permitted by law of the Commonwealth, state 
or territory. Therefore students in Western Australia may well be precluded from 
alleging such a term is unfair because the statutory jurisdiction of the university 
Visitor remains alive in that state. 
 
Of interest for international students are the examples given section 25(i) and 
possibly (j). The example in (i) indicates that a term will be unfair if it limits vicarious 
liability for agents. If a term in a student’s contract with the HEI contained a limitation 
or disclaimer in relation to the representations made by an agent of the HEI then this 
term in the student–HEI contract would be rendered void on the grounds of 
unfairness.208 The issue regarding terms that provide for unilateral assignment of the 
contract to the detriment of the other party without their consent as set out in (k) may 
be relevant where a HEI closes. There has been at least one well-known dispute 
                                                                                                                                            
regulations/student-contract.cfm>. See also Julia Pedley, ‘The Development of a Student Contract and 
Improvement in Student Disciplinary Procedures at Massey University’ (2007) 12(1) Australian & New 
Zealand Journal of Law & Education 73. Terms such as these are likely to be unfair in Australia now. 
206 See Carter, above n 10. He observes that the UK provisions have much clearer reference points in 
relation to this type of term: at 239.  
207 See, eg, Curtin University, Assessment and Student Progression Manual, (23 July 2012) 
<http://policies.curtin.edu.au>. 
208 Australian Attorney-General, above n 13, 20. Although Carter observes it is not clear though what 
this adds to the common law and notes that the UK Regulation in this regard is much more effective and 
specific as it means a consumer can challenge any term where the supplier ‘is entitled to question 
contracts made on its behalf by agents’: Carter, above n 10, 239, 240. This is an area of dispute in the 
consumer tribunals: see, eg, Shu Fen Liv Jia Cheng International Pty Ltd (General) [2008] NSWCTTT 
944(2 April 2008). As discussed below, the mechanisms for redress at least are more favourable to 
student consumers under the ACL. 
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regarding the assignment of contracts for educational services.209 As in the matter of 
the Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Backloads.com Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) 
[2009] VCAT 754, if the term operates to affect detrimentally the consumer’s rights it 
will be considered unfair, particularly if the rights of assignment are to an ‘unidentified 
non-party’.210 
 
It is worth noting here the experience in the UK higher education sector, particularly 
when the UCT regulations initially came into operation.211 At that time the UK Office 
of Fair Trading (‘OFT’) identified training and education institutions as ‘problem 
sectors’.212 A number of reports from the OFT deal with HEIs but typically in relation 
to university residence and issues concerning student property and 
accommodation.213 Of particular interest is the case report for Southbank 
University214 where the enrolment declaration for that University was examined and a 
number of terms were considered to be unfair. These terms included the right to the 
change the regulations, hidden administration fees, exclusion of liability for breach of 
contract, and exclusion of liability for poor services. The term in relation to the 
University’s right to change their regulations was amended so that changes could 
only occur at the beginning of the next academic year and only for the benefit of the 
students. In relation to the exclusion of liability for breach of contract, that term was 
changed to ensure that the student indemnity only covered matters within the 
students’ control. The exclusion of liability for poor services was deleted.215  
 
Summary — unfair contract terms and educational services 
Thus is can be said that the contract for educational services arising on enrolment is 
a standard form consumer contract. It is unlikely that the exemptions contained in 
section 26 will operate to exclude HEI from the operation of the UCT regime to any 
                                                 
209 Commonwealth of Australia v Noel Ling (1993) 44 FCR 397; Noel Ling v Commonwealth of Australia 
(1994) 51 FCR; Noel Ling v Commonwealth of Australia [1996] FCA 1646 (25 July 1996) where 
proceedings were bought against Ling by the Commonwealth as the assignee of the contractual rights 
of ‘overseas students’ under contracts made between the students and Ling for the supply of 
‘educational services’ to the students. See also Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid 
For’, above n 4, 312; Jim Jackson, ‘Regulation of International Education: Australia and New Zealand’ 
(2005) 10(2) & (2006) 11(1) Australia & New Zealand Journal of Law & Education 67. 
210 Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Backloads.com Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2009] VCAT 754, [254 
to 264]. 
211 Davis, above n 49, 21. 
212 Office of Fair Trading, Unfair Contract Terms Bulletin 6 (1999) 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-categories/guidance/unfair-terms-consumer/>, 
8 [1.15]. 
213 Office of Fair Trading, Unfair Contract Terms Bulletin 5 (1998) 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-categories/guidance/unfair-terms-consumer/>; 
Office of Fair Trading, Unfair Contract Terms Bulletins 27 and 28 (2004) 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/publication-categories/guidance/unfair-terms-consumer/>. 
214 Office of Fair Trading, Unfair Contract Terms Bulletin 6, above n 212, 72. 
215 Ibid. 
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great extent. The exemption that has the most potential impact is the exclusion of 
terms relating to the ‘main subject matter’ from the UCT provisions. It is argued in this 
thesis that the exemption should not extend beyond the overall focus of the course or 
composition of courses offered within the programme. This can be said to be the true 
exercise of academic judgement and freedom and therefore an appropriate 
exclusion. 
 
The three limbs of the test for unfairness must all be met before there can be any 
finding of unfairness. Importantly for the student consumer, the detriment can include 
loss other than financial loss or damage. In determining whether a term of the 
contract for educational services is unfair or not, the court will look at the contract as 
a whole and may pay regard to the unique nature of the contractual relationship 
between a student and the HEI. However, the issue for any HEI is going to be one of 
transparency, or lack thereof. A lack of transparency can render a term unfair that is 
perhaps otherwise fair. Potentially the lack of transparency in the contract for 
educational services will render the terms of the contract unfair and void in two 
regards. First, the actual term incorporating the rules and policies of the HEI is likely 
to be unfair. It cannot be said that a term that states that the student is bound by the 
statutes rules and policies of the HEI (as is common practice in all HEI) and provides 
access by way of hyperlink is expressed in reasonably plain language, legible, 
presented clearly and readily available. Second, the individual terms, that is the 
content of the rules and policies, even if fair are clearly not transparent. 
 
Additionally, any HEI will need to be able to produce sufficient market place evidence 
to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that in the event of a significant 
imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties, any term is reasonably 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the HEI. Given the complexity in 
identifying what is the higher education market with any clarity, this may be a difficult 
exercise for the HEI.  
 
This chapter has examined many examples of individual terms of the contract of 
enrolment which are potentially unfair when compared with the examples provided in 
section 25. The nature of the unfairness is not limited to procedural fairness, a 
concept with which HEIs are traditionally comfortable. The UCT provisions allow the 
courts to address issues of substantive unfairness in the student–HEI contract. This 
may even include judicial scrutiny of the actual effect of terms enabling a HEI to 
unilaterally vary the delivery and content of individual units if the term relied on alters 
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the characteristics of the services supplied. This, it is suggested, circumvents the 
principle that academic matters are non-justiciable. A consideration of the 
consequences of a term being unfair and the impact on current practice in higher 
education in Australia follows. 
  
Effect and Redress 
The effect of section 23 is that if a term in a standard form consumer contract is 
unfair it will be void. To the extent that the contract is capable, the contract continues 
to operate to bind the parties without the unfair term.216 An application for a 
declaration that a term is unfair pursuant to section 250 can be sought either by a 
party to the contract or the regulator.217 Unlike the position in the UK and the previous 
Victorian legislation, the role of the regulator in Australia is based on an ‘ex post 
model’ where they can only intervene after the detriment has been suffered.218 A 
declaration that a term is an unfair term is not a contravention of the provisions of the 
CCA, unless a party were to continue to rely on the term subsequent to the 
declaration.219 Consequently no civil penalties apply if a consumer contract contains 
an unfair term unless relied on after such a declaration. 220  
 
A finding that the actual term incorporating the rules and policies of the HEI is unfair 
may prove problematic as regards the student–HEI contract. In these circumstances 
it may be difficult to say that the contract for educational services can continue to 
operate. Indeed this outcome may have a deleterious effect on students’ rights as 
consumers because the ordinances of the HEI would continue to operate as a matter 
of public law. As discussed in Chapter 2, students’ rights to substantive fairness in 
public law judicial review are limited to issues of a procedural nature. However, 
remedies for redress do arise on a determination that a term of the contract is unfair, 
and this can include more than an assessment of financial detriment. The risk for the 
HEI would be that in the event of the contract ceasing to operate, they may not be 
able to collect outstanding fees, at least in relation to full fee paying students.221 
                                                 
216 ACL s 23(2). 
217 Jurisdiction is conferred on the Federal Court by CCA s 138 pursuant to the Federal Court of 
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), EM1, 32 [2.101]–[2.102]. See Corones, above n 77, 22–3 for a detailed 
discussion of the conferral of jurisdiction in proceedings in the state courts and tribunals. 
218 Gray, above n 10, 165. The UK and Victorian model had an ‘ex ante aspect’ where the regulator 
could be proactive or take pre-emptive action in working with business where they felt that terms were 
unfair; Davidson, above n 11, 78–80; Australian Attorney-General, above n 13, 24.  
219 ACL s 224; EM1, 33 [2.104]–[2.105]. 
220 ACL s 224; EM1, 33 [2.106] where orders in those circumstances may include exemplary damages. 
221 See ACCC v Yellow Pages Marketing BV (No2) (2001) 195 FCR 1 cited in Sarah Russell, ‘The 
Australian Consumer Law: The New Enforcement Powers and Remedies — The Story so Far’ (2012) 20 
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Upon a declaration being made that a term is unfair,222 pursuant to section 237, an 
application for compensatory orders may be made by either the ‘injured person’223 
(the person who has suffered loss or damage or is likely to as a result of the unfair 
term) or by the regulator.224 Under this section,225 compensation orders can be 
sought within six years from the date of declaration.226 Furthermore, the ACL now 
allows the regulator to seek orders to redress any loss or damage, or likely loss or 
damage suffered by non-party consumers.227 Non-party consumers are the class of 
persons who have or are likely to suffer loss or damage and are not a party to 
enforcement action in relation to the declared term.228 This is in effect provides for 
class actions and substantially strengthens students’ potential for redress, who as a 
class of persons are largely impecunious and not as well-resourced or powerful as 
HEIs.229 
 
The compensatory orders that can be made in relation to unfair terms are very wide 
in their scope. A court can make ‘such orders as the court thinks appropriate against 
the person’ who relied, or purported to rely on the unfair term.230 The types of orders 
that a court can make in addition to monetary damages are listed in section 243 and 
provide for significant judicial discretion. In particular, the court is able to make orders 
for specific performance, vary the contract, refuse to enforce any part of the contract 
or declare part or the whole of the contract void. 231 This is in contrast to the range of 
orders available at common law or in equity, where courts are unlikely to order 
specific performance or a mandatory injunction to that effect.232 Injunctions are 
available pursuant to section 232(2). It is also possible that the regulator may use its 
                                                                                                                                            
Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law 6, 16 where this meant that the supplier could not 
collect some $6 million dollars in payments outstanding under the contracts. 
222 See also ACL s 242 whereby an application can be made under ACL s 237 or s 239 in relation to the 
term in consumer contract even if the proceeding for the declaration has not been instituted. 
223 Ibid s 237(1)(a)(ii). 
224 Ibid s 237(1) (1)(b). 
225 Cf ACL s 236 which is an order for actual loss suffered. 
226 ACL s 237(3)(b). 
227 Ibid s 239(1)(a)(ii) for unfair terms.  
228 Ibid ss 239(1)(b) and (c); Australian Attorney-General, above n 13, 24. Orders for non-party 
consumers are made in accordance with ACL ss 240–1 and impact on the orders a court may make 
under ACL s 239. 
229 Ogawa v University of Melbourne [2005] FCA 1139. Justice Ryan stated ‘I am mindful of the need to 
ensure that an impecunious student is not shut out by a potential liability for costs from pursuing an 
apparently meritorious claim against a large and wealthy corporation like the University’: at [95] (Ryan 
J); Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 4, 324–6. See also Corones, 
above n 77, 27. He suggests that this amendment to the ACL addresses this issue in relation to 
representative actions for consumer guarantees. 
230 ACL s 237(1). 
231 Ibid s 243. 
232 As noted in Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law’, above n 96, 11, n 50–3. 
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new power to seek a substantiation notice233 from the HEI to aid in any investigation 
as to whether any unfair terms are being relied on before bringing an application. 
Substantiation notices allow the regulator to request information and documents in 
order to assess whether claims made in the supply of goods or services can be 
verified.234 It is unclear whether substantiation notices will apply to unfair contract 
terms, as the section seems to be directed to ‘claims’ and ‘representations’ 
‘promoting’ the supply, although unlike infringement notices235 there is no specific 
exclusion in relation to unfair contract terms.236 Non-compliance with a substantiation 
notice is a contravention of the CCA, for which a pecuniary penalty can be 
imposed.237 
 
Any order for the payment of damages to compensate for loss238 will be in 
accordance with the general principles for assessment of damages under the 
CCA.239 Thus a causal connection between the reliance on the unfair contract term 
(the conduct) and the loss will need to be established, although ‘the amount 
recovered is not necessarily limited by drawing analogies with either the law of 
contract or tort.’240 In relation to damages, a claimant like the student in Fennell v 
Australian National University [1999] FCA 989 discussed in chapter 4 will still have 
difficulties (although a different type of conduct alleged); however, the new 
compensation orders allow for compensation on the basis of more than just 
demonstrated economic loss. Section 13 of the ACL, like its predecessor section 4K 
of the TPA, states that for the purpose of the ACL, loss or damage ‘includes a 
reference to injury’.241 
Therefore, the decision in Shahid is clearly important in the context of assessment of 
damages for loss sustained in relation to a claim based on the UCT provisions. It will 
be recalled that Shahid claimed damages for anxiety and distress in relation to the 
College’s failure to adhere to the promised appeals process.242 Although 
                                                 
233 ACL s 219. 
234 Ibid s 219(2). 
235 CCA s 134A(1). These notices only apply to those sections which incur civil penalties under ACL s 
224, which does not include a declaration that a term is unfair; Russell, above n 221, 9. 
236 See generally Russell, above n 221. 
237 ACL s 221. 
238 Ibid s 237(2). 
239 See Miller, above n 8, 1919–20 [1.S2.237.10]–[1.S2.237.80]. On expectation loss see generally 
David D Knoll, ‘Assessing Commercial Losses in Private Trade Practices Litigation’ (2002) 10 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1. 
240 Miller, above n 8, 1921 [1.S2.237.40] citing I & L Securities Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd 
(2002) 210 CLR 109. 
241 The clear reference to compensatory orders for an injured person in ACL s 237 makes obvious the 
legislatures’ intent that an award can be provided for more than financial loss or detriment. See 
generally EM2, ch 15. 
242 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267, 336 [221]. 
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unsuccessful in contract for her claim for damages for anxiety and distress, she was 
successful in relation to anxiety damages under the state consumer protection 
legislation. This was a result of the Court finding that the anxiety and distress 
experienced by the appellant amounted to an ‘injury’ under the statute.243 The Court 
held that the conduct of the College had caused the loss as claimed244 and following 
the High Court, Jessup J took an expansive view of the meaning of ‘injury’ in the 
consumer protection legislation; ‘Injury’ ‘is not confined to personal injury, but may 
extend to any detriment’245 and should not be limited to actions for recovery of 
economic loss.246 The claim for expectation damages (loss of opportunity) was 
considered, although not made out on the evidence. 
  
What loss may a student claimant suffer as a result of reliance by a HEI on an unfair 
term? Reference is had to the examples of potentially unfair terms considered above. 
A calculation of loss in relation to the imposition of a penalty is fairly straight forward, 
although the ‘injury’ suffered as a result of a HEI unfairly withholding conferment of a 
degree may not be so straight-forward. There is clearly the likelihood of an order 
compelling conferment, a claim for anxiety damages and possibly compensation for 
loss of opportunity in relation to future employment. Likewise, an order for 
compensation regarding an unfair variation that results in the change of the 
characteristics of the educational service could include similar orders that go beyond 
a refund of course fees. Unfair variations to the educational service are most likely to 
cause delay (and possibly increased debt) and attending anxiety and distress. This 
applies equally to claims made in relation to terms that have the effect of unfairly 
limiting or hindering legal rights or exclude or limit liability in relation to agents of the 
HEI. It is clear that the potential for students to successfully claim damages as a 
person ‘injured’ by reliance of the HEI on a UCT pursuant to the ACL has better 
prospects when compared to a claim in damages for breach of contract. 
 
Impact on current practice 
For the reasons above, it is recommended that HEIs in Australia review their 
contracts of enrolment to ensure the absence of unfair terms. 247 Outside of terms 
that are inherently unfair, such as the imposition of disproportionate penalties or very 
                                                 
243 Ibid [230]. Under the TPA s 4K expanded the reference to loss or damage (s 87 and s 82) to include 
injury. 
244 Ibid 336 [230]. 
245 Ibid 335 [225], 336 [227]. 
246 Ibid 335 [226]. The appellant was awarded damages for the ‘injury’ suffered within the meaning of the 
Act in the sum of $2500. 
247 Farrington and Palfreyman have produced an excellent example of a legal risk management review 
for the student contract: Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 49, 636–40, [22.18]–[22.24]. 
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wide exclusion clauses (which should be amended as a matter of some urgency), the 
area of most concern is the impact of the lack of transparency and notice of 
especially unusual or onerous terms. Transparency will not assist to legitimise 
fundamentally unfair terms, but it will assist with terms that are otherwise fair and are 
reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the supplier. It is worth 
noting that significant number of universities, particularly in the UK and New Zealand, 
now have formal written student contracts, the most notable being the Oxford 
University student contract.248 It is argued that in light of the UCT regime, Australian 
HEIs should adopt the practice of the use of formal student contracts, drafted in a 
manner that conforms with the requirements of transparency under the ACL. 
 
Leading UK education law scholars Farrington and Palfreyman provide a model 
student contract in the new edition of their seminal text The Law of Higher 
Education.249 What is immediately noticeable about the model contract is the 
absence of legalese and an attempt to explain clearly what is a complex relationship. 
This is assisted by breaking information into various headings entitled ‘Introduction’, 
‘The contractual background’, ‘Where can you find the small print’, ‘If things go 
wrong’ and finally ‘Accepting the above’. Directly preceding the signing clause, there 
is a paragraph clearly setting out in point form the obligations of the parties. It states 
that students should familiarise themselves with the various regulations, pay fees, 
behave appropriately and participate in academic studies.250 Correspondingly the HEI 
is obliged to ‘provide teaching and learning opportunities with reasonable care and 
skill’, apply its rules ‘fairly and consistently’, give ‘adequate notice of any reasonable 
changes to the academic programme’ that may affect the student and ‘take every 
                                                 
248 See Annexure 2 for a copy of the Oxford student contract Oxford Student Contract (13 August 2012) 
<http://www.st-annes.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/STA/Documents/University_Contract.pdf>; Student contracts 
are used extensively in the UK, see, eg, University of Bristol 
<http://www.bris.ac.uk/secretary/studentrulesregs/agreement.html/>; The University of Sheffield 
<http://www.bris.ac.uk/secretary/studentrulesregs/agreement.html/>; University of Leeds, Taught 
Student Contract (13 August 2012) <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/ssc/studentcontract.htm>. There are even 
professional development courses that can be taken in this area, see, eg, JISC Legal Information (UK) 
<http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/ManageContent/ViewDetail/ID/1866/ARMED--Student-contract-and-
charters.aspx>. Some examples of universities in New Zealand are Massey University, Student Contract 
(13 August 2012) <http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/about-massey/calendar/statutes-and-
regulations/student-contract.cfm>; University of Victoria, Wellington, Student Contract (13 August 2012) 
<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/home/admisenrol/enrol/studentcontract>; Canterbury Christ Church 
University, Student Agreement (13 August 2012) <http://www.canterbury.ac.uk/courses/about/student-
agreement.pdf>. The only formalised agreement that could be found for an Australian HEI was in 
relation to HDR degrees at the University of New England in NSW (13 August 2012) 
http://www.une.edu.au/research-services/forms/studentsupervisoragreement.pdf. See also Pedley, 
above n 205; Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 4, 313. 
249 Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 49, 443. A copy can be obtained for use by HEIs by emailing 
bursar@new.ox.ac.uk. 
250 Ibid 443. 
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reasonable step’ to keep the student informed of ‘issues affecting their studies’.251 
Not only are the terms of the contract expressed in reasonably plain language and 
presented clearly, the corresponding obligations of the HEI are set out. It is arguable 
that this would assist the HEI defending claims in relation to particular terms as being 
unfair, as the court, along with with the student, will readily see the counterbalance in 
any term that is weighted in favour of the HEI. 
 
Additionally the model contract, when adopted, is also accompanied by Explanatory 
Notes.252 This approach accords with practice in other industries, such as the 
provision of Product Disclosure Statements in insurance contracts,253 and with 
suggested reforms regarding one-page disclosure documents in retail leasing and 
standard form ticket sales, giving ‘notice of critical terms governing the transaction 
they are entering into’.254 Notice documents that are ‘one-page summaries’ of critical 
terms are not without their critics, as it is often difficult to reduce complex contractual 
terms to such a small space and there is a temptation by the consumer to regard the 
summary as the entirety of the contract, which is likely to expand over time.255 
Concerns regarding the idea of a one-page summary are overcome somewhat if 
framed more as Explanatory Note to a formal written contract, as suggested by 
Farrington and Palfreyman. It is difficult to see how HEI might otherwise overcome 
the difficulties with transparency and notice, other than by the adoption of formal 
written contracts that contain sufficient notice of terms that may cause a significant 
imbalance in parties’ rights under the contract in a manner that is not reasonably 
necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the HEI supplier. Essentially, the 
purpose of the law is to provide clarity, certainty and better informed contractual 
consent.256 HEIs would be well advised to take steps to ensure that their contractual 
relations with their student consumers do just this. Aside from the wide array of 
orders a court could make against a HEI in relation to reliance on an unfair term, the 
reputational consequences of such orders would be significant in an increasingly 
competitive higher education market. 
                                                 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid.  
253 Svantesson and Holly, above n 9, 7. 
254 Freilich and Webb, above n 32, 270. 
255 Ibid 272 n 61. See generally Griggs, ‘The [Ir]rational Consumer’, above n 14; Paterson, ‘The 
Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 13. 
256 Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 49, 214. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Consumers of Higher Education in Australia: do the unfair contract term provisions in 
the Australian Consumer Law provide effective protection for students as consumers 
of educational services? 
 
Chapter 1 
The principal research question that is addressed in this thesis is whether the 
introduction of an UCT regime in the ACL advances students’ rights as consumers by 
providing effective protection for students regarding the nature of educational 
services supplied. It has been recognised by courts and commentators that some 
rights do accrue to students as consumers of educational services under the ACL, 
principally with regard to promotional activities of HEIs.1 This work seeks to identify 
whether there is an application of the protections afforded by the ACL beyond this 
known application. A review of the literature and case law revealed a number of 
barriers faced by students seeking redress before the courts. First, that claims 
relating to academic matters are almost without exception non-justiciable. Second, 
even if students have been able to establish their claim, proving loss or damage has 
been problematic. In relation claims made against HEIs in consumer protection 
litigation specifically, the principal barrier has been difficulties with categorising the 
provision of educational services as being a service supplied in ‘trade or commerce’. 
This research contends that the introduction of a UCT regime in the ACL overcomes 
the identified barriers faced by students using consumer protection legislation as a 
means to ensure they receive services as promised and advance their rights as 
consumers. 
 
The research question arises in the context of wider commentary surrounding the 
placement of the student as consumer in an expanding and complex market for 
higher education services. As discussed in the introductory chapter and Chapter 5, it 
is clear that the academic community is divided as to whether the acknowledgement 
of a higher education market and the attending consumerist theory will enhance the 
                                                 
1 Despite judicial affirmation that the provision will apply to the promotional activities of a HEI, claimants 
have had limited success in proving their case in the higher courts, see, eg, Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 
ALR 235; Fennell v Australian National University [1999] FCA 989; cf Shahid v Australasian College of 
Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267.There has been mixed success at the tribunal level, see, eg, Kwan 
v University of Sydney Foundation Program P /L (General) [2002] NSWCTTT 83; cf Jones v Academy of 
Applied Hypnosis P/L (General) [2005] NSWCTTT 841; Cotton v Blinman Investments P/L & Blinman 
(General) 2004 NSWCTTT 723. See also Hilary Astor, ‘Why do Students Sue Australian Universities?’ 
(2010) 21 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 20; Patty Kamvounias and Sally Varnham, ‘Getting 
What They Paid For: Consumer Rights of Students in Higher Education’ (2006) 15 Griffith Law Review 
306. 
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educational experience of students and be of benefit to the wider community. Despite 
an acknowledged unease, it is increasingly accepted by the academe that the 
landscape of the higher education sector has been transformed over recent decades 
into a culture of consumerism with the student at the centre as the consumer. This 
however has seldom translated into students seeking redress in relation to 
infringement of their rights as consumers under consumer protection legislation.  
 
Chapter 2 
In order to address the first objective of the research, an examination of the case law 
and literature was undertaken in Chapter 2 to situate the research within the legal 
framework of the student–HEI relationship and identify the significance of the 
research within a broader legal context. The legal framework applying to the student–
HEI relationship is multifaceted. The causes of action available to students with 
respect to a claim against a HEI are extensive, although frequently limited in their 
effectiveness, both in terms of suitability and adequacy of remedies. Students are 
often seen to ‘shoehorn’ their grievances in a way that will achieve success. 
Consequently a claim under the ACL by a student against their HEI for an alleged 
failure in the provision of educational services is only one option open to the student. 
The research argues that the UCT regime provides increased and potentially more 
effective protection for students than other causes of action available. 
 
In evaluating the efficacy of the UCT provisions, the second objective of the research 
was to determine whether claims made by students in relation to academic matters 
are justiciable. The discussion in the thesis has shown that students are concerned 
about the educational experience they participate in. They do make claims in the 
courts regarding the nature of the educational service supplied that go to substantive 
issues including course content, design and delivery, the standards of teaching or the 
merits of an academic decision in the assessment of the standard of students’ work 
or academic progression. These issues relate to academic judgement and have been 
termed academic matters. The examination of the case law and literature in relation 
these types of claims revealed a common barrier to students’ success: subject to few 
exceptions, the part of the claim that relates to academic matters is not justiciable.2 
Outside of the consumer tribunals, there is no Australian precedent to indicate that 
                                                 
2 Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 3 All ER 752 Kirby J in Griffith University v 
Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99 156, [165]; Mark Davies, ‘Challenges to “Academic Immunity” — The 
Beginning of a New Era?’ (2004) 16(2–3) Education and the Law 75; Patty Kamvounias and Sally 
Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions Affecting Students in Australian Courts and 
Tribunals’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 141, 159–60. 
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the courts will look to matters of quality and standards in the supply of educational 
services the same way as it will for other professional services. As the authorities 
stand, judicial review of academic matters attending to the quality of the service 
supplied is improbable.3 Success is more certain if the basis of the claim rests on a 
challenge that relates to a lack of procedural fairness in the decision making process. 
Students may well be concerned that decision making processes are fair, but this is 
not mutually exclusive of claims in relation to substantive matters. Some of the 
difficulties in relation to what is justiciable appear to lie with the lack of clarity as 
which particular academic matters comprise ‘pure academic judgement’. It is the 
proposition of this research that once ‘pure academic judgement’ has been exercised 
in the determination of general course requirements, then to the extent that any other 
academic matters form part of the student–HEI contract, those terms are susceptible 
to judicial review in accordance with the UCT provisions in the ACL.  
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 addressed the third objective of the research and examined and analysed 
the ACL with reference to case law to determine the threshold issue of whether the 
ACL applies to the provision of higher education services to students in Australia. 
The chapter identified that prior to the ACL, the categorisation of educational services 
as occurring in ‘trade or commerce’ was an obstacle for students bringing a claim 
under the TPA. In order to attract the UCT provisions, the contract for educational 
services must be ‘provided, granted or conferred in trade or commerce’.4 Previously, 
under the TPA, academic activities such as statements made in lectures have been 
considered matters internal to the student–HEI relationship and therefore not within 
the scope of the legislation as conduct in trade or commerce.5 This research is 
however a narrower inquiry than a consideration of the extensive range of individual 
academic activities that could arguably be conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ for the 
purpose of other protections available under the ACL.6 The focus is therefore the 
contract for the supply of educational services and the terms contained therein. 
 
In particular, the effect of the new extended definition of ‘trade or commerce’ was 
considered. The new definition is based on the definitions contained in the former 
                                                 
3 See especially Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal challenges to University Decisions’, above n 2, 179. 
4 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘services’). 
5 Fasold v Roberts (1997) 145 ALR 548; Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235; Quickenden v O’Conner 
(2001) 184 ALR 260. See generally Francine Rochford, ‘Traders of the Lost Ark — Lecturers and 
Liability’ (2001) 13(2) Education and the Law 127. 
6 Such as the Consumer Guarantees contained in ACL ch 3 pt 3-2 div 1 sub-div A-D ss 51–68. See 
especially Stephen Corones, ‘Consumer Guarantees and the Supply of Educational Services by Higher 
Education Providers’ (2012) 35(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1. 
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state consumer protection legislation and includes any business or professional 
activity, whether or not carried on for profit.7 The extended definition in the ACL and 
the decisions of Monroe Topple and Shahid 8 strongly suggest that the contract for 
the supply of educational services of a HEI will be considered to be in ‘trade or 
commerce’. It was argued first that to the extent that a student–HEI contract for 
educational services exists, this is an activity or transaction which of its nature bears 
a trading or commercial character. The provision of educational services by the 
modern HEIs is for reward on a highly organised, systematic and ongoing basis.9 
Ipso facto if there is an enforceable contract there is a trading or commercial 
relationship or dealing. Further, the rights of consumers will not be denied because 
the services are provided without profit for the supplier.  
 
Alternatively, the supply of educational services is a ‘professional activity’ as an 
activity or transaction that is unequivocally and distinctly characteristic of the 
carrying-on of the profession10 and therefore provided in ‘trade or commerce’ within 
the extended meaning of the ACL. This concept is not limited to the engagement of 
professional practice and HEIs are therefore not excluded from the ambit of the ACL 
on this basis. It is also arguable that the supply of educational services to 
Commonwealth-funded students falls within the definition of ‘trade or commerce’, 
both on law and on policy grounds. HEIs are unable to claim immunity from the 
operation of the ACL, which has an extended jurisdiction that impacts on the delivery 
of educational services in locations outside Australia, including via the internet. 
 
However, the courts’ have been concerned to ensure that consumer protection 
legislation does not impact negatively on intellectual debate in Australia.11 Therefore 
is it possible to say that academic matters that attend to expressions of opinion or the 
divergence in views is not conduct in ‘trade or commerce’ under the ACL, as this is 
not the central concept of the commercial relationship or the ‘carrying on’ of the 
professional activity. However, other matters relating to the transaction for the 
delivery of educational services are. To the extent that academic activity forms part of 
                                                 
7 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘trade or commerce’).   
8 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267; Monroe Topple & Associates 
Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (2002) 122 FCR 110. Cf the case of Mathews v 
University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414; however, this case was before a single judge of the Federal 
Court, was decided before Shahid and not referred to at all by the Full Court in Shahid as a binding 
authority. 
9 Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (2002) 122 FCR 
110. 
10 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267. 
11 Plimer v Roberts (1997) 150 ALR 235 per Branson J at 245. 
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the student–HEI contract, it will be subject to the ACL provisions regulating unfair 
contract terms.  
 
Chapter 4  
The fourth objective of the research was to undertake an analysis of the case law, 
legislation and literature to establish whether there exists in Australia a contract 
between the student and the HEI, the nature of any contract, its terms and available 
remedies upon a breach. While higher courts in Australia have not had an 
abundance of occasions to consider the question of whether a student–HEI contract 
does exist in Australia, on balance it would seem justified that there is a student–HEI 
contractual relationship, as in other common law countries. The chapter determined 
that the critical elements required for the formation of an enforceable contract were 
met, including the provision of sufficient consideration by Commonwealth-funded 
students. The preferred view is that there are two contracts. First, there is a contract 
of admission, which obliges the HEI to enrol the student into the course on the basis 
of the pre-admission information received by the student. The second contract, the 
contract to educate, arises on the student completing the enrolment process. The 
terms of this contract are informed by the admissions contract and may be varied 
over the course of the study period, in much the same way a contract of employment 
might be varied.  
 
An assessment of threshold issues regarding the application of the ACL was the third 
objective of this research and was in part relevant to the discussion of the nature of 
the contract in Chapter 4. The contract for the supply of educational services must be 
a ‘service’ as defined by the legislation.12 The analysis undertaken in this chapter 
found that the contract for the supply of educational services relates to the 
performance of work, including work of a professional nature. A ‘service’ does not 
need to be attached to the supply of goods. For the purpose of this section, the 
contract for the supply of educational services is analogous to the supply of services 
by other professionals.13 It will also include a contract that relates to the provision and 
use of facilities for instruction. Thus it is likely that the contract to educate is a 
contract for service for the supply of educational services, informed by pre-
contractual information and as varied over the course of study.  
 
                                                 
12 ACL s 2 (definition of ‘service’). 
13 Guzyal Hill, ‘The New Consumer Legislation and the Legal Profession’ (2012) 20 Australian Journal of 
Competition and Consumer Law 18. See also Davies, above n 2. 
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A determination of the scope of the terms of the contract for the supply of educational 
services, with particular reference to the myriad of HEI enrolling, policy and other 
documents was then undertaken. In the absence of a formal written contract, there is 
significant uncertainty and potential difficulties in determining the terms of the 
contract. This research is however only concerned with those terms that can be said 
to be terms of any ‘standard form’ ‘consumer contract’.14 Therefore, the analysis was 
confined to the terms of the contract arising on enrolment, as the ‘standard form’ 
contract, discussed further in Chapter 5. An analysis of potential terms was 
undertaken with reference to the enrolment procedures and documentation at Curtin 
University as an example of a typical enrolment process. It is probable that the 
standard form consumer contract for the supply of educational services will contain 
those terms referred to expressly on enrolment and by incorporation of at least the 
published course handbook and statutes, rules and policies of the HEI.  
 
The chapter also canvassed the remedies available at common law for breach of the 
student–HEI contract. Often such claims are brought in conjunction with other causes 
of action, including a breach of consumer protection legislation.15 The case law and 
commentary is clear that the capacity of students to recover damages for breach of 
contract or otherwise is extremely difficult.16 This is particularly so if the claim is in 
relation to issues surrounding academic matters and the nature of the educational 
service provided. It is apparent from the case law that even if a student is able to 
establish a breach of contract, it is very difficult to establish a causal link to the losses 
claimed17 or alternatively to be able to prove loss at all.18 To a lesser extent this is so 
even in the consumer tribunal matters.19  
 
It is the intangible nature of the loss sought to be recovered that is problematic. 20 To 
date, awards of damages for more than direct losses, such as compensation for 
                                                 
14 ACL ss 23(1)(b) and 23(3). 
15 See, eg, Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267. 
16 See, eg, Fennell v Australian National University [1999] FCA 989; Mathews v University of 
Queensland [2002] FCA 414; Megumi Ogawa, ‘The Courts’ Jurisdiction over Student/University 
Disputes in Australia’, (2012) 2(1) International Journal of Public Law and Policy 96, 97; Francine 
Rochford, ‘Suing the Alma Mater: What Loss Has Been Suffered?’ (2001) 13(4) Education and the Law 
319. 
17 See, eg, Mathews v University of Queensland [2002] FCA 414.  
18 See, eg, Harding v University of New South Wales [2001] NSWSC 301; Fennell v Australian National 
University [1999] FCA 989; Martin Davis, ‘Students, Academic Institutions and Contracts — A Ticking 
Time Bomb?’ (2001) 13(1) Education and the Law 9, 22.   
19 See, eg, Cotton v Blinman Investments Pty Ltd and Blinman (General) [2004] NSWCTTT 723 (13 
December 2004).  
20 Francine Rochford, ‘The Relationship Between the Student and the University’ (1998) 3(1) Australia 
and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 28, 34; Rochford, ‘Suing the Alma Mater’, above n 16; 
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anxiety or distress suffered, have been very limited.21 The case of Shahid was 
considered in detail as authority for the proposition that students’ remedies are more 
extensive under the ACL than at common law. This case involved claims for 
damages for breach of contract and under state consumer protection legislation. The 
student claimant was able to recover damages for anxiety and distress as the 
meaning of ‘injury’ under the state legislation was given an expansive meaning and 
was not limited to recovery of economic loss.22 This decision is significant as regards 
the compensation orders for ‘injured persons’ introduced under sections 237–239 of 
the ACL, discussed more fully in Chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 5 
The fifth chapter addressed the remainder of the objectives of this research. The 
chapter first examined whether the specific protections available under the UCT of 
the ACL are enlivened for the contract of the supply of educational services. In 
addition to the threshold requirements, as addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, that the 
contract for the supply of educational ‘services’ must be in ‘trade or commerce, in 
order for the UCT regime to apply the contract must also be a ‘standard form’ 
‘consumer contract’.23 There is no definition of ‘standard form contract’ although a list 
of matters a court is to take into account is found in section 27(2). The list focuses on 
contracts that are prepared by one party and are not subject to individual negotiation. 
It is a contract offered on a ‘take it or leave it basis’.24 A rebuttable presumption that 
the contract for the supply of educational services is a ‘standard form’ contract will 
arise upon a student making a claim under these provisions. It will be up to a HEI to 
prove otherwise.25 As a matter of proof this will assist students somewhat. When the 
matters listed in section 27(2) of the ACL are examined, the contract for the supply of 
educational services (at least the contract of enrolment) bears the traits of a standard 
form contract. However, the need to establish a ‘standard form’ contract may prove to 
be an additional complexity for Australian students bringing their claims. 
                                                                                                                                            
Sam Middlemiss, ‘Legal Liability of Universities for Students’ (2009) 12(2) Education and the Law 69, 
72. 
21 See, eg, Rycotewood (re damages: 28/2/2003, Warwick Crown Court, His Honour Judge Charles 
Harris QC, OX004341/42, Buckingham v Rycotewood College (26/3/2002, Oxford County Court, 
OX004741/0X004343); David Palfreyman, ‘Phelps … Clark … and now Rycotewood? Disappointment 
Damages for Breach of the Contract to Educate’ (2003) 15(4) Education and the Law 237; Bruce 
Lindsay, ‘Complexity and Ambiguity in University Law: Negotiating the Legal Terrain of Student 
Challenges to University Decisions’ (2007) 12(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and 
Education 7, 11 nn 50–3 regarding the quantification of damages. See also Patty Kamvounias and Sally 
Varnham, ‘In-House or in Court? Legal Challenges to University Decisions’ (2006) 18 Education and the 
Law 11. 
22 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267, 335–6. 
23 ACL ss 23(1)(b) and 23(3). 
24 Australian Attorney-General, The Australian Consumer Law: A Guide to Provisions, 2010, 8.  
25 ACL s 27(1).  
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Additionally the contract in question must be a consumer contract as defined by 
section 23(3) of the ACL. The definition of a consumer contract for the purposes of 
the UCT provisions is a subjective test as it refers to the use that the goods or 
services are put to, not, as in the other definitions of consumer, ‘of a kind ordinarily 
used or put to’.26 Thus the test focuses on the actual intention of the acquirer of the 
services.27 It seems clear that a contract for the provision of educational services 
would be a consumer contract under the legislative definition as they are services 
acquired by students for their personal use. 
  
It is unlikely that the exemptions contained in section 26 will operate to exclude HEI 
from the operation of the UCT regime to any great extent. The exemption that has 
the most potential impact is the exclusion from the UCT provisions of terms relating 
to the ‘main subject matter’. It is argued in this thesis that the ‘main subject matter’ 
exemption should not extend beyond the overall focus of the course or programme.28 
Thus the ‘main subject matter’ of the standard form contract for the supply of 
educational services is the acceptance of the ‘place’. What is chosen as the 
‘purchase’ is an acceptance of the overall focus of the course or programme.29 This 
is consistent with the proposition of this research in Chapter 2 that once ‘pure 
academic judgement’ has been exercised in the determination of general course 
requirements, to the extent any other academic matters form part of the student–HEI 
contract those terms are subject to judicial review for the purpose of the UCT 
provisions.  
 
Chapter 5 also examined a number of examples of individual terms of the contract of 
supply of educational services arising on enrolment that are potentially unfair when 
compared with the indicative list provided in section 25 of the ACL. Reference was 
had to the published Course Handbooks and Statutes, Rules and Policies of Curtin 
                                                 
26 Ibid s 3.  
27 Sirko Harder, ‘Problems in Interpreting the Unfair Contract Terms Provisions of the Australian 
Consumer Law’ (2011) 34 Australian Bar Review 306, 310; Jeannie Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair 
Contract Terms Law: The Rise of Substantive Unfairness as a Ground for Review of Standard Form 
Consumer Contracts’ (2009) 33(3) Melbourne University Law Review 934, 940. See also John W Carter, 
‘The Commercial Side of Australian Consumer Protection Law’ (2010) 26 Journal of Contract Law 221; 
Aviva Freilich, ‘A Radical Solution to Problems with the Statutory Definition of Consumer: All 
Transactions are Consumer Transactions’ (2006) 33 University of Western Australia Law Review 108. 
28 As appears to be the position in the UK. See Dennis Farrington and David Palfreyman, The Law of 
Higher Education (Oxford University Press 2nd ed, 2012), 413 [12.102]; Simon Whittaker, ‘Judicial 
Review in Public Law and in Contract Law: The Example of “Student Rules”’ (2001) 21(2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 193, 209. 
29 See generally the rational for the carve out Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment 
(Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (Cth) (‘EM1’) 25 [2.65]. 
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University as an example of representative practice in the higher education sector. 
Three main areas of concern arise in relation to the contract. The first are terms that 
limit or avoid performance of the contract, such as disclaimers or exclusions. The 
second are those terms that allow for unilateral variations. The third area involves the 
imposition of penalties for breach of the contract. The test of unfairness was 
considered in relation to these types of terms. 
 
The three limbs of the test for unfairness must all be met before there can be any 
finding of unfairness. A term of a consumer contract is unfair if it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract; it is not 
reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who 
would be advantaged by the term; and it would cause detriment (whether financial or 
otherwise) to a party if it were to be applied or relied on.30 In determining unfairness 
the court is to have regard to the contract as a whole and whether the term is 
transparent. Importantly for the student consumer, the detriment can include loss 
other than financial loss or damage.  
 
The issue for any HEI is going to be one of transparency, or lack thereof. A lack of 
transparency can render a term that is perhaps otherwise fair, unfair.31 Potentially the 
lack of transparency in the contract for educational services will render the terms of 
the contract unfair and void in two regards. First, the actual term incorporating the 
rules and policies of the HEI is likely to be unfair. It cannot be said that a term that 
states that the student is bound by the statutes, rules and policies of the HEI (as is 
common practice in all HEI) and provides access by way of hyperlink is expressed in 
reasonably plain language, legible, presented clearly and readily available. Second, 
the individual terms, that is the content of the rules and policies, even if fair are 
clearly not transparent. The terms may be even more oblique if the demographic of 
young inexperienced students enrolling online is taken into account. Additionally, any 
HEI will need to be able to produce sufficient marketplace evidence to establish, on 
the balance of probabilities, that in the event of a significant imbalance in the rights 
and obligations of the parties, any term is reasonably necessary to protect the 
legitimate interest of the HEI. Given the complexity in identifying what is the higher 
education market with any clarity, this may be a difficult exercise for the HEI.  
 
                                                 
30 ACL s 24. 
31 EM1, 21 [2.46]; Chris Willett, ‘The Functions of Transparency in Regulating Contract Terms: UK and 
Australian Approaches’ (2011) 60 International Law Quarterly 355, 373. 
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The nature of the unfairness is not limited to procedural fairness, a concept with 
which HEIs are traditionally comfortable. Although it is clear that students will be 
unable to use the UCT provisions as the basis of a claim that they have not received 
‘value for money’ or have changed their mind about their ‘purchase’, the UCT 
provisions allow the courts to address issues of substantive unfairness in the 
student–HEI contract.32 This will include judicial scrutiny of the actual effect33 of terms 
enabling a HEI to unilaterally vary the delivery and content of individual units if the 
term relied on alters the characteristics of the services supplied. This, it is suggested, 
circumvents the principle that academic matters are non-justiciable and advances 
students’ rights as consumers of higher education services as it is the substantive 
effect of the term that is reviewed, not the academic judgement executed in the 
supply of the service. 
 
The chapter also considered the consequences of a term being declared unfair and 
redress available to students. The effect of section 23 of the ACL is that if a term in a 
standard form consumer contract is unfair it will be void. To the extent that the 
contract is capable, the contract continues to operate to bind the parties without the 
unfair term.34 An application for a declaration that a term is unfair pursuant to secton 
250 can be sought either by a party to the contract or the regulator. A declaration that 
a term is an unfair term is not a contravention of the provisions of the CCA, unless a 
party were to continue to rely on the term subsequent to the declaration.35 
Consequently no civil penalties apply if a consumer contract contains an unfair term, 
unless a party contravenes the CCA by continuing to rely on the term following a 
declaration.36  
 
The ACL makes provision for compensatory orders for loss or damage suffered, or 
likely to be suffered, by an injured person when another person seeks to rely on a 
term that has been declared to be void.37 The orders available under the ACL provide 
for significant judicial discretion38 and include the ability of the court to order 
injunctions and specific performance in relation to unfair contract terms.39 Any order 
for the payment of damages to compensate for loss will be in accordance with the 
                                                 
32 See Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 27; Willett, above n 31.  
33 Harder, above n 27, 318. 
34 ACL s 23(2). 
35 Ibid s 224; EM1, 33 [2.104]–[2.105]. 
36 ACL s 224; EM1, 33 [2.106] where orders in those circumstances may include exemplary damages. 
37 ACL pt 5-2 div 4 ss 237–9. 
38 Ibid s 243.  
39 Ibid s 232. 
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general principles for assessment of damages under the CCA.40 Thus a causal 
connection between the reliance on the unfair contract term and the loss will still 
need to be established by student claimants. However, the assessment of damages 
for loss sustained in relation to a claim based on the UCT provisions is based on the 
‘injury’ suffered. This issue was also addressed in Chapter 4 in relation to available 
remedies at common law for breach of contract and comparisons with claims made 
under state consumer protection legislation in the matter of Shahid.41 The decision in 
Shahid is therefore clearly important as ‘injury’ was given an expansive meaning and 
extends to any detriment and should not be limited to actions for recovery of 
economic loss.42  
 
The loss that a student claimant may suffer as a result of reliance by a HEI on an 
unfair term is potentially extensive. There may be straight forward direct loss, such as 
the imposition of a penalty or refund of course fees as a result of reliance on an 
unfair term. Following the reasoning in Shahid,43 and assuming availability of proof, 
compensation for injury could include successful claims for anxiety damages and 
possibly for loss of opportunity in relation to future employment. It is clear that the 
potential for students to successfully claim damages as a person ‘injured’ by reliance 
of the HEI on an unfair contract term pursuant to the ACL has better prospects when 
compared to a claim in damages at common law. Moreover, the recent amendment 
to the ACL and the ability of the regulator to seek orders to redress any loss or 
damage suffered by non-party consumers strengthens students’ potential ability to 
secure reparation. 44 This in effect provides for class actions by the regulator and 
substantially strengthens students’ potential for redress, who as a class of persons 
are largely impecunious and not as well-resourced or powerful as HEIs. 45 
 
Chapter 5 also considered the impact on current practice in higher education in 
Australia and recommendations for change addressing the final objective of the 
research. The impact and recommendations for change are discussed in detail 
below.  
                                                 
40 See Russell Miller, Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (Thomson Reuters, 
34th ed, 2012), [1.S2.237.10]–[1.S2.237.80]. On expectation loss see generally David D Knoll, 
‘Assessing Commercial Losses in Private Trade Practices Litigation’ (2002) 10 Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 1. 
41 Shahid v Australasian College of Dermatologists (2008) 248 ALR 267. 
42 Ibid 335–6. 
43 Ibid 267. 
44 ACL s 239(1)(a)(ii) for unfair terms; ACL ss 239(1)(b)–(c); ACL ss 240–1. 
45 Ogawa v University of Melbourne [2005] FCA 1139 per Justice Ryan at [95]; Kamvounias and 
Varnham, ‘Getting What They Paid For’, above n 1, 324–6. See also Corones, above n 6, 27.  
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Key findings 
The nature of the student–HEI relationship is multifaceted and evolving in a changing 
marketplace. The student–HEI contract for the supply of educational services co-
exists with other legal rights held by students in regards their relationship with the 
HEI. On balance, this contract also exists between HEIs and Commonwealth-funded 
students. Students have many avenues for redress in their grievances against a HEI 
and consumer protection is only one avenue. Successful claims pursuant to 
consumer protection legislation in Australia have not been significant to date. As 
discussed throughout the thesis, the reasons for this are varied and are likely to 
include matters distinct from the legal framework, such as students’ lack of 
knowledge of their rights as consumers, as is typical in young people, and a 
reluctance to enforce rights on the basis of disempowerment, lack of financial 
resources or possibly satisfaction with internal HEI grievance procedures. 
 
Separate to barriers that may have existed within the consumer protection regulatory 
structure, two common obstacles in relation to student claims can be identified. First, 
claims that rest on judicial review of academic matters are likely to fail on the basis 
that in all but a few exceptional circumstances, academic matters are not justiciable. 
Second, even if students have been able to ‘shoehorn’ or reframe their claims in a 
manner that is acceptable to the courts, proof of loss and an award of damages 
beyond recovery of direct losses have proved insuperable. As regards the previous 
consumer protection regulatory framework, difficulties arose classifying the supply of 
education services by HEIs as being an activity in ‘trade or commerce’, with the 
consequence that the TPA did not apply. 
 
The recent introduction of a single national consumer protection law, the ACL, has 
the potential to improve the protection afforded to students as consumers. The ACL 
is the most significant change to consumer rights since the introduction of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The first tranche of reforms resulted in the imposition of an 
unfair contract terms law from 1 July 2010. Now any term in a consumer contract that 
is unfair as defined by the ACL is void.46 It is arguable that HEIs’ arrangements with 
their students’ falls within the ambit of the UCT provisions. The exemptions available 
under the ACL will not operate to exclude HEI beyond the upfront price or the main 
                                                 
46 ACL s 23. 
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subject matter of the contract. It was argued that the main subject matter of the 
student–HEI contract should be limited to the overall focus of a course of study. 
 
The contract for the supply of educational services is a ‘service’ as defined by the 
ACL.47 The enforceable contract that exists between the student and HEI is a dealing 
or transaction that bears a commercial or trading character. Alternatively it is an 
activity that is unequivocally and distinctly characteristic of the ‘carrying on’ of the 
profession of the HEI so as to be in in ‘trade or commerce’ within the new extended 
definition of the ACL.48 This includes the contract with Commonwealth-funded 
students. The contract arising on enrolment bears the traits a standard form49 
consumer contract, to which the law attaches. Students clearly acquire educational 
services for their personal use.50 Thus the provisions of the UCT are enlivened in 
relation supply of educational services. 
 
The significance of the UCT provisions is that rather than just focusing on procedural 
unfairness they attempt to deal with substantive unfairness.51 In the context of the 
student–HEI relationship and provision of educational services, the UCT provisions 
have the potential to ensure that the student–HEI contract does not contain terms 
that are substantively unfair. This, it is suggested, circumvents the principle that 
academic matters are non-justiciable, as it the substantive effect of the term that is 
reviewed, not the academic judgement executed in the supply of the service. As the 
UCT looks to the substantive fairness of terms, the provisions rely less on an 
adjudication of the quality and standard of educational services supplied by reference 
to analogous principles from other areas of law, such as professional negligence and 
focus instead on the essence of the term. 
 
Notwithstanding commentators’ opinions, there is little precedent to support the view 
that courts will encroach on the academics’ purview and review academic matters. 
Despite decisions of specialist consumer tribunals and decisions in the emerging 
area of admissions law, superior courts remain reluctant to adjudicate on matters of 
academic judgement. Outside of the consumer tribunals, there is no Australian 
superior precedent to indicate that the courts will look to matters of quality and 
standards in the supply of educational services the same way as it does for other 
                                                 
47 Ibid s 2 (definition of ‘services’). 
48 Ibid s 2 (definition of ‘trade or commerce’). 
49 Ibid s 27. 
50 Ibid s 23(3). 
51 Paterson, ‘The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law’, above n 27.  
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professional services. As the authorities stand, judicial review of the quality or 
standard of the teaching service delivered, even pursuant to the statutory guarantees 
under the ACL, is unlikely.52 Thus the UCT provisions progress students’ rights in 
relation to judicial consideration of at least the substantive fairness of a term of the 
contract. Claims regarding the nature of the educational service provided by a HEI 
under the UCT provisions are therefore not as limited by notions of academic 
immunity as other causes of action. 
 
Additionally, the compensation orders and remedies available for students pursuant 
to the ACL upon the declaration that a term in a contract is unfair are more extensive 
and wide-ranging than those available at common law and other legislative schemes. 
 
The impact of the UCT regulation on the higher education sector is potentially 
significant. An examination of examples of terms of the standard form contract of a 
typical university revealed a substantial number of potentially unfair terms, 
particularly in regard to terms that impose penalties, overly-wide exclusion and 
disclaimer clauses, and terms that unilaterally allow the HEI to vary the 
characteristics of the agreed service. The UCT regime will require a change in 
practice by providers of higher education who rely heavily on a myriad of ordinances 
and policies to regulate their relationship with the student consumer in a manner that 
is not transparent. It is suggested that HEIs should clarify what makes up the 
legitimate interests they seek to protect when drafting the contract of enrolment in a 
complex and changing market for higher education, including the boundaries of 
academic freedom. Aside from the wide array of orders a court could make against a 
HEI in relation to reliance on an unfair term, the reputational consequences of such 
orders would be significant in an increasingly competitive higher education market. 
 
Recommendations for change 
The purpose of the law is to provide clarity, certainty and better informed contractual 
consent.53 It is recommended that HEIs in Australia review their contracts of 
enrolment to ensure the absence of unfair terms. Outside of terms that are inherently 
unfair, such as the imposition of disproportionate penalties or very wide exclusion 
clauses (which should be amended as a matter of some urgency), the area of most 
                                                 
52 See also Kamvounias and Varnham, ‘Legal Challenges to University Decisions’, above n 2, 179; 
Contra Corones, above n 6, but he does not consider the jurisprudence regarding non-justiciability of 
academic matters in this context. 
53 Whittaker, ‘Judicial Review’, above n 28, 214; EM1, 6. See generally Australian Government, An 
Australian Consumer Law Fair Markets — Confident Consumer (2009) ch 6. 
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concern is the impact of the lack of transparency and notice of a large number of 
terms of the contract for the supply of educational services. Transparency will not 
assist to legitimise fundamentally unfair terms, but it will assist with terms that are 
otherwise fair and are reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the 
supplier.  
 
It is recommended that Australian HEIs adopt the practice of the use of formal 
student contracts common in other jurisdictions and drafted in a manner that 
complies with the requirements of transparency under the ACL. The model contract 
with accompanying explanatory notes developed by leading UK scholars Farrington 
and Palfreyman is an appropriate precedent.54 It is difficult to see how a HEI might 
otherwise overcome the difficulties with transparency and notice. Greater 
transparency and improved notice may also have the consequence of improving 
students’ awareness of their rights as consumers. 
 
The research question can be answered in the affirmative. Many of the alternative 
causes of action available to students at common law and under statute are 
insufficient in relation to redress. All remain vulnerable to the inability of the court to 
review issues relating to academic matters, including other parts of the ACL such as 
consumer guarantees. The UCT provisions empower the court to address 
substantive unfairness in the contract for the supply of educational services, not just 
procedural unfairness. As it is the substantive effect of the term that is reviewed, not 
the academic judgement executed in the supply of the service, it is impervious to 
issues of justiciability. Students are provided with improved and more effective 
remedies, including representative action on their behalf by the regulator. The 
change in practice required by the sector will result in clearer, more transparent 
contracts and better informed consumers. The UCT provisions in the ACL provide 
effective protection for students regarding the nature of educational services supplied 
and advances their rights as consumers to receive services as promised. 
 
 
                                                 
54 Farrington and Palfreyman, above n 28, 443. 
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